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THE  
WORKS  
OF THE  
RIGHT REVEREND  
WILLIAM WARBURTON, D.D.  
LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

A NEW EDITION,  
IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

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TO WHICH IS PREFIXED  
*A DISCOURSE BY WAY OF GENERAL PREFACE;*  
CONTAINING  
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER  
OF THE AUTHOR;  
*BY RICHARD HURD, D.D.*  
LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

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VOLUME THE ELEVENTH.

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A

VINDICATION

OF THE

AUTHOR

OF

*THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c.*

FROM

THE ASPERSIONS OF THE COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S LETTER

IN THE

WEEKLY MISCELLANY

of FEB. 24, 1737.

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**A**FTER having twice offered my Thoughts to the Public, on two very *important Subjects*, and had the honour to be favourably heard, it must needs be a sufficient mortification to me to be obliged to descend to *so low a subject as myself*. That, and the deference due to the Public, had certainly restrained this appeal to it, had the matter terminated there. But when the accusation intended against me appeared visibly designed to render a projected defence of Revelation suspected; which, I will presume (and, as the author of it, the Reader will excuse me for presuming) may be of some small service to our holy faith, I thought it my duty to vindicate myself, in this public manner, from the *horrid accusations* of a letter-writer in the *Weekly Miscellany* of the 24th of *February* last. Whether this was the true motive of this Vindication will be best seen by the temper in which it is written. The letter-writer begins with me in this manner, *A late Writer, the Author of the Divine Legation of Moses, &c. is very severe upon ALL Clergymen who take the liberty of censuring the conduct of*



ANY OF THEIR BRETHREN. The passage, on which this accusation is founded, is in p. 21\* of the Dedication—*I appeal then to the Public, whether my severity falls on those who censure the conduct of any of their brethren: or on those, who abuse the whole body of the Clergy, considered as an Order instituted by Christ, and established by the State.*

He goes on,—*If I am capable of understanding the meaning and drift of his Book, he had reason to apprehend it might draw upon him the censures of all the Clergy who are sincere friends to Christianity—therefore it might be politic to obviate the force of such animadversions beforehand.* Had I been conscious of deserving the censure of any honest man, I had done, like those who delight in mischief; I had wounded in the dark. But when I chose to write without a name, it was for very contrary purposes. When I presumed to publish (in defence of the Established Clergy) a vindication of the Church of *England*, under the title of *The Alliance between Church and State*, which surely might deserve their pardon, lest the World should imagine I expected more, I put it out without my name. And now writing in the common cause of *Christianity*, I have publicly owned it. For if ever the suspicion of being ashamed of the faith of *Jesus* be more carefully to be avoided at one time than at another, it must certainly be in *this*, when infidelity is become so reputable as to be esteemed a test of superior parts and discernment.

He proceeds,—*I shall add, that if he really means to defend Christianity, he hath published the weakest defence of it that I have ever read.* How are we to understand him here? Must we rectify the proposition thus,—*If the Author gives this volume as a defence of Christianity, then it is the weakest?*—The consequence will then indeed be true.—But I had cut off all pretence for *begging the premisses*. For I have formally and expressly said in the beginning, and repeated it towards the end, that the design of this volume† was only preparatory to the defence of Revelation, and to prove *the use of Religion*

\* 1st Edit.

† Containing Books I. II. III.

*in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular to civil society.* And had I not said *this*, the Book itself would shew that it is no more a *defence of Christianity* than the first proposition of the three terms is a syllogism.

But if the letter-writer means, what his words express—*That if I have a serious purpose of defending Christianity, this volume is the weakest defence*—his premisses will be true indeed, but then they will have no relation to his conclusion. For it does not follow from those premisses, that this is *any defence at all*; any more than that, if I had a serious purpose of building a house, the foundation-stones were that house.

The deference due to the Public, from so obscure a writer as myself, was the true reason why this first part came out separately; the Author not presuming to obtrude a voluminous work upon it till he had some assurance of its willingness to receive it. But the same regard that obliged me to this conduct, would not suffer me to make a secret of the *medium* by which I pretended to establish my demonstration, especially as it had the fortune to be generally esteemed a *paradox*. I therefore gave the proof in form two years ago in the *Appendix to The Alliance between Church and State*. There it is to be found; and had the letter-writer, instead of indulging his monstrous suspicions of the Author, turned himself to making objections to his argument, he might possibly have then as much served *truth* as he now has violated *charity*.

He goes on,—*He is a warmer advocate for Dr. —, who denies the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, than for the Scriptures themselves.* How warm an advocate I am for him, we shall see by and by; how true an *accuser* the letter-writer is of him, we shall examine at present. Dr. — says\*, *it is NECESSARY to believe of the Scriptures in general that they are divinely inspired; and that all which he denies is, that the Scriptures are of absolute and universal inspiration†.* He shews that Tillotson and Grotius were of the same opinion,

\* Remarks on a Reply to the Defence of a Letter to Dr. W. p. 69.

† Ibid. p. 70.



who, he charitably presumes, were *Christians*. And as he tells his friends and acquaintance the same he tells the Public, the letter-writer must excuse me, if I believe a man whose candour, sincerity, benevolence, and charity I have experienced, before *him*, who has not given me the pleasure of remarking in him any of those Christian qualities.

But I would not have the letter-writer infer, that, because he has been pleased to make me Dr. —'s *advocate*, I am to be responsible for his opinions. I differ widely from him in the matter of *inspiration*, and as widely in some others. But we can differ from each other, and avow and maintain our difference of opinion, without violation of common humanity, friendship, or Christian charity. I will give the letter-writer another instance of difference in opinion between us, from this very Book he so much condemns. The writer of the *Defence of the Letter to Dr. W.* p. 45, says,—*Is the notion of the divine origin of the law and inspiration of Moses to be resolved into fiction, or fable, or political lying? No, far be it from me to think or say so. But this perhaps one may venture to say, that the supposition of some degree of such fiction may possibly be found necessary to the solving the difficulties of the Mosaic Writings, without any hurt to their authority, or advantage to infidelity.* I am, as I say, of a different opinion. The writer endeavours to support *his* by several arguments; amongst which one is, *the professions and example of the ancient sages and legislators.* Now, in the Second Section of my Third Book I have inquired into the principles that induced the ancient sages and legislators to deem it lawful to deceive for the public good; in the discovery of which, I think, I have made it evident *that those reasons or principles* could have no place amongst the founders and propagators of the *Jewish and Christian* religions. This truth (as well as several others interspersed throughout this First Volume, and which may perhaps give offence to the indiscreet zeal of the letter-writer) is in my next volume \* applied and enforced to the overthrowing that opinion: *that some degree*

*of fiction may be necessary, &c.* And even in *this* I could not forbear, in the most conspicuous place of my Book, to shew the use of it, as may be seen by these words of the Contents, B. III. S. 2.—*The principles, that induced the ancient sages to deem it lawful to deceive for public good in matters of religion, are explained* AND SHEWN TO BE SUCH AS HAD NO PLACE IN THE PROPAGATION OR GENIUS OF THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS.

But I am a warm advocate for Dr. —. In what? I have called him *a very formidable adversary to the Free-Thinkers*. And I think I had reason: for the arguments he hath used for the TRUTH of *Christianity* against *Tindal* have never yet been answered by them, nor I think ever can. I say *for the truth of Christianity*; for his reasonings, from p. 59 to 64\*, relate only to its truth, and can be understood in no other sense. After this, to think he would have *Christianity* supported only because it is useful, is such a way of interpreting a writer as my charity will never suffer me to follow.

The opinion I have of Dr. —'s abilities, and of the sincerity of his professions, were the true reasons of that esteem I express for him; being desirous of allaying all disgust, if any hath arisen in him, from the treatment of his less candid adversaries; and of engaging him to a further and more compleat vindication of our holy faith, at a time when the good dispositions of the meanest advocate for Revelation should not, I think, in prudence be discouraged: Nay, was I so unhappy to think of Dr. — as the letter-writer is disposed to do, I should yet be inclined to behave myself very differently towards him. I should be so far from estranging him further from the faith by uncharitable anathemas, that I should do all I could to court and allure him to *Christianity*, by *thinking well of its professors*. Thus much, I conceive, *Christian charity* would require; and how far *Christian policy* would persuade, let the *learned* say, who know what ornament his pen would be to the Christian faith, and his *acquaintance* of what example his morals to Christian practice.

\* Letter to Dr. W.

But the letter-writer, having taken it into his head, that Dr. —'s true sentiments are, that *Christianity* can only be defended as useful in the present circumstances of life, makes, as it would seem, this imagination the *key* to my real sentiments and designs in defending Revelation. Hence those strange expressions—*If I am capable of understanding the meaning and drift of his book—he must excuse me, if I suspect his faith and condemn his book—This I am sure of, the author must be a subtile enemy to Revelation, or a very indiscreet friend—I must own he has left me in no doubt.* Now if those be Dr. —'s true sentiments, which yet I no more believe than that *Tindal* was a *Christian* in his heart, I shall not scruple to say that he whom I called one of the most formidable of the Free thinkers adversaries, is indeed one of the weakest and most contemptible. But if they be *mine*, after all I have said in this volume, I will not scruple to say, that that character would be far too mild for me; and that it would be but justice to esteem me the most abandoned writer that ever appeared in any cause.

Let us now take this *key*, and apply it to what I have written.—And it will indeed thoroughly serve the letter-writer's *declared* purpose to *lessen my credit*. For it will make the whole volume a heap of absurdities and contradictions. But lay aside this visionary *key*, and let me be interpreted by those common rules that all mankind have ever used in understanding one another, and then it will be seen I could not possibly have had any other intention than TO PROVE MOSES TO BE A TRUE PROPHET SENT IMMEDIATELY AND EXTRAORDINARILY FROM GOD.—I pretend to do it from *Moses's* omission of the doctrine of a future state; which under an *unequal* Providence, is (as I have shewn in this Book, that being the only end of writing it) absolutely necessary to society. From whence I conclude *Moses's* pretensions were true: who assured the *Israelites* that God had chosen them to be his people, had condescended to be their king, and would consequently govern them by an EQUAL, that is an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE; which conclusion (that appears almost self-evident) I employ my second volume to support, illustrate, and free from objections.

Hence it appears on what account I so much insist on the *usefulness* and *necessity* of religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular to society. The course of my argument, and all the rules of logic, obliged me to this conduct: and indeed I thought it the peculiar happiness of my argument that they did so; for I suppose, till the infidels be convinced that religion is *useful* to civil society, they will never be brought to believe it *true*.

I now haste to the other part of the letter-writer's charge, lest he should be tempted, in his impatience, to repeat it; and say again, that *I am a warmer advocate for Dr. — than for the Scriptures*. The Reader, who has never seen my book, will naturally conclude from these words, that either I had *undervalued Scripture*, or at least neglected a fair opportunity of *vindicating it*. He will be surprised to be told that the latter part of the charge was only for *completing the antithesis*. So indeed it appears to me; but the Reader shall judge for himself.

There are but two places in this volume, in which I had occasion to make observations on the Scripture; the one is, where I endeavour to shew that the argument which the Commentators use to prove the Pentateuch (against *Spinoza* and others) to be written by *Moses*, is a very strong and solid one. The other is, where I say, that the New Testament *does not contain any regular or compleat system or digest of moral laws; the occasional precepts there delivered, how excellent and divine soever, arising only from conjunctures and circumstances that were the subjects of those preachings or writings, in which such precepts are found. For the rest, for a general knowledge of the whole body of moral duty, the great pandect of the law of nature is held open by it to be searched and studied. Finally, says the Apostle Paul, Whatsoever things are true, &c.*

I suppose then, if the letter-writer had any particular meaning, this was the place that was to justify him in saying that *I was no warm advocate for the Scriptures*. But does the *New Testament* contain any such *compleat or regular system*? will the letter-writer say so? will any one besides say so? How weak and *indiscreet a friend*



soever he may please to think me of religion, I will assure the Reader, that as I make it one point of my religion to say nothing but what I think the truth, so I do not use to throw about those truths at random. The observation was here necessary to overthrow the most pernicious doctrine that ever infected society. If it was true, then, it was not untimely urged. But had the letter-writer had a little patience, he would have seen in the second volume (as that will be the case of many other truths interspersed throughout the first) that, by the assistance of this very truth, I overthrow a prevailing notion, which I suppose, *He*, no more than *I*, will think very orthodox, namely, *that Christianity is ONLY a republication of the Religion of Nature.*

This, I can assure the Reader, is the case of all other principles occasionally laid down in this first volume, which are not only here used to prove the usefulness and truth of religion in general, but are in the next volume applied to prove *the truth of Revelation in particular.* To give one instance at present, in the Sixth Section of the Second Book, I have attempted to explain the nature of Paganism, as distinguished from true Revelation; where I have shewn, that though they abounded in pretended revelations, they were utter strangers to the idea of one revelation's being founded upon, or the completion of another. This principle I apply and enforce in the second volume against the fourth chapter of Collins's *Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, where he lays it down for one of his fundamental principles (against all antiquity and fact) *that it is a common and necessary method for new revelations to be built and grounded on preceuent revelations.*

The letter-writer proceeds—*Mr. Warburton modestly says, they [the English Clergy] have undertaken to prove Christianity without understanding it.* As in the case before, about censuring the conduct of Clergymen, the letter-writer turned what I said in *general* of the body, *particularly*, to individuals; so here, by a strange perversity, he turns what I said *particularly* of some certain persons, *generally*, to the *English Clergy.* My words are these: *Who, in this long Controversy between us and the Deists, hath not applied to certain late Advocates*

*eates of Recelation what was formerly said of Arnobius and Lactantius, that they undertook the defence of Christianity before they understood it?*

But have none but *Englishmen* wrote of late in defence of *Christianity*? Have no *Englishmen* but the *English Clergy* wrote in defence of it? If neither of these questions can be answered in the negative, I would ask a third, What possessed the letter-writer to bear witness against me, to the world, that I have any where said *that the English Clergy have undertaken to prove Christianity without understanding it?* I solemnly declare, that in the passage above quoted I meant no *English Clergyman* whatsoever. So far from that, I expressly say, in the Dedication, *that the Clergy of the established Church are they who have been principally watchful in the common cause of Christianity, and MOST SUCCESSFUL in repelling the insults of its enemies.* I must appeal then, this second time, to the Public for justice.

As I was cold in defence of Scripture in general, so my next charge is, that I have *undervalued the evidence arising from miracles.* Would the Reader know how?—Hardly, by saying, as I expressly do, *that men have proved our religion actually divine thereby.* But this went for nothing, because I said in the same place, that the *external evidence* (in which miracles are included) is *not capable of strict demonstration*; but that the *internal* is. Now here might be some pretence for saying I *over-valued internal evidence*; But by what kind of logic it could be inferred that, *therefore, I undervalued miracles,* I know not.

The letter-writer next turns (as it would seem) from me to those who deny *the Divinity of Christ, the merits of his death, the obligation and effects of the sacraments, and the doctrine of grace.* But it is but seeming. He appears willing that these false opinions should be thought mine: for having charged me with *horrid crimes,* without shadow of proof or probability, he would cover the scandal by insinuating me guilty of heterodoxy; or why else did he lead his reader to the very door of calumny, by artfully joining *me, as undervaluing miracles,* to one of *these,* who he says *denies the truth of one of them?*

But

But the letter-writer should have considered, if this was his design, that in this very book I affirm more than once or twice, that the *doctrine of redemption* is the foundation, and of the very essence of *Christianity*. He should have known that all or most of those true Christian doctrines mentioned above are contained in the *doctrine of redemption*.

There are, and those esteemed sincere *Christians* too, who would have taken the names of infidel and heretic for favours at the hand of the letter-writer. But I am of a different humour. These titles have no charms for me. I have lived some time in the world; and, blessed be God, *without giving or taking offence*. This time has been spent in my parish church (for I am a country clergyman, and reside constantly on my Cure) in the service of my neighbour, in my study, and in the offices of filial piety—

“ With lenient Arts t’ extend a Mother’s breath,  
 “ Make Languor smile, and smooth the bed of death,  
 “ Explore the thought, explain the asking eye,  
 “ And keep awhile one Parent from the sky.”

Excess of zeal in such as the letter-writer, and defect of religion in others of better breeding, so efface these feelings of nature, that I could hardly have known how to have told them, had I not both the example, and the fine words too, of one of the politest men of the age to keep me in countenance. The time spent in my study has been employed in confirming my own faith against the erroneous opinions the letter-writer has raked together, and *then*, in planning a Work to confirm my brethren. All the reward I ever had, or ever expect to have here, is the testimony of a good conscience within doors, and a good name without. The first no man can take from me; the other, this letter-writer, in the most unchristian manner, has attempted to invade.

—But I heartily forgive him: and instead of putting uncharitable constructions on his secret intentions, will believe, though I know no more of him than by his letter, that he is *sincere*, and only unhappily agitated by a furious zeal for the cause of God and Religion; instead of thinking *he ought to be hindered from any farther advancement*

*vancement in the Church.* If the want of that be the cause of his spleen and virulency, I heartily wish it may be speedily removed : nay, that the letter he has wrote against me may contribute towards it. Instead of *using any warm endeavours to lessen his credit*, which he professes in so many words to be his purpose against me, I wish him all increase of reputation and honour : and instead of insulting him with the words he seems to apply to me—I pray for the forgiveness and conversion of all bad men, I will assure him, that I pray for him as a brother.

I have only one word more to add : I have presumed to appeal to the Public, in a matter indeed that little concerns it, yet perhaps of some moment in the consequence and example. But whatever necessity I now found myself under of not submitting to so false a charge, the Public need not be under apprehensions that I shall ever give them a second trouble of the same kind. It must be some strange provocation indeed that can make me repeat it. For if I can *forgive* injuries of this kind, it is sure no hard task to despise them. In a word, I have made my defence against these calumnies now once for all ; and my enemies must pardon me, if I decline to be *drawn in*, into a controversy of this nature ; or to be *drawn off* from the subject I have commenced in defence of Revelation. And, by the grace of GOD, no *un-christian treatment* shall ever make me languid or remiss in vindicating the truth of the *Christian cause*. Whether I am a *weak* defender of *Christianity* must be submitted to the judgment of the Public. But I am persuaded that that Public will suspend all severity of judgment till they see the whole performance : and then, I hope, those who now think I have advanced a *paradox* that cannot be supported, will be of another opinion. But if it should not be my good fortune to make out my point to their satisfaction, yet I should hope they will pass a more equitable construction on the attempt than the letter-writer has thought fit to do ; and make all favourable allowances for the newness and difficulty of the subject, and the many incidental points touched upon, which will, I hope, be thought by all persons of equity, candor, and good learning, to have their use. In the mean time, I can say  
with



## 12 VINDICATION OF THE AUTHOR, &c.

with great truth, and, I hope I may do it with *modesty*, that what I offer to the Public concerning *The Divine Legation of Moses* is not a hasty sudden thought, and what has appeared flattering to me upon its first appearance only; as such things often strike, which, upon review, give no satisfaction. But this has been long the subject of my thoughts; often laid by, and then again, at proper intervals, resumed, reviewed, and turned on all sides. What then I have been in no haste to approve after carefully weighing and examining *every part*, I shall hope the equitable Reader will be in no haste to condemn or suspect while he has seen only *one*.

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A  
CRITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL  
COMMENTARY

ON

MR. POPE'S

*ESSAY ON MAN:*

In which is contained a Vindication of the said *Essay*  
from the Misrepresentations of

MR. DE RESNEL, the French Translator;  
and of

MR. DE CROUSAZ,  
Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics  
in the Academy of Lausanne,

The Commentator.

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Vide quam iniqui sunt diviuorum munerum aestimatores  
etiam quidam PROFESSI SAPIENTIAM.—SEN.

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**Address to Mr. ALLEN.**

**Preface.**

**COMMENTARY - - Letter I.**

**- - D• - - - Letter II.**

**- - D• - - - Letter III.**

**- - D• - - - Letter IV.**

TO  
MY WORTHY FRIEND,  
RALPH ALLEN, ESQ.

SIR,

I GIVE myself the pleasure of conversing with you, in this form ; as I see you less under the idea of a patron, than of a joint labourer with me in the service of mankind. For while I attempt to explain the theory of this divine philosophy of *Universal Benevolence*, you illustrate it by your practice. At most therefore I can but offer you the *ESSAY ON MAN*, set in a just light, as a mirror for your cabinet ; where you may behold the perfect image of your own mind : And the works of this Artist, who is beholden only to *truth* for their polish and their lustre, you are too well acquainted with to suspect them of flattery. To preserve the lustre of this mirror was the sole purpose of the following *Letters*. For the dull breath of malice had attempted to defile its purity ; and, by staining it with the black imputation of *Fatalism*, to tarnish every virtue it reflected.

It hath been observed in *Physics*, that nature never gave an excellence, but she at the same time produced its contrary, with qualities peculiarly adapted to its destruction. As we see how this serves the wise ends of Providence, by keeping us in that state of *imperfection* and *dependence* in which it hath pleased the Author of all Things to place us, we need not be much surprised to find the same phænomenon in the *moral world* : In no instance more apparent than in the *doctrine of Fate*, which, almost coæval with the *practice of VIRTUE*, is yet altogether the destruction of it.

But as there is not that decay, nor degeneracy of *good*, in the *natural* as in the *moral world* ; so neither is there that increase of *evil*. I say this chiefly with regard to the *doctrine of Fate*, which hath been still growing, from  
age



age to age, in absurdity and impiety: And therefore no wonder, that *virtue*, whose specific bane it is, should proportionably sicken and decline.

Indeed, it stopped not till it became like the *Tree* in the *Chaldaean's* vision, which *reached to heaven, and extended over the whole earth*; and received all the irrational and impure Creation, *birds, beasts, and insects, to its shade and shelter.*

To consider *fate* in its growth and progress, it divides itself into four principal branches.

The *first* and earliest is that which arose from the strange and prodigious events in the life of Man: Where the amazed beholder observing the ends of human wisdom so perpetually defeated, even when supported by the likeliest means, concluded that nothing less than an overruling *fate* had traversed his well-conducted designs. This early conclusion concerning God's government *here*, from observations on *civil* events, was again inferred in after ages, by another set of men, with regard to his government *hereafter*, from their contemplations on *religious*; while, from an utter inability to penetrate the designs of Providence in its partial Revelations to mankind, they concluded that *fate* or *predestination* had determined of our future, as well as present happiness. These, which are only different modifications of the same imaginary power, may be called the **POPULAR** and **RELIGIOUS** *fate*.

The *second* kind arose from a supposed moral influence of the *heavenly bodies*: founded in an early superstition that the *hero-gods* had migrated into *stars*. It was first understood to be confined to *communities*, as such were the more immediate care of these *heroes* while living: But the same considerations which produced the first species of *fate*, in a little time, extended it to *particulars*. And this is the **CIVIL** or **ASTROLOGIC** *fate*. Hitherto, *free-will* was only curbed, or rendered useless. To annihilate it quite, needed all the power of *philosophy*. So true is the observation, that without *philosophy* Man can hardly become either thoroughly absurd or miserable.

The *Sophist*, in his profound inquiries into human nature, and on what it is we do, when we judge, deliberate, and resolve, came at length to this short conclusion,

*That*

*That the mind is no more than a machine, and that its operations are determined in the same manner that a balance is inclined by its weights.* This absolute necessity of man's actions is the *third* species of *fate*, called the **PHILOSOPHIC**.

From this, to the *last*, that is to say, the necessity of God's, was an easy step. For when, from the very nature of *mind* and *will*, the *philosopher* had demonstrated the absurdity of freedom in man, the same conclusion would hold as to all other beings whatsoever. And this is the **ATHEISTIC fate**.

These, Sir, were the glorious effects of **PRIDE**: which our incomparable Friend, with so good reason, esteems the source of all our misery and impiety. The *pride* of accounting for the *ways of Providence* begot the two first species: and the *pride* of comprehending the *essences of things*, the two latter. *Ah! misera mens hominum, quæ te FATA sæpissimè trahunt!* In the name of *Paul*, if one might be allowed to ask, *What shall deliver us from the body of this fate?* which hangs about the soul like that punishment of the ancient Tyrant, who bound *dead* bodies to the living. I answer, the *Religion of Jesus*: which hath instructed us as clearly in the Nature of *Man*, as in the Nature of *God*; in the *subject*, as well as in the *object*, of worship. A *worship* founded, as reason and conscience tell us it ought, on these two great principles, the **FREEDOM** and the **WEAKNESS of Man**. The first, making our approach to God a **REASONABLE SERVICE**; the latter, God's approach to us a **COVENANT OF GRACE**. And this, Sir, is that *glorious Gospel*, which you are not ashamed to adore, as able to *put to silence the ignorance of foolish men*.

And, in fact, the *fashionable* reasoner is now gone over to the cause of *Liberty*; but still true to his overweening *pride*, is gone over—in the other extreme. Let the Fatalist talk what he pleases of the mind's being a *balance*; if its operations be mechanical, I am sure it is more like a *pendulum*, which, when well leaded, is incessantly swinging from one side to the other. For the vain reasoner is now as much disposed to deny the *weakness* of the mind, as before to deny its *freedom*. Hence it is, we see the *Christian Doctrine of GRACE* despised

and laughed at ; and the means instituted by its Founder for obtaining it, as impiously as sophistically, explained away. Yet without human *freedom* Religion in *general* is a farce ; and but on the truth of human *weakness*, the Religion of *Jesus*, a falsehood.

With regard then to *free-will*, what need we more than the declaration of *Religion*? The simple-minded man naturally supposes it; the good man feels it; the thinking man understands it; and nothing but vain *philosophy* holds out both against *Nature* and *Grace*: Not so openly indeed as formerly; but still as obstinately. The ablest advocates of *necessity* now enveloping it in *systems*; and insinuating it in all the artful detours of what they call a *sufficient reason*.

None have gone farther, or with more success, into this contrivance, than the famous *Leibnitz*; who, with great parts and application of mind, had an immoderate ambition of becoming founder of a sect. He first attempted to raise a name, like the heroes of old, by the invasion of another's property: But being detected and repulsed, he turned himself to *invention*; and framed an *hypothesis* in direct opposition to that *theory* which he before seemed willing to have made his own. This *hypothesis*, founded in a refined *Fatalism*, he chose to deliver by hints only, and in piecemeal; which, at the same time that it gave his scheme an air of depth and mystery, kept its absurdities from being observed. So that it soon made its fortune amongst the *German* wits; who were not out of their way when they took the same deep and cloudy road with their master. It was no wonder then, that this should raise a jealousy in the advocates of Religion, and make the warmer sort of them (not the best at a charitable distinction, though great logicians) to mistake their friends for their enemies.

Amongst other *follies* of this kind, it brought down a storm of calumny on the *ESSAY ON MAN*; and, in its turn, occasioned this *vindication* of our inimitable Poet. A short, and an easy task. For my point, you know, Sir, was not to expose the *absurdity* of *fate*; but to prove the *Essay* free from a doctrine, which my Adversary and I agreed to be an *absurdity*. But if any one, confiding in the tricks of sophistry under the cloudy conveyance of metaphysics,

metaphysics, would dispute this point with us ; I shall give up my share of him to my Adversary, and leave him entirely to the mercy of his *logic*. All the answer he must expect from me, is of that kind with the Philosopher's, who, disputing with one who denied local motion, only used his legs, and walked out of his company : That is to say, I shall decline his challenge merely for the exercise of my freedom. And indeed, what other answer does he deserve, who refuses to acquiesce in that CONSCIOUSNESS of *freedom* which every plain man has, on reflecting upon what passes in his mind when he thinks and acts?

But yet, it may be worth while to remark the nature of this *consciousness* ; from which alone (as I think, Sir, I have had the pleasure to observe to you in our conversation on these subjects) *freedom of will* may be demonstrated to all but the downright atheist. It will, I suppose, be allowed to be an impression on the mind, made by *reflexion*, as strong as any of those made by *sensation*. And sure he must be as blind as even blind fate can make him, who does not see thus far at least. So that the only question is, whether it be, like them, subject to deception ? I answer, No. And first, for a *natural* reason, As the organs of sense are not employed to convey the intelligence : But secondly and principally, for a *moral* one, As there would be nothing left to redress the wrong representation. For, *reason*, which performs this office in the false *impressions of sense*, is the very faculty employed in making the *impressions of reflexion*. Were these therefore liable to the same kind of deception, we should be unavoidably led into and kept in error by the natural frame and constitution of things. But as this would reflect on the Author of Nature, no Theist, I presume, will be inclined to admit the consequence. If the *Fatalist* should reply, that *reason*, when well *exercised* and *refined*, does here, as in the false *impressions of sense*, lay open the delusion ; this, I must tell him, is the very *folly* we complain of : That, when things are submitted to the arbitrement of *Reason*, her award should be rejected while standing in the road of *Nature*, with all her powers and faculties entire ; and not thought worthy to be heard, till made giddy in the



airy heights of *metaphysics*, and racked and tortured by all the engines of sophistry: In a word, when *Reason* is no more herself; but speaks as her *keepers* and *torturers* dictate.

However, it is not the looking *within* only, that assures the Theist of his *freedom*. What he may observe *abroad* of the horrid mischiefs and absurdities arising from the *Doctrine of Fate*, will fully convince him of this truth. It subverts and annihilates *all Religion*: For the belief of rewards and punishments, without which *no Religion* can subsist, is founded on the principle of Man's being an *accountable* creature; but when *freedom of will* is wanting, Man is no more so than a Clock or Organ. It is likewise highly injurious to *Society*: For whoever thinks himself no longer in his own power, will be naturally inclined to give the reins to his passions, as it is submitting to that *fate* which must at last absolutely turn and direct them.

But, after all, the most powerful argument for *Freedom*, I confess, Sir, is such a *life* as yours. Of which, though I could say much, and with pleasure, I will only say that it has made me, in common with every one who knows you,

Your obliged,  
your affectionate,  
and your faithful servant,

W. WARBURTON.

May 18, 1742.

## PREFACE.

THERE are two sorts of Writers, I mean the BIGOT and the FREE-THINKER, that every honest man in his heart esteems no better than the pests of society ; as they are manifestly the bane of *Literature* and *Religion*. And whoever effectually endeavours to serve either of these, is sure immediately to offend both of those. For, the advancement of literature is as favourable to true piety, as it is fatal to *superstition* ; and the advancement of religion as propitious to real knowledge as discrediting to *vain science*.

The Author of the following *Letters*, who hath aimed at least to do this service, by his writings, regarding these two sorts of men, as the irreconcilable enemies of his design, began without any ceremony (for he was not disposed, for their sake, to go about) to break through those lumpish impediments they had thrown across the road of Truth ; and laboured to clear the way, not only for himself, but for all who were disposed to follow him. In which it fared with him as it sometimes happens to those who undertake to remove a public nuisance for the benefit of their neighbourhood, where the nicer noses hold themselves offended even in the service thus undeservedly rendered to them. For notwithstanding our Author hath taken all opportunities, and even *sought out* occasions to celebrate every Writer, living or dead, who was any way respectable for knowledge, virtue, or piety, in whatever party, sect, or religion, he was found, especially such as he had the misfortune to dissent from, and this sometimes with so liberal a hand as to give offence on that side likewise ; though he hath done this, I say, yet having, for the reasons above, declared eternal war with *Bigotry* and *Free-thinking*, the strong, yet sincere colours in which he hath drawn the learning, sense, candour, and truth of those subjects in which these noble qualities are most eminent, have been censured as

insolence and satire, and a transgression of all the bounds of civility and decorum. But he will not be easily induced, by the clamours of the falsely delicate, to betray the interests of all that is good and valuable amongst men, in complaisance to their notions of politeness. 'Tis no time to stand upon ceremony when Religion is struggling for life; when *the whole Head is sick, and the whole Heart faint.*

The *Bigot*, who, between a corrupt will, and a narrow understanding, imputes odious designs to his adversaries, and impious consequences to their opinions, is not, I suppose, to be *complimented*, either into sense or honesty. The Writer here confuted is amongst the chief of them. And it is not impossible but the recent memory of the like usage our Author himself met with from others of the same leaven, might give him a quicker sense and stronger resentment of the injury done his neighbour.

As for the tribe of *Free-thinkers*, Toland, Tindal, Collins, Coward, Blount, Strutt, Chubb, Dudgeon, Morgan, Tillard, and their fellows, the mortal foes both of reason and religion, injured *wit* as well as *virtue*, by the mouth of their happiest advocate and favourite, long ago called out for *vengeance* on them :

— The Licence of a following reign  
 Did all the dregs of bold *Socinus* drain;  
 Then unbelieving priests reform'd the nation,  
 And taught more pleasant methods of salvation;  
 Where Heaven's free subjects might their rights dispute,  
 Lest God himself should seem too absolute.  
 Encourag'd thus, Wit's Titans brav'd the skies,  
 And the press groan'd with licens'd blasphemies.  
*These monsters, Critics, with your darts engage,*  
*Here point your thunder, and exhaust your rage!*

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A  
COMMENTARY  
ON  
MR. POPE'S  
*ESSAY ON MAN.*

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LETTER I.

WHEN a great Genius, whose Writings have afforded the world much pleasure and instruction, happens to be enviously attacked and falsely accused, it is natural to think, that a sense of gratitude due from readers so agreeably obliged, or a sense of that honour resulting to our Country from such a Writer, should raise a general indignation. But every day's experience shews us the very contrary. Some take a malignant satisfaction in the attack; others, a foolish pleasure in a literary conflict; and the greater part look on with an absolute indifference.

Mr. *De Crousaz's* Remarks \* on Mr. *Pope's Essay on Man*, seen in part, through the deceitful medium of a French translation, have just fallen into my hands. As those Remarks appear to me very groundless and unjust, I thought so much due to truth, as to vindicate our Great Countryman from his censure.

The principal object therefore of this Vindication shall be, to give the Reader a fair and just idea of the *Reasoning* of that *Essay*, so egregiously misrepresented; in

\* They are contained in two several Books, the one entitled, *Examen de l'Essai de Mr. Pope*; à Lausanne, 1737. The other, *Commentaire sur la Traduction en vers de M. l'Abbé Du Resnel de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme*; à Geneve, 1738.

which I shall not consider it as a *Poem* (for it stands in no need of the licence of such kind of works to defend it), but as a *System of Philosophy*; and content myself with a plain representation of the sobriety, force, and connection of *that Reasoning*.

I shall begin with the first Epistle. The opening of which, in *fifteen* lines, is taken up in giving an account of his subject; which he shews us (agreeably to the title) is *AN ESSAY ON MAN*, or a Philosophical Inquiry into his *Nature*, and *End*, his *Passions*, and *Pursuits*:

A mighty maze!—but not without a plan,  
as Mr. *De Crousaz* and I have found it, between us.  
The next line tells us with what design he wrote, *viz.*

To vindicate the ways of God to Man.

The men he writes against he hath frequently informed us are such, as

Weigh their opinion against Providence.—l. 110.

Such as,

—cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjust.—l. 114.

Such as fall into the notion,

That vice and virtue there is none at all.

Ep. ii. l. 202.

This occasioneth the Poet to divide his *Vindication of the Ways of God* into *two* Parts. In the *first* of which he gives *direct* answers to those objections which libertine men, on a view of the disorders arising from the perversity of the human will, have intended against Providence: And, in the *second*, he *obviates* all those objections, by a true delineation of human Nature, or a *general* but exact *Map of Man*; which these objectors either not knowing, or mistaking, or else leaving (for the mad pursuit of *metaphysical entities*), have lost and bewildered themselves in a thousand foolish complaints against Providence. The *first Epistle* is employed in the management of the *first* part of this dispute; and the *three* following in the management of the *second*. So that the whole constitutes a complete *Essay on Man*, written for the best purpose, to *vindicate the ways of God*.

The

The Poet therefore having enounced his *subject*, his *end of writing*, and the *quality of his adversaries*, proceeds [from l. 16 to 23.] to instruct us *from whence* he intends to draw his arguments for their confutation; namely, from the *visible things* of God, in this system, to demonstrate the *invisible things* of God, his *eternal power and godhead*: And *why*; because we can *reason only from what we know*, and we *know* no more of *Man* than what we see of his station here; no more of *God* than what we see of his dispensations to Man in this station; therefore

Thro' worlds unnumber'd though the God be known,  
'Tis ours to trace him only in our own \*.

This naturally leads the Poet to exprobrate the miserable folly and impiety of pretending to pry into, and call in question, the profound dispensations of Providence: Which reproof contains [from l. 22 to 43.] the most sublime description of the omniscience of God, and the miserable blindness and presumption of Man.

Presumptuous Man! the reason would'st thou find  
Why form'd so weak, so little, and so blind?  
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess  
Why form'd no weaker, blinder, and no less?  
Ask of thy mother earth, why oaks are made,  
Taller or stronger than the weeds they shade?  
Or ask of yonder argent fields above,  
Why *Jove's* satellites are less than *Jove*?

In the four last lines, the Poet has joined the utmost beauty of argumentation to the sublimity of thought; where the similar instances, proposed for their examination, shew as well the *absurdity* of their complaints against order, as the *fruitlessness* of their inquiries into the arcana of the Godhead.

So far his modest and sober *Introduction*: In which he truly observes, that no wisdom less than omniscient

Can tell why Heav'n has made us as we are.

Yet though we can never discover the *particular* reasons for this mode of our existence, we may be assured in

\* Hunc cognoscimus solummodo per Proprietates suas et Attributa, et per sapientissimas et optimas rerum structuram et causas finales. Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. sub finem.

*general* that it is *right* : For now entering upon his argument, he lays down this self-evident proposition as the foundation of his *thesis*, which he reasonably supposes will be allowed him : *That of all possible systems, infinite Wisdom hath formed the best* ; [l. 43, 44.] From hence he draws two consequences :

1. The *first* [from l. 44 to 51.] is, that as the best system cannot but be such a one as hath no inconnected void ; such a one in which there is a perfect coherence and gradual subordination in all its parts ; there must needs be, in some part or other of the scale of life and sense, such a creature as MAN ; which reduces the dispute to this absurd question, *Whether God has placed him wrong ?*

It being shewn that MAN, *the subject of his inquiry*, has a necessary place in such a system as this is confessed to be : And it being evident that the abuse of free-will, from whence proceeds all moral evil, is the certain effect of such a creature's existence ; the next question will be, how these evils can be accounted for, consistently with the idea we have of God's attributes ? Therefore,

2. The *second* consequence he draws from his principle, *That of all possible systems, infinite Wisdom has formed the best*, is, that whatever is wrong in our private system, is right, as relative to the whole [l. 50 to 53.]

Respecting Man, whatever wrong we call,  
*May, must be right*, as relative to ALL.

That it *may*, he proves [from l. 52 to 61.] by shewing in what consists the difference between the *systematic* works of God and those of Man, *viz.* that, in the *latter*, a thousand movements scarce gain one purpose ; in the *former*, one movement gains many purposes. So that

—Man, who here seems *principal* alone,  
Perhaps acts *second* to some sphere unknown.

And acting thus, the appearances of *wrong* in the *particular* system may be *right* in the *universal* : For,

'Tis but a part we see, and not a whole.

—That it *must*, the whole body of this Epistle is employed to illustrate and inforce. Thus *partial evil is universal good*, and thus Providence is fairly acquitted.

From

From all this he draws a general conclusion [from l. 60 to 87.] that, as what had been said is sufficient to vindicate the ways of Providence, Man should rest submissive and content, and confess every thing to be disposed for the best; that to pretend to inquire into the manner how God conducts this wonderful scheme to its completion, is as absurd as to imagine that the horse and ox shall ever come to comprehend why they undergo such different *manage* and *fortunes* in the hand of Man; nay, that such knowledge, if communicated, would be even pernicious to Man, and make him neglect or *desert* his duty here.

Heav'n from all creatures hides the Book of Fate,  
All but the page prescrib'd, the present state,  
From brutes what men, from men what spirits know,  
*Or who would suffer being here below?*

This he illustrates by an instance in the lamb, which is happy in not knowing the fate that attends it from the hand of the butcher; and from thence takes occasion to observe, that God is the equal master of all his creatures, and provides for the proper happiness of each Being.

Who sees with equal eye, as God of all,  
A hero perish, or a sparrow fall\*.

But now the objector is supposed to put in, and say; "You tell us indeed, that all things will turn out for good; but we see ourselves surrounded with present evil; and yet you forbid us all inquiry into the manner how we are to be extricated; and in a word, leave us in a very disconsolate condition." Not so, replies the Poet [from l. 86 to 95.] you may reasonably, if you so please, receive much comfort from the HOPE of a happy futurity; a *hope* given us by God himself for this very purpose, as an earnest of that bliss, which *here* indeed perpetually flies us, but is reserved for the good man *hereafter*.

What future bliss he gives not thee to know,  
But gives that *hope* to be thy blessing now.  
*Hope* springs eternal in the human breast,  
Man never *is*, but always *to be* blest.

\* Matt. x. 29.



The soul uneasy, and confin'd from home,  
Rests and expatiates in a life to come.

Now the reason why the Poet chuses to insist on this proof of a future state in preference to others, I conceive, is in order to give his system (which is founded in a sublime and improved *Platonism*) the utmost grace of uniformity. For we know this HOPE was *Plato's* peculiar argument for a future state; and the words here employed, *The soul uneasy, &c.* his peculiar expression: We have seen the argument illustrated with great force of reasoning, by our most eminent modern divines: But no where stronger urged than by our Poet, in this *Essay*. He says here, in express terms, *That God gave us Hope to supply that future bliss which he at present keeps hid from us.* In his 2d Ep. l. 264. he goes still farther, and says, this HOPE quits us not even at death, when every thing mortal drops from us.

Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die.

And, in the 4th Epistle he shews how the same HOPE is a certain proof of a future state, from the consideration of God's giving Man no appetite in vain, or what he did not intend should be satisfied; (which is *Plato's* great argument for a future state.) For, describing the condition of the good man, he breaks out into these rapturous strains:

For him alone hope leads from goal to goal,  
And opens still, and opens on his soul;  
Till, lengthen'd on to faith, and unconfin'd,  
It pours the bliss, that fills up all the mind.  
He sees, why Nature plants in Man alone  
Hope of known bliss, and faith in bliss unknown:  
Nature, whose dictates to no other kind  
Are giv'n in vain, but what they seek they find.

l. 331, *et seq.*

It is only for the good man, he tells us, that hope leads from goal to goal, &c. It would be strange indeed then, if it should be a delusion.

But it hath been objected, that the *system of the best* weakens the other natural arguments for a future state, because if the evils which good men suffer, promote the benefit of the whole, then every thing is here in order;

and nothing amiss that wants to be set right: Nor has the good man any reason to expect a reparation, when the evils he suffered had such a tendency. To this we reply, that the *system of the best* is so far from weakening those natural arguments, that it strengthens and supports them. To consider it a little, if those evils to which good men are subject be mere *disorders*, without any tendency to the greater good of the whole, then, though we must indeed conclude that they will hereafter be set right, yet this view of things, representing God as suffering disorders for no other purpose than to set them right, gives us a very low idea of the Divine Wisdom. But if those evils (according to the *system of the best*) contribute to the greater perfection of the whole, a reason may be then given for their permission, and such a one as supports our idea of Divine Wisdom to the highest religious purposes. Then, as to the good man's *hopes* of a retribution, those still remain in their original force. For our idea of God's justice, and how far that justice is engaged to a retribution, is exactly and invariably the same on either hypothesis. For though the *system of the best* supposes that the *evils themselves* will be fully compensated by the good they produce to the *whole*, yet this is so far from supposing that *particulars* shall suffer for a *general good*, that it is essential to *this system*, to conclude that, at the completion of things, when the whole is arrived to the state of utmost perfection, *particular and universal good shall coincide*.

Such is the WORLD'S great harmony, that springs  
 From union, order, full consent of things;  
 Where *small* and *great*, where *weak* and *mighty*, made  
 To *serve* not *suffer*, *strengthen* not *invade*.

Ep. iii. l. 296, *et seq.*

Which coincidence can never be without a retribution to good men for the evils suffered here below.

To return then to the Poet's argument, he, as we said, bids Man comfort himself with expectation of future happiness, and shews him that this HOPE is an earnest of it: But first of all puts in one very necessary caution,

Hope *humbly* then, with *trembling* pinions soar.

And provoked at those miscreants, whom he afterwards

[Ep. 3.

[Ep. 3. l. 262.] describes as building *Hell on spite, and Heaven on pride*, he upbraids them [from l. 94 to 10.] with the example of the poor *Indian*, to whom also Nature hath given this *common HOPE of mankind*. But though his untutored mind had betrayed him into many childish fancies concerning the nature of that future state, yet he is so far from excluding any part of his own species (a vice which could proceed only from vain science, which *puffeth up*), that he humanely admits even *his faithful dog to bear him company*.

And then [from l. 108 to 119.] shews them, that complaints against the *established order of things*, begin in the *highest absurdity* from misapplied *reason and power*, and end in the *highest impiety*, in an attempt to degrade the God of Heaven, and assume his place.

Go wiser thou, and in thy scale of sense  
Weigh thy *opinion* against *Providence* :  
*Destroy* all creatures for thy sport or gust,  
Yet cry, if Man's *unhappy*, God's *unjust* ;  
If Man alone ingross not Heaven's high care,  
Alone made *perfect here, immortal there*,

That is, be made God, *who only is perfect, and hath immortality* :

To which sense the lines immediately following confine us :

Snatch from his hand the balance and the rod,  
Rejudge his justice, be the God of God.

From these men, the Poet turns to his *Friend*, and [from l. 118 to 137.] remarks that the ground of all this extravagance is *pride* ; which, more or less, infects the whole species :—shews the ill effects of it, in the case of the fallen angels ; and observes, that even *wishing* to invert the laws of order is a lower species of their crime :—then brings an instance of one of the effects of pride, which is the folly of thinking every thing made *solely* for the use of Man ; without the least regard to any other of God's creatures.

Ask for what end the heavenly Bodies shine,  
Earth for whose use ? PRIDE answers, 'Tis for *mine* :  
For *me*, kind Nature wakes her genial power,  
Suckles each herb, and spreads out ev'ry flower ;

. Annual

Annual for *me*, the grape, the rose, renew  
 'The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew ;  
 For *me*, the mine a thousand treasures brings,  
 For *me*, health gushes from a thousand springs;  
 Seas roll to waft *me*, suns to light *me* rise,  
*My* footstool, Earth ; *my* canopy, the skies.

The ridicule of imagining the *greater portions* of the material system were solely for the use of Man, *philosophy* has sufficiently exposed : and *common sense*, as the Poet shews, instructs us to know that *our fellow-creatures*, placed by Providence the joint inhabitants of this globe, are designed by Providence to be joint sharers with us of its blessings.

Has God, thou fool ! work'd solely for *thy* good,  
*Thy* joy, *thy* pastime, *thy* attire, *thy* food ?  
 Who for *thy* table feeds the wanton fawn,  
 For him as kindly spreads the flow'ry lawn.  
 Is it for *thee*, the lark ascends and sings ?  
 Joy tunes his voice, joy elevates his wings.  
 Is it for *thee* the linnet pours his throat ?  
 Loves of his own and raptures swell the note.  
*Is thine alone* the seed that strows the plain ?  
 'The birds of heaven shall vindicate their grain.

Ep. iii. l. 27.

Having thus given a general idea of the goodness and wisdom of God, and the folly and ingratitude of Man, the great Author comes next (after this necessary preparation) to the *confirmation* of his *thesis*. That partial Moral Evil is universal Good : but introduceth it with a proper argument to abate our wonder at the phænomenon of moral evil, which argument he builds on a concession of his adversaries. " If we ask you," says he, [from l. 136 to 147.] " whether Nature doth not err " from the gracious end of its Creator, when plagues, " earthquakes, and tempests, unpeople whole regions " at a time ? you readily answer, No. For that God " acts by general and not by particular laws ; and that " the course of matter and motion must be necessarily " subject to some irregularities, because nothing created " is perfect." Say you so ? I then ask, why you should expect this perfection in Man ? If you own that the great  
*end*

*end of God* (notwithstanding all this deviation) be *general happiness*, then it is *Nature*, and not God that deviates; and do you expect greater constancy in Man?

Then Nature deviates, and can Man do less?

*i. e.* if Nature, or the inanimate system (on which God hath imposed his laws, which it obeys as a machine obeys the hand of the workman), may in course of time deviate from its first direction, as the best philosophy shews it may\*; where is the wonder that Man, who was created a free agent, and hath it in his power every moment to transgress the eternal Rule of Right, should sometimes go out of order?

Having thus shewn how Moral Evil came into the world, namely, by *Man's abuse of his own free-will*, he comes to the point, the *confirmation* of his *thesis*, by shewing how *moral* Evil promotes *Good*; and employs the *same* concession of his adversaries, concerning *natural* Evil, to illustrate it.

1. He shews it tends to the *good* of the *whole*, or *universe* [from l. 146 to 157.] and this by analogy. "You own, says he, that storms and tempests, clouds, rain, heat, and variety of seasons are necessary (notwithstanding the accidental evils they bring with them) to the health and plenty of this *globe*; why then should you suppose there is not the same use, with regard to the *universe*, in a *Borgia* and a *Catiline*?" But you say, you can see the one and not the other. You say right. One terminates in *this system*, the other refers to the *whole*. But, says the Poet, in *another place*,

—of this frame, the bearings and the ties,  
The strong connexions, nice dependencies,  
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul  
Look'd thro'? Or can a *part* contain the *whole*?

l. 29, *et seq.*

\* While Comets move in very eccentric orbs, in all manner of positions, blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in orbs concentric, some inconsiderable irregularities excepted, which may have risen from the mutual actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase till this system wants a reformation. Sir Is. Newt. Optics, Quest. ult.

Own

Own therefore, says he, *here*, that,

From pride, from pride our very reasoning springs ;  
 Account for *moral* as for *natural* things :  
 Why charge we Heaven in those, in these acquit ?  
 In both *to reason right*, is *to submit*.

2. But secondly, to strengthen the foregoing *analogical* argument, and to make the wisdom and goodness of God still more apparent, he observes next [from l. 156 to 165] that *moral evil* is not only productive of good to the *whole*, but is even productive of good in our *own system*. It might, says he, perhaps appear better to us, that there were nothing in this world but *peace* and *virtue*,

That never air nor ocean felt the wind,  
 That never passion discompos'd the mind.

But then consider, that as our *material system* is supported by the strife of its elementary particles, so is our *intellectual system* by the conflict of our passions, which are the elements of human action.

Love, hope, and joy, fair pleasure's smiling train,  
 Hate, fear, and grief, the family of pain,  
 These mix'd with art, and to due bounds confin'd,  
 Make and maintain the balance of the mind.

Ep. 2. l. 107, *et seq.*

For (as he says again in his *second* Epistle, where he illustrates this observation at large)

What crops of wit and honesty appear  
 From spleen, from obstinacy, hate or fear ! l. 175.

In a word, as without the benefit of tempestuous *winds*, both *air* and *ocean* would stagnate, and corrupt, and spread universal contagion throughout all the ranks of animals that inhabit, or are supported, by them ; so, without the benefit of the *passions*, that *harmony*, and *virtue*, the effects of—the absence of those passions, would be a lifeless calm, a stoical *apathy*,

Contracted all, retiring to the breast :

But health of mind is *exercise*, not *rest*. Ep. 2. l. 93.

Therefore, concludes the Poet, instead of regarding the *conflict of elements*, and the *passions of the mind*, as *dis-*  
 VOL. XI. D orders ;

*orders*; you ought to consider them as what they are, part of the *general order* of Providence: and that they are so, appears from their always preserving the same unvaried course, throughout all ages, from the creation, to the present time:

The *general order*, since the whole began,  
Is kept in *Nature*, and is kept in *Man*.

We see therefore it would be doing great injustice to our Author to suspect that he intended, by this, to give any encouragement to *vice*; or to insinuate the *necessity* of it to a happy life, on the equally execrable and absurd scheme of the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*. His system, as all his *Ethic Epistles* shew, is this, That the passions, for the reasons given above, are necessary to the support of *virtue*: That indeed the passions in excess, produce *vice*, which is, in its own nature, the greatest of all evils; and comes into the world from the abuse of Man's free-will; but that God, in his infinite wisdom, and goodness, deviously turns the natural bias of its malignity to the advancement of human happiness, and makes it productive of general *good*:

TH' ETERNAL ART EDUCES GOOD FROM ILL.

Ep. 2. l. 165.

This, set against what we have observed of the Poet's doctrine of a *future state*, will furnish us with an instance of his *steering* (as he well expresses it in his Preface) *between doctrines seemingly opposite: If his Essay has any merit, he thinks it is in this*. And doubtless it is uncommon merit to reject the extravagances of every system, and take in only what is rational and real. The *Characteristics*, and the *Fable of the Bees*, are two seemingly inconsistent systems: The extravagancy of the first is in giving a scheme of *Virtue without Religion*; and of the latter, in giving a scheme of *Religion without Virtue*. These our Poet leaves to any body that will take them up; but agrees however so far with the *first*, that virtue would be worth having, though itself was its only reward; and so far with the *latter*, that God makes evil, against its nature, productive of good.

The Poet having thus justified Providence in its *permission* of partial MORAL EVIL, employs the remaining  
part

part of this Epistle in vindicating *it* from the *imputation* of certain supposed NATURAL EVILS. For now he shews, that though the complaint of his Adversaries against Providence be on pretence of *real moral evils*, yet, at bottom, it all proceeds from their impatience under *imaginary natural ones*, the issue of a depraved appetite for visionary advantages, which if Man had, they would be either *useless* or *pernicious* to him, as unsuitable to his state, or repugnant to his condition [from l. 164 to 199.] “Though God (says he) hath so bountifully bestowed on Man, faculties little less than *angelic*, yet he ungratefully grasps at higher; and then, extravagant in another extreme, with a passion as ridiculous as that is impious, envies even the peculiar accommodations of *Brutes*. But here his own principles shew his folly.” He supposes them all made for his use: Now what use could he have of them, when he had robbed them of all their qualities. *Qualities*, as they are at present divided, distributed with the highest wisdom: But which, if bestowed according to the froward humour of these childish complainers, would be found to be every where either *wanting* or *superfluous*. But even with these *brutal* qualities Man would not only be no gainer, but a considerable loser, as the Poet shews, in explaining the consequences that would follow from his having his sensations in that exquisite degree in which this or that animal is observed to possess them.

He tells us next [from l. 198 to 225] that the complying with such extravagant desires would not only be *useless and pernicious to Man*, but would be breaking the order, and deforming the beauty, of God's Creation. In which *this* animal is subject to *that*, and *all* to Man; who by his reason enjoys the benefit of all their powers:

Far as Creation's ample range extends,  
 The scale of *sensual, mental* powers ascends:  
 Mark how it mounts, to Man's imperial race,  
 From the green myriads in the peopled grass!  
 Without this just gradation, could they be  
 Subjected these to those, or all to thee?  
 The powers of all subdued by thee alone,  
 Is not thy reason all those powers in one?



And farther [from l. 224 to 259] that this breaking the order of things, which as a link or chain connects all beings from the highest to the lowest, would unavoidably be attended with the destruction of the Universe :

For if each system in gradation roll,  
Alike essential to th' amazing whole ;  
The least confusion but in one, not all  
That system only, but the whole must fall.  
Let Earth unbalanc'd from her orbit fly,  
Planets and Suns rush lawless thro' the sky :  
Let ruling Angels from their spheres be hurl'd,  
Being on being wreck'd, and world on world,  
Heaven's whole foundations to their centre nod,  
And Nature tremble to the throne of God.

For that the several parts of the Universe must at least compose as entire and harmonious a whole, as the parts of an human body do, cannot be doubted : Yet we see what confusion it would make in our frame, if the members were set upon invading each other's office.

What if the foot, ordain'd the dust to tread,  
Or hand to toil, aspir'd to be the head ? &c.  
Just as absurd, for any part to claim  
To be another in this gen'ral frame :  
Just as absurd, to mourn the task and pains  
The great directing \*MIND of ALL ordains.

Who will not acknowledge that so harmonious a connection in the disposition of things, as is here described, is transcendently beautiful ? But the *Fatalists* suppose such a one.—What then ? Is the first great free Agent debarred from a contrivance so exquisite, because some men, to set up their idol, *Fate*, absurdly represent it as presiding over such a system ?

Having thus given a representation of God's Creation, as *one entire whole*, where all the parts have a necessary dependance on and relation to each other, and where every *particular* works and concurs to the perfection of the *whole* ; as such a system would be thought above the reach of vulgar ideas ; to reconcile it to their conceptions,

\* Veneramur autem et colimus ob Dominium. Deus enim sine Dominio, Providentia, et causis Finalibus, nihil aliud est quam FATUM et NATURA. Newtoni Princip. Schol. gener. sub finem.

he shews [from l. 258 to 273] that God is equally and intimately present to every sort of substance, to every particle of matter, and in every instant of being; which eases the labouring imagination, and makes it expect no less, from such a *presence*, than such a *dispensation*.

And now, the Poet, as he had promised, having *vindicated the ways of God to Man*, concludes [from l. 272 to the end] that from what had been said it appears, that the very things we blame contribute to our happiness, either as *particulars*, or as *parts of the universal system*; that our *ignorance*, in accounting for the ways of Providence, was allotted to us out of compassion; that yet we have as much *knowledge* as is sufficient to shew us, that we are, and always shall be, as blest as we can bear; for that NATURE is neither a *stratonic* chain of blind causes and effects,

(*All nature is but art unknown to thee*);

nor yet the fortuitous result of *Epicurean* atoms,

(*All chance, direction which thou canst not see*);

as these two species of atheism supposed it; but the wonderful art and direction (unknown indeed to man) of an all-powerful, all-wise, all-good, and free Being. And therefore we may be assured, that the arguments brought above, to prove partial moral evil productive of universal good, may be safely relied on; from whence one certain truth results, in spite of all the pride and cavils of vain reason, That WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY. And this truth once owned, all complaints against Providence are secluded.

But that the reader may see, in one view, the *exactness of the method*, as well as *force of the argument*, I shall here draw up a short *synopsis* of this epistle. The Poet begins in telling us his subject is *An Essay on Man*—His end of writing is to *vindicate Providence*—Tells us against whom he wrote, *the Atheists*—From whence he intends to fetch his arguments, *from the visible things of God seen in this system*—Lays down this proposition as the foundation of his thesis, *that of all possible systems, infinite Wisdom has formed the best*—Draws from thence two consequences; 1. *That there must needs be some-*

where such a creature as Man; 2. That the moral evil which He is author of, is productive of the good of the whole. This is his general *thesis*; from whence he draws this conclusion, That Man should rest submissive and content, and make the hopes of futurity his comfort—but not suffer this to be the occasion of PRIDE, which is the cause of all his impious complaints.

He proceeds to confirm his *thesis*.—Previously endeavours to abate our wonder at the phænomenon of moral evil—Shews first *its use to the perfection of the universe*, by analogy, from the use of physical evil in this particular system—Secondly, *its use in this system*, where it is turned, providentially, from its natural bias, to promote virtue—Then goes on to vindicate Providence from the imputation of certain *supposed natural evils*, as he had before justified it for the permission of *real moral evil*, in shewing that though the Atheist's complaint against Providence be on pretence of *real moral evil*, yet the true cause is his impatience under *imaginary natural evil*; the issue of a *depraved appetite for fantastical advantages*, which he shews, if obtained, would be *useless*, or *hurtful to Man*— and deforming and destructive to the *Universe*; as breaking into that *order* by which it is supported.—He describes that *order, harmony, and close connection of the parts*. And, by shewing the intimate presence of God to his whole creation, gives a reason for an Universe so amazingly beautiful, and perfect. From all this he deduces his general conclusion, that *Nature being neither a blind chain of causes and effects, nor yet the fortuitous result of wandering atoms, but the wonderful art and direction of an all-wise, all-good, and free Being; Whatever is, is right, with regard to the disposition of God and its ultimate tendency*; which once granted, all complaints against Providence are at an end.

This is a plain and consistent account of the argument of this famous Epistle, which (though here humbled, and stripped of all its ornaments) hath such a *force of reasoning* as would support rhimes as bad as *Donne's*, and such a *strain of poetry* as would immortalize even the wretched sophistry that Mr. DE CROUSAZ has employed against it.

Whose objections it is now high time we should consider.

sider. For having shewn what Mr. *Pope's* system really is, we come next to shew what it is *not*; namely, what that writer hath the injustice, or the folly, to represent it. He begins his *examination*, with saying, that "Mr. *Pope* "seems to him, quite throughout his system, to embrace "the *pre-established harmony* of the celebrated *Leibnitz*, "which, in his opinion, establishes a fatality destructive "of all religion and morality\*."—That the *pre-established harmony* of *Leibnitz* terminates in fate, is readily owned; but that Mr. *Pope* hath espoused that impious whimsy, is an utter chimæra. The *pre-established harmony* was built upon, and is an outrageous extension of, a conception of *Plato's*; who combating the atheistical objections about the origin of evil, employs this argument in defence of Providence; "That, amongst an infinite number of "possible worlds in God's idea, *this*, which he hath "created, and brought into being, and admits of a mixture of evil, is the *best*." But if the *best*, then evil consequently is *partial*, comparatively small, and *tends* to the greater perfection of the *whole*. This *principle* is espoused and supported by Mr. *Pope* with all the power of reason and poetry. But neither was *Plato* a *fatalist*, nor is there any *fatalism* in the argument. As to the truth of the notion, that is another question; and how far it clears up the very difficult controversy about the origin of evil, that is still *another*. That it is a full solution of all difficulties, I cannot think, for reasons too long to be given in this place. Perhaps we shall never have a full solution here; and it may be no great matter though we have not, as we are demonstrably certain of the *moral attributes* of the Deity. However, what may justify Mr. *Pope* in inforcing and illustrating this *Platonic* notion is, that it has been received by the most celebrated and orthodox *divines* both of the ancient and modern Church.

This doctrine, we own, then, was taken up by *Leibnitz*; but it was to ingraft upon it a most pernicious *fatalism*. *Plato* said, God *chose* the best: *Leibnitz* said, he *could not but* chuse the best. *Plato* supposed *freedom* in God, to chuse one of two things equally good: *Leibnitz* held the supposition to be absurd; but however, admitting

\* Examen de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme:

the case, he maintained that God could *not* chuse *one* of *two* things *equally* good. Thus it appears the first went on the *system* of *freedom*; and that the latter, notwithstanding the most artful disguises in his *Theodicée*, was a thorough *fatalist*. For we cannot well suppose he would give that *freedom* to Man which he had taken away from God. The truth of the matter seems to have been this: He saw, on the one hand, the monstrous absurdity of supposing, with *Spinosas*, that *blind* Fate was the author of a coherent Universe; but yet, on the other, could not conceive, with *Plato*, that God could foresee and conduct, according to an archetypal idea, a world, of all possible worlds the *best*, inhabited by *free agents*. This difficulty, therefore, which made the *Socinians* take *prescience* from God, disposed *Leibnitz* to take *free-will* from Man: And thus he fashioned his fantastical hypothesis: He supposed that, when God made the body, he impressed on his new-created machine a certain series or *suite* of *motions*; and that when he made the fellow soul, the same series of *ideas*, whose operations, throughout the whole duration of the union, so exactly jumped, that whenever an *idea* was excited, a correspondent *motion* was ever ready to satisfy the *volition*. Thus for instance, when the mind had the will to raise the arm to the head, the body was so pre-contrived as to raise, at that very moment, the part required. This he called the PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY. And with this he promised to do wonders.

Now we see, that, from the principle of *Plato*, as well as from that of *Leibnitz*, this grand consequence follows, THAT WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT; because every thing in this world, even evil itself, tends to the greater perfection of the *whole*. This Mr. *Pope* employs as a *principle*, throughout a Poem (the most sublime that ever was written) to humble the pride of Man, who would impiously make God accountable for his creation. What then does common sense teach us to understand by *what-ever is, is right*? Did the Poet mean *right* with regard to Man, or *right* with regard to God? *Right* with regard to itself, or *right* with regard to its ultimate tendency? Surely *with regard to God*: For he tells us, his design is

To vindicate the ways of God to Man. l. 16.

Surely

Surely *with regard to its ultimate tendency*: For he tells us again,

All partial ill is universal good. l. 283.

Yet Mr. *De Crousaz* preposterously takes it the other way; and so perversely interpreted, it is no wonder that he, and his wise friends, should find the Poem full of contradictions\*.

But, before we come to an examination of particulars, it will be necessary to remind the reader once again, that the subject of this Epistle is a justification of Providence, against the impious objections of atheistic Men. It is to *vindicate the ways of God to Man*.—Thus the Poet addresses them at the *beginning*:

Presumptuous Man! the reason would'st thou find  
Why form'd so weak, so little, and so blind? l. 35.

Then say not Man's imperfect, *Heav'n in fault*. l. 69.

As he proceeds, he still applies his reasoning to the *same Men*:

Go — and in thy scale of sense  
*Weigh thy opinion against Providence*;  
Call imperfection what thou fancy'st such;  
Say, *here he gives too little, there too much*;  
Destroy all creatures for thy sport or gust:  
Yet cry, if Man's unhappy, *God's unjust*. l. 109, & seq.

And concludes with this reproof to them:

Cease then, nor *Order Imperfection* name. l. 273.

Having premised thus much, we now proceed to Mr. *De Crousaz*.

Mr. *Pope* had said,

The lamb thy riot dooms to bleed to-day,  
Had he thy reason, would he skip and play?

\* J'ai lu l'essai de Mr. Pope (repond un ami de la compagnie) et jamais je n'eus plus besoin de patience. J'ai fait des grands efforts, pour y trouver quelque sens raisonnable, et je les ai faits inutilement. Tantôt j'y suis tombé sur des precisions sophistiques, tantôt sur des decisions également hardies et sans preuves, tantôt enfin sur des longues periodes d'un pompeux galimatias, &c. Examen de l'Essai.— Thus his friend runs on in this abusive way, and grows more particular in his scurrility, while Mr. *De Crousaz*, good man, is unable to make him hold his peace.

Pleas'd

Pleas'd to the last, he crops the flow'ry food,  
 And licks the hand just rais'd to shed his blood.  
 O blindness to the future! kindly giv'n,  
 That each may fill the circle mark'd by Heav'n.

l. 77, & seq.

On which his *Commentator*:—"We do not, indeed, perceive any thing in beasts, that shews they have an idea or apprehension of death. But, surely, with regard to Man, to reflect on death, and to contemplate the certainty of it, are of great use to a prudent life and a happy death. Reason and religion agree in this, and a man must want both one and the other, to cry out,

"O blindness to the future! kindly giv'n,  
 "That each may fill the circle mark'd by Heav'n.

"This supposes, that if men had a foreknowledge of their destiny, they would do all they could to avoid it, and that they would succeed: Because, without this ignorance, Heaven, it seems, could never bring all its *beings to fill that circle marked out by it*. Yet this, notwithstanding, is a consequence that can have no place, if it be impossible for men to act with freedom. But the doctrine of FATE necessarily draws us into "contradictions\*." Mr. Crousaz introduces his *Commentary*, by solemnly acquainting his reader, *That he had, from his very infancy, a strong bias towards LOGIC: that he has given a considerable time to that study, and does not repent his pains; that he has profited by maxims which he has found in books not written with a design to give them; that he has run through every book that has fallen into his hands under that title, or any thing approaching to it; that he has not even neglected the most out-of-fashioned works of this kind: But, as the greatest treasure is worthless, unless well used, he is resolv'd to employ some of it upon Mr. Pope†. And here you have the fruits of his labours. Here he has shewn, to some purpose, his skill in extracting doctrines from books not designed to give them.* And for this passage I will

\* *Commentaire sur la Traduction en vers de Mr. l'Abbé du Resnel de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme*, p. 63, 64.

† P. 27, 28.

be answerable, that he has *extracted a doctrine* from it which our POET did *not design to give*; who, when he had answered the *atheistical* objection about positive evil, supposes the Objector to reply to this effect:—It may be true, what you say, that *partial evil tends to universal good*: But why, then, has not God let me clearly into this secret, and acquainted me with the manner how? The Poet replies, “For very good reasons. You were “sent into the world on a task and duty to be performed “by you. And as the knowing these things might “distract you, or draw you from your station; it was in “mercy that God hath hid these things from you:

Heav'n from all creatures hides the book of fate,  
All but the page prescrib'd, their present state,  
From brutes what Men, from *Men what spirits know*;  
*Or who would suffer Being here below?* l. 73, & seq.

“To illustrate this by a familiar instance; how kindly  
“hath Nature acted by the lamb, in hiding its death from  
“it; the knowledge of which would have imbitter'd all  
“its life?” This is the force of the Poet's argument; and nothing can be better connected, or more beautiful. But our great *Logician*, instead of attending to the argument of a very close reasoner (whose thread of reasoning, therefore, one should have imagined might have conducted a mathematician too, as he is, to the true sense of the passage) rambles after a meaning that could not possibly be Mr. *Pope's*; because it both disagrees with the context, and directly opposes what he lays down in express words in this very essay. Mr. *De Crousaz*, we see, imagines that this instance of the *lamb* was given to shew how *hurtful a gift* God bestowed upon us, when he gave us the knowledge of our end. Mr. *Pope* says expressly, that it was a *friendly gift*:

To each *unthinking* being Heav'n a *friend*,  
Gives not the *useless knowledge of its end*:  
To *Man imparts it*: but with such a view,  
As, while he dreads it, makes him *hope* it too.

Ep. iii. l. 75, & seq.

i. e. “Heaven, which is not only friendly to Man, but  
“beast, gives not this *latter* the knowledge of its end;  
“because such knowledge (which is necessarily attended  
“with



“ with anxiety) would be useless to it. On the other  
 “ hand, He gives it to Man; because it is of the highest  
 “ advantage to him, who, being to exist in a future state,  
 “ may, by this means, make a fitting preparation for his  
 “ good reception there; which preparation will *temper*,  
 “ and, at length, *quite subdue* the anxiety necessarily  
 “ attendant (as is said) on the knowledge of our end, by  
 “ the certain *hope* of a happy immortality.”

After these extraordinary fruits of our Logician's long application to *the art of thinking*, he goes on, for four pages together\*, to shew how useful and necessary it is for Man to cultivate his understanding. You ask whom he contradicts in this? He absurdly supposes, Mr. *Pope*; while he is indeed but quarrelling with his own imaginations. Here we must recollect what we observed above of the subject of the Poem; which is a vindication of Providence against impious complainers. As these will not acknowledge it just and good, because they cannot comprehend it, and as this argument is only supported by *pride*, the Poet thought proper to mortify that *pride*; which could not be done more effectually, than by shewing them, that even a savage *Indian* reasoned better :

Lo! the poor *Indian*, whose untutor'd mind  
 Sees God in clouds, and hears him in the wind;  
 His soul proud science never taught to stray  
 Far as the solar walk, or milky way;  
 Yet simple nature to his hope has giv'n,  
 Behind the cloud-topt hill, an humbler heav'n;  
 To *be* contents his natural desire,  
 He asks no angel's wing, or seraph's fire, &c.

l. 95, & seq.

What are we to conclude from hence? That Mr. *Pope* intended to discourage all improvements of the human understanding? or that it was only his design to deter men from impiety, and from presuming to *rejudge the justice* of their Creator? Mr. *Crousaz*; contrary to common sense, and the whole tenor of the Epistle, has chosen the former part; though Mr. *Pope* had immediately added,

\* Commentaire, p. 66 to 70.

Go wiser thou, and in thy scale of sense  
 Weigh thy opinion against Providence.  
 Call imperfection what thou fancy'st such,  
 Say, Here he gives too little, there too much;  
 Destroy all creatures for thy sport or gust:  
 Yet cry, If Man's unhappy, God's unjust.

l. 109. & seq.

But to this, the *Commentator*:—"To whom does Mr. *Pope* address himself in this long period? Is it to those presumptuous men, who are continually confounding themselves, and abusing the fruitfulness of their imaginations, to teaze good Christians with objections against Providence? Their rashness and impatience well deserve, in my opinion, the censures Mr. *Pope* here inflicts upon them\*."—Wonderful! Our Logician has, at length, discovered the subject of Mr. *Pope's* Epistle. Why then did he not do justice to truth, by striking out all the rest of his remarks? For if this be right, all the rest must, of consequence, be wrong.

Mr. *Pope* says, speaking of the end of Providence,  
 As much that end a constant course requires  
 Of showers and sunshine, as of Man's desires;  
 As much eternal springs and cloudless skies,  
 As Men for ever temp'rate, calm and wise.

l. 147, & seq.

On which the *Examiner*, "A continual spring and a heaven without clouds would be fatal to the earth and its inhabitants; but can we regard it as a misfortune that men should be always sage, calm and temperate? I am quite in the dark as to this comparison†." Let us try if we can drag him into light, as unwilling as he is to see. The argument stands thus:—Presumptuous Man complains of moral evil; Mr. *Pope* checks and informs him thus: The evil, says he, you complain of, tends to universal good; for as clouds, and rain, and tempest, are necessary to preserve health and plenty in this sublunary world, so the evils that spring from disorder'd passions are necessary.—To what? Not to Man's happiness here,

\* *Commentaire*, p. 79.

† *Examen de l'Essai*, &c.

but to the perfection of the universe in general. So that,

If plagues or earthquakes break not Heaven's design,  
Why then a *Borgia* or a *Catiline*?

On which the Examiner thus descants,—“ These lines “ have no sense but on the system of *Leibnitz*, which “ confounds morals with physics; and in which, all that “ we call pleasures, grief, contentment, inquietude, wisdom, virtue, truth, error, vices, crimes, abominations, “ are the inevitable consequence of a fatal chain of “ things as ancient as the world. But this is it which “ renders the system so horrible, that all honest men “ must shudder at it. It is, indeed, sufficient to humble “ human nature, to reflect that this was invented by a “ man, and that other men have adopted it\*.” This is, indeed, very tragical; but we have shewn above, that it hath its sense on the *Platonic*, not the *Leibnitzian* system; and besides, that the context confines us to that sense.

What hath misled the Examiner is his supposing the comparison to be between the effects of *two things in this sublunary world*; when not only the *elegancy*, but the *justness of it* consists in its being between the *effects of a thing in the universe at large*, and the familiar and known *effects of one in this sublunary world*. For the *position* inforced in these lines is this, *that partial evil tends to the good of the whole*:

*Respecting Man*, whatever wrong we call,

May, must be right, as relative to *all*. l. 51.

*How* does the Poet inforce it? Why, if you will believe the Examiner, by illustrating the effects of partial moral evil in a particular system, by that of partial natural evil in the *same* system, and so leaves his *position* in the lurch; but we must never believe the great Poet reasons like the *Logician*. The way to prove his point he knew was to illustrate the effect of partial moral evil in the *universe*, by partial natural evil in a *particular system*. Whether partial moral evil tend to the good of the universe, being a *question*, which by reason of our ignorance of *many parts* of that universe, we cannot decide, but

\* Examen de l'Essai, &c.

from known effects; the rules of argument require that it be proved by *analogy*, i. e. setting it by, and comparing it with a thing *certain*; and it is a thing *certain*, that partial natural evil tends to the good of our *particular system*. This is his argument: And thus, we see, it stands clear of Mr. *De Crousaz*'s objection, and of *Leibnitz's fatalism*.

After having inforced this analogical *position*, the Poet then indeed, in order to strengthen and support it, employs the same instance of natural evil, to shew that, even here to *Man*, as well as to the *whole*, *moral evil* is productive of good, by the gracious disposition of Providence, who turns it deviously from its natural tendency.

Mr. *Pope* then adds,

From pride, from pride, our very reasoning springs;  
Account for moral, as for nat'ral things:  
Why charge we Heaven in those, in these acquit?  
In both, to reason right, is to submit. l. 153, & seq.

Our *Commentator* asks—"Why, then, does Mr. *Pope* pretend to reason upon the matter, and rear his head so high, and decide so dogmatically, upon the most important of all subjects\*?" This is indeed pleasant. Suppose Mr. *De Crousaz* should undertake to shew the folly of pretending to penetrate into the mysteries of *revealed religion*, as here Mr. *Pope* has done of *natural*, must he not employ the succours of reason? And could he conclude his reasonings with greater truth and modesty, than in the words of Mr. *Pope*?—*To reason right, is to submit*.—But he goes on, "If you will believe him [Mr. *Pope*] the sovereign perfections of the Eternal Being have *inevitably* determined him to create this Universe, because the idea of it was the most perfect of all those which represented many possible worlds. Notwithstanding, there is nothing perfect in this part, which is assigned for our habitation: it swarms with imperfections; it is God who is the cause of them, and it was not in his power to contrive matters otherwise. The Poet had not the caution to recur to Man's abuse of his own free-will, the true source of all our miseries, and which are agreeable to that state

\* *Commentaire*, p. 94.

“ of disorder in which men live by their own fault\*.” I will venture to say, every part of this reflection is false and calumnious. The first part of it, that the *Eternal Being*, according to Mr *Pope*, was *inevitably* determined, and that he *had not power to contrive matters otherwise*, I have already shewn to be so. It is still a more unpardonable calumny to say that Mr. *Pope* has *thrown the cause of moral evil upon God*, and *had not the caution to recur to Man's abuse of his own free-will*: For Mr. *De Crousaz* could not but see that the Poet had, in so many words, thrown the cause entirely upon *that abuse*, where, speaking of natural and moral Evil, he says,

What makes all physical and moral Ill !

There deviates Nature, and here wanders Will,  
GOD SENDS NOT ILL.                      Ep. iv. l. 109, & seq.

When he had said this, and acquitted the Supreme Cause, he then informs us what is God's agency, after natural and moral evil had been thus produced by the deviation of nature, and depravity of will; namely, that he hath so contrived, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, that good shall arise from this evil.

——If rightly understood,  
Or partial ill is universal good,  
Or Chance admits, or Nature lets it fall,  
Short and but rare, till Man improv'd it all.

l. 111, & seq.

And speaking in another place of God's Providence, he says,

That counterworks each folly and caprice,  
That disappoints th' effects of ev'ry vice.

Ep. ii. l. 229.

What is this but bringing good out of evil? And how distant is that from being the cause of evil?

After this, a *philosopher* should never think of writing more till he had rectified what he had already wrote so much amiss.

The next passage the *Examiner* attacks is the following:

\* Commentaire, p. 94, 95.

Better for us, perhaps, it might appear,  
 Were there all harmony, all virtue here;  
 That never air or ocean felt the wind;  
 That never passion discompos'd the mind :  
 But all subsists by elemental strife,  
*And passions are the elements of life.* l. 157, & seq.

Here the Examiner upbraids Mr. *Pope* for degrading himself so far as to write to the gross prejudices of the people. "In the corporeal nature (says he) there is no piece of matter that is perfectly simple; all are composed of small particles, called elementary; from their mixture, proceeds a fermentation, sometimes weak and sometimes strong, which still farther attenuates these particles: and thus agitated and divided, they serve for the nourishment and growth of organic bodies; to this growth it is we give the name of life. But what have the passions in common with these particles? Do their mixture and fermentation serve for the nourishment of that substance which thinks, and do they constitute the life of that substance\*?" Thus Mr. *De Crousaz*, who, as, a little before, he could not see the nature of the comparison, so here, by a more deplorable blindness, could not see that there was any comparison at all. "You, says Mr. *Pope*, perhaps may think it would be better, that neither air nor ocean was vexed with tempests, nor that the mind was ever discomposed by passion; but consider, that as in the one case our material system is supported by the strife of its elementary particles, so in the intellectual, the passions of the mind are, as it were, the elements of human life, i. e. actions." All here is clear, solid, and well-reasoned, and hath been considered above. What must we say then to our Examiner's wild talk of the mixture and fermentation of elementary particles of matter for the nourishment of that substance that thinks, and of its constituting the life of that substance? I call it the Examiner's, for, you see, it is not Mr. *Pope*'s; and Mr. *Crousaz* ought to be charged with it, because it may be questioned whether it was a simple blunder, he urging it so invidiously as to insinuate that Mr. *Pope*

might probably hold the *materiality of the scul.* However, if it was a mistake, it was a pleasant one, and arose from the ambiguity of the word *life*, which in *English*, as *la vie* in *French*, signifies both *existence* and *human action*, and is always to have its sense determined by the context.

Mr. *Pope* says, speaking of the brute creation,  
*Nature* to these, without profusion, kind,  
 The proper organs, proper powers assign'd. l. 171.

Mr. *Crousaz* observes, that "in this verse, by the term "*Nature*, we must necessarily understand the *Author of Nature*; it is a figure much in use. *SPINOZA* has employed all his metaphysics to confound these two significations \*." Therefore, I suppose, Mr. *Pope* must not employ the word at all, though it be to vindicate it from that *abuse*, by distinguishing its *different* significations. But this we are to consider as a touch of our logician's art. It is what they call *argumentum ad invidiam*.

The Poet,  
 Far as Creation's ample range extends,  
 The scale of sensual, mental powers ascends :  
 Mark how it mounts to *Man's imperial race*,  
 From the green myriads in the peopled grass.

Ep. i. l. 199, & seq.

On this the *Commentator*, "That place of honour, which the Poet has refused to *Man* in another part of his *Epistle*, he gives him here, because it serves to embellish and perfect the gradation. At every step Mr. *Pope* forgets one of those principal and most essential rules, which Mr. *Des Cartes* lays down in his *method*; that is, exactly to review what one asserts, so that *no part* be found to be *gratis dictum*, nor the *whole* repugnant to itself †." This we are to understand, as said, *διαλεκτικῶς*. But I shall beg leave to observe, that our logician here gives his lessons very impertinently. For, that Mr. *Pope*, in calling the *race of Man imperial*, hath bestowed no title on him in this place, which he had denied him elsewhere. He, with

\* *Commentaire*, p. 99. † *Ibid.* p. 108.

great piety and prudence, supposes what the Scripture tells us to be true, *that Man was created lord of this inferior world*; he *supposes* it, I say, in these lines of this very Epistle:

Without this just gradation could they be  
*Subjected* these to those, and *all to thee*?  
 The powers of all subdued by thee alone,  
 Is not thy reason all those powers in one?

l. 221, & seq.

He *expressly asserts* it in the *third Epistle*:

Heaven's attribute was universal care,  
 And *Man's prerogative to rule*, but spare. l. 160.

And this, in the very place where he gives the description of man in paradise.

What misled our Critic so far as to imagine Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himself was, I suppose, such passages as these:

Ask for what end the heavenly bodies shine, &c.'

And again:

Has God, thou fool! work'd solely for thy good, &c.

But in truth this is so far from a contradiction to what was said before of *Man's prerogative*, that it is a confirmation of it, and of what the Scripture tells us concerning it. And because this matter has been mistaken, to the discredit of the Poet's religious sentiments, by readers, whom the conduct of certain licentious writers, treating this subject in an abusive way, hath rendered jealous and mistrustful, I shall endeavour to explain it. Scripture says, that Man was made *lord* of all. But this lord, become, at length, intoxicated with pride, the common effect of sovereignty, erected himself, like particular monarchs, into a *tyrant*. And as *tyranny* consists in supposing *all made for the use of one*; he took those freedoms with *all*, that are consequent on such a principle. He soon began to consider the whole animal creation as his *slaves*, rather than his *subjects*; as being created for no use of *their own*, but for *his only*; and therefore used them with the utmost barbarity: and not so content; to add *insult* to his *cruelty*, he endeavoured



to philosophise himself into an opinion, that *animals* were mere *machines*, insensible of pain or pleasure. And thus, as Mr. *Pope* says, *Man* affected to be the *wit*, as well as *tyrant of the whole*\*. Our *Commentator* can tell us what deep philosopher it was that invented this witty system, and by the assistance of what *METHOD* so wonderful a discovery was brought to light. It became then one who adhered to the Scripture account of *Man's dominion*, to reprove this abuse of it, and to shew that,

Heaven's attribute was *universal care*,  
And *Man's prerogative to rule*, BUT SPARE.

The poetical Translator † has turned the words, to *Man's imperial race*, by

Jusqu'à l'Homme, *ce chef, ce roy de l'univers!*  
Even to *Man*, this head, this king of the universe.

Which is so sad a blunder, that it contradicts Mr. *Pope's* whole system. Who, although he allows *Man* to be king of this inferior world, is far from thinking him *king of the universe*. If the system itself could not teach him this, yet methinks the following lines of this very Epistle might:

So *Man*, who here seems *principal* alone,  
Perhaps acts *second* to some sphere unknown. l. 57.

If the Translator imagined Mr. *Pope* was here speaking *ironically*, where he talks of *Man's imperial race*, and so would heighten the ridicule by *ce roy de l'univers*, the mistake is still worse; the force of the argument depending upon its being said *seriously*. For the Poet is speaking of a scale, from the *highest* to the lowest, in the mundane system.

But now we come to the famous passage which is to fix the charge:

All are but parts of one stupendous whole,  
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.  
That, chang'd through all, and yet in all the same,  
Great in the earth as in th' ethereal frame,

\* Grant that the powerful still the weak controul,  
Be *Man* the *wit* and *tyrant* of the whole. Ep. iii. 54.

† M. L'Abbé du Resnel.

Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,  
 Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,  
 Lives through all life, extends through all extent,  
 Spreads undivided, operates unspent,  
 Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,  
 As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart;  
 As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,  
 As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns:  
 To him no high, no low, no great, no small;  
 He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.

Ep i. l. 259, & seq.

On which our *Examiner*, blind to the light of reason, as well as deaf to the charms of harmony—*A Spinozist* (says he) *would express himself in this manner* \*. I believe he would, and so would St *Paul* too, writing on the same subject, namely, the omnipresence of God in his providence, and in his substance. *In him we live and move, and have our being* †; i. e. we are parts of him, his offspring, as the Greek poet a *Pantheist*, quoted by the apostle, observes: and the reason is, because a religious *theist*, and an impious *Pantheist*, both profess to believe the omnipresence of God. But would *Spinoza*, as Mr. *Pope* does, call God *the great directing mind of all*, who hath intentionally created a perfect universe ‡? Or would Mr. *Pope*, like *Spinoza*, say there is but one universal substance in the universe, and that blind too? We know *Spinoza* would not say the first; and we ought not to think Mr. *Pope* would say the latter, because he says the direct contrary throughout the Poem. Now it is *this* latter only that is *Spinozism*.

But this sublime description of the Godhead contains not only the *divinity* of St. *Paul*; but, if that will not satisfy, the *philosophy* likewise of Sir *Isaac Newton*,

The Poet says,

All are but parts of one stupendous whole,  
 Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.

\* Examen de l'Essai.

† For in him we live and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own Poets have said: For we are also his offspring. Acts xvii. 28.

‡ For that is the meaning of

All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;

All chance, direction which thou canst not see.

The *Philosopher*, “Deus omnipræsens est, non per  
“*virtutem* solam, sed etiam per SUBSTANTIAM: nam  
“*virtus sine substantia* subsistere non potest\*.”

Mr. Pope,

That, chang'd through all, and yet in all the same,  
Great in the earth as in th' etherial frame,  
*Warms* in the sun, *refreshes* in the breeze,  
*Glow*s in the stars, and *blossoms* in the trees;  
Lives through all life, *extends through all extent*,  
*Spreads undivided, operates unspent*.

Sir *Isaac Newton*—“In ipso continentur et moventur.  
“universa, sed *absque mutua passione*. Deus nihil pa-  
“titur ex corporum motibus; illa nullam sentiunt resis-  
“tentiam ex omni-præsentia Dei.—Corpore omni et  
“figura corporea destituitur†.—Omnia regit et omnia  
“cognoscit.—Cum unaquæque spatii particula sit semper,  
“et unumquodque durationis indivisibile momentum,  
“ubique, certe rerum omnium fabricator ac dominus  
“non erit nunquam, nusquam‡.”

Mr. Pope,

Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,  
As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart;  
As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,  
As the rap't Seraph that adores and burns:  
To him no high, no low, no great, no small;  
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.

Sir *Isaac Newton*—“Annon ex phænomenis constat  
“esse entem incorporeum, viventem, intelligentem, om-  
“nipræsentem, qui in spatio infinito, tanquam sensorio  
“suo, *res ipsas* intime cernat, penitusque perspiciat,  
“*totasque intra se præsens præsentis complectatur*§.”

But now admitting, for argument's sake, that there was  
an ambiguity in these expressions, so great, as that a  
*Spinozist* might employ them to express his own particular  
principles; and such a thing might well be, without any

\* Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. sub finem.

† Id. ib.

‡ Id. ib.

§ Opticæ Quæst. 20.

reflection

reflection on the *Poet's* religion, or exactness as a writer, because it is none on the *apostle's*, who actually did that which Mr. *Pope* is not only falsely, but, as we see from this instance, foolishly accused of doing, and because the *Spinozists*, in order to hide the impiety of their principle, are used to express the *omnipresence* of God in terms that any religious theist might employ: in this case, I say, how are we to judge of the *Poet's* meaning? Surely by the whole tenor of his argument. Now take the words in the sense of the *Spinozists*, and he is made, in the conclusion of his Epistle, to overthrow all he has been advancing throughout the body of it: for *Spinozism* is the destruction of an universe, where every thing tends, by a foreseen contrivance in all its parts, to the perfection of the *whole*. But allow him to employ the passage in the sense of St. *Paul*, that *we and all creatures live and move, and have our being in God*, and then it will be seen to be the most logical support of all that had preceded. For the *Poet* having, as we say, laboured through his Epistle, to prove that every thing in the universe tends, by a foreseen contrivance, and a present direction of all its parts, to the perfection of the *whole*; it might be objected that such a disposition of things implying in God a painful, operose, and inconceivable extent of providence, it could not be supposed that such care extended to *all*, but was confined to the more noble parts of the Creation. This gross conception of the *first cause*, the *Poet* exposes, by shewing that God is equally and intimately present to every particle of matter, to every sort of substance, and in every instant of being.

And how truly, may be seen by the *Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, wrote expressly against *Spinozism*, where the excellent author has shewn the necessity of the *immediate influence of God*, in every moment of time, to keep matter from falling back into its primitive nothing.

The *Examiner* goes on: "Mr. *Pope* hath reason to call this whole, a *stupendous whole*; nothing being more paradoxical and incredible, if we take his description literally\*." I will add, nor nothing more so

\* Examen de l'Essai.

than St. Paul's, in him we live and move, and have our being, if taken literally. I have met with one who took it so, and from thence concluded, with great reach of wit, *that SPACE was GOD.*

But Mr. Pope having said of God, that he,  
Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,  
As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart:”

the *Commentator* remarks, that “one should make a criminal abuse of these pompous expressions, if once launched out, with SPINOZA, to confound the substance of God with our own; and to imagine that the substance of what we call *creature*, is the same with that Being's, to which we give the name of *Creator*\*.” Spinoza is still the burthen of the song. To cut this matter short, we shall therefore give Mr. Pope's own plain words and sentiments, in a line of this very Essay, that overturn all *Spinozism* from its very foundations: where, speaking of what *common sense* taught mankind, before *false sense* had depraved the understanding, he says,

THE WORKER FROM THE WORK DISTINCT WAS  
And simple reason never sought but one. [KNOWN,  
Ep. iii. l. 230.

But the *Commentator* is, at every turn, crying out, *A follower of Spinoza would express himself just so.* I believe he might; and sure Mr. Crousaz could not be ignorant of the reason. It being so well known that that unhappy man, the better to disguise his atheism, covered it with such expressions as kept it long concealed even from those friends and acquaintance with whom he most intimately corresponded. Hence it must necessarily happen, that every the best intentioned, most religious writer will employ many phrases, that a *Spinozist* would use, in the explanation of his impiety.

To persist, therefore, from henceforth, in this accusation, will deserve a name, which it is not my business to bestow.

Mr. Pope concludes thus:

Cease then, nor order imperfection name:  
Our proper bliss depends on what we blame.

\* *Commentaire.*

Know

Know thy own point: this kind, this due degree  
 Of blindness, weakness, heaven bestows on thee.  
 Submit.—In this, or any other sphere,  
 Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear:  
 Safe in the hand of one disposing power,  
 Or in the natal, or the mortal hour. l. 273, & seq.

“The heart gives itself up (says Mr. *De Crousaz*) to the magnificence of these words.—But I ask Mr. *Pope*, with regard to such consolatory ideas, whether he was not beholden, in some measure, to religion for them\*?” This is in the true spirit of modern controversy.—Our logician had taken it into his head, that the Poet had no religion; though he does not pretend his proofs rise higher than to a legitimate suspicion; and finding here a passage that spoke plainly to the contrary, instead of retracting that rash uncharitable opinion, he would turn this very evidence of his own mistake into a new proof for the support of it; and so insinuate, you see, that Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himself. He then preaches, for two pages together, on the passage, and ends in these words: “From all this I conclude, that the verses in question are altogether edifying in the mouth of an honest man, but that they give scandal and appear profane in the mouth of an ill one†.” How exactly can *Rome* and *Geneva* jump on occasion! So the conclave adjudged, that those propositions, which in the mouth of St. *Austin* were altogether edifying, became scandalous and profane in the mouth of *Jansenius*.

But the Examiner pursues the Poet to the very end, and cavils even at those lines, which might have set him right in his mistakes about the sense of all the rest.

All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;  
 All chance, direction which thou canst not see;  
 All discord, harmony not understood;  
 All partial evil, universal good;  
 And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,  
 One truth is clear, *Whatever is, is RIGHT*.

“See (says our Examiner) Mr. *Pope*'s general conclusion, *all that is, is right*. So that at the sight of *Charles* the first losing his head on the scaffold, Mr. *Pope*

\* *Commentaire*, p. 124, 125.

† *Ib.* p. 127.

“ must

“ must have said, *this is right*; at the sight too of his  
 “ judges condemning him, he must have said, *this is*  
 “ *right*; at the sight of some of these judges, taken  
 “ and condemned for the action which he had owned to  
 “ be right, he must have cried out, *this is doubly right*\*.”

How unaccountable is this perverseness! Mr. *Pope*,  
 in this very *Epistle*, has himself *thus* explained *Whatever*  
*is, is right*,

Respecting Man, whatever wrong we call,  
 May, must be right, as relative to *all*,  
 —So Man, who here seems principal alone,  
 Perhaps acts second to some sphere unknown,  
 Touches some wheel, or verges to some goal;  
 'Tis but a part we see, and not a whole. l. 51, & seq.

But it is amazing that the absurdities arising from the sense in which the Examiner takes Mr. *Pope's* grand principle, *Whatever is, is right*, could not shew him his mistake: for could any one in his senses employ a proposition in a meaning from whence such evident absurdities immediately arise? I had observed, that this conclusion of Mr. *Pope's*, that *whatever is, is right*, is a consequence of his principle, that *partial evil tends to universal good*. This shews us the only sense in which the proposition can be understood, namely, that **WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY**. Now is this any encouragement to vice? Or does it take off from the crime of him who commits it, that God providentially produces good out of evil? Had Mr. *Pope* abruptly said in his conclusion, *the result of all is, that whatever is, is right*, Mr. *De Crousaz* had even then been inexcusable for putting so absurd a sense upon the words, when he might have seen that it was a conclusion from the general principle above-mentioned; and therefore must necessarily have another meaning. But what must we think of him? when the Poet, to prevent mistakes, had delivered in this very place, the principle itself, together with this conclusion as the consequence of it:

All discord, harmony not understood ;  
*All partial evil, universal good ;*  
 And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,  
 One truth is clear, *Whatever is, is right.*

I cannot see how he could have told his reader plainer, that *this conclusion* was the consequence of *that* principle, unless he had wrote THEREFORE, in great church letters.

Thus have I gone through what I found material in Mr. *De Crousaz's Examen and Commentary* on the *first Epistle*: I will only observe, that he has, in several places, charged Mr. *Pope* with pretended absurdities and impieties, for which his *free Translator*\* is only answerable. But as he professes not to understand *English*, those things might have been passed over, had he not had, at the same time, a very exact and excellent translation in prose†, by which he might have discovered the mistakes of the other. Notwithstanding that, he has chosen to follow a version abounding in absurdities; because it gave him frequent opportunity to calumniate. On this account therefore, it may not be amiss to give an instance or two of these confederate misrepresentations, as a specimen of this part of the performance, likewise.

The *Translator* says,

Il ne desire point cette celeste flame,  
 Qui des purs seraphins devore, et nourrit l'ame‡.

That is, the savage *does not desire that heavenly flame, which, at the same time that it devours the souls of pure seraphims, nourishes them.* Mr. *De Crousaz* remarks: "Mr. *Pope*, by exalting the fire of his poetry by an antithesis, throws, occasionally, his ridicule on those heavenly spirits. The *Indian*, says the Poet, contents himself without any thing of that flame, which devours at the same time that it nourishes." But Mr. *Pope* is altogether free from this imputation; nothing can be more grave or sober than his *English* on this occasion:

To *be*, contents his natural desire ;  
 He asks no angel's wing or seraph's fire. l. 105.

\* Mr. Resnel.

† By Mr. De Silhouette.

‡ Commentaire, p. 77.



But neither, I dare say, did the Translator mean any thing of ridicule in his *devore & nourrit l'ame*. It is the sober solid jargon of the schools; and Mr. *l'Abbé* no doubt had frequently heard it from the benches of the *Sorbonne*. Indeed had a writer like Mr. *Pope* used such an expression, one might have suspected that he was not so serious as he should be.

The Poet, speaking of God's omnipresence, says,

As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,

As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns. l. 269.

Which Mr. *l'Abbé* has thus translated,

Dans un homme ignore sous une humble chaumiere,

Que dans le seraphin, rayonnant de lumiere \*.

That is, *as well in the ignorant man, who inhabits an humble cottage, as in the seraphim encompassed with rays of light*. Our Frenchman here, in good earnest, thought, that *a vile man that mourned* could be none but some poor inhabitant of a country cottage. Which has betrayed Mr. *De Crousaz* into this important remark: "For all that, we sometimes find in persons of the lowest rank, a fund of probity and resignation, that preserves them from contempt; their minds are indeed but narrow, yet fitted to their station." &c. But Mr. *Pope* had no such childish idea in his head. He was opposing here the *human species* to the *angelic*, and so spoke of *that*, when compared to *this*, as vile and disconsolate. The force and beauty of the reflection depend on this sense, and, what is more, the propriety of it; and it is amazing that neither the *Translator* nor the *Critic* could see it. There are many mistakes of this nature, both of one and the other, throughout the *Translation* and the *Commentary*, which perhaps we may have occasion to take notice of as we proceed.

In a word, if it were of such Men as our Commentator that Mr. *Pope* speaks, when he expresses his contempt for modern philosophers, he might well say,

Yes, I despise the Man to books confin'd,

Who from his study rails at human kind,

Though what he learns he speaks, and may advance

Some general maxims, or be right by chance,

\* Commentaire, p. 120.

## LETTER II.

HARD hath been the fate of our great Countryman, to fall into the hands of such a *Critic* and *Translator*. We have already seen how Mr. *De Crousaz* hath discharged himself. I now turn to M. *l'Abbé du Resnel*, whose sufficiency at least equals the malice and calumny of the other ; and is attended with just the same issue.

I have shewn, in my first Letter, that this noble production of human wit and reason is as singular for its philosophical *exactness of method*, as for its poetical sublimity of style.

Yet hear how our Translator descants upon the matter :  
 “ The only reason for which this Poem can be properly  
 “ termed an *Essay*, is, that the Author has not formed  
 “ his plan with all the regularity of method which it  
 “ might have admitted.”—And again—“ I would not  
 “ willingly have made use, in my version, of any other  
 “ liberties than such as the Author himself must have  
 “ taken, had he attempted a *French* translation of his  
 “ own Work ; but I was by the unanimous opinion of all  
 “ those whom I have consulted on this occasion, and,  
 “ amongst these, of several *Englishmen*, completely  
 “ skilled in both languages, obliged to follow a different  
 “ method. The French are not satisfied with sentiments  
 “ however beautiful, unless they are methodically dis-  
 “ posed ; method being the characteristic that distin-  
 “ guishes our performances from those of our neighbours,  
 “ and almost the only excellence which they agree to  
 “ allow us. That Mr. *Pope* did not think himself con-  
 “ fined to a regular plan, I have already observed. I  
 “ have therefore, by a necessary compliance with our  
 “ taste, divided it into *five cantos* \*.” But the Reader  
 will see presently, that our Translator was so far from  
 being able to judge of Mr. *Pope's method*, that he did not  
 even understand either his *subject* or his *sense*, on which  
*all method* is to be regulated.

For I now come to the Poet's *second Epistle*. He had

\* See the English Translation of his Preface.

shewn,

shewn, in the *first*, that the ways of God are too high for our comprehension; whence he rightly concludes, that

The proper study of *Mankind* is *Man*.

.... This *conclusion*, from the reasoning of the *first* Epistle, he methodically makes the subject of his *introduction* to the *second*; which treats of *Man's nature*. But here immediately the accusers of Providence would be apt to object, and say, "Admit that we had run into an extreme, while we pretended to censure or penetrate the designs of Providence, a matter indeed too high for us; yet have you gone as far into the opposite, while you only send us to the knowledge of ourselves. You must mock us when you talk of this as a *study*; for sure we are intimately acquainted with ourselves. The proper conclusion therefore from your demonstration of our inability to comprehend the ways of God, is, that we should turn ourselves to the study of the frame of NATURE." Thus, I say, would they be apt to object; for there are no sort of men more elate with *pride* than these *freethinkers*; the effects of which the Poet hath so well exposed in his *first* Epistle, especially that kind of pride, which consists in a boasted knowledge of their own nature. Hence we see the general argument of the late books against religion turns on a supposed inconsistency between revelation, and what they presume to call the eternal dictates of human nature. The Poet, therefore, to convince them that this study is less easy than they imagine, replies [from l. 2 to 19] to the *first part* of the objection, by describing the dark and feeble state of the *human understanding*, with regard to the *knowledge of ourselves*: and farther, to strengthen this argument, he shews, in answer to the *second part* of the objection [from l. 18 to 31] that the highest advances in natural knowledge may be easily acquired, and yet we all the while continue very ignorant of ourselves. For that neither the *clearest* science, which results from the *Newtonian* philosophy, nor the *most sublime*, which is taught by the *Platonic*, will at all assist us in this *self-study*; nay, what is more, that religion itself, when grown *fanatical and enthusiastic*,

will be equally useless: though pure and sober religion will best instruct us in Man's nature, that knowledge being essential to religion, whose *subject* is Man, considered in all his relations, and consequently whose *object* is God.

To give this *second* argument its full force, he illustrates it [from l. 30 to 43] by the noblest example that ever was in science, the incomparable NEWTON, whom he makes so superior to *humanity*, as to represent the *angelic beings* in doubt, when they observed him of late unfold all the law of Nature, whether he was not to be reckoned in their number; just as men, when they see the surprising marks of reason in an *ape*, are almost tempted to think him of their own species. Yet this *wondrous creature*, who saw so far into the works of Nature, could go no farther in *human* knowledge, than the generality of his kind. For which the Poet assigns this very just and adequate cause: in all other sciences, the understanding is unchecked and uncontrolled by any opposite principle; but in *the science of Man*, the *passions* overturn, as fast as *reason* can build up.

Alas, what wonder! Man's superior part  
Uncheck'd may rise, and climb from art to art;  
But when his own great work is but begun,  
What reason weaves, by passion is undone.

This is a brief account of the Poet's fine reasoning in his Introduction. The whole of which his poetical Translator has so miserably mistaken, that, of one of the most strong and best connected arguments, he has rendered it the most obscure and inconsistent, which even the officious *Commentator* could scarce make worse by his important and candid remarks.—Thus beautifully does Mr. *Pope* describe Man's weakness and blindness, with regard to his own nature:

—Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,  
A being darkly wise, and rudely great;  
With too much knowledge for the sceptic side,  
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride,  
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;  
In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast;

In doubt, his mind, or body to prefer,  
Born but to die, and reasoning but to err.

And as he hath given this description of Man, for the very contrary purpose to which *sceptics* are wont to employ such kind of paintings, namely, not to deter men from the *search*, but to excite them to the *discovery* of *truth*; he hath, with great judgment, represented man as doubting and wavering between the *right* and *wrong* object; from which state there are great *hopes* he may be relieved by a careful and circumspect use of reason. On the contrary, had he supposed Man so blind as to be busied in chusing, or doubtful in his choice, between two objects *equally wrong*, the case had appeared desperate; and all *study* of Man had been effectually *discouraged*. But his Translator not seeing into the force and beauty of this conduct, hath run into the very absurdity I have here shewn Mr. *Pope* hath so artfully avoided.

The Poet says,

Man hangs between; in doubt to ACT, or REST.

Now he tells us 'tis Man's duty to *act*, not to *rest*, as the *Stoics* thought; and to their principle this latter word alludes, he having just before mentioned that *sect*\*, whose virtue, as he says, is

—fix'd as in a frost;

Contracted all, retiring to the breast:

But strength of mind is EXERCISE, not rest.

l. 92, & seq.

But the Translator is not for mincing matters.

Seroit-il en naissant *au travail condamné*?

Aux *douceurs du repos* seroit-il destiné!

According to him, Man doubts whether he be condemned to a *slavish toil and labour*, or destined to the *luxury of repose*; neither of which is the condition whereto Providence designed him. This therefore contradicts the Poet's whole purpose, which is to recommend the study of Man, on a supposition that it will enable him to determine *rightly* in his *doubts* between the *true* and *false* object. 'Tis on this account he says,

\* With too much weakness for the *Stoic's* pride.

Alike

Alike in ignorance, his reason such,  
 Whether he thinks too *little*, or too *much*;  
 Chaos of thought and passion, all confus'd,  
 Still by *himself* abus'd, or disabus'd.

*i. e.* the proper sphere of his reason is so narrow, and the exercise of it so nice, that the too immoderate use of it is attended with the same ignorance that proceeds from the not using it at all. Yet, though in both these cases, he is *abused by himself*, he has it still in his own power to *disabuse himself*, in making his *passions* subservient to the *means*, and regulating his *reason* by the *end of life*. Mr. De Crousaz himself had some glimmering of the absurdity of those two lines of the Translator: and because he shall not say, I allow him to have said nothing reasonable throughout his whole *Commentary*, I will here transcribe his very words: "Ce qui fait encore, que les antitheses frappent au lieu d'instruire, c'est qu'elles sont outrées. *L'homme n'ait-il condamné au travail? Doit-il se permettre la mollesse et le repos?* Quel sujet de decouragement ou de trouble, si l'on n'avoit de choix qu'entre deux partis si contraires? Mais nous ne naissons ni destinés à un repos oisif, ni condamnés à un travail accablant et inhumain." p. 138.

Again, Mr. *Pope*,

In doubt to deem himself a *god*, or *beast*.

*i. e.* He doubts, as appears from the line immediately following this\*, whether his soul be *mortal* or *immortal*; one of which is the truth, namely, its immortality, as the Poet himself teaches, when he speaks of the omnipresence of God:

Breathes in our *soul*, informs our *mortal* part.

1 Ep. l. 267.

The Translator, as we say, unconscious of the Poet's purpose, rambles, as before:

Tantôt de son esprit admirant l'excellence,  
 Il pense qu'il est Dieu, *qu'il en a la puissance*;  
 Et tantôt gémissant des besoins de son corps,  
 Il croit que de la brute, il n'a que les *recorts*.

Here his head (turned to a sceptical view) was running

\* In doubt his *mind* or *body* to prefer.

on the different extravagances of *Plato* in his *divinity*, and of *Des Cartes* in his *philosophy*. Sometimes, says he, Man thinks himself a *real god*, and sometimes again a *mere machine*; things quite out of Mr. *Pope's* thoughts in this place.

Again, the Poet, in a beautiful allusion to the sentiments and words of *Scripture*, breaks out into this just and moral reflection upon *Man's* condition here,

Born but to die, and reasoning but to err.

The Translator turns this fine and sober thought into the most outrageous scepticism;

Ce n'est que pour mourir, qu'il est né, qu'il respire,  
Et tout sa raison n'est presque qu'un delire :

and so makes his author directly contradict himself, where he says of *Man*, that he hath

—too much knowledge for the sceptic side.

Strange! that the Translator could not see his Author's meaning was, that, as we are *born to die* and yet enjoy some small portion of life; so, though we *reason to err*, yet we comprehend some few truths. Strange! that he could not see the difference between that weak state of reason, in which error mixes itself with all its true conclusions concerning *Man's* nature; and *an abstract quality, which we vainly call reason, but which*, he tells us, *is indeed scarce any thing else but madness*. One would think he paid little attention to the concluding words of this sublime description, where the Poet tells us, *Man* was

Created *half to rise*, and half to fall;  
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;  
Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd;  
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world.

Indeed he paid so much, as to contrive how he might pervert them to a sense consistent with his

Et tout sa raison n'est presque qu'un delire :

Which he does in these words :

Tantôt feu, tantôt sage, il change A CHAQUE INSTANT.  
This is indeed making a *madman* of this sole judge of  
truth,

*truth*, to all intents and purposes. But Mr. *Pope* says nothing of his *changing every moment from sage to fool*; he only says, that folly and wisdom are the inseparable partage of *humanity*: which is quite another thing.

But *mistakes*, like *misfortunes*, seldom come single; and the reason is the same, in both cases, because they influence one another. For the *Translator*, having mistaken both the *nature* and *end* of the description of the weakness of human nature, imagined the Poet's *second* argument for the difficulty of the *study of Man*, which shews, that the *clearest* and *sublimest* science is no assistance to it, nor even religion itself, when grown *fanatical* and *enthusiastic*; he imagined, I say, that this fine argument was an *illustration* only of the foregoing description, in which illustration, instances were given of the several *extravagances in false science*; whereas the Poet's design was, just the contrary, to shew the prodigious vigour of the human mind, in studies which do not relate to itself; and yet that all its force, together with those effects of it, avail little in this inquiry.

But there was another cause of the *Translator's* error; he had mistaken, as we say, the Poet's *first* argument for a description of the weakness of the human mind with regard to *all truth*; whereas it is only such with regard to the *knowledge of Man's nature*. This led him, as it would seem, to conclude, that, if Mr. *Pope* were to be understood as speaking *here* in his *second* argument, of real and great progress in *science*, it would *contradict* what had been said in the description; and therefore, out of tenderness to his author, he turns it all to imaginary *hypotheses*.

Let us take the whole context.

### I.

Go, wondrous creature! mount where science guides,  
Go measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides;  
Shew by what laws the wand'ring planets stray,  
Correct old time, and teach the sun his way.

### II.

Go soar, with *Plato*, to th' empyreal sphere,  
To the first good, first perfect, and first fair;



## III.

Or tread the mazy round his followers trod,  
 And quitting sense call imitating God.  
 Go teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule,  
 Then drop into thyself, and be a fool.

Mr. *Pope* says, *Go, wondrous creature*; and he never speaks at random. The reason of his giving Man this epithet, is, because, though he be, as the Poet says, in another place\*, *little less than angel* in his faculties of science, yet is he miserably blind in the knowledge of himself. But the *Translator* not apprehending the Poet's thought, imagined it was said ironically, and so translates it;

Va, sublime mortel, fier de ton excellence,  
*Ne crois rien d'impossible à ton intelligence.*

Mr. *Pope*—

—Mount where science guides,  
 Go measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides;  
 Shew by what laws the ward'ring planets stray,  
 Correct old time, and teach the sun his way.

This is a *description* of the *real* advances in science, such as the *Newtonian*. And the very introduction to it,—*Mount where science guides*, shews it to be so.

But the *Translator*, carried away with the fancy of its being an *illustration* of the foregoing description, turns the whole to *vain, false, imaginary* science, such as that of *Des Cartes*:

Le compas à la main, *mesure l'universe*;  
 Règle à ton gré le flux et le reflux des mers;  
*Fixe* le poids de l'air, et *commande* aux planetes;  
*Determine* le cours de leurs marches secretes;  
 Soumets à ton calcul l'obscurité des tems,  
 Et de l'astre du jour conduis les movemens.

Here, in order to add the greater ridicule to his false sense, he introduces the philosopher, *with compass in hand, measuring the Universe*, mimicking the office of God in the act of creation, as he is represented by the ancients, who used to say, *Θεὸς γυνήσκει*. Whereas Mr. *Pope's* words are,

\* Ep. i. l. 166.

*Go measure earth—*

• Alluding to the noble and useful project of the modern mathematicians to measure a degree at the equator and the polar circle, in order to determine the true figure of the earth, of great importance to astronomy and navigation.

*Regulate*, says he, *according to your own will, the flux and reflux of the sea*; and this, *Des Cartes* presumed to do: but it was *Newton* that *stated the tides*. It is the pretended philosopher that *fixes the weight of the air*; but the real philosopher that *weighs air*. It was *Des Cartes* that *commanded the planets*, and *determined them to roll according to his own good pleasure*; but it was *Newton* who

*Shew'd by what laws the wand'ring planets stray.*

*Submit*, says the Translator, *the obscurity of time to your calculation*.—The Poet says,

*Correct old time.*

He is here still speaking of *Newton*. *Correct old time* alludes to that great man's *Grecian Chronology*, which he reformed on those two sublime conceptions, the *difference between the reigns of kings, and the generations of men*, and the *positions of the colures of the equinox and solstices, at the time of the Argonautic expedition*.

And when the Translator comes to the *third* instance, which is that of *false religion*, he introduceth it thus,

*Et joignant la folie à la temerité.*

Which shews how ill he understood Mr. *Pope's* instances of the *natural philosophy* of *Newton*, and the *metaphysical philosophy* of *Plato*. And yet all the justness, the force, and sublimity of the Poet's reasoning consist in a right apprehension of them.

*Mr. Pope—*

Go teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule,  
Then drop into thyself, and be a fool.

These *two* lines have only contributed to keep the Translator in his error; for he took the *first* of them to be a *recapitulation* of all that had been said from l. 18. Whereas *both* of them together, are a *conclusion* from it, to this effect: "Go now, vain Man, elated with thy

“acquirements in *real* science and *imaginary* intimacy  
 “with God; Go and run into all the extravagances I  
 “have exploded in the first Epistle, *where* thou pre-  
 “tendest to teach Providence how to govern; then drop  
 “into the obscurities of thy own nature, and thereby  
 “manifest thy ignorance and folly.”

Mr. *Pope* then confirms and illustrates this reasoning by one of the greatest examples that ever was:

Superior Beings, when of late they saw  
 A mortal Man unfold all nature's law,  
 Admir'd such wisdom in an earthly shape,  
 And shew'd a NEWTON, as we shew an ape.

In these lines he speaks to this effect—“But to make  
 “you fully sensible of the difficulty of this study, I shall  
 “instance in the great *Newton* himself; whom when  
 “superior Beings, not long since, saw capable of unfold-  
 “ing the whole law of Nature, they were in doubt whether  
 “the owner of such prodigious science should not be  
 “reckoned of their own order; just as men, when they  
 “see the surprising marks of reason in an ape, are almost  
 “tempted to rank him with their own kind. And yet  
 “this wondrous man could go no farther in the know-  
 “ledge of his own nature, than the generality of his  
 “species.”

Thus stands the argument, in which the Poet has paid a higher compliment to the great *Newton*, as well as a more ingenious, than was ever yet paid him by any of his most zealous followers: yet the Translator, now quite in the dark, by mistake upon mistake, imagined his design was to depreciate *Newton*'s knowledge, and to humble the pride of his followers: which hath made him play at cross purposes with his original:

Des celestes esprits la vive intelligence  
 Regard avec pitie notre foible science;  
*Newton*, le grand *Newton*, que nos admirons tous,  
 Est peut-etre pour eux, ce qu'un singe est pour nous.

“The heavenly spirits, whose understanding is so far  
 “superior to ours, look down with pity on the weakness  
 “of human science; *Newton*, the great *Newton*, whom  
 “we so much admire, is perhaps in no higher esteem  
 “with them, than an ape is with us,”

But

But it is not their *pity*, but their *admiration*, that is the subject in question: and it was for no slight cause they admired; it was to see *a mortal Man unfold the whole law of Nature*: which, by the way, might have shewn the Translator, that the Poet was speaking of *real science* in the foregoing paragraph. Nor was it Mr. *Pope's* intention to bring any of the ape's *qualities*, but its *sagacity*, into the comparison. But why the *ape's*, it may be said, rather than the sagacity of some more decent animal; particularly *the half-reasoning elephant*, as the Poet calls it, which, as well on account of this its superiority, as for its having no ridiculous side, like the *ape*, on which it could be viewed, seems better to have deserved this honour? I reply, because as none but a shape resembling human, accompanied with great sagacity, could occasion the doubt of that animal's relation to Man, the ape only having that resemblance, no other animal was fitted for the comparison. And on this ground of relation the whole beauty of the thought depends; *Newton*, and those superior Beings being equally immortal spirits, though of different orders. And here let me take notice of a new species of the *sublime*, of which our Poet may be justly said to be the maker; so new that we have yet no name for it, though of a nature distinct from every other poetical excellence. The two great perfections of works of genius are *wit* and *sublimity*. Many writers have been *witty*, several have been *sublime*, and some few have even possessed both these qualities *separately*. But none that I know of, besides our Poet, hath had the art to *incorporate* them. Of which he hath given many examples, both in this Essay, and in his other Poems. One of the noblest being the passage in question. This seems to be the last effort of the imagination, to poetical perfection. And in this compounded excellence the wit receives a *dignity* from the sublime, and the sublime a *splendour* from the wit; which, in their state of separate existence, they both wanted.

To return, this mistake seems to have led both the *Translator* and *Commentator* into a much worse; into a strange imagination that Mr. *Pope* had here reflected upon Sir *Isaac Newton's* moral character; which the

Poet was as far from doing, as the philosopher was from deserving: for,

After Mr. *Pope* had shewn, by this illustrious instance, that a great genius might make prodigious advances in the knowledge of *nature*, and at the same time remain very ignorant of *himself*, he gives a reason for it:—In all other sciences the understanding has no opposite principle to cloud and bias it; but in the knowledge of Man, the *passions* obscure as fast as *reason* can clear up.

Could he, whose *rules the rapid comet bind*,  
Describe, or fix, one movement of the mind?  
Who saw those fires *here rise, and there descend*\*,  
Explain his own beginning, or his end?  
Alas, what wonder! Man's superior part  
Uncheck'd may rise, and climb from art to art;  
But when his own great work is but begun,  
What reason weaves, by passion is undone.

Here we see, at the fifth line, the Poet turns from *Newton*, and speaks of *Man* and his *nature* in general. But the *Translator* applies all that follows to that philosopher:

Toi qui jusques aux cieux oses porter ta vue,  
Qui crois en concevoir et l'ordre et l'étendue,  
Toi qui veux dans leur cours, leur prescrire la loi,  
Sçais-tu régler ton cœur, sçais-tu régner sur toi?  
Ton esprit qui sur tout vainement se fatigue,  
Avide de sçavoir, ne connoît point de digne;  
De quoi par ses travaux s'est-il rendu certain?  
Peut-il te decouvrir ton principe et ta fin?

On which the *Commentator* thus candidly remarks;  
“It is not to be disputed, but that whatever progress a  
“great genius hath made in science, he deserves rather  
“censure than applause, if he has spent that time in  
“barren speculations, curious indeed, but of little use,  
“which he should have employed to know himself, *his*

\* Sir *Isaac Newton* in calculating the *velocity* of a *comet's* motion, and the course it describes, when it becomes visible in its descent to, and ascent from the sun, conjectured, with the highest appearance of truth, that they revolve perpetually round the sun, in *ellipses*, vastly eccentric, and very nearly approaching to *parabolas*. In which he was greatly confirmed, in observing between two comets a coincidence in their *perihelions*, and a perfect agreement in their velocities.

“beginning

“beginning and his end, and how to regulate his conduct; and if, instead of that candour and humanity, and desire to oblige, virtues so becoming our nature, he be overrun with ambition, envy, and a rage of pre-eminence, whose violence and rancour are attended with the most scandalous effects, of which there are too many instances; *vices which Mr. Newton lived and died an entire stranger to*”.

I have transcribed this passage to expose the malignant motives the *Commentator* appears to have had in writing against the *Essay on Man*. As to the *Translator*, it would be indeed harder to know what motives he could have in translating it, for it is plain he did not understand it. Yet this is he who tells us, that *the Author of the Essay has not formed his plan with all the regularity of method which it might have admitted; that he was obliged to follow a different method; for that the French are not satisfied with sentiments however beautiful, unless they be methodically disposed, method being the characteristic that distinguishes their performances from those of their neighbours.*

Thus neither did the *Critic*, nor *Translator*, suspect (and never were poor men so miscreably bit) that

Those oft' are stratagems which errors seem,  
Nor is it *Homer* nods, but we that dream.

The poetical *Translator* could not imagine so great a Poet would pique himself upon close reasoning; and the fastidious philosopher, of course, concluded, that a man of so much wit could hardly reason well; so neither of them gave a proper attention to the Poet's system. A system logically close, though wrote in verse, and complete, though studiously concise: this second Epistle particularly (the subject of the present Letter) containing the truest, clearest, shortest, and consequently the best account of the origin, use, and end of the passions, that is, in my opinion, any where to be met with. Which I now proceed to consider, in the same strict manner I have scrutinized the *Introduction*. For our Poet's works want nothing but to be fairly examined by the severest rules of logic and good philosophy, to become

as illustrious for their sense, as they have long been for their wit and poetry.

I go on therefore to the body of the discourse; which, as plain as it is, I find Mr. *De Crousaz* has made a shift (though extremely free with his insinuations of irreligion and *Spinozism*) to mistake from end to end. So true is the old saying, *Homine imperito nihil est iniquius*.

The Poet having thus shewn the difficulty attending the study of *Man*, proceeds to our assistance in laying before us the *elements* or true *principle* of this science, in an account of the origin, use, and end, of the passions. He begins [from l. 42 to 49] with pointing out the *two* grand *principles* in human nature, SELF-LOVE and REASON. Describes their *general* nature: the first *sets* Man upon acting, the other *regulates his action*. However, these principles are *natural*, not *moral*: and, therefore, *in themselves*, neither *good* nor *bad*; but so, only as they are *directed*.

Nor this a *good*, nor that a *bad* we call,  
Each works its end, to move or govern all;  
And to their *proper* operation still  
Ascribe all *good*, to their *improper ill*.

This observation is made with great judgment, in opposition to the desperate folly of those *fanatics*, who, as the *ascetic*, pretend to eradicate *self-love*; as the *mystic*, would stifle *reason*; and *both*, on the absurd fancy of their being *moral*, not *natural* principles.

The Poet proceeds [from l. 48 to 57] more *minutely* to mark out the distinct offices of these *two principles*, which he had before assigned only in *general*; and here he shews their *necessity*; for without *self-love*, as the *spring*, Man would be *unactive*, and without reason, as the *balance*, active to *no purpose*.

Fixt like a plant on his peculiar spot,  
'To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot:  
Or, meteor-like, flame lawless through the void,  
Destroying others, by himself destroy'd.

Having thus explained the *ends* and *offices* of each principle, he goes on [from l. 56 to 69] to speak of their *qualities*: and shews how they are fitted to discharge those functions, and answer their respective *intentions*.

The

The business of *self-love* being to excite to action, it is quick and impetuous; and moving instinctively, has, like *attraction*, its force prodigiously increased as the object approaches, and proportionably lessened as that recedes. On the contrary, *reason*, like the *author of attraction*, is always calm and sedate, and equally preserves itself, whether the object be near, or far off. Hence the *moving* principle is made more *strong*; though the *restraining* be more *quick-sighted*. The consequence he draws from this is, that, if we would not be carried away to our destruction, we must always keep reason upon guard.

But it would be objected, that if this account be true, human life would be *most* miserable, and, even in the wisest, a perpetual conflict between *reason* and the *passions*. To this therefore the Poet replies [from l. 68 to 71.] *First*, that Providence has so graciously contrived, that even in the voluntary exercise of *reason*, as in the mere mechanic motion of a limb, *habit* makes that, which was at first done with pain, easy and natural. And, *secondly*, that the *experience* gained by the long exercise of *reason* goes a great way towards *eluding* the force of *self-love*. Now, the *attending to reason*, as here recommended, will gain us this *habit* and *experience*.

*Attention*, habit and experience gains;  
Each strengthens reason, and self-love restrains.

Hence it appears, that this station in which reason is to be kept constantly upon guard, is not so uneasy a one as may be at first imagined.

From this description of *self-love* and *reason* it follows, as the Poet observes [from l. 70 to 83] that both conspire to one *end*, namely, *human happiness*, though they be not equally expert in the choice of the means; the difference being this, that the *first* hastily seizes every thing which has the *appearance* of good; the *other* weighs and examines whether it *be indeed* what it appears.

This shews, as he next observes, the folly of the *schoolmen*, who consider them as two *opposite* principles, the one *good*, and the other *ill*: the observation is seasonable and judicious; for this dangerous *school-opinion* gives great support to the *Manichean* or *Zoroastran* error, the confutation of which was one of the Author's chief ends



ends of writing. For if there be two principles in Man, a *good* and *bad*, it is natural to think him the joint product of the two *Manichean* deities (the first of which contributed to his *reason*, the other to his *passions*) rather than the creature of *one individual cause*. This was *Plutarch's* notion, and, as we may see in him, of the more ancient *Manicheans*. It was of importance therefore to reprobate and subvert a notion that served to the support of so dangerous an error. And this the Poet has done with more force and clearness than is often to be found in whole volumes wrote against that heretical opinion:

Let subtile schoolmen teach these friends to fight,  
More studious to *divide*, than to unite;  
And grace and virtue, sense and reason split,  
With all the rash dexterity of wit.

But the *French* Translator has mistaken these lines for a reflection, not on the *theology*, as Mr. *Pope* intended them, but on the *logic* of the *schools*, with which the Poet had here nothing to do. This, it is true, delights in *distinctions* without *difference*, which is indeed a fault, but not of so high malignity as the other: *that*, which the Poet censures, leading directly into error; *this*, which his Translator reproves, only hindering our progress in truth or science.

Qu'un scholastique vain cherchant à discourir  
Cache la verité loin de la découvrir,  
Que, par un long tissu d'argumens inutiles,  
Par des tours ambigus, par des raisons inutiles,  
Voulant tout diviser jusques à l'infini,  
Il separe avec art ce qui doit être uni.

Now, though this fault in the *logic of the schools* be universally owned and coudemned by all *out of them*, and by no one more than by Mr. *De Crousaz* himself, in his books of *logic*, yet in pure contradiction to Mr. *Pope*, who, as he thought, had condemned it, he could not forbear saying, *A poet may happen to write with more elegance than a schoolman, and yet for all that not be able to express himself with more justness and precision\**.

The Poet having given this account of the nature of

\* *Commentaire*, p. 152.

*self-love* in general, comes now to *anatomize* it, in a discourse of the PASSIONS, which he aptly names the *Modes of Self-love*; the object of all these, he shews [from l. 82 to 91] is *good*; and when under the guidance of reason, *real good*; either of our own, or of another; for some goods not being capable of division or communication, and *reason*, at the same time, directing us to provide for ourselves, we therefore, in pursuit of these objects, sometimes aim at *our own* good, sometimes at the good of *others*; when fairly aiming at our own, the *passion* is called *prudence*, when at another's, *virtue*.

Hence (as he shews from l. 90 to 95) appears the folly of the *Stoics*, who would *eradicate* the passions, things so necessary both to the good of the *individual*, and of the *kind*. Which preposterous method of promoting virtue, he therefore very reasonably reproveth. But as it was from observation of the evils occasioned by the passions, that the *Stoics* thus extravagantly projected their extirpation, the Poet recurs [from l. 94 to 101] to his grand principle, so often before, and to so good purpose, insisted on, that

—*partial ill is universal good*:

and shews, that, though the tempest of the passions, like that of the air, may tear and ravage some few parts of nature in its passage, yet the salutary agitation produced by it preserves the whole in life and vigour. This is his *first* argument against the *Stoics*, which he illustrates by a very beautiful similitude, on a hint taken from Scripture story\*:

Nor God alone in the *still calm* we find,  
He mounts the *storm*, and walks upon the wind.

But the Translator, not taking this allusion, has turn'd it thus:

Dieu lui-même, Dieu sort de son *profond repos*.

And so has made an *epicurean* god of the Governor of the Universe, of whom Scripture afforded Mr. Pope this grand and sublime idea. Mr. De Crousaz does not spare this expression of *God's coming out of his profound repose*.—It is (says he) *excessively poetical*, and presents

*us with ideas which we ought not to dwell upon.* But when he goes on—(*there is nothing in God's directing the storm which can authorize the passions that disturb our happiness\**), he talks very inaptly. Mr. Pope is not here arguing from *analogy*, that as God raises and heightens the *storm*, so should we raise and heighten the *passions*. The words are only a simple affirmation in the poetic dress of a similitude, to this purpose—"Good is "not only produced by the subdual of the passions, but "by the turbulent exercise of them:"

Nor *God* alone in the still calm we find,  
He mounts the *storm*, and walks upon the wind.

A truth conveyed under the most sublime imagery that poetry could conceive or paint. For he is here only shewing the providential effects of the passions, and how, by *God's* gracious disposition, they are turned away from their natural bias, to promote the happiness of mankind. As to the method in which they are to be treated by *Man*, in whom they are found, all that he contends for, in favour of them, is only this, that they should not be quite rooted up and destroyed, as the *Stoics*, and their followers in all religions, foolishly attempted. For the rest, he constantly repeats this advice:

The action of the *stronger* to suspend,  
REASON still use, to REASON still attend.

His *second* argument against the *Stoics* [from l. 100 to 113] is, that *passions* go to the composition of a *moral character*, just as *elementary particles* go to the composition of an *organized body*: therefore, for *Man* to go about to destroy what composes his very being, is the height of extravagance: it is true, he tells us that these *passions* which in their natural state, like *elements*, are in perpetual jar, must be tempered, softened, and united, in order to perfect the work of the *great plastic artist*; who, in this office, employs human *reason*: whose business it is to follow the *road of Nature*, and to observe the *dictates of the Deity*. Follow her and God. The use and importance of this precept is evident: for in doing the *first*, she will discover the absurdity of attempting to

\* Commentaire, p. 158. /

eradicate the passions ; in doing the *second*, she will learn how to make them subservient to the interest of virtue :

Suffice that reason keep to *Nature's* road,  
 Subject, compound them, follow *her* and *God*.  
 Love, hope, and joy, fair pleasure's smiling train,  
 Hate, fear, and grief, the family of pain,  
 These mixt with art, and to due bounds confin'd,  
 Make and maintain the balance of the mind.

His *third* argument against the *Stoics* [from l. 112 to 117] is, that the passions occasion in us a perpetual excitement to the pursuit of happiness ; which without these powerful inciters we should neglect, in an insensible indolence. Now *happiness* is the *end* of our creation ; and this *excitement* the *means* of *happiness* : therefore these movers, the *passions*, are the instruments of God, which he has put into the hands of reason, to work withal :

Pleasures are ever in our hands or eyes,  
 And when in act they cease, in prospect rise ;  
 Present to grasp, and future still to find,  
 The whole employ of body and of mind.

The Poet then proceeds in his subject ; and this last observation leads him naturally to the discussion of his next principle. He shews then, that though all the *passions* have their turn in swaying the determinations of the mind, yet every man has one MASTER PASSION that at length stifles or absorbs all the rest. The *fact* he illustrates at large, in the *first epistle of his second book*. Here [from l. 116 to 132] he gives us the *cause* of it :  
 " Those pleasures or goods, which are the objects of the  
 " passions, affect the mind, by striking on the senses ;  
 " but, as through the formation of the organs of the  
 " human frame, every man has some sense stronger and  
 " more acute than others, the object, which strikes that  
 " stronger or acuter sense, whatever it be, will be the  
 " object most desired ; and, consequently, the pursuit of  
 " that will be the *ruling passion* : "

All spread their charms, but charm not all alike,  
 On different senses different objects strike ;  
 Hence different passions more or less inflame,  
 As strong, or weak, the organs of the frame ;

And

And hence one *master passion* in the breast,  
Like *Aaron's* serpent, swallows all the rest.

—that the difference of force in this *ruling passion* shall at first, perhaps, be very small or even imperceptible; but *nature, habit, imagination, wit*, nay even *reason* itself, shall assist its growth, till it hath at length drawn and converted every other into itself.

All this is delivered in a strain of poetry so wonderfully sublime, as suspends for a while the *ruling passion* in every reader, and ingrosses his whole admiration:

As Man, perhaps, the moment of his breath  
Receives the lurking principle of death;  
The young disease, that must subdue at length,  
Grows with his growth, and strengthens with his  
So, cast and mingled with his very frame, [strength:  
The mind's disease, its *RULING PASSION* came:  
Each vital humour which should feed the whole,  
Soon flows to this, in body and in soul;  
Whatever warms the heart, or fills the head,  
As the mind opens, and its functions spread,  
Imagination plies her dangerous art,  
And pours it all upon the peccant part.  
Nature its mother, habit is its nurse;  
*Wit*, spirit, faculties, but make it worse;  
*Reason itself* but gives it edge and power,  
As Heaven's blest beam turns vinegar more sour\*.

This naturally leads the Poet to lament the *weakness and insufficiency of human reason* [from l. 138 to 151]; and the honest purpose he had in so doing was, plainly to intimate the necessity of a more sublime dispensation to mankind:

We, wretched subjects, though to lawful sway,  
In this weak queen some fav'rite still obey.

\* The Poet, in some other of his *Epistles*, gives examples of the doctrine and precepts here delivered. Thus, in that of the Use of Riches, he has illustrated this truth in the character of *Cotta*:

Old *Cotta* sham'd his fortune and his birth,  
Yet was not *Cotta* void of wit or worth.  
What though (the use of barb'rous spits forgot)  
His kitchen vied in coolness with his grot?  
If *Cotta* liv'd on pulse, it was no more  
Than *bramins, saints, and sages*, did before.

Ah! if she lend not *arms* as well as rules,  
 What can she more than tell us we are fools?  
 Teach us to mourn our nature, not to mend,  
 A sharp accuser, but a helpless friend!

St. *Paul* himself did not chuse to employ other arguments, when disposed to give us the highest idea of the usefulness of *Christianity* \*. But, it may be, the Poet finds a remedy in *natural religion*: Far from it. He here leaves reason unrelieved. What is this then but an intimation that we ought to seek for a cure in that religion which only dares profess to give it?

But Mr. *De Crousaz* says, the Poet, in this representation of human reason, has contradicted what he said of it in the 80th and 98th lines of this Epistle. And, possessed with this notion, he goes on, in his declamatory way, so unworthy a grave logician: *Does Mr. Pope take a pleasure in blowing hot and cold, in giving us successively the sweet and bitter, to reduce us to such a state that we may not know what to stick to? If there be no ill design at bottom in these contradictions, but that they only spring from the imprudent custom, established in the schools, of talking Pro and Con †, &c.* And then tells an idle common-place story of Cardinal *Perron*. In the mean time it happens that this is no contradiction at all, or, if it be, it is that very contradiction into which St. *Paul* likewise fell, when he so continually recommended the use of reason, and yet so energetically described its imbecility and impotence. But as our *Logician* said before, on a like occasion, *this might be edifying in a good man, yet give scandal in an ill one.*

To proceed: As it appears from the account here given of the *ruling passion*, and its *cause*, which results from the structure of the organs, that it is the *road of nature*, the Poet shews [from l. 150 to 157] that this road is to be followed. So that the office of reason is not to direct us what passion to exercise, but to assist us in RECTIFYING, and keeping within due bounds, that which Nature hath so strongly impressed; for that

A mightier Power the strong direction sends,  
 And several men impels to several ends.

\* Epistle to the Romans, c. vii.

† Comment. p. 166.

Here Mr. *De Crousaz* pours out the full stream of his candour and politeness, in his criticism on these lines :

Yet Nature's road must ever be preferr'd ;  
Reason is here no guide, but still a guard ;  
'Tis her's to RECTIFY, not overthrow,  
And treat *this passion* more as friend than foe.

*The only refuge I have here left* (says he) *is to suppose that Mr. Pope thought the very mention of this notion would be sufficient to expose the absurdity and horror of it, and of those who regulate their conduct on such unrighteous and shocking ideas. And I conceive I should do M. l'Abbé de Sep-Fontaines much injustice, if I did not believe this was his intention in translating this passage. But, to have a more perfect idea of the ridicule and horror of it, let us put the words into the mouth of a confessor\**, &c. And so he goes gayly on †, to represent a ghostly father encouraging his penitents in their several vices on Mr. Pope's pretended principles. But we shall spoil his mirth, by only assuring him, that the Poet's precept can have no other meaning than this, "That as the *ruling passion* is implanted by *Nature*, it "is Reason's office to regulate, direct, and restrain, but "not to overthrow it. To regulate the passion of *avarice*, "for instance, into a parsimonious dispensation of the "public revenues ; to direct the passion of *love*, whose "object is worth and beauty,

"To the first *good*, first *perfect*, and first *fair* ‡,  
"as his master *Plato* advises ; and to restrain *spleen*, to  
"a contempt and hatred of vice." This is what the Poet meant, and what every unprejudiced man could not but see he must needs mean, by RECTIFYING THE MASTER PASSION, though he had not *confined* us to this sense, in the *reason* he gives of his *precept*, in these words :

A mightier Power the strong direction sends,  
And several men impels to several ends.

For what ends are they which God impels to, but the ends of virtue ?

\* Commentaire, p. 170. † Id. 171, 172.

‡ Τὸ καλὸν—τ' ἀγαθόν.

But for a *more perfect idea* (to speak in his own free terms) of the *ridicule* of our Logician's Comment, let us attend to what he remarks on these two last lines. *These words* (says he) *may be understood in more than one sense, which is not rare, and may have a more or less restrained meaning. They are susceptible of a sense extravagant and injurious to Providence, and they will admit of a reasonable one, and very worthy our attention\**. Here we see, he doubts about the meaning of the *reason* of the precept; admits it may have a good one; and yet condemns, without hesitation, and in the grossest and most shocking terms, the *precept* itself; whose meaning must yet, according to all rational rules, even those of his own logic, if it have any such, be determined by the *reason* of it.

But to return. The Poet having proved that the *ruling passion* (since Nature hath given it us) is not to be overthrown, but *rectified*, the next inquiry will be of what use the *ruling passion* is; for an *use* it must have, if reason be to treat it thus mildly? *This* use he shews us [from l. 156 to 187] is twofold, *natural* and *moral*.

1. Its *natural* use is to conduct men steddily to *one certain end*, who would otherwise be eternally fluctuating between the *equal* violence of various and discordant passions, driving them up and down at random:

Like varying winds, by *other* passions tost,  
*This* drives them constant to a certain coast;

and by that means enables them to promote the *good of society*, by making each a contributor to the common stock.

Let *power* or *knowledge*, *gold* or *glory* please,  
 Or (oft more strong than all) the *love of ease*:  
*Through* life 'tis follow'd.—

2. Its *moral* use is to ingraft our *ruling virtue* upon it:

Th' eternal art, educing good from ill,  
 Grafts on this passion our *best principle*;

and by that means enables us to promote *our own good* by turning the exorbitancy of the *ruling passion* into its *neighbouring virtue*:

\* Commentaire, p. 174.



See *anger*, zeal and fortitude supply ;  
 Ev'n *avarice*, prudence ; *sloth*, philosophy :  
 Nor virtue, male or female, can we name,  
 But what will grow on pride, or grow on shame.

The wisdom of the divine Artist is, as the Poet finely observes, very illustrious in this contrivance : For the mind and body having now one common interest, the efforts of virtue will have their force infinitely augmented :

'Tis thus the mercury of Man is fixt,  
 Strong grows the virtue with his nature mixt ;  
 The dross cements what else were too refin'd,  
 And in *one int'rest body acts with mind*.

But lest it should be objected that this account favours the doctrine of *necessity*, and would insinuate that men are *only acted upon* in the production of good out of evil ; the Poet teacheth [from l. 186 to 193] that Man is a *free agent*, and hath it in his *own power* to turn the natural passions into *virtues* or into *vices*, properly so called :

*Reason* the bias turns from good to ill,  
 And *Nero* reigns a *Titus*, if he *WILL*.

*Secondly*, If it should be objected, that though the Poet doth indeed tell us some actions are *beneficial* and some *hurtful*, yet he could not call those *virtuous*, nor these *vicious*, because, as he has described things, the *motive* appears to be only *gratification of some passion* ; give me leave to answer for him, that this would be mistaking the argument, which in this epistle [to l. 239] considers the passions *only with regard to society*, that is, with regard to their *effects* rather than their *motives*. That however it is his design to teach that actions are *properly virtuous and vicious* ; and though it be difficult to distinguish *genuine* virtue from *spurious*, they having both the same *appearance*, and both the same *public effects* ; yet they may be disembarrassed. If it be asked, by what means ? He replies [from l. 192 to 195] by *conscience*, which is sufficient to the purpose ; for 'tis only a man's *own* concern, to know whether his virtue be pure and solid ; for what is that to *others*, while the effect of this virtue, whether real or unsubstantial, is, as to *them*, the same ?

This light and darkness, in our chaos join'd,  
 What shall divide ? *The God within the mind*.

A Platonic

A *Platonic* phrase for CONSCIENCE; and here employed with great judgment and propriety. For *conscience* either signifies, *speculatively*, the judgment we pass of things upon whatever principles we chance to have; and then it is only OPINION, a very unable judge and *divider*: Or else, it signifies, *practically*, the application of the *eternal rule of right* (received by us as the *law of God*) to the regulation of our actions; and then it is properly CONSCIENCE, *The God* (or the law of God) *within the mind*, of power to divide the light from the darkness in this chaos of the passions.

But still it will be said, why all this difficulty to distinguish true virtue from false? The Poet shews *why* [from l. 194 to 201.] “That though indeed vice and “virtue so invade each other’s bounds, that sometimes “we can scarce tell where one ends and the other begins, “yet great purposes are serv’d thereby, no less than the “perfecting the constitution of the whole; as lights and “shades, which run into one another in a well-wrought “picture, make the harmony and spirit of the composition.” But on this account to say there is neither *vice* nor *virtue*, the Poet shews [from l. 200 to 207] would be just as wise as to say there is neither *black* nor *white*; because the shade of *that*, and the light of *this*, often run into one another:

Ask your *own heart*, and nothing is so plain;  
’Tis to mistake them costs the time and *pain*.

This is an error of *speculation*, which leads men so foolishly to conclude, that there is neither *vice* nor *virtue*.

2. There is another of *practice*, which hath more common and fatal effects; and is next considered [from l. 206 to 211:] It is this, that though, at the first aspect, *Vice* be so horrible as to affright all beholders, yet, when by habit we are once grown familiar with her, we first suffer, and in time begin to lose the memory of her nature:

Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,  
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;  
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,  
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

Which necessarily implies an equal ignorance in the  
nature

nature of *virtue*. Hence men conclude, that there is neither one nor the other.

But it is not only that *extreme of vice next to virtue*, which betrays us into these mistakes: We are deceived too, as he shews us [from l. 210 to 221], by our observations about the *other extreme*.

But where th' extreme of vice was ne'er agreed :  
Ask where's the North? at York 'tis on the *Tweed*;  
In *Scotland*, at the *Orcades*; and there  
At *Greenland*, *Zembla*, or the Lord knows where.

For, from the *extreme* of vice's being unsettled, and perpetually shifting, men conclude, that *vice itself* is only nominal.

3. There is yet a *third* cause of this error of *no vice no virtue*, composed of the other two, *i. e.* partly *speculative*, and partly *practical*: and this also the Poet considers [from l. 220 to 229], shewing it ariseth from the *imperfection* of the *best* characters, and the *inequality* of *all*; whence it happens that no man is extremely virtuous or vicious, nor extremely constant in pursuit of either. Why it so happens, the Poet assigns an admirable reason in this line :

For, vice or virtue, *SELF directs it still*.

An adherence or regard to what is, in the sense of the world, a *man's own interest*, making an extreme in either impossible. Its effect in keeping a good man from the *extreme of virtue* needs no explanation : And in an ill man, *self-interest* shewing him the necessity of some kind of reputation, the procuring and preserving *that* will necessarily keep him from the *extreme of vice*.

The mention of this principle that *self directs vice and virtue*, and its consequence, which is, that

Each individual seeks a several Goal,  
leads the Author to observe

That Heaven's great view is one, and that the whole ;  
and this brings him naturally round again to his main subject, namely, *God's producing good out of ill*, which he prosecutes in his inimitable manner [from l. 228 to 239.]

That counterworks each folly and caprice ;  
 That disappoints th' effect of ev'ry vice :  
 That happy frailties to all ranks apply'd,  
 Shame to the virgin, to the matron pride,  
 Fear to the statesman, rashness to the chief,  
 To kings presumption, and to crowds belief.

I. *Hitherto* the Poet hath been employed in discoursing of the *use of the passions*, with regard to society at large, and in freeing his doctrine from *objections*. This is the *first* general division of the subject of *this Epistle*.

II. He comes to shew [from l. 238 to 251] the use of these passions, *with regard to the more conjoined circle of our friends, relations, and acquaintance*. And this is the *second* general division :

*Wants, frailties, passions*, closer still ally  
 The common int'rest, or endear the tie :  
 To *these* we owe true friendship, love sincere,  
 Each homefelt joy that *life* inherits here :  
 Yet from *the same* we learn in *its* decline  
 Those joys, those loves, those int'rests to resign.

As these lines seem not to have been understood by the *Translator*, and are scandalously misrepresented by the *Commentator*, who would insinuate them to be a kind of approbation of *suicide*\*, I shall here give the reader their plain and obvious meaning.

"To these frailties (says he) we owe all the endearments of private life ; yet, when we come to that age, which generally disposes men to think more seriously of the true value of things, and, consequently, of their provision for a future state, the consideration that the *grounds of those joys, loves and friendships*, are *wants, frailties and passions*, proves the best expedient to wean us from the *world*, a disengagement so friendly to that provision we are now making for *another*." The observation is new, and would in any place be extremely beautiful, but has *here* an infinite grace and propriety, as it so well confirms, by an instance of great moment, the Poet's general thesis, *That God makes ill, at every step, productive of good*.

III. The Poet having thus shewn the use of the

\* *Commentaire*, p. 206.

passions in *society* and in *domestic life*, he comes in *the last place* [from l. 250 to the end] to shew their use to *the individual*, even in their *illusions*; the imaginary happiness they present helping to make the real miseries of life less insupportable. And this is his *third* general division:

—*Opinion* gilds with varying rays  
 Those painted clouds that beautify our days :  
 Each want of happiness by hope supply'd,  
 And each vacuity of sense by pride.  
 'These build as fast as knowledge can destroy :  
 In folly's cup still laughs the bubble joy ;  
 One prospect lost, another still we gain ;  
 And not a vanity is given in vain.

Which must needs vastly raise our idea of God's goodness, who hath not only provided more than a counter-balance of *real* happiness to human miseries, but hath even, in his infinite compassion, bestowed on those, who were so foolish as not to have made this provision, an *imaginary* happiness ; that they may not be *quite* overborne with the load of human miseries. This is the Poet's great and noble thought, as strong and solid as it is new and ingenious. But so strangely perverse is his *Commentator*, that he will suppose him to mean any thing rather than what the obvious drift of his argument requires ; yet, to say truth, cares not much in what sense you take it, so you will believe him that Mr. *Pope's* general design was to represent human life as *one grand illusion fatally conducted*. But if the rules of *logic* serve for any other purpose than to countenance the passions and prejudices of such writers, it may be demonstrated, that what the Poet here teaches is only this, " That these  
 " illusions are the follies of men, which they *wilfully*  
 " fall into, and through their own *fault*; thereby depriv-  
 " ing themselves of much happiness, and exposing them-  
 " selves to equal misery : But that still God (according  
 " to his universal way of working) graciously turns these  
 " follies so far to the advantage of his miserable crea-  
 " tures, as to be the *present* solace and support of their  
 " distresses,"

—Tho' Man's a fool, yet God is wise.

LETTER

## LETTER III.

WE are now got to the *Third Epistle* of the *Essay on Man*. Mr. *Pope*, in explaining the origin, use, and end of the passions, in the *second Epistle*, having shewn that Man has *social* as well as *selfish* passions; that doctrine naturally introduceth the *third*, which treats of Man as a *SOCIAL* animal; and connects it with the *second*, which considered him as an *INDIVIDUAL*. And as the conclusion from the subject of the *First Epistle* made the Introduction to the *Second*, so here again, the conclusion of the *Second*,

Ev'n mean self-love becomes, by force divine,  
The scale to measure others wants by thine,  
makes the Introduction to the *Third*:

Here then we rest; the Universal Cause  
Acts to *one* end, but acts by *various* laws.

The reason of *variety* in those laws, all which tend to *one* and the same end, the good of the *whole*, generally, is, because the good of the *individual* is likewise to be provided for; both which together make up the good of the whole *universally*. And this is the cause, as the Poet says elsewhere, that

Each individual seeks a *several* goal. Ep. ii. l. 227.

But to prevent their resting *there*, God has made each need the assistance of another: and so,

On mutual wants, built mutual happiness.

Ep. iii. l. 112.

It was necessary to explain these two first lines, the better to see the pertinency and force of what follows [from l. 2 to 7] where the Poet warns such to take notice of this truth, whose circumstances placing them in an *imaginary* station of independence, and a *real* one of insensibility to mutual wants (from whence general happiness results) make them but too apt to overlook the true system of things; such as those in *full health* and *opulence*. This caution was necessary with regard to  
*society*;

*society*; but still more necessary with regard to *religion*: therefore he especially recommends the memory of it both to clergy and laity, when they *preach* or *pray*; because the *preacher* who does not consider the *First Cause* under this view, as a Being consulting the good of the whole, must needs give a very *unworthy* idea of him: And the suppliant, who prays as one not related to a *whole*, or as disregarding the happiness of it, will not only pray in *vain*, but *offend* his Maker, by an impious attempt to counterwork his dispensation:

In all the madness of superfluous *health*,  
 The trim of *pride*, the impudence of *wealth*,  
 Let this great truth be present night and day,  
 But most be present, if we *preach* or *pray*.

The Translator, not seeing into the admirable purposes of this caution, hath quite dropt the most material circumstances contained in the *last* line; and, what is worse, for the sake of a foolish antithesis, hath destroyed the whole propriety of the thought, in the *first* and *second*, and so, between both, hath left his Author neither sense nor system,

Dans le sein du bonheur, ou de l'*adversité*.

Now, of all men, those *in adversity* have the least need of this caution, as being the least apt to forget *that God consults the good of the whole, and provides for it, by procuring mutual happiness by means of mutual wants*: Because such as yet retain the smart of any fresh calamity are most compassionate to others labouring under the same misfortunes, and most prompt and ready to relieve them.

The Poet then introduceth his system of human *sociability* [l. 7, 8] by shewing it to be the dictate of the Creator, and that *Man*, in *this*, did but follow the example of *general nature*, which is united in *one close system of benevolence*:

Look round our world; behold the chain of love  
 Combining all below, and all above.

This he proves, *first* [from l. 8 to 13] (on the noble theory of *attraction*) from the *œconomy* of the *material world*; where there is a general conspiracy in all the particles

cles of matter to work for one end ; the use, beauty, and harmony of the whole mass.

## I.

See plastic Nature working to this end,  
The single atoms each to other tend,  
Attract, attracted to, the next in place  
*Form'd and impell'd* it's neighbour to embrace.

*Formed and impelled*, says he. These are not words of a loose undistinguished meaning, thrown in to fill up the verse. This is not our Author's way, they are full of sense ; and of the most philosophical precision. For to make matter so *cohere* as to fit it for the uses intended by its Creator, a proper configuration of its insensible parts is as necessary as that quality so equally and universally conferred upon it, called *attraction*.

But here again the Translator, mistaking this description of the *preservation* of the material universe by the principle of attraction, for a description of its *creation*, has quite destroyed the Poet's fine analogical argument, by which he proves, from the circumstance of mutual attraction in matter, that man, while he seeks society, and thereby promotes the good of his species, co-operates with God's *general dispensation*. For the circumstance of a *creation* proves nothing but a *Creator* :

Voi du *sein du chaos* eclater la lumiere.

Chaque atome ebranlé courir pour s'embrasser, &c.

The Poet's *second* argument [from l. 12 to 27] is taken from the *vegetable* and *animal world* ; whose beings serve *mutually* for the production, support, and sustentation of each other.

## II.

See matter next, with various life endued,  
Press to one centre still, *the general good* ;  
See dying vegetables life sustain,  
See life dissolving vegetate again :  
All forms that perish, other forms supply,  
By turns they catch the vital breath, and die ;  
Like bubbles to the sea of matter born,  
They rise, they break, and to that sea return, &c.

One



One would wonder what should have induced Mr. *l'Abbé* to translate the two last lines, thus :

*Sort du neant y rentre, et reparoit au jour.*

*Comes out of nothing, and enters back again into nothing.*

But he is generally as consistently wrong as his author is right. For having, as we observed, mistaken the Poet's account of the *preservation* of the *material* world, for the *creation* of it; he makes the very same mistake with regard to the *vegetable* and *animal*; and so comes in here (indeed rather of the latest) with his *production of things out of nothing*.

I should not have taken notice of this mistake, but for Mr. *De Crousaz's* ready remark. "Mr. *Pope*, says he, "descends even to the most vulgar prejudices; when he "tells us, that *each being comes out of nothing*, the "common people think that that which disappears is "annihilated. The atoms, the smallest particles, the "roots of terrestrial bodies subsist\*," &c. But who it is that descends to the worst *vulgar prejudices*, the reader will see when he is told that Mr. *De Crousaz* knew very well that Mr. *Pope* said not one word of each being's *going back into nothing*; both from his not finding it in the prose Translator, and from *Resnel's* confession in his preface, that he had taken great liberties with his original.

But this part of the argument, in which the Poet tells us, that God

Connects each Being, greatest with the least;  
Made beast in aid of Man, and Man of beast;  
*All serv'd, all serving*——

awaking again the old *pride* of his adversaries, who cannot bear that *Man* should be thought to be *serving* as well as *served*; he takes this occasion *again to humble* them [from l. 26 to 53] by the same kind of argument he had so successfully employed in the *first* Epistle, and which our *first* Letter has considered at large.

However, his adversaries, loth to give up the question,

\* *Commentaire*, p. 221.

will reason upon the matter; and we are now to suppose them objecting against Providence in this manner:—We grant, say they, that in the *irrational*, as in the *inanimate* creation, *all is served, and all is serving*. But, with regard to Man, the case is different; he stands single. For his *reason* hath endowed him both with power and address, sufficient to make all things *serve him*; and his *self-love*, of which you have so largely provided for him, will dispose him, in his turn, *to serve none*. Therefore your theory is imperfect.—“Not so, replies the Poet [from “l. 52 to 83]: I grant you, Man indeed affects to be *the wit and tyrant of the whole*, and would fain shake off

—That chain of love,

Combining all below and all above:

“But Nature, even by the *very gift of reason*, checks this *tyrant*: For *reason* endowing Man with the ability of setting together the *memory* of the past, and *conjecture* about the future; and past misfortunes making him apprehensive of more to come, this disposes him to pity and relieve others in a *state* of suffering. And the passion growing habitual, naturally extends its effects to all that have a *sense* of suffering. Now as brutes have neither Man's *reason*, nor his inordinate *self-love* to draw them from the system of benevolence, so they wanted not, and therefore have not, this *human sympathy* of another's misery. By which passion we see those qualities, in Man, balance one another, and so retain him in that general *order*, in which Providence has placed its whole creation. But this is not all; Man's interest, amusement, vanity, and luxury, tie him still closer to the system of benevolence, by obliging him to provide for the support of other animals; and though it be, for the most part, only to devour them with the greatest gust, yet this does not abate the proper happiness of the animals so preserved, to whom *Providence has not given the useless knowledge of their end*. From all which it appears, that the theory is yet uniform, and perfect.

Grant that the powerful still the weak controul,  
Be Man the wit and tyrant of the whole:

Nature

Nature that tyrant checks ; he only knows  
 And helps another creature's wants and wocs.  
 Say, will the falcon, stooping from above,  
 Smit with her varying plumage, spare the dove?  
 Admires the jay the insect's gilded wings,  
 (Or hears the hawk when *Philomela* sings?  
 Man cares for all, &c.—  
 For some his interest prompts him to provide,  
 For more his pleasure, yet for more his pride.

This is the force of this fine and noble argument. The senseless and scandalous reflections of Mr. *De Crousaz* on the latter part of it, I have refuted in my former Letter.

But even to this, as a *caviller* would still object, we must suppose him so to do, and say—Admit you have shewn that Nature hath endowed all animals, whether human or brutal, with such faculties as admirably fit them to promote the *general good*: yet, in its care for *this*, hath not Nature neglected to provide for the *private* good of the individual? We have cause to think it hath, and we suppose that it was on this exclusive consideration that it kept back from brutes the gift of *reason* (so necessary a means of *private* happiness), because *reason*, as we find in the instance of Man, where there is occasion for all the complicated contrivance you have described above, to make the effects of his *passions* counterwork the immediate powers of his *reason*, in order to keep him subservient to the *general* system; *reason*, we say, naturally tends to draw beings into a *private*, independent system.

This the Poet answers by shewing [from l. 82 to 100] that the *happiness* of *animal* and *human* life is widely different. The happiness of human life consisting in the improvement of the mind, can be procured by *reason* only: but the happiness of animal life consisting in the gratifications of sense, is best promoted by *instinct*. And, with regard to the regular and constant operation of each, in *that*, instinct hath plainly the advantage: for *here* God directs *immediately*; *there*, only *mediately*, through Man:

Reason,

Reason, however able, cool at best,  
 Cares not for service, or but serves when prest ;  
 Stays till we call, and then not often near ;  
 But honest instinct comes a volunteer.  
 And reason raise o'er instinct as you can,  
 In this 'tis *God directs*, in that 'tis *Man*.

The Commentator (who I will, in charity, suppose saw nothing of this fine and sober reasoning, nor was apprehensive of the *objection* which occasioned it, though that objection arises directly from the subject) accuseth the Poet of designing to *represent brutes as perfect as Man, who is* (says he) *of a nature susceptible of religion*\*. But if our Commentator could not see the chain of reasoning, he might yet, methinks, have attended to this plain denunciation of the Poet, which introduceth the discourse that gives him so much offence :

Whether with reason or with instinct blest,  
*Know* all enjoy the power, *which suits them best* :  
 To bliss alike by that direction tend,  
*And find the means proportion'd to the end*.

Which shews the *perfection* here spoken of not to be a perfection *equalled* to that of another being, but only such an one as is *proportioned* to the being itself, of whom this perfection is predicated.

The Poet now comes to the *main* subject of his Epistle, the proof of Man's SOCIABILITY, from the two general societies composed by him; the NATURAL, subject to *paternal* authority; and the CIVIL, subject to that of a magistrate: which he hath had the address to introduce, from what had preceded, in so easy and natural a manner, as shews him to have the art of giving all the grace to the dryness and severity of method, as well as wit to the strength and depth of reason. For the philosophic nature of his work requiring he should shew by what means those societies were introduced, this affords him an opportunity of sliding gracefully and easily from the *preliminaries* into the *main subject*; and so of giving his work that perfection of method, which we find only in the compositions of great writers.

For having just before, though to a different purpose,

\* *Commentaire*, p. 229,

described the power of bestial instinct to attain the happiness of the *individual*, he goes on in speaking of instinct as it is serviceable both to *that*, and to the *kind* [from l. 108 to 148] to illustrate the original of society. He shews, that though, as he had before observed, God had founded the proper bliss of each creature in the *nature* of its own *being*, yet these not being independent individuals, but parts of a whole, God, to bless that whole, built mutual happiness on mutual wants: now for the supply of mutual wants, creatures must necessarily come together; which is the first ground of society amongst men:

Whate'er of life all-quickenin' æther keeps,  
Or breathes through air, or shoots beneath the deeps,  
Or pours profuse on earth; one Nature feeds  
The vital flame, and swells the genial seeds.  
Not Man alone, but all that roam the wood,  
Or wing the sky, or roll along the flood,  
Each loves itself, but not itself alone,  
Each sex desires alike, till two are one.

He then proceeds to that called *natural*, subject to *paternal* authority, and arising from the union of the two sexes; describes the imperfect image of it in brutes; then explains it at large in all its causes and effects: and, lastly, shews, that as IN FACT, like mere *animal* society, it is founded and preserved by mutual wants, the supply of which causes mutual happiness; so is it likewise in RIGHT, as a *rational* society, by equity, gratitude, and the observance of the relation of things in general:

Reflection, reason, still the ties improve;  
At once extend the int'rest, and the love:  
With choice we fix, with sympathy we burn,  
Each virtue in each passion takes its turn;  
And still new needs, new helps, new habits, rise,  
That graft benevolence on charities.  
Men's joy and forecast just returns engage,  
That pointed back to youth, this on to age;  
While pleasure, gratitude, and hope combin'd,  
Still spread the int'rest, and preserv'd the kind.

But the Atheist and *Hobbist*, against whom Mr. *Pope* writes,

writes, deny the principle of *right*, or of *natural justice*, before the invention of *civil compact*, which, they say, gave being to it: And accordingly have had the effrontery publicly to declare, *that a state of nature was a state of war*. This quite subverts the Poet's *natural society*: Therefore, after his *account* of *that* state, he proceeds to support the *reality* of it, by overthrowing the oppugnant principle of *no natural justice*; which he does [from l. 147 to 170] by shewing, in a fine description of *the state of innocence*, as represented in Scripture, that a state of nature was so far from being without *natural justice*, that it was, at first, the *reign of God*, where *right* and *truth* universally prevailed:

Nor think, in Nature's state they blindly trod,  
The state of Nature was the reign of God.  
Self-love, and social, at her birth began,  
Union, the bond of all things, and of Man.  
Pride then was not; nor *arts*, that pride to aid;  
Man walk'd with beast, joint tenant of the shade.

Now let us hear Mr. *De Crousaz*, who tells us, *he had redoubled his attention upon this Epistle*\*.—Mr. *Pope* (says he) *speaks with the assurance of an eye-witness of what passed in this first age of the world*†.—And why should he not, when conducted by his faith in Scripture history?—*That which he here represents*, says he, *is much less credible in itself, than that which Moses teacheth us*†. Now what must we think of our Logician's faith, who taking it for granted, that Mr. *Pope* would not borrow of *Moses*, has here condemned, before he was aware, the credibility of Scripture history? For the account here given of the *state of innocence* is indeed no other than that of *Moses* himself.

He goes on—*This religion, common to brutes and men, insinuates to us, that, in those happy times, men had no more religion than brutes*†.

This shrewd reflection points at the following lines:

In the same temple, the resounding wood,  
All vocal beings hymn'd their equal God.

But does not the Poet speak, in this very place, of Man, as officiating in the priestly office at the altar,

\* Commentaire, p. 218.

† Ib. p. 240.

and offering up his blameless eucharistical sacrifice to Heaven?

The shrine with gore unstain'd, with gold undrest,  
Unbrib'd, unbloody, stood the blameless priest.

As to the line,

All vocal beings hymn'd their equal God,  
our Logician should be sent to Scripture for its meaning;  
who, had he been as conversant with the *Psalmist* as  
with *Burgersdicius*, would have learned to have judged  
more piously as well as more charitably. The *inspired*  
Poet calling to mind (as Mr. *Pope* did here) the *age of*  
*innocence*, and full of the great ideas of those

—Chains of love,

Combining all below, and all above;

which

Draw to one point, and to one centre bring  
*Beast, man, or angel, servant, lord, or king;*

breaks out into this rapturous and divine apostrophe, to  
call back the devious Creation to its pristine rectitude;  
That very state Mr. *Pope* describes above:—"Praise  
"the Lord, all ye *angels*: praise him, all ye hosts.  
"Praise him, sun and moon: praise him, all ye stars  
"of light. Let them praise the name of the Lord: for  
"he commanded, and they were created. Praise the  
"Lord from the earth, ye dragons, and all deeps: Fire  
"and hail, snow and vapour, stormy wind fulfilling his  
"word: Mountains and all hills; fruitful trees and all  
"cedars: *Beasts* and all cattle, creeping things, and  
"flying fowl: *Kings* of the earth, and all *people*;  
"princes, and all judges of the earth: Let them praise  
"the name of the Lord; for his name alone is excellent,  
"his glory is above the earth and heaven." *Psalms*  
cxlviii.

To return. Strict method (in which, by this time, the  
reader finds the Poet more conversant than our Logician  
was aware of) leads him next to speak of that society  
which succeeded the *natural*, namely, the *civil*. But as  
he does all by easy steps, in the natural progression of  
ideas, he first explains [from l. 169 to 200] the *inter-*  
*mediate means* which led mankind from *natural* to *civil*  
society.

society. These were the *invention* and *improvement of arts*. For while mankind lived in a mere state of nature, unconscious of the arts of life, there was no need of any other government than the *paternal*; but when arts were found out and improved, then that more perfect form under the direction of a *magistrate* became necessary. And for these reasons; *First*, to bring those arts, already found, to *perfection*; and, *Secondly*, to secure the product of them to their rightful *proprietors*. The Poet, therefore, comes now, as we say, to the *invention of arts*; but being always intent on the great end for which he wrote his *Essay*, namely, to mortify that *pride*, which occasions the impious complaints against Providence, he, with the greatest art and contrivance, speaks of these *inventions*, as only lessons learnt of mere animals guided by instinct; and thus, at the same time, gives a new instance of the wonderful providence of God, who has contrived to teach mankind in a way not only proper to humble human arrogance, but to raise our idea of Infinite Wisdom to the greatest pitch. All this he does in a *prosopopæia* the most sublime that ever entered into the human imagination :

See him from *Nature* rising slow to *art* !  
 To copy *instinct* then was *reason's* part :  
 Thus then to Man the voice of Nature spake—  
 “ Go, from the Creatures thy instructions take ;  
 “ Thy arts of building from the *bee* receive,  
 “ Learn of the *mole* to plow, the *worm* to weave ;  
 “ Learn of the little *nautilus* to sail,  
 “ Spread the thin oar, and catch the driving gale, &c.  
 “ Yet go ! and thus o’er all the creatures sway,  
 “ Thus let the wiser make the rest obey,  
 “ And for those *arts* mere *instinct* could afford,  
 “ *Be crown’d as monarchs, or as gods ador’d.*”

The delicacy of the Poet's address, in the first part of the last line, is very remarkable. I observed, that, in this paragraph, he has given an account of those *intermediate means* that led mankind from *natural* to *civil* society, namely, the invention and improvement of arts. Now here, on his conclusion of this account, and entry upon the description of *civil society* itself, he connects



the two parts the most gracefully that can be conceived, by this true historical circumstance, that it was the *invention* of those arts, which raised to the magistracy, in this *new society*, now formed for the *perfecting* them.

I cannot leave this part without taking notice of the strange turn the Translator has given to these two lines :

Thus then to Man the voice of Nature spake—  
“ Go, from the Creatures thy instructions take.”

Ya Nature *indigné* alors se fit entendre ;  
Va, *malheureux* mortel, va, lui dit-elle, apprendre  
Des *plus vils* animaux.—

One would wonder what should make him represent *Nature* in such a passion at Man, and calling him names, when Mr. *Pope* supposes her in her best good humour, and Man the most *happy* in the direction here given. But what led him into this mistake was another full as gross : Mr. *Pope* having described the state of innocence, which ends at these lines,

Heaven's attribute was universal care,  
And Man's prerogative to rule, but spare,  
turns from *those* times to a view of *these latter ages*, and breaks out into this tender and humane complaint :

Ah, how unlike *the Man of times to come* !  
Of half that live the butcher and the tomb ;  
Who, foe to Nature, hears the general groan,  
Murders their species, and betrays his own, &c.

Unluckily, the Translator took this *Man of times to come*, for the corrupter of that *first age* ; and so imagined the Poet had introduced *Nature* only to set things right : he then supposed, of course, she was to be very angry, and not finding Mr. *Pope* had represented her in any great emotion, he was willing to improve upon his original.

To proceed : After all this necessary preparation, the Poet shews [from l. 199 to 211] how *civil society* followed, and the advantages it produced. But these are best described in his own words :

Great Nature spoke ; observant Men obey'd ;  
Cities were built, societies were made :  
Here rose one little state ; another near  
Grew by like means, and join'd through love, or fear.  
Did

Did here the trees with ruddier burthens bend,  
 And there the streams in purer rills descend?  
 What war could ravish, commerce could bestow,  
 And he return'd a friend, who came a foe.  
 Converse and love mankind might strongly draw,  
 When love was liberty, and nature law.  
 Thus states were form'd.—

Nothing can be juster than this account, or more corroborative of the Poet's general theory. Yet his Translator has a strange fatality in contradicting him, whenever he attempts to *paraphrase his sense*.

The first line Mr. *l'Abbé* turns thus,  
 Par ces mots la Nature excita l'industrie,  
 Et de l'Homme féroce enchaina la furie,  
 Chained up the fury of savage Man,

And so contradicts his Author's whole system of *benelolence*, and goes over to the Atheist's, who supposes the *state of nature* to be a *state of war*. That which seems to have misled him was these lines :

What war could ravish, commerce could bestow,  
 And he return'd a friend, who came a foe.

But the Translator should have considered, that though his Author maintains *a state of nature to be a state of peace*, yet he never imagined there could be *no quarrels* in it. He well knew, that *self-love drives through just and through unjust* \*. He pushes no system to an extravagance ; but steers between doctrines seemingly opposite †, or, in other words, follows truth uniformly throughout.

Having thus explained the original of *civil society*, he shews us next [from l. 210 to 216] that to this society a *civil magistrate*, properly so called, did belong : and this, in confutation of that idle hypothesis of *Hobbes*, and others ; which pretends that God conferred the *regal* title on the *fathers of families*, from whence men, when they had instituted society, were to fetch their *magistrates*. On the contrary, our Poet shews that a *king* was unknown till *common interest*, which led men to institute civil government, led them, at the same time, to institute a *governor*. However, that it is true that the same *wisdom* or *valour*, which gained *regal* obedience

\* Ep. iii. l. 270.

† See Preface.

from sons to the *sire*, procured *kings* a *paternal* authority, and made them considered as *fathers of their people*. Which probably was the *original* (and, while mistaken, continues to be the chief *support*) of that slavish error; antiquity representing its earliest monarchs under the idea of a *common father*, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν. Afterwards indeed they became a kind of *foster-fathers*, ποιμένα λαῶν, as *Homer* calls them: till at length they began to *devour* that flock they had been so long accustomed to *shear*; and, as *Plutarch* says of *Cecrops*, ἐκ χρεστῆ βασιλείῳ ἀγρίον καὶ δρακοντώδη γενόμενον ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΝ.

—the name of king unknown,

Till common int'rest plac'd the sway in one.

'Twas Virtue only (or in arts, or arms,

Diffusing blessings, or averting harms)

The same which in a sire the sons obey'd,

A prince, the father of a people made.

Our Author has good authority for his account of the origin of kingship. *Aristotle* assures us of this truth, that *'Twas Virtue only or in arts or arms*. Καθίσταται Βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπισκευῶν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιαύτη γένεσι\*.

The Poet now returns [at l. 216 to 242] to what he had left unfinished in his description of *natural society*. This, which appears irregular, is indeed a fine instance of his thorough knowledge of the art of method. I will explain it.

This third Epistle, we see, considers *Man with respect to society*; the second, *with respect to himself*; and the fourth, *with respect to happiness*. But in none of these relations does the Poet ever lose sight of him under *that* in which he stands to God; it will follow therefore, that speaking of him *with respect to society*, the account would be then most imperfect, were he not at the same time considered *with respect to his religion*; for, between these two there is a close, and, while things continue in *order*, a most *interesting* connexion.

True faith, true policy, UNITED ran;

That was but love of God, and this of Man. l. 240.

Now religion suffering no change, or depravation, when

\* Polit. lib. v. c. 10.

Man first entered into civil society, but continuing the same as in the state of nature, the Poet, to avoid repetition, and to bring the accounts of *true* and *false* religion nearer to one another, in order to *contrast* them by the advantage of that situation, deferred giving account of his *religion*, till he had spoken of the origin of *that* society. Thence it is, that he here resumes the account of the *State of Nature*, that is, so much of it as he had left untouched, which was only the *religion* of it. This consisting in the *knowledge* of one God, the Creator of all things, the Poet shews how Men came by that knowledge. That it was either found out by REASON, which, giving to every *effect* a *cause*, instructed them to go from *cause* to *cause*, till they came to the FIRST, who being *causeless*, would necessarily be judged *self-existent*: or taught by TRADITION, which preserved the memory of the creation.—He then tells us *what* these Men, undebauched by false science, understood by God's NATURE and ATTRIBUTES. 1st, Of God's *nature*; that they easily distinguished between the *Workman and the work*; and saw the *substance* of the Creator to be distinct and different from *that* of the creature; and so were in no danger of falling into the horrid opinion of the *Greek* philosophers, and their follower *Spinoza*. And simple reason teaching them, that the Creator was but *one*, they easily saw that *all was right*; and were in as little danger of falling into the *Manichean* error, which, when *oblique wit* had *broke the steady light* of reason, imagined *all was not right*, having before imagined all was not the work of *One*. 2dly, *What* they understood of God's *attributes*; that they easily conceived a *father* where they had found a *Deity*, and that a *sovereign Being* could only be a *sovereign good*.

Till then, by Nature crown'd, each patriarch sate,  
King, priest, and parent of his growing state:  
On him, their *second Providence*, they hung,  
Their law his eye; their oracle his tongue, &c.  
Till drooping, sick'ning, dying, they began  
Whom they rever'd as God, to mourn as Man.

## I.

Then, looking up from sire to sire, explor'd  
One great first Father, and that First ador'd.

## II.

Or plain tradition that this all *begun*,  
Convey'd unbroken faith from sire to son.

## I.

The Worker from the work distinct was known,  
And simple reason never sought but *one*.  
Ere wit oblique had broke that steady light,  
Man, like his Maker, saw that *all was right*.

## II.

To virtue in the paths of pleasure trod,  
And own'd a *Father* when he own'd a God.  
Love all the faith, &c.

Our *methodical* Translator, not apprehending that the Poet was here returned to finish his description of the state of nature, has fallen into one of the grossest mistakes that ever was committed. He has taken this account of *true religion*, for an account of the *origin of idolatry*, and thus fatally embellishes his own blunder,

Jaloux d'en conserver les traits et la figure,  
Leur zele industrieux inventa la peinture.  
Leurs neveux, attentifs à ces hommes fameux,  
Qui par le droit du sang avoient régné sur eux,  
Trouvent-ils dans leur suite un grand, un premier pere,  
Leur aveugle respect l'adore et le révere.

Here you have one of the finest pieces of reasoning in the world, turned, at once, into as mere a heap of nonsense. You will wonder how it came about: the unlucky term of *Great first Father* confounded our Translator, and he took it to signify a *great-grandfather*. But he should have *considered* that Mr. Pope always represents God, as every wise and good Man would do, and as our religion directs us to do, under the idea of a FATHER; he should have *observed* that the Poet is here describing those men, who

To virtue in the paths of pleasure trod,  
And own'd a *further*, where they own'd a God.

You may be sure Mr. De Crousaz has not let these fine strokes about the *original of painting* escape him. But here the Critic (which is a wonder) proves clearer-sighted than the Translator; he saw that the lines in question

question were a continuation of something *not immediately preceding*; but that was *all* he saw, as may appear by his sagacious remark. "We shall be mistaken (says he) "if we regard this passage as a continuation of the "history immediately going before. It would be too "great an anachronism to suppose it. The government "of *fathers* of *families* did not succeed that of *kings*; "on the contrary, the reign of *these* was established on "the government of *those*.\*"

Order leads the Poet to speak next [from l. 241 to 246] of the *corruption* of *civil society* into tyranny, and its *causes*; and here, with all the *art of address*, as well as *truth*, he observes, it arose from the violation of that *great principle*, which he so much insists upon throughout his Essay, *That each was made for the use of all*:

Who first taught souls enslav'd, and realms undone,  
Th' enormous faith of *many made for one*;  
That proud exception to all Nature's laws,  
T' invert the world, and counterwork its cause?

And in this, *Aristotle* places the difference between a king and a tyrant; that the *first* supposes himself made for the people; the *other*, that the people are made for him †.

But we may be sure, that in this corruption, where natural justice was thrown aside, and *force*, the Atheist's justice, presided in its stead, *religion* would follow the fate of *civil society*. We know, from ancient history, it did so. Accordingly, Mr. *Pope* [from l. 245 to 270] with corrupt politics describes corrupt religion and its causes; he *first* informs us, agreeable to his exact knowledge of antiquity, that it was the *POLITICIAN*, and not the *PRIEST* (as our illiterate tribe of Free-thinkers would make us believe) who first corrupted religion. *Secondly*, that the *SUPERSTITION*, he brought in, was not invented by him, as an *engine* to play upon others (as the dreaming *Atheist* feigns, who would thus miserably account for the origin of religion), but was a *trap* he first fell into himself.

\* Commentaire, p. 249.

† Βασιλείαι δ' ἡ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κειλημένοι τὰς ὑσίας, μηθὲν ἄδικον πάσχωσιν, ὃ δὲ Δῆμος μὴ ἐβρίζῃται μηθὲν, ἢ δὲ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΖ, πρὸς ἑδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν; εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὑφελείας χάριν. Pol. l. v. c. 10.

Force first made conquest, and that conquest, law ;  
 'Till *superstition taught the tyrant awe*,  
 'Then *shar'd the tyranny, then lent it aid*,  
 And gods of conquerors, slaves of subjects made.

All this is agreeable to the Poet's vast knowledge of human nature. For that *impotency* of mind, as the *Latin* writers call it\*, which gives birth to the enormous crimes necessary to support a tyranny, naturally subjects its owner to all the *vain*, as well as *real* terrors of conscience. Hence the whole machinery of *Superstition*.

She, 'midst the lightning's blaze and thunder's sound,  
 When rock'd the mountains, and when groan'd the  
 ground,  
 She, from the rending earth and bursting skies,  
 Saw gods descend, and fiends infernal rise.

And it is no wonder that those, who had so impiously attempted to counterwork the design of Nature, by acting as if *many were made for one*, should now imagine they saw all Nature arming in vengeance against them.

It is true, the Poet observes, that afterwards, when the tyrant's fright was over, he had cunning enough, from the experience of the effect of superstition upon himself, to turn it by the assistance of the priest (who for his reward went shares with him in the tyranny) as his best defence against his subjects.

With Heaven's own thunders shook the world below,  
 And play'd the god an engine on his foe.

For a tyrant naturally and reasonably takes all his *slaves* for his *enemies*.

Having given the *causes* of superstition, he next describes its *objects* :

Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,  
 Whose attributes were rage, revenge, and lust :  
 Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,  
 And, form'd like tyrants, tyrants would believe.

The ancient Pagan gods are here very exactly described. This fact is a convincing evidence of the truth of that

\* They expressed the *passion for tyrannizing* by this word. A fine Roman historian says of Marius, that he was *gloriæ insatiabilis, IMPOTENS semperque inquietus*. And of Pompey, *potentiâ suâ nunquam aut raro ad IMPOTENTIAM usus*.

original which the Poet gives to superstition : for if these phantasms were first raised in the imagination of tyrants, they must needs have the qualities here assigned them. For *force* being the tyrant's *virtue*, and *luxury* his *happiness*, the attributes of his god would of course be *revenge* and *lust* ; in a word, the *antitype* of himself. But there was another, and more substantial cause, of the resemblance between a *tyrant* and a *Pagan god* ; and that was the making *gods of conquerors*, as the Poet says, and so canonizing a tyrant's *vices* with his *person*. That these gods should suit a people humbled to the stroke of a master, will be no wonder, if we recollect a generous saying of the *ancients* ;—*That, that day which sees a man a slave, takes away half his virtue.*

The inference our Poet draws from all this [from l. 269 to 284] is, that *self-love* drives through right and wrong ; it causes the tyrant to violate the rights of mankind ; and it causes the people to vindicate that violation. For *self-love* being common to the whole species, and setting each individual in pursuit of the same objects, it became necessary for each, if he would secure his own, to provide for the safety of another's. And thus equity and benevolence arose from that same *self-love* which had given birth to avarice and injustice.

For what one likes, if others like as well,  
What serves one will, when many wills rebel ?  
How shall he keep, what, sleeping or awake,  
A weaker may surprise, a stronger take ?  
His safety must his liberty restrain ;  
All join to guard what each desires to gain.

The Poet hath not any where shewn greater address in the masterly disposition of his work, than with regard to the *inference* before us ; which not only gives a proper and timely support to what he had before advanced, in his *second Epistle*, concerning the nature and effects of *self-love* ; but is a necessary introduction to what follows concerning the *reformation of religion and society*, as we shall see presently.

The Poet hath now described the rise, perfection, and decay of *civil policy* and *religion*, in the more early ages. But the design had been imperfectly executed, had he  
here



here dropp'd his discourse; there was, after this, a recovery from their several corruptions. Accordingly, he hath chosen that happy period for the conclusion of his song. But as good and ill governments and religions succeed one another without ceasing, he now, with great judgment, leaves *facts*, and turns his discourse [from l. 283 to 296] to speak of a more lasting reform of mankind, in the invention of those *philosophic principles*, by whose observance a *policy* and *religion* may be for ever kept from sinking into *tyranny* and *superstition*.

'Twas then the studious head, or gen'rous mind,  
Follower of God, or friend of human kind,  
Poet or patriot, rose but to restore -  
The faith and morals, Nature gave before;  
Relum'd her ancient light, not kindled new,  
If not God's image, yet his shadow drew;  
Taught power's due use to people and to kings,  
Taught not to slack, nor strain its tender strings, &c.

The easy and just transition into this subject, from the foregoing, is admirable. In the foregoing, he had described the *effects* of *self-love*; now the *observation* of these effects, he, with great art and high probability, makes the *occasion* of those *discoveries*, which speculative men made of the *true principles* of policy and religion, described in the present paragraph; and this he evidently hints at in that fine transition,

'Twas THEN the studious head, &c.

Mr. De Crousaz, who saw nothing of this beauty, says,—*It is not easy to guess to what epoch Mr. Pope would have us refer his THEN\**. He has indeed proved himself no good *guesser*, which yet is the best quality of a critic. I will therefore tell him without more ado, Mr. Pope meant the *polite and flourishing age of Greece*; and those benefactors to mankind, which, I presume, he had principally in view, were *Socrates* and *Aristotle*, who, of all the Pagan world, spoke best of *God*, and wrote best of *government*.

Having thus described the *true principles of civil and ecclesiastical policy*, the great Poet proceeds [from l. 295

\* Commentaire, p. 261.

to 305] to illustrate his account by the similar harmony of the universe:

Such is the world's great harmony, that springs  
From union, order, full consent of things!  
Where small and great, where weak and mighty, made,  
To serve, not suffer, strengthen, not invade;  
More powerful each as needful to the rest,  
And in proportion as it blesses, blest;  
Draw to one point, and to one centre bring  
Beast, man, or angel, servant, lord, or king.

Thus, as in the *beginning* of this Epistle, he supported the *great principle of mutual love or association in general*, by considerations drawn from the *properties* of matter, and the *mutual dependence* between vegetable and animal life; so, in the *conclusion*, he has enforced the *particular principles of civil and religious society*, from that *universal harmony* which springs, in part, from those *properties* and *dependencies*.

But now the Poet, having so much commended the invention and inventors of the *philosophic principles of religion and government*, lest an evil use should be made of this, by men's resting in *theory* and *speculation*, as they have been always too apt to do, in matters whose *practice* makes their happiness, he cautions his reader [from l. 304 to 311] against this error, in a *warmth of expression*, which the sublime ideas of that *universal harmony*, operating incessantly to *universal good*, had raised up in him.

For *forms* of government let fools contest;  
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.  
For *modes* of faith let graceless zealots fight;  
His can't be wrong, whose life is in the right.  
All must be false, that thwart this one great end,  
And all of God, that bless mankind, or mend.

The seasonableness of this reproof will appear evident enough to those who know, that mad disputes about *liberty* and *prerogative* had *once* well nigh overturned our constitution; and that others about *mystery* and *church authority* had almost destroyed the very spirit of our holy religion.

But these fine lines have been strangely misunderstood.

The Author, against his own express words, against the plain sense of his system, has been conceived to mean, *that all governments and all religions were, as to their forms and objects, indifferent*. But as this wrong judgment proceeded from ignorance of the *reason* of the reproof, as explained above, that explanation is alone sufficient to rectify the mistake.

However, not to leave him under the least suspicion, in a matter of so much importance, I shall justify the sense here given to this passage more at large. First by considering the *words themselves*: and then by comparing this mistaken sense with the context.

The Poet, we must observe, is here speaking, not of civil society *at large*, but of a *just* legitimate policy,

Th' according music of a WELL-MIX'D State.

Now these are of several kinds; in some of which the *democratic*, in others the *aristocratic*, and in others the *monarchic* FORM prevails. Now as each of these *mix'd forms* is equally legitimate, as being founded on the principles of natural liberty, that man is guilty of the highest *folly*, who chuses rather to employ himself in a speculative contest for the superior excellence of one of these forms to the rest, than in promoting the good administration of that settled *form* to which he is subject. And yet all our warm disputes about government have been of this kind. Again, if, by *forms of government*, must needs be meant *legitimate government*, because that is the subject under debate, then by *modes of faith*, which is the correspondent idea, must needs be meant the modes or *explanations* of the *true faith*, because the Author is here too on the subject of *true religion*;

Relum'd her ancient light, not kindled new.

Besides, the very expression (than which nothing can be more precise) confines us to understand, by *modes of faith*, those human explanations of Christian mysteries, in contesting which, zeal and ignorance have so perpetually violated charity.

*Secondly*, If we consider the *context*; to suppose him to mean, that *all forms of government are indifferent*, is making him directly contradict the preceding paragraph; where he extols the patriot for discriminating the  
*true*

*true* from the *false* modes of government. He, says the Poet,

Taught power's due use to people and to kings,  
Taught not to slack, nor strain its tender strings;  
The less and greater set so justly true,  
That touching one must strike the other too;  
'Till jarring interests of themselves create  
Th' according music of a *well-mix'd State*.

Here he recommends the *true* form of government, which is the *mixt*. In another place he as strongly condemns the *false*, or the absolute *jure divino* form:

For Nature knew no *right divine* in Men. l. 237.

To suppose him to mean, *that all religions are indifferent*, is an equally wrong as well as uncharitable suspicion. Mr. *Pope*, though his subject in this *Essay on Man* confines him to *natural religion* (his purpose being to vindicate God's natural dispensations to mankind against the Atheist), yet gives frequent intimations of a more sublime dispensation, and even of the necessity of it; particularly in his *second Epistle* [l. 139], where he speaks of the *weakness and insufficiency of human reason*\*.

Again, in his fourth Epistle [l. 331] speaking of the good man, the favourite of Heaven, he says,

For him alone, *hope* leads from goal to goal,  
And opens still, and opens on his soul;  
Till lengthen'd on to *faith*, and unconfin'd,  
It pours the bliss that fills up all the mind.

But *natural religion* never lengthened *hope* on to *faith*; nor did any religion, but the Christian, ever conceive that *faith* could fill the mind with happiness.

*Lastly*, The Poet, in this very Epistle, and in this very place, speaking of the great restorers of the religion of Nature, intimates that they could only draw God's *shadow*, *not his image*:

Relum'd her ancient light, not kindled new,  
If not *God's image*, yet his *shadow* drew.

As reverencing that truth, which tells us that this *discovery* was reserved for the *glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the IMAGE OF GOD*†.

\* See the second Letter, pp. 80, 81.

† 2 Cor. iv. 4.

Having thus largely considered Man in his *social capacity*, the Poet, in order to fix a momentous truth in the mind of his reader, concludes the Epistle in recapitulating the *two principles* which concur to the support of *this part* of his character, namely, *self-love* and *social*; and shewing that they are only two different motions of the *appetite, to good*, by which the Author of Nature has enabled Man to find *his own* happiness in the happiness of the *whole*. This the Poet illustrates with a thought as sublime as is that general harmony he describes :

On their own axis as the planets run,  
Yct make at once their circle round the sun ;  
So two consistent motions act the soul,  
And one regards itself, and one the whole.  
'Thus God and Nature link'd the general frame,  
And bad *self-love* and *social* be the same.

For he hath the art of converting poetical ornaments into philosophic reasoning; and of improving a *simile* into an *analogical argument*. But of this art, more in our next.

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#### LETTER IV.

THE Poet, in the two foregoing Epistles, having considered MAN with regard to the MEANS (that is, *in all his relations*, whether as an *individual*, or a member of *society*) comes now, in this last, to consider him with regard to the END, that is, HAPPINESS.

It opens with an *invocation to happiness*, in the manner of the ancient poets, who, when destitute of a patron *god*, applied to the *Muse*, and, if she was engaged, took up with any simple *virtue*, next at hand, to inspire and prosper their designs. This was the *ancient invocation*, which few modern poets have had the art to imitate with any degree of spirit or decorum; while our Author, not content to heighten this poetic ornament with the graces of the *antique*, hath also contrived to make it subservient to the method and reasoning of his philosophic composition. I will endeavour to explain so uncommon a beauty.

It

It is to be observed that the Pagan deities had each their *several names* and *places of abode*, with some of which they were supposed to be more delighted than with others, and consequently to be then most propitious when invoked by the favourite *name* and *place*: hence we find the hymns of *Homer*, *Orpheus*, and *Callimachus*, to be chiefly employed in enumerating the several names and places of abode by which the patron god was distinguished. Now, our Poet, with great and masterly address, hath made these *two circumstances* serve to introduce his subject, according to the exactest rules of logic. His purpose is to write of *happiness*; method therefore requires that he first define what men mean by *happiness*, and this he does in the ornament of a poetic *invocation*:

O *happiness*! our being's end and aim,  
Good, *pleasure*, *ease*, *content*! whate'er thy NAME.

After the DEFINITION, that which follows next, in order of method, is the PROPOSITION, which here is, *that human happiness consists not in external advantages, but in virtue*. For the subject of this Epistle is the detecting the *false* notions of happiness, and settling and explaining the *true*; and this the Poet lays down in the next sixteen lines. Now the enumeration of *happiness's* several supposed *places of abode* (which, in imitation of the ancient Poets, he next mentions in the *invocation*, and which makes ten of the sixteen lines) is a summary of *false happiness*, placed in *externals*:

Plant of celestial seed! if dropt below,  
Say in what mortal soil thou deign'st to grow?  
Fair opening to some *court's* propitious shine,  
Or deep with *diamonds* in the flaming mine?  
Twin'd with the wreaths *Parnassian laurels* yield,  
Or reap'd in *iron harvests* of the field?

The six remaining lines deliver the *true* notion of happiness to be in *virtue*. Which is sumn'd up in these two;

Fixt to no spot is happiness sincere,  
'Tis no where to be found, or every where.

The Poet, having thus *defined* his *terms*, and laid down  
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his *proposition*, proceeds to the support of his *thesis*; the various arguments of which make up the body of the Epistle.

He begins [from l. 18 to 27] with detecting the *false notions of happiness*. These are of two kinds, the *philosophical* and *popular*: the latter he had recapitulated in the *invocation*, when *happiness* was call'd upon at her several supposed places of abode; the *philosophic* then only remained to be delivered.

Ask of the *learn'd* the way, the *learn'd* are blind,  
This bids to *serve*, and that to *shun* mankind :  
Some place the bliss in *action*, some in *ease* ;  
Those call it pleasure, and contentment these.

The confutation of these *philosophic* errors, he shews to be very easy, *one common fallacy* running through them all ; namely this, That, instead of telling us in what the *happiness of human nature* consists, which was what was asked of them, each busies himself to explain in what he placed *his own peculiar happiness*:

Who thus define it, say they more or less  
Than this, that happiness is happiness ?

And here, before we go any farther, it will be proper to turn to our *Logician*, who, blind to these beauties in the admirable disposition of the subject, is extremely scandalized at the Poet for not proceeding immediately to explain *true happiness* (after having defined his terms and delivered his thesis) but for going back again (as he fancies) to a consideration of the *false*.—Speaking of the sixteen lines, he says,—“ Happiness is then near me, “ and I feel myself considerably refreshed; but, by ill “ luck, it is only for a moment, my doubts presently “ return, and I find myself in the hands of a Poet, who “ can do what he will with me, and who, having placed “ me on the very borders of happiness, on a sudden “ shuts up all its avenues\*.”

But a very little *patience* and *impartiality* would have shewn him, that they were immediately laid open again in the very next lines [from 26 to 33] where the Poet shews, that if you will but take the road of *nature*, and leave that of *mad opinion*, you will soon find happiness

\* Commentaire, p. 271.

to be a good of the species, and, like common sense, equally distributed to all mankind:

Take Nature's path, and mad opinion's leave,  
All states can reach it, and all heads conceive;  
Obvious her goods, in no extreme they dwell,  
There needs but thinking right, and meaning well;  
And, mourn our various portions as we please,  
Equal is common sense, and common case.

But this is so far from satisfying our bully-critic, that it only furnishes him with fresh matter for a quarrel. He is much offended at the two first lines. "—I must here renew my complaints. Take Nature's path, you say; and what am I to understand by this Nature? Must I take the *reasonable nature* for my guide? But, according to you, the philosophers have consulted it to no purpose. Shall I give myself up to the *animal nature*? This would soon reduce me to great distresses.—Encompassed with doubts and difficulties, what have I left, but to suffer myself to be borne away by chance or hazard? And to conclude, that the counsel here given of taking *Nature's path*, comes at length to this, to march steadily on in the footsteps of *fatality*\*."

It would be hard indeed, if our Commentator could not find the road to *fatality*, in every step the Poet takes. But here, in avoiding the horns of his own chimerical *dilemma*, he jumps upon it more awkwardly than usual. The Poet, says he, must either mean the *reasonable*, or the *animal nature*. Agreed. He could not mean the *animal nature*. This too is true. Nor the *reasonable*. Why not? Because it stood the philosophers in no stead. What then? Do you think he has ever the worse opinion of it on that account? They could not possibly have run into more mistakes about *happiness*, than you have about the Poet's *meaning*: And yet, for all that, I apprehend he will think never the worse, either of *reason* or *himself*.

But what is indeed incredible, after Mr. *De Crousaz* had thus commented the two first lines, he goes on with his remarks on the immediately following, *Obvious her goods*, &c. in these words: "See Mr. Pope once again

\* *Commentaire*, pp. 272, 273.



"under the necessity of restoring reason to its rights".<sup>\*</sup> Prodigious! It seems then, after all, Mr. Pope by *Nature's path*, did indeed mean the *reasonable nature*. For we now see it was Mr. De Crousaz, not Mr. Pope, that was *under the necessity of restoring reason to its rights*.

To proceed: the Poet having exposed the *two false species of happiness*, the PHILOSOPHICAL and POPULAR, and denounced the *true*, in order to establish the *last*, goes on to a confutation of the two *former*.

I. He first [from l. 32 to 47] confutes the PHILOSOPHICAL, which, as we said, makes happiness a *particular*, not a *general* good: and this two ways:

1. From his *grand principle*, That *God acts by general laws*: the consequence of which is, that *happiness*, which supports the well-being of every system, must needs be *universal*, and not *partial*, as the philosophers conceived:

Remember, Man! *the universal Cause*  
*Acts not by partial, but by general laws;*  
 And makes, what happiness we justly call,  
 Subsist not in the good of one, but all.

2. From *fact*, That Man instinctively concurs with this designation of Providence, to make happiness *universal*, by his having no delight in any thing *uncommunicated* or *uncommunicable*:

There's not a blessing individuals find,  
 But some way leans and hearkens to the kind.  
 No bandit fierce, no tyrant mad with pride,  
 No cavern'd hermit rests self-satisfied.  
 Abstract what others feel, what others think,  
 All pleasures sicken, and all glories sink.

II. The Poet, in the second place [from l. 46 to 65] confutes the POPULAR error concerning *happiness*, namely, that it consists in *externals*: which he does,

1. By inquiring into the reasons of the present providential disposition of *external goods*: a topic of confutation chosen with the greatest accuracy and penetration. For, if it appears *they* were distributed in the manner we see them, for reasons *different* from the *happiness of individuals*,

*individuals*, it is absurd to think that they should make *part* of that happiness.

He shews, therefore, that disparity of external possessions among men was for the sake of *society*, 1. to promote the harmony and happiness of a *system*:

Order is Heaven's first law ; and, this confess,  
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest,  
More rich, more wise,—

Because the *want* of external goods in some, and the *abundance* in others, increase general harmony in the *obliger* and *obliged*.

Yet here (says he) mark the impartial wisdom of Heaven ; this very *inequality of externals*, by contributing to *general harmony* and order, produceth an *equality of happiness* amongst *individuals* ; and, *for that very reason*,

Heaven to mankind impartial we confess,  
If all are equal in their happiness :  
But mutual wants this happiness increase,  
All Nature's difference keeps all Nature's peace.  
Condition, circumstance, is not the thing :  
Bliss is the same, in subject, or in king ;  
In who obtain defence, or who defend ;  
In him who is, or him who finds, a friend.  
Heaven breathes thro' every member of the whole  
One common blessing as one common soul.

2. This disparity was necessary, because, if external goods were equally distributed, they would occasion perpetual discord amongst men all *equal* in power :

But fortune's gifts if each alike possess,  
And each were equal, must not all contest?

From hence he concludes, That, as *external goods* were not given for the reward of virtue, but for many different purposes, God could not, if he intended happiness for all, place it in the enjoyment of *externals* :

If then to *all* men happiness was meant,  
God in externals could not place content.

2. His second argument [from l. 64 to 71] against the *popular error* of happiness's being placed in *externals*, is, that the *possession* of them is inseparably attended

with *fear*, the *want* of them with *hope*; which directly crossing all their pretensions to making happy, evidently shew that God had placed happiness *elsewhere*:

Fortune her gifts may variously dispose,  
And these be happy call'd, unhappy those;  
But Heaven's just balance equal will appear,  
While those are plac'd in HOPE, and these in FEAR:  
Not present good or ill, the joy or curse,  
But future views of better or of worse.

Hence, in concluding this argument, he takes occasion [from l. 70 to 75] to upbraid the desperate folly and impiety of those, who, in spite of God and Nature, will yet attempt to place *happiness in externals*.

O sons of earth! attempt ye still to rise,  
By mountains pil'd on mountains, to the skies?  
Heaven still with laughter the vain toil surveys,  
And buries madmen in the heaps they raise.

I must not here omit to observe, that the Translator (unconscious of all this fine reasoning between the 32d and 75th lines; where the Poet first confutes the *philosophic* errors concerning happiness, and next the *popular*) hath strangely jumbled together and confounded his different arguments on these two different heads. But this is not the worst; he hath perverted the Poet's words to a horrid and senseless *fatalism*, foreign to the argument in hand, and directly contrary to Mr. Pope's general principles.

The Poet says,

Remember, Man! the universal Cause  
Acts not by partial, but by general laws.

His Translator,

—Une loi generale

Determine toujours la cause principale.

That is, *a general law ever determines the principal cause*, which is the very *fate* of the ancient Pagans, who supposed that destiny gave law to the *Father of gods and men*.

The Poet says again,

Order is Heaven's first law:

That

That is, *the first law made by God, relates to order*; which is a beautiful allusion to the Scripture history of the Creation, when God first appeased the disorders of *chaos*, and separated the light from the darkness. Let us now hear his Translator:

L'ordre, cet inflexible et grand législateur,  
Qui des decrets du Ciel est le premier auteur :

*Order, that inflexible and grand legislator, who is the first author of the laws of Heaven.* A proposition abominable in most senses, and absurd in all.

But now what says Mr. *De Crousaz* to this, who is perpetually crying out, *fate! fate!* as men in distraction call out *fire?* The reader will be surprised to hear him pass this cool reflexion on two so obnoxious passages—*"This Order, the first author of laws, presents us with very harsh expressions, and bold ideas, which Mr. Pope elsewhere condemns as rash and unjustifiable\*."* But this is his moderation, when Mr. *L'Abbé* comes under his critique: And we know, the excellent prose translation gave him the advantage of knowing whom he had to do with.

To proceed: the Poet having thus confuted the two errors concerning *happiness*, PHILOSOPHICAL and POPULAR, and proved that true happiness was neither *soutary and partial*, nor yet *placed in externals*; goes on [from l. 74 to 91] to shew in what it *doth* consist. He had before said in general, and repeated it, that happiness lay in common to the whole species. He now brings us better acquainted with it, in a more explicit information of its nature; and tells us, it is all contained in *health, peace, and competence*; but that these are to be gained only by VIRTUE, namely, by *temperance, innocence, and industry*:

Reason's whole pleasures, all the joys of sense,  
Lie in three words, health, peace, and competence.  
But health consists with temperance alone,  
And peace, O *Virtue!* peace is all thy own.

The first line,

*Reason's whole pleasures, all the joys of sense,*  
is the most beautiful paraphrasis for *happiness*; for all

\* *Commentaire*, p. 282.

we feel of good is by *sensation* and *reflexion*. The Translator, who seemed little to concern himself with the Poet's philosophy or argument, mistook this description of *happiness* for a description of the *intellectual and sensitive faculties*, opposed to one another; and therefore thus translates it:

Le charme seducteur, dont s'enyvrant les sens,  
Les plaisirs de l'esprit encore plus ravissans.

And so, with the highest absurdity, not only makes the Poet constitute *sensual excesses* a part of human happiness, but likewise the product of virtue.

After this, we shall no longer wonder at such kind of translations as the following:

Mr. *Pope* says,

And peace, O *Virtue*! peace is all thy own.

The Translator,

Pour vous, O paix du cœur, digne fille des Cieux,  
Vous êtes du bonheur le gage précieux.

*Conscious innocence*, says the Poet, *is the only source of internal peace*, and *known innocence of external*; therefore peace is the sole issue of virtue; or, in his own emphatic words, *peace is ALL thy own*; a conclusive observation in his argument. *O peace*, says the Translator, *thou art the precious pledge of happiness*; an observation, which concludes no more than that the Translator did not understand the argument, which stands thus:—Is happiness rightly placed in externals? No, for it consists in health, peace, and competence. Health and competence are the product of temperance and industry; and peace, of perfect innocence.

But hitherto, the Poet hath only considered *health* and *peace*:

But *health* consists with temperance alone,  
And *peace*, O *Virtue*! peace is all thy own.

One head yet remains to be spoken to, namely, *competence*. In the pursuit of *health* and *peace*, there is no danger of running into excess. But the case is different with regard to *competence*. Here, *wealth* and *affluence* would be too apt to be mistaken for it, in men's passion-

ate pursuit of external goods. To obviate this mistake, therefore, the Poet shews, that, as *exorbitant wealth* adds nothing to the happiness arising from a *competence*, so, as it is generally ill gotten, it is attended with circumstances that weaken another part of this triple cord, namely, *peace* :

The good or bad the gifts of fortune gain ;  
 But these less taste them as they worse obtain.  
 Say, in pursuit of profit or delight,  
 Who risk the most, that take wrong means or right?  
 Of vice or virtue, whether blest or curst,  
 Which meets contempt, or which compassion first ?  
 Count all th' advantage prosp'rous vice attains,  
 'Tis but what virtue flies from, and disdains ;  
 And grant the bad what happiness they would,  
 One they must want, which is, to pass for good.

Here Mr. *De Crousaz*'s remarks are indeed very extraordinary—"To whom (says he) are these interrogatories addressed?—If you refer yourself to the judgment of a troop of young libertines, such as are to be found in great cities, and in armies, you will certainly not have the laughers on your side\*," &c. What then? If *reason* require they should, is not that sufficient for the Poet's purpose, in a discourse where *reason* is continually appealed to, in a controversy between him and them? But our Logician's perversity is without example. Till now, his quarrel with the Poet was, that his arguments flattered the corrupt sentiments of libertinism. At present he is as captious with him for their opposing those sentiments. Does not this look as if he were resolved to approve of nothing Mr. *Pope* could say?

Our Author having thus largely confuted the mistake of *happiness's consisting in externals*, proceeds to expose the terrible CONSEQUENCES of such an opinion, on the sentiments and practice of all sorts of men, making the DISSOLUTE impious and atheistical, the RELIGIOUS uncharitable and intolerant, and the GOOD restless and discontent. For when it is once taken for granted, that *happiness consists in externals*, it is immediately seen

\* Commentaire, p. 289, 290.

that *ill* men are often more happy than *good*; which sets all conditions on objecting to the ways of Providence, and some even on rashly attempting to rectify its dispensations, though by the violation of law, divine and human. Now this being the most momentous part of the subject under consideration, is deservedly treated most at large. And here it will be proper to take notice of the exquisite art of the Poet, in making this confutation serve, at the same time, for a full solution of all objections which might be made to his main proposition, *that happiness consists not in externals*.

I. He begins, first of all, with the *ATHEISTICAL complainers*, and pursues their impiety [from l. 90 to 129] with all the vengeance of his eloquence.

Oh blind to truth, and God's whole scheme below !

Who fancy bliss to vice, to virtue woe :

Who sees and follows that great scheme the best,

Best knows the blessing, and will most be blest.

He exposes their folly, even on their own notions of *external goods*:

1. By *examples* [from line 96 to 109] where he shews *first*, that, if good men have been untimely cut off, this is not to be ascribed to their virtues, but to a contempt of life that hurried them into dangers. *Secondly*, That if they will still persist in ascribing *untimely death* to virtue, they must needs, on the same principle, likewise ascribe *long life* to it. Consequently as the argument, in *fact*, concludes both ways, in *logic*, it concludes neither.

But fools the *good* alone unhappy call,

From ills or accidents that chance to *all*.

Say, was it virtue, more though Heaven ne'er gave,

Lamented *Digby*! sunk thee to the grave?

Tell me, if virtue made the son expire,

Why full of days and honour lives the sire?

Why drew *Marseilles'* good bishop purer breath,

When nature sicken'd, and each gale was death?

Or why so long (in life if long can be)

Lent Heaven a parent to the poor, and me?

This last instance of the Poet's illustration of the ways of Providence, the reader sees, has a peculiar elegance ;  
where

where a tribute of piety to a *parent* is paid in a return of thanks to [*Lent Heaven a parent, &c.*] and made subservient of [*Or why so long—*] his vindication of, the *Great Father of all things*.

2. He exposes their folly [from line 108 to 129] *by considerations drawn from the system of Nature*; and these, two-fold, *natural* and *moral*. You accuse God, says the Poet, because the good man is subject to natural and moral evil: Let us see whence these proceed. Natural evil is the necessary consequence of a material world so constituted: But that this constitution was *best*, we have proved in the first Epistle. Moral evil ariseth from the depraved will of Man: Therefore, neither the one nor the other from God.

What makes all physical or moral ill?  
There deviates Nature, and here wanders Will.  
God sends not ill, if rightly understood;  
Or partial ill is universal good;  
Or chance admits, or Nature lets it fall,  
Short, and but rare, till Man improv'd it all.

But you say (adds the Poet, to these impious complainers) that though it be fit Man should suffer the miseries which he brings upon himself, by the commission of moral evil, yet it seems to be unfit his innocent posterity should bear a share of them. To this, says he, I reply,

We just as wisely might of Heaven complain  
That righteous *Abel* was destroy'd by *Cain*,  
As that the virtuous Son is ill at ease,  
When his lewd Father gave the dire disease.

But you will still say (continues the Poet) why does not God either prevent, or immediately repair these evils? You may as well ask, why he doth not work continual miracles, and every moment reverse the established laws of Nature:

Shall burning *Ætna*, if a sage requires,  
Forget to thunder, and recal her fires?  
On air or sea new motions be imprest,  
O blameless *Bethel*! to relieve thy breast?

When



When the loose mountain trembles from on high,  
 Shall gravitation cease, if you go by?  
 Or, some old temple nodding to its fall,  
 For *Chartres*' head reserve the hanging wall?

This is the force of the Poet's reasoning, and these the men to whom he addresses it, namely, the *libertine* cavillers against Providence.

II. But now, so unhappy is the condition of our corrupt nature, that these are not the only complainers. *Religious* men are but too apt, if not to *speak out*, yet sometimes secretly to *murmur* against Providence, and say, *its ways are not equal*: Especially those more inordinately devoted to a sect or party are scandalized, that the *JUST* (for such they esteem themselves) *who are to judge the world*, have no better *portion in their own inheritance*. The Poet therefore now leaves those more *profligate* complainers, and turns [from l. 128 to 147] to the *religious*, in these words:

But still this world (so fitted for the knave)  
 Contents us not. A better shall we have?  
 A *kingdom of the just* then let it be,  
 But first consider how those *just* agree.

-As the more impious complainers wanted external goods to be the reward of virtue for the *moral* man; so these want them for the *pious*, in order to have a *kingdom of the just*. To this the Poet holds it sufficient to answer: Pray, gentlemen, first agree amongst yourselves, who *those just* are. We allow,

The good must merit God's peculiar care,  
 But who but God can tell us who they are?  
 One thinks on *Catrin* Heaven's own Spirit fell,  
 Another deems him instrument of hell:  
 If *Catrin* feels Heaven's blessing or its rod,  
 'This cries, There is, and that, There is no God.

As this is the case, he even bids them rest satisfied; remember his fundamental principle, *That whatever is, is right*; and content themselves (as their religion teaches them to profess a more than ordinary submission to the ways of Providence) with that common answer which he with so much reason and piety gives to every kind of complainer.

However,

However, though there be yet no kingdom of the *just*, there is still no kingdom of the *unjust*. That both the *virtuous* and the *vicious*, whatsoever becomes of those whom every sect calls the *faithful*, have their shares in external goods; and, what is more, the *virtuous* have infinitely the most enjoyment in them:

—This world, 'tis true,  
Was made for *Cæsar*, but for *Titus* too:  
And which more *blest*? who chain'd his country, say,  
Or he whose virtue sigh'd to lose a day?

I have been the more careful to explain this last argument, and to shew against whom it is directed, because much depends upon it for the illustration of the sense, and the just defence of the Poet. For if we suppose him still addressing himself to those *impious* complainers, confuted in the thirty-eight preceding lines, we should make him guilty of a *paralogism* in the argument about the *just*, and in the illustration of it by the case of *Calvin*. For then the libertines ask, Why the *just*, that is, the *moral man*, is not rewarded? The answer is, That none but God can tell who the *just*, that is, the *truly faithful man*, is. Where the term is changed, in order to support the argument; for about the *truly moral man* there is no dispute; about the *truly faithful*, or the *orthodox*, a great deal. But take the Poet right, as arguing here against *religious* complainers, and the reasoning is strict and logical. They ask, Why the *truly faithful* are not rewarded? He answers, They may be for aught you know, for none but God can tell who they are. Mr. *De Crousas's* objections to this reasoning receive all their force from that wrong supposition, That the Poet was here arguing against *libertine* complainers; and consequently they have no force at all.

III. The Poet having dispatched these two species of complainers, comes now to the third and still more pardonable sort, the discontented *good men*, who lament only, that *virtue starves, while vice riots*. To these the Poet replies [from l. 146 to 155] that admit this to be the case, yet they have no reason to complain, either of the good man's lot in particular, or of the dispensation of Providence in general. Not of the *former*, because  
*happiness,*

*happiness*, the reward of virtue, consists not in *externals*; nor of the *latter*, because ill men may gain wealth by commendable industry, good men want necessities through indolence or bad conduct.

But as modest as this complaint seems at first view, the Poet next shews [from l. 154 to 165] that it is founded on a principle of the highest extravagance, which will never let the discontented *good man* rest, till he becomes as vain and foolish in his imaginations as the very worst sort of complainers. For that when once he begins to think he wants what is his due, he will never know where to stop, while God has any thing to give.

But this is not all; he proves next [from l. 164 to 175] that these demands are not only *unreasonable*, but in the highest degree *absurd* likewise. For that those very *goods*, if granted, would be the *destruction* of that *virtue* for which they are demanded as a *reward*. He concludes therefore on the whole, that,

What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy,  
The soul's calm sunshine, and the heart-felt joy,  
Is Virtue's prize.—

But the Poet now enters more at large upon the matter: and still continuing his discourse to this *third* sort of complainers (whom he indulges as much more pardonable than the *first* or *second*, in rectifying all their doubts and mistakes) proves both from *reason* and *example*, how unable any of those things are, which the world most admires, to make a *good man happy*. For, as to the *philosophic* mistakes concerning happiness, there being little danger of their making a general impression, the Poet, after a short confutation, had dismissed them altogether. But *external goods* are those syrens, which so bewitch the world with dreams of *happiness*, that of all things the most difficult is, to awaken it out of its delusions; though, as he proves, in an exact review of the most pretending, they dishonour *bad men*, and add no lustre to the *good*. That it is only this third and least criminal sort of complainers, against which the remaining part of the discourse is levelled, appears from the Poet's so frequently addressing himself, while he inforces his arguments in behalf of Providence, from henceforward to his friend.

I. He begins therefore [from line 174 to 195] with considering RICHES. 1. He examines, first, what there is of *real* value in them, and shews, they can give the *good* man only that very contentment he had before, or, at most, but burthen him with a trust to be dispensed for the benefit of others:

For *riches*, can they give but to the just  
His *own contentment*, or *another's trust*?

Since the *good* man esteems all, beside what is sufficient to supply him with the conveniencies of life, as entrusted to him by Providence, for the supplial of others necessities.

It is true, he tells us elsewhere, that another sort of *good* men are of a different opinion :

The grave Sir *Gilbert* holds it for a rule,  
That *every man in want is knave or fool* :  
God cannot love (says *Blunt*, with lifted eyes)  
The wretch he starves—and piously denies.

*Of the Use of Riches*, l. 103.

And these are they to whom he here alludes, where he says,

O fool ! to think God hates the worthy mind,  
The lover, and the love, of human kind,  
Whose life is healthful, and whose conscience clear,  
Because he wants a thousand pounds a year !

The Poet next examines the *imaginary* value of riches, as the fountain of *honour*. For his adversaries objection stands thus :—As honour is the genuine claim of virtue, and shame the just retribution of vice ; and as *honour*, in their opinion, follows riches, and shame poverty ; therefore the *good* man should be *rich*. He tells them in this they are much mistaken :

Honour and shame from no condition rise ;  
Act well your part, there all the honour lies.

What power then has *fortune* over the *Man*? None at all. For, as her *favours* can confer neither worth nor *wisdom* ; so neither can her *displeasure* cure him of any of his *follies*. On his *garb* indeed she has some little influence ; but his *heart* still remains the same :

*Fortune* in Men has some small difference made,  
One *flaunts* in rags, one *flutters* in brocade.

II. Then,

II. Then, as to **NOBILITY**, by *creation* or *birth*, this too he shews [from l. 195 to 207] is, in itself, as devoid of all real worth as the rest: because, in the *first* case the *title* is generally gained by no merit at all:

Stuck o'er with titles, and hung round with strings,  
That thou may'st be by kings, or whores of kings.

In the *second*, by the merit of the first founder of the family, which will always, when reflected on, be rather the subject of *mortification* than *glory*:

Go! if your ancient, but ignoble, blood  
Has crept through scoundrels ever since the flood,  
Go! and pretend your family is young;  
Nor own your fathers have been fools so long.

III. The Poet in the next place [from l. 206 to 227] unmasks the false pretences of **GREATNESS**, whereby it is seen that the *hero* and *politician* (the two characters which would monopolize that quality) after all their bustle, effect only this, if they want virtue, that the one proves himself a *fool*, and the other a *knave*: and *virtue* they but too generally *want*. The *art of heroism* being understood to consist in ravage and *desolation*: and the *art of politics*, in *circumvention*. Now

—Grant that those can conquer, these can cheat,  
'Tis phrase absurd to call a *villain*, great:  
Who wickedly is wise, or madly brave,  
Is but the more a *fool*, the more a *knave*.

It is not *success* therefore that constitutes *true greatness*; but the *end aimed at*; and the *means* which are *employed*: and if these be right, glory will be the *reward*, whatever be the *issue*:

Who noble ends by noble means obtains,  
Or failing, smiles in exile or in chains,  
Like good *Aurelius* let him reign, or bleed  
Like *Socrates*, that man is great indeed.

IV. With regard to **FAME**, that still more fantastic blessing, he shews [from l. 226 to 249] that all of it, besides what we hear ourselves, is merely nothing; and that even of this small portion, no more of it gives the possessor a real satisfaction, than what is the fruit of virtue.

All *fame* is foreign, but of true desert,  
Plays round the *head*, but comes not near the *heart*.

Thus he shews, that *honour*, *nobility*, *greatness*, *glory*, so far as they have any thing real and substantial, that is, so far as they contribute to the *happiness* of the possessor, are the sole issue of *virtue*, and that neither *riches*, *courts*, *armies*, nor the *populace*, are capable of conferring them.

V. But lastly, the Poet proves [from l. 248 to 259] that as *no external* goods can make Man happy, so neither is it in the power of *all internal*. For, that even SUPERIOR PARTS bring no more real happiness to the possessor, than the rest, nay, put him into a worse condition; for that the quickness of apprehension, and depth of penetration, do but sharpen the miseries of life:

In parts superior, what advantage lies?  
Tell (for you can) what is it to be wise?  
'Tis but to know how little can be known;  
To see all others faults, and feel our own, &c.  
Painful pre-eminence! yourself to view  
*Above life's weakness, and its COMFORTS too.*

This to his friend—nor does it at all contradict what he had said to him concerning *happiness*, in the beginning of the Epistle:

'Tis never to be bought, but always free,  
And, fled from monarchs, *St. John!* dwells with thee.

For he is now proving that nothing either external to Man, or what is not in his own power, and of his own acquirement, can make him happy *here*. The most plausible rival of *virtue* is *knowledge*. Yet even this, he says, is so far from giving any degree of real happiness, that it deprives men of those *common comforts* of life, which are a kind of support to us under the want of *happiness*: such as the more innocent of those *delusions* which he speaks of in the second Epistle, where he says,

Till then, opinion gilds with varying rays  
Those painted clouds, that beautify our days, &c.  
l. 265.

Now *knowledge* (as is here said) *destroys* all those comforts, by setting Man *above life's weaknesses*: so that in him, who thinks to attain *happiness* by *knowledge*, the *fable* is reversed, and in a preposterous attempt to gain the *substance*, he loses even the *shadow*. This I take to be the true sense of this fine stroke of satire, on the wrong pursuits after *happiness*.

Having thus proved how empty and unsatisfactory all these greatest external goods are, from an examination of their nature, the Poet proceeds to strengthen his argument [from l. 258 to 299] by these two *farther* considerations,

1st, That the acquirement of these goods is made with the loss of one another; or of greater, either as inconsistent with them, or as spent in attaining them:

How much of other each is sure to cost;  
 How each for other oft is wholly lost;  
 How inconsistent greater goods with these;  
 How sometimes life is risk'd, and always ease.

2dly, That the possessors of each of these goods are generally such as are so far from raising envy in a good man, that he would refuse to take their persons, though accompanied with their possessions. And this the Poet illustrates by examples:

Think, and if still the things thy envy call,  
 Say, would'st thou be the man to whom they fall? &c.

3dly, Nay, that even the possession of them all together, where they have excluded virtue, only terminates in more enormous misery:

If all, united, thy ambition call,  
 From ancient story learn to scorn them all.  
 There, in the *rich*, the *honour'd*, *fam'd*, and great,  
 See the false scale of happiness complete!  
 Mark by what wretched steps their glory grows,  
 From dirt and sea-weed, as proud *Venice* rose, &c.

Having thus at length shewn, that *happiness* consists neither in *any external* goods, nor in *all kinds of internal*, that is, such of them as are not of our own acquirement,  
 he

he concludes [from l. 298 to 301] that it is to be found in  
VIRTUE ALONE:

Know then this truth (enough for Man to know)  
Virtue alone is happiness below.

Which the Translator turns thus:

Appren donc qu'il n'est point icy bas de bonheur  
Si la vertu ne regle et l'esprit, et le cœur.

i. e. *Learn therefore that there is no happiness here below, if virtue does not regulate the heart and the understanding*, which destroys the whole force of the Poet's conclusion. He had proved, that happiness consists neither in *external goods*, as the *vulgar* imagined, nor yet in the *visionary* pursuits of the *philosophers*: he therefore concludes that it consists in VIRTUE ALONE. His Translator says, *without virtue there can be no happiness*. And so say the men against whom the Poet is here arguing. For though they supposed *external* goods requisite to happiness, yet it was, when enjoyed according to the rules of virtue. Mr. Pope says,

*Virtue ALONE* is happiness below,  
and so ought his Translator to have said after him.

Hitherto the Poet had proved, *NEGATIVELY*, that *happiness consists in virtue*, by shewing it consisted not in any other thing. He now [from l. 300 to 317] proves the same *POSITIVELY*, by an enumeration of its *qualities*, all naturally adapted to give, and to increase human happiness: as its *constancy, capacity, vigour, efficacy, activity, moderation, and self-sufficiency*:

The only point where human bliss stands still,  
And tastes the good, without the fall to ill;  
Without satiety, though e'er so bless'd,  
And but more relish'd, as the more distress'd:  
Good, from each object, from each place acquir'd,  
For ever exercis'd, yet never tir'd;  
Never elated, while one man's oppress'd;  
Never dejected, while another's bless'd;  
And where no wants, no wishes can remain,  
Since, but to wish more virtue, is to gain.



Having thus proved that *happiness* is indeed placed in *virtue*, he proves next [from l. 316 to 319] that it is **RIGHTLY** placed there: For, that *then*, and *then only*, **ALL** may partake of it, and **ALL** be capable of relishing it:

See the sole bliss Heaven *could* on **ALL** bestow,  
Which who but feels can taste, but thinks can know.

The Poet then observes, with some indignation, [from l. 318 to 331] that as easy and as evident as this truth was, yet *riches* and *false philosophy* had so blinded the perception, even of *improved* minds, that the possessors of the *first* placed happiness in *externals* unsuitable to Man's *nature*; and the followers of the *latter* in refined *visions*, unsuitable to his *situation*: while the simple-minded man, with **NATURE** only for his guide, found plainly in what it should be placed:

Yet *poor* with *fortune*, and with *learning* *blind*,  
The bad must miss, the good untaught will find;  
Slave to no sect, who takes no private road,  
But *looks thro' Nature up to Nature's God*.  
Pursues that chain, which links th' immense design,  
Joins heaven and earth, and mortal and divine.  
Sees that no Being any bliss can know,  
But touches some above, and some below;  
Learns, from this union of the rising *whole*,  
The first last purpose of the human soul;  
And knows where faith, law, morals, all began,  
All end, in **LOVE OF GOD**, and **LOVE OF MAN**.

To this Mr. *De Crousaz*,—"I made my remarks as  
"I went along, in reading the Poem of Mr. *Du Resnel*;  
"and, in proportion as I advanced in it, I have had the  
"most agreeable satisfaction to find, that my *Commennaries*  
"have been too hasty and immature on this  
"Poem; in so clear a light has the illustrious *Abbé*  
"placed those truths, which the prose Translator had  
"delivered with much less preciseness. In this translation  
"I evidently meet with the sacred terms of *faith*,  
"*hope*, and *charity*; but I don't know where he had  
"them."

“ them. And it is not easy for me to find, how the ideas  
 “ which I have been accustomed to fix to them can agree  
 “ with them. I am puzzled to know what they have to  
 “ do here \*.”

This, to use our Critic's own words, is a specimen of that *Gulimatias*, which runs through his whole Commentary. He suspects, he approves, he doubts, he applauds; but it all ends in calumny and condemnation. Here you have an old veteran Controversialist of seventy-five, who gives the world his *second thoughts* (for he had published his *Examen* before he wrote his *Commentary*) telling us that he scribbled at random, and made the greatest part of his remarks before he had read over the book he wrote against: a book that contains a regular, well-digested system, whose parts, having a mutual dependence, necessarily support and illustrate one another. But if a man would make so free with himself as to tell this strange story to the world, which certainly he had a right to do, he should, as his moral character was concerned, have made satisfaction for his folly, by striking out all those odious imputations with which the foregoing part of his Commentary abounds. Instead of this, he was not only content to leave the calumnies of *fatalism* and *Spinozism* unretracted; but has thought fit to renew them, even after this confession of his hasty, *immature* way of writing. Ah! *misera mens hominis, quo te fatum sæpissime trahit!* What but this could have forced him to write a whole book in contradiction to the very principle he himself lays down to proceed by? *An over-scrupulous exactitude* (says he) *would hurt the very end of poetry. But we must make it a law to interpret one expression by another, for fear of attributing notions to a Poet that would be injurious to him†.*

But to return: This is not all; the Poet shews farther [from l. 330 to 343] that, when the simple-minded man, on his first setting out in the pursuit of truth, in order to happiness, has had the wisdom

*To look thro' Nature up to Nature's God,*

instead of adhering to any sect or party, where there was

\* *Commentaire*, p. 332.

† *Ibid.* p. 196.

so great odds of his chusing wrong; that then the benefit of gaining the *knowledge of God's will written in the mind* is not there confined; for that standing on this *sure foundation*, he is now *no longer* in danger of chusing wrong, amidst *such diversities* of religions; but by pursuing this grand scheme of universal benevolence, in *practice*, as well as *theory*, he arrives at length to the *knowledge of the revealed will of God*, which is the *consummation of the system of benevolence*:

For him alone *hope* leads from goal to goal,  
And opens still, and opens on his soul,  
Till lengthen'd on to FAITH, and unconfin'd,  
It pours the bliss, that fills up all the mind.

But let us once more hear Mr. *De Crousaz*: "We  
"are brought (says he) at length to the *truths of Revela-*  
"tion.—See Man once again re-established in his rights,  
"raised as far above brutes as Heaven is above the earth.  
"How infinite a difference between what one reads in  
"this *fourth* Epistle, and what the Poet ventured to  
"propose in the *first*, and in part of the *two following*!  
"There, corrupt minds *thought* they read their own  
"sentiments; and even this, which we find here, is in-  
"sufficient to bring them back again from their pre-  
"ventions \*."

That the *three first* Epistles have nothing contrary to the *fourth*, we have not only sufficiently evinced, but shewn likewise, that the doctrine of this *last*, so much approved by Mr. *De Crousaz*, is the necessary consequence of that laid down in every one of the *preceding*, so much condemned by him. But, that *corrupt minds thought they read their own sentiments there*, nay, that it will be hard to bring them back again from their *preventions*, I can easily conceive; because, not only *partiality* to men's *own* opinions, but *prejudice* against the opinions of *others*, may make them fancy they see doctrines in a *celebrated writer*, which are indeed not there. And then, *self-love* on the one hand, and *self-conceit* on

\* Commentaire, p. 332, 333.

the other, may easily keep both in their several delusions, against all the power of conviction.

To proceed: the Poet, in the last place, marks out [from l. 342 to 363] the *progress* of his *good man's* benevolence, pushed through *natural* religion to *revealed*, till it arrives to that height, which the *sacred writers* describe as the very summit of *Christian perfection*: and shews how the progress of *human* differs from the progress of *divine* benevolence. That the *divine* descends from whole to parts; but that the *human* must rise from individual to universal. And with this rapturous description the subject of the Epistle closes:

*Self-love* thus push'd to social, to divine,  
 Gives thee to make thy neighbour's blessing thine:  
 Is this too little for the boundless heart?  
 Extend it, let thy enemies have part.  
 Grasp the whole worlds of reason, life, and sense,  
 In one close system of benevolence.  
 Happier, as kinder! in whate'er degree,  
 AND HEIGHT OF BLISS, BUT HEIGHT OF CHARITY.  
 God loves from whole to parts; but human soul  
 Must rise from individual to the whole.  
*Self-love* but serves the virtuous mind to wake,  
 As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;  
 The centre mov'd, a circle straight succeeds,  
 Another still, and still another spreads, &c.

The last part of the observation is important. *Roche-focault*, *Esprit*, and their wordy disciple *Mandeville*, had observed, that *self-love* was the *origin* of all those virtues mankind most admire; and therefore foolishly supposed it was the *end* likewise: and so, *taught* that the highest pretences to disinterestedness were only the more artful disguises of *self-love*. But Mr. *Pope*, who says, somewhere or other,

Of human nature wit its worst may write,  
 We all revere it in our own despite,  
 saw, as well as they, and every body else, that the passions began in *self-love*; yet he understood human nature better

better than to imagine they terminated there. He knew that reason and religion could convert *selfishness* into its very opposite; and therefore *teaches* that

*Self-love* but serves the virtuous mind to wake,

and thus hath vindicated the dignity of human nature, and the philosophic truth of the Christian doctrine.

But let us turn once more to Mr. *De Crousaz*, who, constant to himself, concludes, in the same even tenor in which he first set out. "A Man (says he) must use some efforts to go even so far as to love his enemies.— But as to what concerns all parts of the universe, and all the living beings that inhabit it, as well those we see not, as those we do see, we find n thing in ourselves repugnant indeed to the giving them our love; but then, on the other hand, we do not feel any motions towards the rendering it to them. And while so great a number of objects, with which we are closely surrounded, demand our attention and concern, it appears not only superfluous but even irrational, to tease ourselves with I cannot tell what kind of tenderness, for the inhabitants of *Jupiter*\*, " &c.

This presents him with a pleasant idea, and he pursues it with his usual grace and vivacity.

After this one would scarce think that in the very next words he should confute himself, answer his own objections, and vindicate the very charity he had ridiculed. And yet this he now does, as much without fear, as the other was without wit. "I own (says he) that a soul devoted to its Creator, and struck and raised with admiration at the attentive view of his mere corporeal creation, would be ready to lend those Beings his voice and sentiments, in order to join with them in an offering of praise and thanksgiving to their common Creator, whose glory they so magnificently declare, though without any knowledge of the truth which they proclaim. Nay, I go farther, and say, that a soul so sanctified, and at the same time well assured, that there are innumerable choirs of happy intelligences, who con-

\* *Commentaire*, p. 336.

"tinually

"tinually adore their Creator in ecstatic raptures, far surpassing our conceptions, will *congratulate* with them on their glory\* and felicity." Here we see described, and, to say the truth, not ill, that very state of mind which produced the raptures of our admirable Poet :

Grasp the whole worlds of reason, life, and sense,  
In one close system of benevolence.  
Happier, as kinder! in whatc'er degree,  
And height of bliss but height of charity.

No, says our Critic, who would still keep on foot the censure he himself has overthrown; the elevations I speak of, are not *elevations of charity for those glorious intelligences. We are the objects of their charity, not they of ours*†. Egregious philosopher! By charity, Mr. Pope not only *means* benevolence, but expressly *calls* it so. And *benevolence* surely may be as well exercised *towards* superiors, as *by* them.

But he proceeds—"This pretended chimerical affection can have no foundation but in the chimerical system of *a whole*, of which we make a part, and of which all the parts without exception are so dependent on each other, that, if any *one only* be displaced, or never so little deviating from its proper function, that disorder will affect the rest, and spread itself over the *whole*: and, by consequence, extend to us, who make an essential part of that whole. *Self-love* therefore, interests itself in every thing that exists and moves." *Self-love* was never sent on such an errand, no not by *Rochefoucault* or *Esprit*, though they forced it to do all their drudgery. Here, a man who never yet once rightly understood *what* his adversary *did say*, will now pretend to guess at his *reasons for saying*. One might have foreseen with what success. But something he has taught us, and that is, to rest content with the Poet's own reasoning. His argument then for this extended benevolence is, that as God has made *a whole*, whose parts have a perfect relation to, and an entire dependency on each

\* Commentaire, p. 337, 338.

† Ibid. p. 338.

other,

other, Man, in extending his benevolence throughout that *whole*, acts in conformity to the will of his Creator; and therefore, this *enlargement* of his affection becomes a *duty*.

But the Poet hath not only shewn his *piety* in this *precept*, but the utmost *art* and *address* likewise in the *disposition* of it. The *Essay on Man* opens with exposing the murmurings, and impious conclusions of foolish men against the present constitution of things. As it proceeds, it occasionally detects all those false principles and opinions that led them to conclude thus perversely. Having now done all that was necessary in *speculation*, the Poet turns to *practice*; and ends his *Essay* with the recommendation of an acknowledged virtue, *charity*, which, if exercised in the extent that conformity to the will of God requires, would effectually *prevent* all complaints against the present order of things: such complaints being made with a total disregard to every thing, but their own *private system*; and seeking remedy in the disorder, and at the expence of all the rest.

The art and contrivance, we see, is truly admirable. But Mr. *De Crousaz* pursues his own ideas. For to know Mr. *Pope's*, seems to have been his least concern throughout his whole *Commentary*. "This system [namely, of a *whole*] will carry us to a great length. "Miracles, which deviate from the ordinary course of nature, must pass from henceforward as idle fable." [Observe his reason] "It was impossible that any kind of thing which has happened, should not have happened, or not have happened in the manner it hath\*." As to Mr. *Pope's* fatalism, we have said enough of that matter already. But now, if, for disputation's sake, we admit what, for truth's sake, we must reject, according to my notions of logic, this conclusion would follow, *that therefore miracles could not but have been*; not Mr. *Crousaz's*, *that therefore they never could be*. Miracles are proved, like other matters of fact, by *human testimony*: if *that* says, iron at one time swam, at other times sunk, and we suppose things ordered fatally; these two events were equally *necessary*: so that, to make out

\* *Commentaire*, p. 339.

his conclusion, he must be forced to add downright *atheism* to his *fate*.

Mr. *De Crousaz* has now pushed matters to a decent length. He has said, the Poet's *extent of charity was irrational—the system on which it was founded chimerical—that it ended in fate—and overthrew all miracles*. One would imagine this should have satisfied the most orthodox resentiment. But there wanted something to make a right polemical climax. To crown the whole, therefore, he tells us, that, “According to the Poet, the “universe would not have been a work sufficiently worthy “of God, had there not been atheists, superstitious, “persecutors, tyrants, idolaters, assassins, and poisoners\*.” What I can find in the *Essay* coming nearest to this, is, That those mischiefs do not deform God's creation; *because* the divine art is incessantly producing good out of evil: and that as this universe is the best of all those in God's idea, therefore, whatever is, is right, with respect to that universe: either as tending, *in its own nature*, to the perfection of it, or made so to tend by infinite Wisdom, *contrary to its nature*. The true consequence drawn from all this, is, *That an universe with atheists, superstitious, &c. is sufficiently worthy of God*. How that can infer this other, *That the universe would not have been a work sufficiently worthy of God, had there not been atheists, superstitious, &c.* I leave Mr. *De Crousaz* to draw out by his own logic, or, which seems the more ductile of the two, his own conscience.

The Poet's address to his friend, which follows, and closes this *Epistle*, comes not within the design of these observations; which are only to explain the *philosophy* and *reasoning* of the *Essay on Man*. Otherwise, this single apostrophe would furnish a critic with examples of every one of those *five* species of elocution, from which, as from its sources, *Longinus* deduceth the *SUBLIME*†.

\* *Commentaire*, p. 340.

† — πῶς πηγαί τινες εἰσι τ' ὑψηλότηας. 1. Πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κράτιστον τὸ περὶ τὰς κοίτης ἀδριπύουλον. 2. Διύτερον δὲ τὸ σφοδρὲν καὶ ἐνθυσιαστικὸν πάθος. 3. Ποιὰ τῶν σχημάτων πλοασις. 4. Ἡ γυναιὶ φρασσις. 5. Πίμπλη δὲ μεγέθυς αἰτία, καὶ συγκαλίψα τὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἄπαντα, καὶ ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ διάρσει σέβησις.

1. The



1. The first and chief is *a grandeur and sublimity of conception*:

Come then, my friend ! my genius ! come along,  
O master of the Poet, and the song !  
And while the Muse now stoops, and now ascends,  
To Man's low passions, or their glorious ends—

2. The *second*, that *pathetic enthusiasm, which at the same time melts and enflames*:

Teach me, like thee, in various nature wise,  
To fall with dignity, with temper rise ;  
Form'd by thy converse, happily to steer  
From grave to gay, from lively to severe ;  
Correct with spirit, eloquent with ease,  
Intent to reason, or polite to please.

3. *A certain elegant formation and ordonnance of figures*:

O ! while along the stream of time, thy name  
Expanded flies, and gathers all its fame,  
Say, shall my little bark attendant sail,  
Pursue the triumph, and partake the gale ?

4. *A splendid diction* :

When statesmen, heroes, kings, in dust repose,  
Whose sons shall blush their fathers were thy foes,  
Shall then this verse to future age pretend  
Thou wert my guide, philosopher, and friend ?  
That, urg'd by thee, I turn'd the tuneful art  
From sounds to things, from fancy to the heart ;  
For wit's false mirror held up Nature's light—

And *fifthly*, which includes in itself all the rest, a *weight and dignity in the composition*:

Shew'd erring Pride, whatever is, is RIGHT ;  
That REASON, PASSION, answer *one great AIM* ;  
That true SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL are the SAME ;  
That VITRUE only makes our BLISS below ;  
And all our knowledge is, OURSELVES TO KNOW.

But this, as we say, is not our province at present. I shall therefore content myself with an observation, which this sublime recapitulation of the general argument, in  
the

the last lines, affords me to conclude with. Which is, of one great beauty that shines through the whole *Essay*. It is this, that the Poet, whether he speaks of Man as an *individual*, a member of *society*, or the subject of *happiness*, never misseeth an opportunity, while he is explaining his *state* under any of these capacities, to illustrate it, in the most artful manner, by the inforcement of his grand principle, *That every thing tends to the good of the whole*. From whence his system receives the reciprocal advantage of having that grand *theorem* realized by *facts*, and his *facts* justified on a *principle of right* or nature.

Thus have I endcavoured to analyse and explain the noble reasoning of these four Epistles. Enough, I presume, to convince our Critic's *friends* that it hath a precision, force, and closeness of connexion, rarely to be met with, even in the most formal treatises of philosophy. Yet in doing this, it is but too evident I have destroyed that grace and energy which animates the original. So right was Mr. *Pope's* prediction of the event of such an undertaking, where he says, in his preface, that, *he was unable to treat this part of his subject more in detail, without becoming dry and tedious*. And now let the Reader believe, if he be so disposed, what our great Logician insinuates to be his own sentiments, as well as those of his friends: "That certain persons have conjectured that Mr. *Pope* did not compose this *Essay* at once, and in a regular order; but that after he had wrote several fragments of Poetry, all finished in their kind; one, for example, on the Parallel between *Reason* and *Instinct*; another, upon Man's groundless *Pride*; another, on the Prerogatives of *Human Nature*; another, on *Religion* and *Superstition*; another, on the *Original of Society*; and several fragments besides, on *Self-love* and the *Passions*; he tacked these together as he could, and divided them into four Epistles, as, it is said, was the fortune of *Homer's Rhapsodies*.\*" Yes, I believe full as much of Mr. *Pope's Rhapsodies*, as I do of *Homer's*. But if this be the case, that the *leaves* of these *two great Poets* were wrote at raudom, tossed about, and afterwards put in order, like the *Cumæan Sibyls*; then, what

\* *Commentaire*, p. 346.

we have till now thought an old lying bravado of the Poets, *that they wrote by inspiration*, will become a sober truth. For, if *chance* could not produce them, and *human design* had no hand in them, what must we conclude, but that they are, what they are so commonly called, *divine*?

However, so honourable an account of *rhapsody writing* should by all means be encouraged, as matter of consolation to certain modern writers in divinity and politics. But the mischief is, our Logician has given us an unlucky proof in his own case, that *all Rhapsodists* are not so happy.

To be serious: As to *Homer*, one might hope, by this time, those old exploded fooleries about his *rhapsodies* would be forgotten. But as to his *Translator*, it must be owned, he has given cause enough of disgust to our *philosophers* and *men of reason*. Till this time, every Poet, good or bad, stuck fairly to his profession: But Mr. *Pope*, now the last of the poetic line amongst us, on whom the large patrimony of his whole race is devolved, seems desirous, as is natural in such cases, to ally himself to a more lasting family; and so, after having disported himself at will, in the flowery paths of fancy, and revelled in all the favours of the Muses, boasts of having taken up in time, and courted and espoused *truth*:

That not in *fancy's* maze he wander'd long,  
But stoop'd to *truth*, and moraliz'd his song.

But now, in what light, must we think, will the graver Christian reader regard the calumnies we have here confuted? How sad an idea will this give him of the *present* spirit of Christian profession, that a work, wrote solely to recommend the *charity* that religion so strongly inforceth, and breathing nothing but love to God, and universal good-will to Man, should bring upon the Author such a storm of uncharitable bitterness and calumny, and that, from a pretended Advocate of Christianity? A religion the very vitality of which (if we may believe its propagators) is universal benevolence: *For the end of the commandment is charity*\*. Conformably hereunto we may

\* 1 Tim. i. 5.

observe,

observe, that in their *Epistles* to the *Churches*, whatever the occasion was, whatever discipline they instituted, whatever points of faith they explained, whatever heresies they stigmatized, whatever immoralities they condemned, or whatever virtues they recommended, CHARITY was still the thing most constantly enforced, as the very end of all, *the bond of perfectness*\*. The *beloved* disciple of our Lord, particularly, who may surely be supposed to know his Master's will, hath wrote *his* Epistle on set purpose to recommend this single virtue: at a crisis too, when, as heresies were springing up apace, a *modern controversialist* would be apt to think he might have employed his time better. And why (it may be reasonably asked) so very much on *charity*, in an age when Christians had so few provocations or temptations to violate it? For their faith being yet chaste from the prostitutions of the *schools*, and their hierarchy yet uncorrupted by the gifts of *Constantine*, the Church knew neither *bigotry* nor *ambition*, the two fatal sources of uncharitable zeal. I will tell you, it was the providence of their prophetic spirit, which presented to them the image of those miserable times foretold by their Master, when *iniquity should abound, and the love of many wax cold*†. So that if the men of those times should persist in violating *this bond of perfectness*, after so many repeated admonitions, they might be found altogether without excuse. For I can by no means enter into the views of that profound philosopher, who discovered that *Jesus* and his followers might preach up love and charity, the better to enable a set of men, some centuries afterwards, to tyrannise over those whom the *engaging sounds of charity and brotherly love* had intrapped into subjection‡.

I am aware that certain modern propagators of the faith, aided with a *school distinction*, will tell you, that it is pure charity which sets them all at work; and that what you call *uncharitableness*, when they insult the fame, the fortune, or the person of their brother, is indeed the very height of charity, a charity for his *soul*. This indeed may be the height of the hangman's charity,

\* Col. iii. 14.

† Matt. xxiv. 12.

‡ *Characteristics*, vol. i. p. 87. vol. iii. p. 115. Ed. 1737.

who waits for your clothes : But it could never be St. Paul's. His was *not easily provoked, thought no evil, bore all things, hoped all things, endured all things*\*. It was a charity that began in candour, inspired good opinion, and sought the temporal happiness of his brother.

I leave it with Mr. *De Crousaz* to think upon the different effects which excess of zeal in the service of religion hath produced in him. For I will, in very *charity*, believe it to be really *that* ; notwithstanding we every day see the most despicable tools of *others impotency*, and the vilest slaves to their *own ambition*, hide their corrupt passions under the self-same cover. This learned gentleman should reflect on what the sober part of the world will think of his conduct. For though the Apostle bids AGED MEN BE SOUND IN FAITH, he adds immediately, and IN CHARITY, IN PATIENCE† likewise. But where was his *charity* in labouring, on the slightest grounds, to represent his brother as propagating *Spinozism* and immorality? Where was his *temper*, when he became so furious against him, on the supposition of his espousing a *system* he had *never read*, that of *Leibnitz*; and justifying a doctrine he had *never heard of*, the *pre-established harmony*? Where was his *patience*, when, having conceived this of him, on the mere authority of a *most mistaken Translator*, he would not stay to inquire whether the Author owned the faithfulness of the version ; but published his conceptions, and the strongest accusations upon those conceptions, in volume after volume, to the whole world? Where, if in any of these imaginations so founded, he should be mistaken, he became guilty of a deliberate and repeated act of the highest injustice ; the attempting to deprive a virtuous man of his honest reputation.

If Mr. *De Crousaz* presumes his zeal for the honour of God will excuse his violations of charity towards men, I must tell him, *he knows not what spirit he is of*. If a man (says the beloved disciple of our Lord) say, *I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar : For he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love*

\* 1 Cor. xiii. 5. 7.      † Titus ii. 2.

*God whom he hath not seen*\*? A free-thinker may perhaps laugh at the simplicity of this argument, which yet he would affect to admire, could any one find it for him in *Plato*. But let him for once condescend to be instructed by his *Bible*, and hearken to a little *christian* reasoning.

"You say you *love* God (says the Apostle) though  
 "you hate your brother: Impossible! The love of any  
 "object begins originally, like all the other passions,  
 "from self-love. Thus we love ourselves, by representa-  
 "tion, in our offspring; which love extends by degrees  
 "to our remoter relations, and so on through our neigh-  
 "bourhood, to all the fellow-members of our community.  
 "And now self-love, refined by reason and religion, be-  
 "gins to lose its nature, and deservedly assumes another  
 "name. Our country next claims our love; we then  
 "extend it to all mankind, and never rest till we have,  
 "at length, fixed it on that *most amiable* of all objects,  
 "the great Author and Original of Being. This is the  
 "course and progress of human love:

God loves from whole to parts, but human soul  
 Must rise from individual to the whole.

"Now (pursues the Apostle) I reason thus: Can  
 "you, who are not yet arrived at that inferior stage of  
 "benevolence, the love of your brother, *whom you have*  
 "*seen*, that is, whom the necessities of civil life, and a  
 "sense of your mutual relation might teach you to love,  
 "pretend to have reached the very height and per-  
 "fection of this passion, the love of God, *whom you have*  
 "*not seen*? that is, *whose* wonderful oeconomy in his  
 "system of creation, which makes him so amiable, you  
 "cannot have the least conception of; *you*, who have  
 "not yet learnt that your own private system is supported  
 "on the great principle of benevolence? *Fear* him,  
 "*flatter* him, *fight* for him, as you dread his *power*,  
 "you may; but to *love* him, as you know not his *nature*,  
 "is impossible." This is the Apostle's grand and  
 sublime reasoning; and it is with the same thought on  
 which the Apostle founds his argument, that our moral

\* 1 John iv. 20.

Poet ends his Essay, as the just and necessary conclusion of his work :

*Self-love* but serves the virtuous mind to *wake*,  
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;  
The *centre* mov'd, a *circle* straight succeeds,  
Another still, and still another spreads;  
*Friend, parent, neighbour*, - first it will embrace,  
His *country* next, and next, *all human race*;  
Wide, and more wide, th' o'erflowings of the mind  
Take every creature in, of every kind;  
*Earth* smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,  
AND HEAVEN BEHOLDS ITS IMAGE IN HIS BREAST.

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# REMARKS

ON A BOOK ENTITLED

*Future Rewards and Punishments believed by the Ancients,  
particularly the Philosophers;*

*Wherein some Objections of the Rev. Mr. WARBURTON, in his  
Divine Legation of Moses, are considered: 1742.*

WITH

A POSTSCRIPT,

In answer to some Objections of DR. SYKES;

And A LETTER to Bishop SMALLBROOK.

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Beware lest any man spoil you through PHILOSOPHY and vain deceit,  
after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after  
CHRIST.—Col. ii. 8.

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## ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE SECOND EDITION;

1742.

THE AUTHOR of the Pamphlet here examined, hath lately made a public confession of his authorship, signed with his own *name*; and thereby saved himself from all farther correction of this kind. For he who is so lost to shame, as a WRITER, to *own* what he before wrote, and so lost to shame, as a MAN, to *own* what he hath now written, must needs be past all amendment, the only reasonable view in *correction*. I shall therefore but do, what indeed (were it any more than repeating what he himself hath discovered to the Public) would be justly reckoned the cruellest of all things, tell my reader the name of this Miserable; which we find to be I. TILLARD.

## REMARKS.

## I.

**T**HOUGH I could not persuade myself to take this notice of such a kind of Writer as him of the *Miscellany*, yet a very little thing, the reader sees, will engage me to give an adversary satisfaction; while I suffer myself to be seduced into a controversy by the Writer of a late Book, entitled, *Future Rewards and Punishments believed by the Ancients, particularly the Philosophers; wherein some Objections of the Reverend Mr. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of MOSES, are considered\**.

And a very little thing it was; only the finding in his book one single truth, which does me a piece of justice, that the *orthodox* Writer above-mentioned would by no means be brought unto, even after his conviction of calumny on that head. It is in these words; *But I must here do so much justice to Mr. Warburton, as to acknowledge, that the point he denies, is, that the philosophers only did not believe future rewards and punishments; whereas he allows all others did believe them.* p. 84.

For the rest, neither his *abilities* nor his *candour* deserved this notice. His *abilities* are duly celebrated in these few sheets; and for his *candour*, the reader will, I believe, require no farther proof than the following:—*After all these lively descriptions—if there can the least doubt remain in the reader's breast—it must arise from the influence and prepossession of a few random expressions now and then thrown out to depreciate the philosophers, by certain persons, who, thinking themselves obliged to say something out of the common road, very frequently discover their IGNORANCE AND WANT OF SENSE IN THE VERY ATTEMPT TO DISPLAY THEIR*

\* 8vo. London, 1740. Printed by M. Steen, in the Inner-Temple Lane.

LEARNING: *But that* SUCH PRETENDERS TO KNOWLEDGE, SUCH EMPTY MIMICS OF REAL WORTH, MAY NO LONGER IMPOSE *upon persons of good understanding*—*I shall, &c.* pp. 164, 165.

But though I shew this distinction to a puny truth half overlaid, which I was forced to draw from under an unwieldy heap of blunders and prevarications: yet, let it be observed, that this is only for once, and out of due regard to the first writer against me, that has condescended to say any thing truly of me: For I hope common honesty is not so rare, even *amongst Answerers by profession* (of all sober knaves the most corrupt) that this tribute need be paid twice unto it.

My Considerer begins his preface thus: *The motive which principally induced me to publish the following collection and observations, was the strange and unjustifiable methods which some men take to advance their own SYSTEMS by depreciating and running down those of others.* p. iii. The reader sees what the man would be at. Here is no disguise or reserve, however. It is the old infidel grudge against the intolerant spirit of Christianity, delivered as crudely as ever his dear friends, the *philosophers*, urged it against the *primitive apologists*. Their great quarrel to Christianity was, that its defenders endeavoured *to advance their own systems, by depreciating and running down those of others\**: And this, in their, and in their advocates opinion, *was a strange and unjustifiable method*. And how should he think otherwise? when he has so mean an opinion of the cause of Revelation, as to tell us presently after, That most of that vast number of books that have been wrote to prove the necessity and excellency of our holy religion, are thought very mean and insufficient by the unprejudiced and inquisitive adversary, but appear in a very different light to the mob of Christians, who, by the happy prejudice of education, have been brought up to doubt of nothing. But hear him in his own more emphatic words. *The vast number of books and pamphlets which have of late years been so plentifully poured out, to prove the necessity and excellency of our holy religion, certainly deserve the approbation and thanks of every zealous and truly devout*

\* See the Divine Legat. Book II. § 6.

*Christian :*

*Christian: And though many of these performances have been THOUGHT BY THE ADVERSARY VERY MEAN AND INSUFFICIENT, yet they have appeared in a quite different light in the eyes of the bulk of mankind; WHO, FROM THE HAPPY CAST OF THEIR NATIVITY, HAVE, IN THEIR EARLIEST AGE, BEEN TAUGHT TO FORM A MUCH BETTER JUDGMENT OF THINGS; AND WHO, SELDOM HAVING ANY DOUBTS OR SCRUPLES TO DISTURB THEM, are therefore the easier confirmed in the quiet and full persuasion of these doctrines THEY AT FIRST RECEIVED.* pp. iii. iv.

Had I not reason to say as I did, "That the heathen philosophers of our times might be well excused in being angry, to see their ancient brethren shewn for knaves in practice, and fools in theory; but that any else should think themselves concerned in the force and fidelity of the drawing, was a mystery I did not know what to make of?"

It is therefore matter of much consolation to me, to find that the real friends of Revelation have at length left these *heathen philosophers* (the men whom only it concerns) to dispute this point with me. I have now got a *gentleman freethinker* under my hands; and, if those other folks will be but easy, I'll promise to give a good account of him.

Our *Considerer* proceeds to shew the reasons why some defenders of Christianity will not acknowledge the doctrine contained in his book. He graciously acquits them of all malice and design, and throws it first,

1. Upon their ignorance. *The first of which is the ignorance, in this particular, of by far the greatest part of them [defenders of Christianity] who really do not know that rewards and punishments in another life are any where spoken of but in the New Testament, unless it be in some dark and figurative terms, which (AS IF THERE WERE NONE SUCH AMONGST THEMSELVES) they think they have a right to laugh at and expose. They remember, perhaps, some stories in their school-books of Elysium, of Tartarus, of Cerberus, &c. and conclude, very hastily, that this was all that was ever thought of or believed by the Heathens concerning a world to*

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

come. p. v. It was not for nothing, we find, that he despised the defenders of Christianity as scribblers, whom none but a prejudiced mob would give any credit to: For the *far greatest part of them*, it seems, knew no more of antiquity than a few *stories in their school-books*. But who can enough admire the modesty of this, in one, who confesses he has forgot his *Greek*, and this only in order to insinuate that he has some *Latin* which yet sticks by him?

2. He throws it, *Secondly*, Upon their *prejudices*, that is, *their great attachment to their own religion*. On this head, he talks I don't know what—of *captivated lovers, picus zeal, prejudice of education, interest, preferment*; in short the common dog-trot of infidelity and freethinking.

After this specimen of his *modesty*, he presents us with one of his *abilities*. *As to what relates (says he) to the subject of the following sheets, the case in fact is this. It is indisputably true, and beyond all reasonable contradiction, that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is clearly and plainly delivered and laid down in the New Testament: And it is as indisputably true, and beyond all reasonable contradiction, that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is CLEARLY AND PLAINLY DELIVERED AND LAID DOWN in the books and writings of the Heathens. THE TRUTH OF WHICH POINT is now submitted to the judgment of every impartial reader.* p. vii. This *indisputable point*, which he writes a book to prove, is, I believe, strictly so. At least it was never disputed by his humble servant. On the contrary, I have said, the heathen philosophers were perpetually inculcating to the people the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in their discourses and writings\*. But his title-page professes to prove the truth of a very different point, not quite so indisputable. *Future Rewards and Punishments BELIEVED by the Antients, particularly the Philosophers, wherein some Objections of the Reverend Mr. W. in his Divine Legation of MOSES are considered.* Thus we see this able writer has mistaken his question before he be got to the end of his Preface. *Diós me de contiéndá con quién me entiéndá*, says the Spanish Proverb, *God grant*

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 2.

*me an adversary that understands me.* But, wretch that I am, after having met with such an adversary, I am now forced to contend with one that does not understand himself.

His Pretace concludes thus: *I thought once to have changed the order in which the quotations of the second chapter are placed.* BUT METHOD IN SUCH CASES DEPENDING ALMOST AS MUCH UPON THE FANCY OF EVERY READER AS THE REAL PROPRIETY OF THE THING ITSELF, *I chose rather to submit them as they are, &c.* p. ix. By these his frank sentiments of *method*, it appears he has forgot his *logic* too, if ever he had any, as well as his *Greek*, which, he tells us, *he had neglected, like Lord Chief Justice Hale, by a long advocacy to studies of quite another nature.* p. viii. Whatever his studies were, he can scarce persuade the reader to think them like *Lord Chief Justice Hale's*. That learned man indeed lost his *Greek*, but got a great deal of *good sense*. Our Author too has lost his *Greek*. And what has he got? Marry, the knack of writing without any sense at all.

II. We come now to his *first chapter*, the only one that I am concerned in; and therefore the only one I shall, at present, give myself the trouble of considering. As just before he had innocently blundered out of the question; so now by entering on his attendance on the Author of *The Divine Legation*, he has as innocently blundered into it: And thus has set all right again.

After having frankly told the reader, that the Author of *The Divine Legation* had not the direct and immediate discovery of truth, and the REAL and SUBSTANTIAL improvement of mankind [*i. e.* the recommendation of Pagan Philosophy] in his thoughts and studies, but the advancement of a certain favourite scheme [*i. e.* of Revelation] he goes on to quote the apologies I make for venturing to deny a commonly received opinion. On which he thus descants: *By all which, and indeed his whole manner of treating this subject, he plainly discovers such a great distrust of his arguments and conclusions to convince the judgment of his reader, that, &c.* pp. 1--3. I am a very unlucky Writer. If I express myself with *confidence*, I am supposed to distrust other men's opinions; if with *diffidence*, my own. But let him  
rest

rest himself content. I am under no manner of diffidence. Or, if I had any, his writing against me had easily removed it. However, in this I shall never recriminate. I confess, he writes all the way as much without fear as wit.

*I shall* (says our crafty Advocate) *pass over his nice distinctions, divisions, and subdivisions.* p. 3. Now this, I cannot but think hard. He had before made his exceptions to *Greek*, and I dare say he would think it unfair to have it urged against him after he had so fairly pleaded *Ignoramus* to it; yet a critical use of that language is alone sufficient to determine a decisive question in this controversy, namely, *of the Spinozism of the ancient philosophers*: and here he debars me all benefit of logic, and won't have patience while I state the question, and divide the subject. *I shall pass over* (says he) *his nice distinctions, divisions, and subdivisions.* So that because he knows neither *Greek* nor *method*, I shall use none. Here then I might fairly dismiss this *minute philosopher*, who dares me to the combat, and yet excepts against all the weapons in use. But not to disappoint the company we have brought together, I will accept his challenge, and fight him with his own wooden dagger.

*I proceed* (says he) *directly to take notice of those reasons which, IN MY APPREHENSION, any ways affect the present question; and these, I think, may be reduced to two.* 1st, "*That the philosophers held it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing, when they thought another, and that they actually did so.*" 2dly, "*That they held some fundamental principles of philosophy, which were altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of future rewards and punishments.*" pp. 3, 4. But surely, if he will needs write against me, his business is not only to consider what, *in his apprehension*, tends to the proof of my point, but likewise what *in my apprehension* I had said does so. For instance, *in his apprehension*, this argument, *That the philosophers held it lawful in general to say one thing, when they thought another*, and this, that they actually *did so*, tends to the proof of my point. And, *in my apprehension*, this other argument likewise, *That the philosophers acted on the above principle, with regard to a future state of rewards and punishments, the very doctrine*

*doctrine in question*, has, at least, as strong a tendency: For which reason I had employed *six large pages* to inforce it. But to all this my adversary has thought fit to say—Nothing.

However, if he will needs confine the strength of my discourse to those two points, I must be content, and accept the best terms he can be brought to. Nor will the reader perhaps think these bad ones. But, alas! he yet knows little of our advocate. Of a hundred arguments from reason and authority which support those two points, he has not ventured so much as at a *decimation*; and his attack of those few he shuffles off in so evasive a manner, as would never get him *victory in the schools*, (p 3.) nor hardly credit at the bar. But what would he not do, or what would he not forbear to do, for his philosophers? For if that set of modern heathens, as he gravely tells us, *ARE NOT FAR FROM THE KINGDOM OF GOD, who being really in good earnest in the search of truth, have without prejudice considered, and have calmly, seriously, and with the utmost diligence examined into the obligation of the several religions, or sects of religion, which now prevail in the world; and after the maturest deliberation are satisfied there is nothing extraordinary or immediately divine in any of them; but that, upon the whole, all which they contain or pretend to (except what relates to our duty to God, and our obligations to morality) is merely human invention, and the product of design, of error, or of enthusiasm.* pp. 201, 202. If these be so near day, in what a hopeful condition are those of the *elder house*, who certainly cannot be said to have rejected the Gospel; though so ready to give *a diligent and dispassionate examination* to any thing that would afford room for a dispute.

III. But we must take him as we find him, and be thankful. The reader will say presently we have reason. For he now proceeds to the confutation of the first point, *That the philosophers held it lawful, for public good, to say one thing, when they thought another.* And how does he set about it? Truly in a very new way. By PROVING it at large, from the fourth to the sixteenth page:



page: which, he *honestly*, for the *second time*, concludes thus: *all which is, in effect, no more than what Mr. Warburton himself says*. pp. 16, 17. Why, no; but he being able to say it so much better, had a mind to shew his parts. And now, according to his own confession, *the philosophers holding it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another*; and I having proved, to which proof he has not opposed a single syllable, *that they practised this rule in the very point in question*, the dispute is fairly at an end. This will certainly surprise our less attentive readers: but they must know, all this good-natured pains was neither for their sakes nor for mine, but for his dear *philosophers*. The case stood thus: when I spoke of the *double doctrine*, I considered the practice of it as not altogether free from blame. Not that this representation contributed to prove it practised in the point in question, but because I thought the representation *true*. But my adversary, as we see, having taken it for granted, that *I had not the direct and immediate discovery of TRUTH in my thoughts and studies*, had nothing left, but the first reason to assign for my representation, which affecting the credit of his masters, he will endeavour, as great an enemy as he is to *divisions and distinctions*, to *distinguish* away this opprobrium. He therefore *divides* the practice of the *double doctrine* into two sorts. The one, a little criminal: the other, quite free from blame. And to shew his judgment, in the first class he places *priests and politicians*, and in the *second*, the *Chinese literati*, who taught Atheism in private; and *Orpheus*, who against his conscience, as he says, taught Polytheism in public. pp. 7 and 12—14. But the class of innocents, you may be sure, was erected chiefly for his dear philosophers, whose *double doctrine* he impiously compares to the practices of the ever blessed *Jesus*, pp. 30—39. For which I remit him to the *appointed* defenders of religion: who will, I hope, give him due correction for all his insults on their *ignorance* and their *school-books*.

The mighty argument then he labours with, and for the sake of which he has, before he was aware, given up the whole cause, is this: "The philosophers' practice of the *double doctrine* was innocent and laudable: therefore  
 " it

“it could never be employed to preach up a future state of rewards and punishments in public, and to preach it down in private.”—This, I suppose, he would have said, had he known how to express his own meaning. Let us see then what force it has upon his principles. For, as much as he contends for the propagation of truth, he is not likely to die a martyr to it; as you may hear by his talking—*To disturb the public peace, to break the laws, and fruitlessly to expose ourselves to manifest danger for the sake of propagating our religion, seems to carry a contradiction in itself, and would need no confutation, if the mistaken principles and practice of a few zealots did not inflame some people to think otherwise.* p. 43. It is no wonder this should raise his indignation. For had not Christ and his apostles been guilty of the very misdemeanor that, he tells us, *carries a contradiction in itself* (which, whatever it means in his jargon, is surely something very bad) we had never had the poor philosophers at this time of day so disgracefully pushed beside the chair. But for this, I again send him to be disciplined by the *defenders* aforesaid; and go on to try his argument on his own principle. *The philosophers, as he confesses, used, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.* They saw that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was firmly believed by the people, and of infinite service to society. But their speculative opinions led them to reject it. What was to be done? Telling what they thought the truth would be injurious, on the supposition, both to society and themselves. And (as he assures us) *fruitlessly to expose one's self to manifest danger for the sake of propagating one's religion, seems to carry a contradiction in itself.* Here then their principle of *saying one thing when they thought another*, came in practice, nothing being left, but to *profess* in public, and *believe* in private. But he will say, perhaps, *that sincere impartial inquirers after truth*, like his philosophers, could not, *after the most careful examination*, reject the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. Why not, I ask him? They might be as costive of belief, for aught he knows, as his favourite class of free-thinkers; who, with the same qualifications, reject all Revelation in general. But it ran strangely

strangely in his head, that if I thought the philosophers practised the double doctrine on the point in question, I must needs suppose they had *no fixed principles*.—But it is *very unreasonable* (says he) and *unjust* from hence to conclude, that they who do so, have no belief of their own, or that they think all religion whatever the intention of designing men. And again,—So that, notwithstanding their double doctrine, they had still some fixed ones of their own. pp. 45. 47. Why, thou mighty defender of heathen wisdom! who ever said they had not! Or who but *such* a defender would not have seen, that all the force of my argument rests upon this very truth, that they had *fixed principles*, that they had a *belief of their own*?

But as if he had not done enough in this obliging way, he will go on, and prove for me, that *the double doctrine was not about different opinions, but the same*. I indeed thought it incumbent on *me* to shew this: because it was bringing my argument home to the point, that a future state was one of the objects of the *double doctrine*. But how it could be made to serve *his* purpose, was quite beyond my reach. Judge then of my surprise, when I saw him attempt to prove it at large; and to conclude his proof thus: *it appears then that the external doctrine related to the same thing as the internal*. p. 24. I was some time at a loss for his meaning in the former case: but here I gave over the search as desperate. Not but I concluded there was mischief somewhere. At last I found this slender thing of an argument lie lurking under a *conundrum*. I don't know whether it will bear the handling; but at present it hangs together thus: “The “external doctrine related to the same thing as the “internal. Now *a future state* is *one* thing, and *no future state*, another. These therefore being *two*, “could not be the object of the *double doctrine*, which “was concerned with *one* thing only.” But our advocate is so far from being able to make a good argument, that, to the shame of his *profession*, he knows not how to make a good *quibble*. For I had all along affirmed the philosophers, both in their *external* and *internal* teaching, held *a future state* (here's his *one and the same thing* for him:) in their *external*, a future state *with* rewards and  
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punishments;

punishments; in their *internal*, a future state *without* them.

But though he contends, that *the external doctrine related to the same thing with the internal, yet it does not* (he says) *in the least appear, that the philosophers believed one thing, and taught a quite contrary to the people.* p. 19. This is strange indeed. These philosophers then must be like their advocate, and teach *nothing*. Otherwise, if the external teaching was for the people, and the internal what the people could not be trusted with, and both about the same thing, the two ways of teaching must certainly proceed upon contrary propositions. But, perhaps, in the humour he is now in, an authority may be better liked than a reason. I will give him one above all exception: his own. In another place he tells us, *it did fully appear, that the philosophers believed one thing, and taught a quite contrary to the people; for he says—THE EXTERNAL THEREFORE MUST BE JUST THE REVERSE [to the internal] WITH RELATION TO THE SAME POINTS.* p. 24.

IV. Our advocate hath given me so little room to quarrel with him on this head, that the reader must needs have had a very poor and meagre entertainment. Nothing but a still-born blunder, and the ghost of a departed quibble. He must therefore be content to make out his treat with what cold scraps I can pick up from the over-sodden *crambe* of his *logic* and *literature*.

In the fifth page he says, Mr. Warburton *EXPRESSES himself very AMBIGUOUSLY, where he asserts that they held it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.* FOR, in the present question, if we understand by this, that the philosophers believed a future state in a spiritual, refined, and rational sense, while they sometimes countenanced the people in their gross, vulgar, and corporeal notions of it, then what he lays down is certainly true: but if we understand it, AS HE INTENDS WE SHOULD, that the philosophers preached the doctrine of a future state to the people, while themselves believed the contrary, viz. that there was no future state of rewards and punishments at all; then his charge on the philosophers is absolutely false.

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The *logic* of this incomparable period stands thus :

1. First I talk *ambiguously*, BECAUSE it is in his power to misunderstand me ; *for in the present case* (says he) *if we understand*, &c. not *because* of any thing I myself said, or omitted to say. For when I asserted what he here lays to my charge, I had added *that the philosophers preached the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments to the people, while themselves believed the contrary* ; and repeated it so often over, that this writer himself, who accuses me of *expressing myself ambiguously*, confesses, in the very attempt to prove his accusation, that he knows my meaning. *But if we understand it* (says he) AS HE INTENDS WE SHOULD——

2. Secondly, I talk *ambiguously*, BECAUSE, in his sense of the words, they are true—in mine, not true.

These are such discoveries in the *art of reasoning*, that I could almost wish the Author would add a chapter of *ambiguities* to our common *logics*. A thing, I'll assure him, very much wanted.

In his 17th page we have these words, *Notwithstanding which* [viz. the double-doctrine] *the design and end of the philosophers in both, was still in general the same, that is, to improve mankind as much as they would bear ; and the doctrines in substance and at the bottom were all along one and the same ; JUST AS true Christianity MAY NOW BE, though in some countries scarce discernible, being overwhelmed with legends, false miracles, image-worship, and all the trumpery of Popish superstition.*

Here's a period, let me tell you, that has no weak side of *sense*, but is impenetrable all round. Does he mean that the external and internal doctrines of the philosophers were in general the same, *just as* pure Christianity, and corrupt Christianity *overwhelmed with legends, false miracles, image-worship, and all the trumpery of Popish superstition*, are in general the same ? Or does he mean that the external and internal doctrines of the philosophers were both to improve mankind as much as they could bear, *just as* pure Christianity, and corrupt Christianity *overwhelmed with legends, false miracles, image worship, and all the trumpery of Popish superstition*, are both to improve mankind as much as they can bear ? Or, lastly,  
which

which perhaps should have been asked first, had he any meaning at all? However it is every way so profound, that I should advise him to add a chapter of *comparisons* to his chapter of *ambiguities*, that the one may furnish us with *examples* to fit his *rules* in the other. 'This shall suffice at present for a specimen of his *Art of Reasoning*.

Let us turn to his *literature*, and see first how he manages his *Latin translations*.

He gives us the following quotation from Ælian's *Various History*\*: *Ita vero etiam Socratem non explicate disserere; si quis autem eas dissertationes CONVERTAT, planissimas esse*; and translates it thus: *Socrates used to talk ambiguously; but if any one turns and SIFTS his discourses WITH ATTENTION, they will appear most plain and easy.* p. 18.

The reader will seek to no purpose in the Latin for *sifts with attention*; but this was the paraphrase of a word he did not understand, *convertat*, *σείψαι*, used by the Author in allusion to its *literal*, not *figurative* sense. Ælian had just before told a story of one, a *connoisseur* like our Advocate, who would needs have a horse painted rolling on his back. The artist brought him a running horse; which not contenting him, the other put it into the posture required, by turning the picture upside down. Turn *Socrates* thus, says Ælian, and you have his true meaning. That is, *understand him by contraries*. And this rule was given with judgment. For *Socrates* being perpetually *ironical*, take him in the reverse, and he is in his right senses. But our Advocate knew as little of *Socrates's* character as of his Translator's Latin. "*Pausonem enim pictorem, quum*  
*" audivisset a quodam, ut volutantem se equum pingeret,*  
*" currentem eum pinxisse. Quum igitur is qui tabulam*  
*" pingendam locarat, indignaretur, tanquam contra pac-*  
*" tum ille pinxisset, respondisse pictorem, VERTE [ἄρ-*  
*" σείψαι] tabulum, & ita volutans tibi esto equus, qui*  
*" nunc est currens. Ita vero etiam Socratem non ex-*  
*" plicite disserere; si quis autem eas dissertationes CON-*  
*" VERTAT [σείψαι] planissimas esse."* Let us now see how ably he acquits himself of his *original* writers.

\* L. xiv. c. 15.

He brings a passage from *Macrobius* in these words, *Si quid de his assignare conantur, quæ non sermonem tantummodo, sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines & exempla confugiunt.*—*Sic ipsa mysteria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur; ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat; sed summatibus tantum viris sapientia interprete veri arcani conscius; contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris descendentibus a vilitate secretum,* 1 *Macrobius*. 2. *Ed. Lond.* 1694. Which he translates thus: TO THE SAME PURPOSE *Macrobius*, speaking of God and Nature, says, *The philosophers when they treated of such subjects as were beyond all our words, and exceeded even our thoughts, they had recourse to similes and allusions. FOR THAT THESE THINGS WERE AS MYSTERIES, WHICH THE WISE ONLY WERE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING; but that others should be content WITH AN AWFUL VENERATION for them under the veil of figures and allegories, LEST THEY SHOULD BE DESPISED.* p. 20.

This comes of *free-thinking*, and leaving his *school-books* to the *clergy*: who owe him a shame for that contemptuous donation\*.

1. We see here, he makes the words, *Si quid de his assignare conantur*, to *confugiunt*, to relate to the *double doctrine* of the philosophers, as is evident by this introduction, *To the same purpose Macrobius*. To what purpose, I beseech you? Why, to the purpose of *Burnet's* words immediately preceding, which expressly treat of the nature of the *twofold doctrine of the ancients*. But who but a *free-thinker*, would not have found that these of *Macrobius* relate to a quite different thing? namely, the inability of expressing spiritual and abstract ideas any otherwise than by words conveying sensible and material images. Not, like the *external doctrine*, a matter of *choice*, but *necessity*; a necessity arising from the nature of things. A way of speaking the philosophers could not avoid, even when conveying their *internal doctrine* to their *adepts*. But now the reader will be apt to ask, if this be so, as is evident even from the words themselves, what must we do with the rest of the pas-

\* See the quotation, at p. 151.

sage, beginning at *Sic ipsa mysteria*—which does indeed relate to the *double doctrine*; for it gives a reason why men *have recourse to similes and allusions*, a reason founded in the nature and expediency of the *double doctrine*? What shall I say? that our Advocate has wilfully murdered and dismembered poor *Macrobius*? or, that it was mere chance-medley? Let the reader determine. It is sufficient he be made to know, that the latter part of the quotation, beginning at *Sic ipsa mysteria*, has no other relation to the former part, beginning at *Si quid de his assignare*, than is between two things set in direct opposition to one another.

2. *Macrobius* had observed, that the philosophers did not admit the *fabulous* in *all* their disputations; but in those only which related to the soul, the HEAVENLY BODIES, and the HERO-GODS. On the contrary, when they discoursed of the *First Cause*, and the *mind* proceeding from him, that then every thing was delivered agreeably to strict truth—“*Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita*”, “*sed his uti solent, cum vel de anima, vel de ÆRIIS, ÆTHERIISVE POTESTATIBUS, vel de CETERIS DIS loquuntur. Ceterum cum ad summum & principem omnium Deum, qui apud Græcos τὸ ἀγλὸν qui πρῶτον αἰτίον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere; vel ad mentem, quam Græci νῦν appellant, originales rerum species, quæ ιδίαι dictæ sunt, continentem, ex summo natam & profectam Deo: cum de his, inquam, loquuntur, summo Deo & mente, nihil fabulosum penitus attingunt.*” But then he immediately subjoins, in the words in question, that, though here they spoke nothing but the *truth*, yet, by reason of the high abstraction and spiritual nature of the subject, they were unavoidably at a loss for adequate expressions, and therefore obliged to

\* All the old editions had these words *vel licita*; the more modern, not knowing what to make of them, fairly sunk them. *Gronovius* takes notice of the fraud, and restores them to their place, but in order finally to degrade them on a fair hearing. He says they are corrupt, and should be read *vel ficta*. But *licita* is the genuine word, which this Critic would have seen, had he apprehended that it signified those *theological fables allowed of by public authority*. So that *fabulosa vel licita* signify either such fables as the philosophers themselves invented, or such as they borrowed from the popular belief.



speak figuratively, that is, make use of sensible and material images. SED SI QUID DE HIS ASSIGNARE CONANTUR, QUÆ NON SERMONEM TANTUMMODO, SED COGITATIONEM QUOQUE HUMANAM SUPERANT, AD SIMILITUDINES ET EXEMPLA CONFUGIUNT.

When *Macrobius* had said this, and illustrated the last observation by an example from *Plato*, he goes on to the other part of his subject, namely, to tell us how the philosophers managed when they treated of the other Gods and the soul; then (he says) they admitted of the *fabulous*; not childishly, or to please a wanton imagination, but because they knew that exposing Nature, naked as she was, would be greatly injurious to her. Who, as she withdraws herself from the knowledge of the vulgar by her various covering and disguise of FORMS, so it is her pleasure that the philosophers should handle her secrets in fable and allegory.—“De Diis autem, ut  
 “dixi, ceteris, & de anima non frustra se, nec ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt inimicam  
 “esse Naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui:  
 “quæ sicut vulgaribus hominum sensibus intellectum sui  
 “vario rerum TEGMINE OPERIMENTOQUE subtrahit;  
 “ita a prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari.”—Then follow the rest of the words, which should be translated thus: *So the mysteries themselves are hid under the deceits of figurative representations, lest the naked truth should obtrude itself even on the initiated. But while the greatest men, with wisdom for their guide, are conscious of the true secret; the rest may be well content with such representations as secure the dignity of the secret, and are contrived to excite their veneration.* SIC IPSA MYSTERIA FIGURARUM CUNICULIS OPERIUNTUR, NE VEL HÆC ADEPTIS NUDARERUM TALIA SE NATURA PRÆBEAT: SED SUMMATIBUS TANTUM VIRIS, SAPIENTIA INTERPRETE, VERI ARCANI CONSCIIS, CONTENTI SINT RELIQUI AD VENERATIONEM FIGURIS DEFENDENTIBUS A VILITATE SECRETUM. The reader now sees that *this* period, and the *other*, beginning with *Sed quid de his assignare*, which our Advocate had tacked to it, are so far from belonging to one another, that the first describes the unavoidable condition that attends the speaking *truth*; the other the advantages

advantages that may be reaped from *lying*. But as ill as he understood the original, his own bad translation, methinks, might have informed him, that the two parts of the quotation could have nothing to do with one another, they are so full of contradiction. The first part says, the high subjects there spoken of *are beyond all our words, and exceed even our thoughts*. The second part says *no such matter, the wise are capable of receiving them*. For the rest, they must do as they can; *be content with*, I do not know what, *an awful veneration, &c.* But more of this matter presently.

3. For I have not yet done with this wondrous Advocate of old Philosophy. We have seen how he has acquitted himself as to the general purport of the *quotation*: let us now see whether he be equally happy in the sense he gives of the words and phrases.

The learned reader perceives, that the words last quoted, *Sic ipsa mysteria, &c.* are an illustration and inforcement, taken from the practice of the *mysteries*, of the foregoing observation, *that it was commendable to hide some things under fables*. How does our Advocate translate *Sic ipsa mysteria*? Thus, FOR THESE THINGS WERE AS MYSTERIES. So, from an *illustration* he makes it an *illation*: and *mysteria*, the rites so called, he degrades to a simple secret. SIC FOR—IPSA THESE THINGS—MYSTERIA WERE AS MYSTERIES.—A hopeful scholar! He had reason to upbraid us with the *memory* of our *school-books*, [Pref. p. v.] Well, but what are *these things* that are so like *mysteries*? Why, even by his own account, *abstract ideas expressed in metaphorical terms*. According to this, the DICTIONARY should be the most *mysterious* book in the world: and so, I suppose, our Free-thinker found it: and having a natural aversion to *mysteries*, he turned himself to *studies of quite another nature*. p. viii.

The next words, *Figurarum cuniculis operiuntur*, he has passed over untranslated, and with good reason. For as they allude to the *shows of the mysteries* represented in *subterraneous places*, he could have no kind of conception of them. The next—*ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat*, undergo the same neglect; and on the same account. He knew not what

to make of *adepts*, the *initiated*; and he thought too it contracted

The next—*Sed summatis tantum viris, sapientia interprete, veri arcani consciis*. Here he breaks silence, and, on my word, to the purpose, WHICH THE WISE ONLY WERE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING. *Sapientia interprete, the wise only are capable of receiving*. Notwithstanding the difference of number, it is plain he thought *sapientia interprete* was put in *apposition* to *summatis viris*. He did not see the construction was *summatis viris veri arcani consciis, sapientia interprete*, nor that the *sapientia interpretes* alluded to the *hierophant* of the *mysteries*, who explained the secret to the most capable of the *initiated*, the *summatis viris*; by which *Macrobius* meant heroes, princes, legislators, in allusion to their old practice, of seeking initiation into the greater mysteries\*. And those he had distinguished from the rest of the *initiated*, by the foregoing words, *ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat*.

The concluding words are, *Contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a vilitate secretum*, which he translates, *but that others should be content WITH AN AWFUL VENERATION FOR THEM, under the veil of figures and allegories, lest they should be despised*. What is meant by a worshipper's being content with an awful veneration, I do not understand: much less his being content with an awful veneration, lest the things venerated should be despised. The object worshipped indeed may be well enough said to be content with an awful veneration, lest, if it should be unreasonable, and expect more, it might come to be despised. But, as our profound Translator well observes, *These things are as mysteries*, and so we will leave them. However, the learned reader sees he took *contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris*, to be the same as *contenti sint reliqui veneratione figurarum*, whereas it is equivalent to *contenti sint reliqui figuris ad venerationem excogitatis*; and should be translated thus: *The rest may be well content with such representations as secure the dignity of the secret, and are contrived to excite their veneration*. What must we think of our Advocate?

\* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 97.

Does not he come well instructed in his cause? Which shall we admire most; his modesty, his learning, or his good faith? But his *translations*, of which his book is almost all made up, abound with these beauties; I shall therefore reserve the examination of them for a work by itself, and leave him at present,

*With all his blushing honours thick upon him.*

V. Our Advocate goes on to the second of the arguments, which, *in his apprehension*, affects the present question: namely, *that the philosophers held some fundamental principles, which were altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of future rewards and punishments.* Of these he tells us, and, indeed, tells us fairly, *that the first was, that God could neither be angry nor hurt any one. The second, that the soul was a discerped part of the whole, and that this whole was God, into whom it was again to be resolved.* p. 47.

These he undertakes to examine in their order.

From the *first*, that *God could not be angry nor hurt any one*, I drew this conclusion, that they could not believe a future state of rewards and punishments. Which I endeavoured to support from a passage in *Tully's Offices* to this effect. The writer is commending *Regulus* for keeping his oath. But (says he) it may be objected, what is there in an oath? The violator need not fear the punishment of Heaven, for *all* the philosophers hold *that God cannot be angry nor hurt any one.* To this *Tully* replies, and owns that indeed it was a consequence of the general opinion of *God's not being angry*, that the perjured man had nothing to fear from the divine vengeance. But then it was not this fear, which was indeed nothing, but justice and good faith which made the real sanction, or moral obligation of an oath. "Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in jurejurando? " Num iratum timeamus Jovem? At hoc quidem commune " est omnium philosophorum, nunquam nec irasci Deum, " nec nocere—Hæc quidem ratio non magis contra *Regu-* " lum quam contra omne jusjurandum valet: sed in " jurejurando non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet " intelligi. Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa. " Quod autem affirmate, quasi Deo teste, promiseris, id " tenendum

“tenendum est: jam enim non ad iram Deorum, quæ nulla est; sed ad justitiam & ad fidem pertinet\*.”

1. Now what says our Advocate to this? *Upon the whole of this authority* (he says) *I think it appears that the OBJECTOR rightly cited an opinion of the philosophers, but, mistaking the true meaning, drew a wrong conclusion from it.* Tully, NOT TROUBLING HIMSELF TO CONFUTE OR SET HIM RIGHT, goes on with his purpose, and proves the intrinsic sacredness and obligation of an oath, without regarding the circumstances of hope or fear. p. 49. What an idea has he here given us of this great reasoner! Tully thinks an objector worth taking notice of, and yet WILL NOT TROUBLE HIMSELF TO CONFUTE HIM. Without doubt our Advocate here compared Tully to himself for reasoning; as before he had compared himself to Chief Justice Hale for Greek. And because he can write books against an objector† without troubling himself to confute him, he thought Tully might do so too. But the best of the story is, that this objector proves to be Tully's own self: *Dixerit quis, a man might perhaps object* (says he). And sure Tully did not mistake the true meaning of a common opinion. And as for a voluntary slip, it was not his way, as it is this Author's, to make blunders, and pass them off for other men's, with a *dixerit aliquis*. But it seems, Tully not only mistook the true meaning, but drew a wrong conclusion from it. This is hard. And, harder still, he had not the patience to stay and set himself right. But sure, if he had all this leisure to discredit his own judgment, by inventing wrong meanings, and drawing worse conclusions, he would have found time to restore himself to his reader's opinion by confuting them. But then, whether the objection was Tully's or another man's, what a low opinion must Tully have, in the mean time, of the importance of a future state to society, if, in a Book of Offices, he would not trouble himself to confute or set an objector right, whom he had brought in with a mistaken argument that overturned it? There is indeed a time when a serious writer would not trouble himself to confute or set a wrangler right. And it is such an one as

\* De Offic. l. 3. c. 28, 29.

† See his Title-page.

this,

this, where the perversity is so great, as to become an insult upon every reader's understanding.

2. But his *Translation* is in all respects as curious as his *Comment*. It follows in these words: *But some one might object and say, that Regulus need be under no apprehension from the breach of his oath, of his being punished by the Gods, since it is a WELL-KNOWN SAYING amongst philosophers, That God cannot be angry.* Tully, in answer to this, says, *that this might be a reason not only against Regulus, but against all oaths whatsoever; for (says he) in swearing it is not the fear of punishment, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of it, which is to be regarded; for an oath is a religious affirmation made in the presence of God, and as such ought to be solemnly observed. To conclude then, it is not the anger of the Gods, which is NOTHING [IN THE PRESENT CASE] but justice and good faith which is [IMMEDIATELY] to be RESPECTED.* pp. 48, 49.

*Hoc quidem COMMUNE est OMNIUM philosophorum,* says Tully. *It is a WELL-KNOWN SAYING AMONGST the philosophers,* says his Translator, instead of, *this is a tenet common to all the philosophers, commune dogma, decretum.*

*In jurejurando (says Tully) non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit debet intelligi.* *In swearing (says his Translator) it is not the fear of punishment, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of it, which is to be regarded.* The pretended Objector observing that the people were chiefly influenced, in their oaths, by the fear of divine punishment, argues against the *efficacy* of oaths in this manner. All the philosophers (says he) hold that God cannot be angry, therefore he cannot punish; consequently oaths will have no *efficacy*, or there will be nothing in an oath. To this Tully gives a plain answer. The *efficacy* of an oath (says he) is not to be measured by the degree of fear that attends the taking it, but by the moral obligation of keeping it, that is, by its proper *sanction*. *In jurejurando non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit debet intelligi.* Literally, *in swearing it ought to be considered, not what fear attends it, but what sanction it hath.* And then shews, this sanction to be good faith. All here is close and well argued.—Let us now hear how his Translator makes him reason. An oath (says the Objector) is of no

EFFICACY

EFFICACY [*quid est in jurejurando?*] because *fear* is no more. Oh, replies *Tully*, it is not *fear*, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of an oath, that is to be regarded. Admirably concluded. And had *Tully* reasoned thus, I should have believed he had *forgot his Greek too, and turned himself to studies of quite another nature.*

But the flower of translations is the following: *Tully; Jam enim non ad iram Deorum, QUÆ NULLA EST.* His Translator; *To conclude then, it is not the anger of the Gods, which is NOTHING [IN THE PRESENT CASE] Quæ nulla est!* Here he believed in good earnest that *quæ nulla est* was equivalent to *quæ nihil ad rem pertinet*: and so it may be, for aught I know, in his *Law-Latin*, but in *Cicero's*, it signifies the same as *quæ vana & commentitia est.* *Tully; sed ad justitiam & ad fidem PERTINET,* His Translator; *but justice and good faith which is [IMMEDIATELY] to be RESPECTED. Pertinet, immediately to be respected.* He could not find the nominative case to his verb, and so took *pertinet* to be the impersonal. But another time let him remember it is governed of *ID.* *Jam enim [id quod promiseris] non ad iram Deorum, quæ nulla est, sed ad justitiam & ad fidem pertinet.* Literally thus, *For now what you have promised relates not to the anger of the Gods, which is indeed no anger, but to justice and good faith.* This concludes the argument very logically. But our Advocate says, *justice and good faith is IMMEDIATELY to be respected:* Which vitiates the whole reasoning. First, as these words do not imply *the sanction*, the very thing *Tully* is here fixing. Secondly, as they do imply that *something else* was to be respected, the very thing *Tully* is here opposing.

Is not this an able interpreter of his old philosophers? Yet the poor man did his best; and, without doubt, laboured hard. With what gravity does he introduce this subject! *From the first [principle] that God could not be angry nor hurt any one, he [Mr. W.] draws a conclusion, that they could believe no future state, &c. which he endeavours to support by a passage in Tully, the TRUE SENSE of which, when CONSIDERED, will not, as I apprehend, answer his purpose.* pp. 47, 48.

VI. But he will still go on: *To shew (says he) that the Ancients did not draw the same conclusion from this opinion*  
*of*

of the philosophers, as the Objector in Tully or Mr. Warburton, it appears in many places that they believed—What? that the GODS actually punished this very crime, and that men incurred their anger and displeasure by committing it. p. 50. And so say I too. Nay more, I shew at large\* the consistency of this belief, that the Gods punished, with that other, that the one God did not. And yet to establish this important point he brings two witnesses, *Cornelius Nepos* and *Xenophon*.

But, as if conscious of the impertinence, he talks more to the purpose in what follows. And that Mr. Warburton's distinction between the anger of demons and that of the Supreme Being may have no place here, it may be necessary to shew by a passage or two, that, as to the effects, the same is asserted of the SUPREME GOD. p. 52. This is saying something. But now to his evidence. The first he produces are three poets. *Hesiod* (says he) tells us, that he who speaks the truth in public, will be rewarded by all-seeing Jove; but he who forswears himself is irreparably lost, and his posterity shall come to nothing, but the generation of the just shall flourish. And *Phocylides*, Forswear not thyself either inadvertently or knowingly, for the immortal God hateth a false oath; and others have spoke to the same purpose, pp. 52, 53, for which he quotes 4 *Iliad*. 167.

1. Let us attend to the question. It is, Whether the Greek philosophers believed the One Supreme God punished and rewarded? And for the proof of the affirmative, he brings us three Greek poets. But this is not the worst:

2. Two of these poets do not so much as speak of the Supreme Being, but of the false idol Gods of the people. *Homer* and *Hesiod* expressly call the God, they here speak of as the rewarder and punisher of true and false swearers, ΖΕΥΣ ΚΡΟΝΙΑΔΗΣ, *Jupiter Saturnius*. Now it will be news, I suppose, to this writer, that *Jupiter Saturnius* was not the One Supreme Being, but *Jupiter the Son of Saturn*, an idol-deity, though set at the head of the college.

The other Greek poet is, if possible, still less to his purpose. For he happens to be no heathen at all; in-

\* Divine Legat. Book III. § 4.



deed not so honest a man: but a false Christian, the disgrace of our holy religion, who would put himself on the world for old *Phocylides* the *Milesian*, contemporary with *Theognis*. But the imposture hath been detected by critics of the first order, such as *Joseph Scaliger*, *Ger. and Is. Vossius*, *D. Heinsius*, *Huetius*, *Reiskius*, *Barthius*, *Taubman*, &c. To the abundant arguments they have produced, we may add this very expression, cited by my adversary, *Ψεύδοπον συνίει Θεὸς ἄεθολον*.

3. But had these poets been *philosophers*, and their *idol Gods*, the *Supreme*, who, unless it was our Advocate, would not have seen that, in popular writings, they must needs talk popularly, and keep an *esoteric* opinion, so destructive of society, to themselves?

But he comes yet closer to the point.—*And PLATO says, GOD will execute vengeance on him, who, slighting the awful majesty of his divine power, shall at any time forswear himself.* pp. 52, 53. He hath given us a *philosopher* at last, we see; but to understand with what judgment, we must again state the question.

1. Which is, whether the Greek philosophers BELIEVED that the Supreme God punished and rewarded. Now our Advocate hath *owned*, and, what is more, hath *proved*, that the philosophers had a twofold doctrine, an internal and an external; that the one contained matter of *belief*, the other of *utility*. I have proved (to which our Advocate hath said nothing) that the philosophers divided their writings into two classes, the *exoteric* and *esoteric*; and that this very Book of *Plato*, intitled, *Of Laws*, from whence he hath taken the passage above, was of the *exoteric* kind. Yet for all this, he can without blushing, or, perhaps, without knowing why he should blush, quote the Book of *Laws*, for *Plato's* real sentiments, in contradiction to what *Tully* and *Lactantius* tell us was part of the *esoteric* doctrine of *all* the philosophers. The impartial reader will hardly reflect on this without some sort of pity or indignation. But what will he say when I tell him that this *jallacy*, with others as gross, that have been and shall be taken notice of in their place, run through every page of his performance?

2. But we have not yet done with this quotation from *Plato*. It is doomed to undergo a still greater disgrace.

In an evil hour did our Advocate forget his *Greek*, unconscious that *Fate* and *Free-thinking* had decreed to raise him up, in spite of nature, for the preparer of the way to pure Pagan philosophy, with his

—*Petite hinc, juvenesque, senesque,  
Finem animo certum miserisque viatica canis*\*.

For here *Serranus* hath given him a terrible *quid pro quo*; which he hath innocently swallowed. This Translator makes *Plato* say *DEUS illum odio prosequitur, qui SACROSANCTA DIVINI NUMINIS autoritate neglecta falsum juramentum dicit*†. But *Plato* says no such thing. He speaks of the *GODS*, in the plural, such as the people worshipped. The whole passage is in these words: *Let no man, when he invokes the GODS for his truth, mix any thing of falsehood, fraud, or insincerity, either in his word or deed; unless he chuses to become most hateful to the GODS. As in the first place is he, who, without any reverence to the GODS, swears falsely: And in the second place, he, who lies before his betters.* Ψῦδ<sup>Θ</sup> μηδεὶς μὴδ' ἀπάτην, μηδὲ τι κίβδηλον, γίν<sup>Θ</sup> ἐπικαλέμεν<sup>Θ</sup> ΘΕΩΝ, μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πρᾶξειεν, ὃ μὴ θεομισέειν<sup>Θ</sup> [Diis infensissimus, says *Serranus* rightly here] ἔσεισθαι μέλλων· ἔτ<sup>Θ</sup> δ' εἰσιν ὃ ἂν ὅρκους ὁμνῶς ψευδεῖς μηδὲν φρονιζέη ΘΕΩΝ· δεύτερ<sup>Θ</sup> δέ, ὃς ἂν ἐναντίον τῶν Κρείττόνων αὐτῶ ψεύδειαι. Had our Advocate had the least taste of antiquity, he might have seen, from the concluding period, with what spirit the whole was written. With no other, sure, than to instruct the people in their devoirs to society. A likely place to find any of *Plato's* esoteric doctrines.

But if one considers the whole evidence together, one would wonder how it could ever enter seriously into the head of one, whose profession (if it taught him any thing) taught him to judge of the nature of evidence, that poets writing to the people, and speaking their language, or a poetical philosopher writing a popular book of laws to keep them in order, should ever talk to a heathen commonalty of the only *One God*.

VII. But he is wiser in what follows *The next authority* (says he) *Mr. Warburton brings to strengthen his conclusion is from Lactantius, which he calls an*

\* The Motto to his Title-page. † Plat. 917, a. Ed. Serr.

*illustrious instance ; but on reading, it turns out so low and insipid, THAT IT IS NOT WORTH CONSIDERING.* p. 53. Indeed, so short ! How happy had it been for him, had he passed the same judgment on all the rest ! The argument from *Lactantius* stood thus : That eloquent writer, in defending *Christianity*, found nothing so much opposed the doctrine of a *future judgment*, as a prevailing principle common to all the philosophers, that God could not be angry. He therefore composed his discourse, intitled, *De Ira Dei*, to combat this following syllogism :

If God hath no affections of love or hatred, fondness or anger, he cannot reward or punish.

But he hath no affections, &c.—Therefore, &c.

A modern advocate of religion would certainly have denied the *major*, but that was a principle which *Lactantius* expressly tells us was received by all parties. He therefore turns his whole discourse against the *minor* ; and endeavours to prove that God hath these affections. Nor does he at all mince the matter. For he tells us there are in God, as in Man, the passions of love and hatred : And, to make all sure, contends for God's having an human form. Now the inference I drew from it was this, that, as *Lactantius* was admirably well skilled in all Pagan philosophy, he could not mistake a principle which all the philosophers held, nor a consequence which they all drew from it. The *principle* was, that the Supreme God had no affections ; and the *consequence*, that he could neither reward nor punish. Therefore this *principle* and this *consequence* were held by ALL, the point to be proved. It was on this account, that I called the case of *Lactantius* an *illustrious one*. Our Advocate says 'tis *low and insipid, and not worth considering*. Utri creditis, quiritēs ?

But I commended him too soon. He won't let the matter rest when 'tis well : See then what comes of it.

He tells the reader, that *I myself say Lactantius knew little of Christianity*. Egregious Advocate ! must not this be the very cause (if there were any cause at all) of those *philosophic prejudices*, which so fatally disposed him to attack the *minor* rather than the *major* ?—*That he fell into many errors*. Could it be otherwise while he opposed the *minor* ?—*That his Treatise was obscure*.

Must

Must it not needs be so, when his opposition to the *minor* led him to maintain, that there is in God, as in Man, the passions of love and hatred?—*And strongly contended that God had a human form.* Was not this extravagance a full proof that the connexion between the *principle* (of God's having no passions) and the *consequence* (that he could neither punish nor reward) was so universally held, that he could find no way to *break through*; but was forced to *evade* it, by asserting God had passions? For which to provide a proper subject, he thought fit to give him a human form likewise.—*All then* (says our Advocate) *that appears from this illustrious instance is, that Lactantius grossly mistook this fine sentiment of the philosophers.* Does he know whom he talks of? Why, this *Lactantius* was a *philosopher* himself; not like that canting tribe of dunces, *Porphyry, Jamblichus, &c.* who first brought their fanaticism into the schools of philosophy, which so soon after, and so fatally, infected the church of *Christ*; but one whom the greatest monarch of the world made choice of for the governor of his Son. He was a *lawyer* too, and his critics say, a happy emulator of the eloquence of *Cicero*. Yet our Advocate believes in good earnest, that *he grossly mistook this fine sentiment of the philosophers.* Alas! What he *mistook* were the *fine sentiments of Christianity*; and this in too warm a zeal for overturning those of *philosophy*, which he understood but too well.—*And in combating with it fell into a puddle of foul absurdities.* Who told him so? Doctors differ. *St. Jerom* calls this tract *De Ira Dei, pulcherrimum opus.* Which had our Advocate known, without doubt, he had opposed the judgment of a Father of the church to mine. For, to say the truth, I am answerable for all the freedoms he here takes with *Lactantius*; what he knew of the *De Ira Dei* being only from *The Divine Legation.* But I produce the authority of *Jerom*, who differs so much from my sentiments of the Tract, to shew the reader that *Lactantius's* manner of supporting a *future judgment* against the philosophers, was the approved defence of the learned Christians of that time. Consequently *Lactantius* did not *grossly mistake this FINE sentiment of the philosophers.* pp. 53, 54.

VIII. But this *principle* seems fated to disgrace him ; so that he can't for his life let it alone. He goes on therefore in these words : *To clear this matter more fully, it may now be proper to consider the PRINCIPLE itself, which, as Mr. Warburton says, greatly embarrassed antiquity ; because the ancients, says he, could not distinguish between human passions and the divine attributes of justice and goodness.* p. 393\*. But I hope to make it appear, that the ancients were not at all embarrassed ; and that they distinguished in this particular, just in the same manner as we do now. p. 54.

He tells the reader, I say the *PRINCIPLE greatly embarrassed antiquity*, and refers to page 393\*. Let the reader then hear me speak. " We see *Tully* owns the " *consequence* of this univereal *principle*.—A modern " reader, full of the philosophic ideas of these late ages, " will be surprised, perhaps, to be told, THAT THIS " CONSEQUENCE GREATLY EMBARRASSED ANTIQUITY ; " when he can so easily evade it, by distinguishing be- " tween human passions and the divine attributes of " justice and goodness, on which alone the doctrine of a " future state of rewards and punishments is invincibly " established. But the ancients had no such precise " ideas of the divine nature. They knew not how to " sever anger from its justice, nor fondness from its good- " ness."—He charges me with saying, the *PRINCIPLE greatly embarrassed antiquity* : and I say the *CONSEQUENCE* from that principle *greatly embarrassed antiquity*. What are we to think of this ? That it was done with design ? Alas ! No. The poor man knew no difference between *principles* and *consequences*, premisses and conclusions. Or if he had any meaning, it was to shew his contempt of these, and all other my *nice distinctions, divisions, and subdivisions, which*, he tells us, *he passes over as needless curiosities.* p. 3.

But his next attendant effort is still more surprising. For he rises in his blunders, like *Homer's* battles in their terror. I had said, *the ancients were embarrassed*. He will prove *they were not at all embarrassed*, without so much as knowing what *ancients* must needs be meant. Now the intelligent reader sees they are the ancient

\* Div. Leg. Vol. III. pp. 129, 130.

CHRISTIAN, not *Pagan* writers, for this plain reason, That, though I hold neither Christian nor Pagan writers could *distinguish between human passions and the divine attributes*, yet none but *Christian* writers could be *embarrassed* with the *consequence* of God's not being angry (which consequence was, that therefore he could not punish) because none but *Christians* (according to my assertion) held that he could punish. Now from their holding, as they did at first, with the *philosophers*, that God *could not be angry*, and with the *founders of their faith*, that he *would punish*, arose all that EMBARRAS I took notice of; and which of course I must suppose the Pagans free from, by their not holding those two supposed contrary propositions. Our Advocate, who had not the least conception of all this, will yet venture to contradict me; and taking it for granted, as he does every thing he can't prove, that I meant PAGAN antiquity lay under this *embarras*, he brings a number of passages from Pagan *philosophers*, to confute my assertion. Thus all he proves, if he should chance to prove any thing, being nothing to the purpose, I might here fairly leave him to himself.

But as *Pagan antiquity*, though it was not *embarrassed* like the *Christian*, yet was not at all more *exact* in its ideas of the divine attributes, I will permit our Advocate, for once, to suppose, that I had said, that *the ancient philosophers were embarrassed, and could not distinguish between human passions and the divine attributes*: Let us see then what he will make of it. But as I restore him his arms, and instruct him how to use them, it may be allowed me to remind my reader,

1. That when I say they could not distinguish between *human passions and the divine attributes*, I mean the attributes of the *first Cause of all things*.

2. When I say they could not *distinguish*, I mean distinguish in such a manner, as to leave room for the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; all other *distinctions* being out of the question.

Well then, to prove that Antiquity was not embarrassed, how does this mighty champion of old philosophy set out? Why, first, he proves *that he himself is not embarrassed*.

arrassed. Secondly, that those who read the Scriptures cannot be embarrassed. But this is only to feel his own strength, and make the flourish of his arms. He soon comes to himself, and then says, *But that the reader may see how rightly the philosophers could distinguish between human passions and the divine attributes, I shall now lay before him some passages, in which it is said God is not subject to passion, or that he is void of anger, and can hurt none; and others, where he is said to be angry, and to punish sinners for their crimes; by which every one may the better judge, whether the ancients were not exactly of the same opinion as himself, and did not speak as Christians now do, sometimes with regard to the ineffable and absolute rectitude of an infinitely perfect Being, and sometimes with respect to the relation he bears to us his finite and imperfect creatures.* pp. 54—56. This is indeed to the point.

And first, says he, *I readily agree with Mr. Warburton, that it was the opinion of all the philosophers, that God could not be angry, nor hurt any one.* p. 56. And though we agree in this, yet he will bring several witnesses to prove it. This is always his way, when he has so safe ground to go upon. Thus he proved the double doctrine of the philosophers, and the single object of that double doctrine. And on such occasions, I must acquaint the reader, he is a most unmerciful prover. But as he can never forbear mixing and confounding the several parts of his subject, the last of his testimonies, to prove *God cannot be angry*, being taken from *Seneca*, he is drawn to another question before his time. But order, method, and logic, we know, are nothing with this writer. However, a good thing never comes amiss. What, then, says *Seneca*? *That that man is mistaken, who supposes the Gods can hurt any one; for they neither can do wrong, nor suffer it, both of which betoken frailty.* But *Seneca* immediately after says, *that the Gods do exact punishment, and chastise some for their good.* Therefore, *Seneca* must either contradict himself, or speak of the same beings in different respects; and indeed these two last passages of *Seneca*, one of which is quoted by *Mr. Warburton*, TO PROVE that the Gods can  
hurt

*hurt none, seem to have no reference to their just anger against sinners, but to such hurt or injury as arises from wrong or injustice.* p. 58.

1. This whole remark is nothing to the purpose. *Seneca* here means the Gods of Paganism, not *the first Cause of all things*, where he talks of their *punishing and chastising*. Now the *first Cause* is the subject of our question.

2. *But of these two passages, one is quoted by me* (he says) *to prove that the Gods can hurt none.*—The passage is in vol. iii. page 145, of this Edition. My words are these, *A benevolence too, that went not from the will, but the essence of the Supreme Being; SO Seneca informs us, Quæ causa est Dîs, &c.* Here again his old luck follows him. I quoted it, to shew what *kind of benevolence* they gave to God: he says, I quoted it to *prove the Gods can hurt none.*

Having thus notably supported his agreement with me, that it was the opinion of the philosophers that God could not be angry nor hurt any one; he proceeds, *But that THEY are angry, so as to punish the wicked for their crimes, might be proved by a multitude of testimonies.* Without doubt it might. But what then? I require him to shew, that the philosophers believed *the one God* could be angry and punish; and he says, they believed their *false Gods* could. And so said I, and proved it likewise. Yet he brings witness upon witness, poets upon philosophers, to shew they thought *THE GODS could be angry and punish*: and then goes on thus: *By all which it manifestly appears, that when the ancients said, God could not be angry, they meant, &c.* pp. 58—60. Was there ever such a reasoner? He will prove what the ancients thought of their *false Gods*, a thing nobody asked; and from thence conclude, what they thought of the *SUPREME*, a thing nobody will believe.

But lest the reader should suspect, as he has little reason, that this was only a blunder in words; and that though our Advocate promised to shew by quotations, what was nothing to the purpose, yet the quotations themselves might haply inform us of what was; I shall run through his passages.

The two first (p. 59.) are from *Plato's Book of Laws*, a writing of the *exoteric* kind, in which the philosopher



speaks to the people; and consequently must needs speak of those Gods they were acquainted with. In one of the passages he actually uses the *plural*, in the other the *singular*, used perpetually, in the writings of the ancients, for the *plural*: Sometimes as the peculiar tutelary God of the people was meant; sometimes as it was *Jupiter* the first of the class; but most frequently as it was a common figure of speech for a *Greek* republican to say the *God* or the *Magistrate*, when there were a hundred of each. But what will surprise our Advocate (who appears not to have received instruction on this matter) they sometimes, though very rarely, used the *plural* for the *singular*. As *Seneca*, in the place that came in question just above, *Quæ causa est Diis*, &c. and *Sallust*, in another, that will come in question below. A little discernment is sufficient to take them right, in either of these *conversions*. But this is more, it seems, than we are to expect of our Advocate, who puzzling on, between his *true* and *false* Gods, hangs, like a false teacher as he is, between heaven and earth, in the fool's paradise of Pagan philosophy.

The other two passages he brings (p. 59.) are from a spurious thing given to *Cicero*. This was a pleasant mistake. He had seen me quote *Tully de Consolatione*, twice, and therefore thought he might safely do the same. But my two passages were from the genuine fragments of that lost book; his two, by the malice of his old luck, from that forgery of *Sigonius*, intitled, *De Consolatione*, and fathered upon *Tully*: but it could never get a god-father till our Advocate became its *sponsor*. *Cicero* (says he) *says that a man by his wickedness becomes an enemy and hated of God*. And for this *decisive* saying, *Cic. de Consol.* is quoted.

He goes on, *But we need not question the philosophers, when the poets say the same*, p. 60. Nay, it must be owned they're all in a story. And how should they chuse, when prompted by their *false Gods*, in whose favour they are speaking?

At length, however, as if even sensible of the impertinence of all he had been saying, he goes on thus: *But not to let this matter rest wholly upon CONCLUSIONS, though never so well grounded.*—He means *inferences*.

You

You must excuse him. If he be there, or thereabouts, 'tis enough for a man so averse to the *nicety of distinction*. Well, *not to let it rest then* (though I suspect it had been the wiser course, as I am so well acquainted with his way of mending matters) What then? Why, he will further shew what constructions they put upon such expressions, by one who has wrote a whole chapter upon this question, "*In what sense can the Gods, who are immutable, be said to be either angry or appeased?*" In which he tells us, "*that God cannot, properly speaking, be said to rejoice, for then he must sometimes be affected with sorrow; nor to be angry, since anger is a motion of the mind; nor to be pleased with gifts, for that would be to be overcome with pleasures, &c.; but while we are good, we are united to the Gods by similitude, and when wicked, separated for our unlikeness: Not that they are really angry, but that our offences hinder the light of their goodness from shining upon us; wherefore it is the same thing to say, God hateth, or is angry with sinners, as to say the sun is hid from the eyes of those who are blind.*" pp. 62, 63. These are the words of *Sallust* the philosopher. To which I answer,

1. That this *Sallust* is no legal evidence. I have expressly excepted against him and all his fellows, all that came so long after the times in question; which I confine to the period before *Christ*. The rising of the *Gospel*, I confess, again and again, gave such light to the *philosophers*, that they refined all their doctrines by its splendor, and then, like their mimic brethren of the present age, ungratefully abused their benefactors. These are my words in one place of my book: "Such was the general doctrine on this point, before the coming of Christianity. But then those philosophers who held out against its truth, after some time, new-modelled both their philosophy and religion: making their philosophy more religious, and their religion more philosophical.—So, amongst the many improvements of Paganism, the softening this doctrine was one.—And it is remarkable, that *then, and not till then, the philosophers began really to believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments* \*." What now must

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

we think of our Advocate? Was there ever any thing so shameless? Yet this is one of his hackney fallacies, that runs on all his errands.

2. But as our Advocate is turned solicitor, and, without doubt, has been at much pains in finding out this witness, we will hear him. And if he should chance to prove what I affirm, and what my adversary denies, it would be but the common case of evidence picked up at a venture, to support a bad cause. To keep him no longer in suspense, I must here let him know, that, had I searched all antiquity, I could not have found a passage more to my purpose. Such is his old luck at quoting.

This *Sallust* having put together some common-place stuff of *the gods and the world*, in his fourteenth chapter proposes to speak to this question, *How the immutable gods may be said to be angry and appeased*. Πῶς οἱ Θεοὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόμενοι, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι λέγουται. He says in the first place, that God has no human passions, he *neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeased with gifts*, καὶ χαίρει Θεὸς—οὐδὲ ὀργίζεται—οὐδὲ δώροις θεραπεύεται. So far doubtless is agreeable to truth. But how then? Why that the Gods are *eternally beneficent*, or, as *Seneca* had said, *Causa Diis benefaciendi NATURA, and beneficent only, but never hurtful*, ἰκκίνοι μὲν ἀγαθοὶ τε εἰσὶν ΑΕΙ, καὶ ὠφελῶσι μόνον· βλάπτουσι δὲ οὐδέποτε. Thus having avoided one extreme, he falls into another, and supposeth it *blind nature* and not *will* that determines God's beneficence. The inference from this is, that the rewards and punishments of heaven are the *natural and necessary effects* of actions; not *positive, arbitrary consequences*, or the designation of will. And so our philosopher maintains. For now the difficulty being, that if *Nature be the cause of the beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence bestow good on the virtuous man, and evil on the wicked? Our Sophist resolves it thus: *While we are good, we are joined by similitude of nature to the Gods; and when evil, separated by dissimilitude—They become our enemies, not because they are angry at us, but because our crimes hinder the Gods from shining on us—wherefore it would be the same thing to say, that God is turned away from the evil, as to say, the SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND MAN*. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ὅτις δι' ὁμοιότητι Θεοῖς συναπτόμεθα,

μεθα, κακοὶ δὲ γινόμενοι δι' ἀνομοιότητά χωριζόμεθα—ἐκ ἐκείνων ὀργιζομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων Θεὸς μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ ἐόντων ἱλλάμπειν—ὥς ὁμοιον τὸν Θεὸν λέγειν τὰς κακὰς ἀπιστεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν ΗΑΙΟΝ τοῖς ἐστρημένοις τῶν ὄψεων κρύπτεσθαι. An apt comparison, and very expressive of the case; where the influence of the Deity is supposed to be *natural*, like the sun's, and consequently all reward and punishment, not the *moral*, but the *necessary* issue of things. A Platonic principle entirely subversive of the proper doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as believed every where by the people, and taught by the Christian religion. But this matter I had explained at large in the book\* he pretends to write against.—The Pagans then, we find, in taking away human passions from God, left him nothing but an essential excellence, that went not from his *will*, but his *nature* only, and consequently was destitute of *morality*. This was one extreme. The *primitive Christians*, as *Lactantius*, seeing clearly that the Platonic notion of God overturned a *future judgment*, and not seeing that medium which their masters in science, the *philosophers*, had missed of, maintained that God had human passions. And this was the other extreme. And whence, I pray, did both arise, but from neither's being able to distinguish *between human passions* and THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES OF JUSTICE AND GOODNESS, the true medium between *human passions* and a *blind excellence of nature*? Did not I guess right when I said, if he would not let the matter rest, he would soon make it worse? Yet hear how triumphantly he goes off; unconscious of all the fine work he has been making. *And now I may venture to affirm* (says he) *that no one can reasonably imagine this opinion of the philosophers, that God cannot be angry, &c. could be any the least obstacle to their believing a future state of rewards and punishments.* p. 63. I, for my part, will only venture to affirm that the dispute between us (if that may be called a *dispute* where there is no *contradiction*) stands thus: I had said, *The ancients could not distinguish between human passions and the divine attributes of justice and goodness in the FIRST CAUSE of all things*: and he has proved *they could distinguish between*

\* Div. Leg. Book III. sec. 2. & seqq.

*just and unjust passions in their IDOLATROUS GODS. I had said, they could not so distinguish as to leave any foundation for the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments: and he has proved that I said true, by one of his own witnesses, Sallust the philosopher. But, what the reader can reasonably imagine, upon this view of the evidence, as I would not pretend to direct his judgment, I will not venture to affirm.*

IX. *I now come to the next principle (says our Advocate) which Mr. Warburton lays down as repugnant to the belief of a future state, &c. which is, "That the generality of the philosophers held the soul to be a dispersed part of a whole, and this whole was God, into whom it was again to be resolved."* BUT HERE HE BEGINS, AS IN OTHER PLACES, TO EXPRESS HIS FEARS, *"that the reader will suspect (as I am apt to think he will) these kind of phrases are highly figurative expressions, and not to be measured by the severe standard of metaphysical propriety;" and therefore he desires the reader to take notice of another consequence from this principle, which is, that the soul was eternal à parte antè, as well as à parte post; and this, as he says, was universally held by antiquity, though he attempts to bring but one authority to prove it, which he says is above exception; and therefore I shall transcribe it out of his own book, as he quotes it from Cudworth, that the reader may the better judge of its validity. "It is a thing very well known (says the great Cudworth) that according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together, in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, its præ-existence as well as its post-existence; neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its præ-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it was once granted that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might also be corrupted: and therefore the asserters of the soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove its præ-existence," &c. pp. 64, 65.*

*Here (says he) he begins, as in other places, to express his FEARS. This is the second time he has told me*  
of

of my *fears*. And without doubt he took me in good earnest for some very *fearful animal*, or he would never have ventured so wantonly to insult me. But the reader perhaps may be curious to know how that Writer expresses his *fears* of his own arguments, who has been represented by the Bigots of the opposite party, as despising all other men's. The *fearful* passage is in these words: "And that the reader may not suspect these kind of phrases, as that the *soul is part of God; dispersed from him; of his nature*; which perpetually occur in the writings of the Ancients, to be only *highly figurative expressions*, and not to be measured by the exact standard of metaphysical propriety; he is desired to take notice of one consequence drawn from this principle, and universally held by antiquity, which was this, that the soul was eternal *à parte antè*, as well as *à parte post*; which the Latins well expressed by the word *Sempiternus*\*." Does the reader find any of that passion here which our quick-sighted Advocate has discovered? All I can say to the matter is, that as it is the punishment of *free-acting* to *fear* for one's self, where no fear is; so it is, it seems, the reward of *free-thinking* to see fear for others where no fear is.

Well, but let us hear what he has to say to the passage from Cudworth. Now I readily agree (says he) that what Cudworth says of the philosophers is true; but deny that what Mr. Warburton quotes him for, can any ways be proved from thence; which is, that the philosophers held the soul to be eternal *à parte antè* as well as *à parte post*; and indeed there is not ONE WORD which either expresses, or, WITH ANY TOLERABLE PROPRIETY, implies any such doctrine. They held, says Cudworth, the soul's *præ-existence*, or that it was in being before the body; but it will IMMEDIATELY OCCUR to the reader, that if it *præ-existed* only one day or one hour, before it was infused into the body, it really *præ-existed* as much, though not so long, as if it had been from eternity. And the whole design of Cudworth is to shew, that the Ancients held the soul to be immortal. For this reason amongst others, that it was not propagated with the body, and therefore could not be corrupted with it; but was a dis-

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

*tinct substance from it, for that it præ-existed, or was made before it, as he proves from a passage of Aristotle. Therefore the doctrine of præ-existence does not in the least prove the soul to be eternal à parte antè; much less that it was discerped or torn from God in a literal sense.* pp. 65, 66.—Pity me, reader! who am forced into a controversy with an Advocate of *old philosophy*, who has not yet so much as learnt his first elements either in the *old* or *new*. Why, thou mighty man of law! if the Ancients were to prove (as in this case you own they were) that the soul was eternal *à parte post* by an argument taken from its *præ-existence*, and that it was an acknowledged principle (as we both agree it was) *that whatsoever was generated could not be proved to be incorruptible*, must not by that *præ-existence* be meant an *eternal præ-existence*? For if there were a time when the soul was *generated*, though many millions of years before its entrance into the body, it could not be proved to be *eternal à parte post*. The acknowledged principle, *that whatever was generated could not be proved to be incorruptible*, forbidding that conclusion. For, the reader must take notice, their point was not to give an *analogical probability* that the soul *simply* survived the body, but a *metaphysical demonstration* that it would survive *for ever*. And let him not imagine that our Advocate has only mistaken the question, and argued right from the wrong state of it. He delivers it truly in these words, *The whole design of Cudworth is to shew, that the Ancients held the soul to be IMMORTAL*. He wanted, we see, no knowledge of the particular question; all his want was want of common apprehension. Yet *Cudworth* thought the argument so obvious, that no one, who was fit to read his book, could possibly mistake in it: and therefore contented himself in using *præ-existence* simply, without adding *eternal*, as the argument necessarily determined the *mode* of the *præ-existence*. Yet has he at length got a reader who is fairly able to mistake him, and who, instead of being thankful for an explanation made, as it appears, for his peculiar use, will find fault with his instructor, and not content with saying that *there is not one word in Cudworth, which expresses my sense*, will add, *that there is nothing that can with any*

*tolerable propriety imply it.* This he says; and yet (what exceeds belief) he had but just before transcribed these very words of *Cudworth*: THEY CLEARLY PERCEIVING, THAT, IF IT WAS ONCE GRANTED THAT THE SOUL WAS GENERATED, IT COULD NEVER BE PROVED, BUT THAT IT MIGHT ALSO BE CORRUPTED. Now if he would not see it, is he fit to write? And, if he could not, is he fit to be read? Who can be positive, after this, that he ever saw *Cudworth's* book, which concludes the whole observation in these words: "The *Totum* or "*Compositum* of a man or animal may be said to be "*generated and corrupted* in regard of the union and "*disunion, conjunction and separation* of those two "*parts, the soul and body.* But the soul itself, according to these principles, IS NEITHER A THING GENERABLE NOR CORRUPTIBLE\*." Yet our Advocate tells us, *the whole design of Cudworth is to shew, that the Ancients held the soul to be immortal, for this reason amongst others, that it was not propagated with the body, and therefore could not be corrupted with it.* Which is just as wise a reason as the following: *The last Lord Mayor of London will live a thousand years, for this reason, amongst others, that he was in being before his entrance on his office, and existed after his going out of it.* But he has all the way done wonders with his FOR. I have taken upon me to dignify several of them with *capitals*, for their eminent services. But the bold humour of the *English* is, never to spare this particle. On the contrary, the *French*, a wise people, when the Royal Academy was founded for the advancement of *eloquence*, with which *reason* had little to do, held a solemn sessions for the extirpation of their FOR, CAR, as an useless and dangerous word. And though, I think, it escaped, and even survived the edict of *Nantes* (notwithstanding all the mischief it had done the Catholic cause) yet their prudent writers are extremely reserved in the use of this and all other their *illative particles*. Feu Gomberville (says one of their Dictionary writers) *haissoit le mot CAR, parce, disoit-il, qu'il venoit du Grec.* The late Gomberville hated the word CAR, because, as he said, it came from the Greek. How happy for us,

\* Intell. Syst. p. 39.

that



that our FOR is differently descended, or we had lost a great reasoner, who bears as thorough an antipathy to Greek, as ever did Monsieur Gomberville!

He goes on, *And if I may be allowed to argue in the same way as Mr. Warburton.* The Public, I believe, will pardon him, let him begin when he will. Well, but allow him to do what, however, we are never to expect of him, to talk a little plain sense; what then? Why *the Ancients could not strictly believe this doctrine* [that the soul was part of God], *because it is greatly INCONSISTENT with another well-known opinion amongst them, that souls were linked to bodies for a punishment, or sent down as into a state of trial.* Now for his reason—FOR to suppose in the gross sense, that pieces or parts of the ever perfect and supreme God were so served, is WHAT NO ONE WILL IMAGINE THE PHILOSOPHERS CAPABLE OF. pp. 66, 67. FOR is here again, as usual, on very desperate service. He promises to shew the *inconsistency* between two *metaphysical* opinions. What reader now but would expect a *metaphysical* reason? Instead of that, he puts us off with a *moral* one. *No one will imagine the philosophers capable of holding both those opinions.* And to finish the absurdity, this is called arguing like me, in an instance where I proved the meaning of a *metaphysical* term by a *metaphysical* opinion. *If I may be allowed,* says he, *to argue in the same way as Mr. Warburton.*

2. But to be at a word with him and his philosophers together. What both are CAPABLE OF we shall now see. It is agreed that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held that *souls were linked to bodies for a punishment, or sent down as into a state of trial.* Yet of this very *PYTHAGORAS* *Cicero* speaks thus: *Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commeantem ex quo nostri animi CARPERENTUR, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum DISCERPI ET LACERARI DEUM.* Of *PLATO* and his followers, *Arnobius* speaks thus: *Ipse denique animus qui IMMORTALIS a vobis & DEUS ESSE NARRATUR, cur in Ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus? Delira & fatua & insana!* Here we see what two great writers of antiquity thought the philosophers capable of. Was he ignorant

ignorant of this? No; I had quoted them in the discourse he pretends to confute\*. Did he attempt to confute them? No; nor a great number more to the same purpose, unless this may be called a confutation, *And we may observe, that some of his authorities to prove this are exceedingly strained, and, as himself acknowledges more than once, are otherwise understood by learned men.* SOME? What then are the rest? But as to these some, does he prove what he says? Yes: And how? By quoting my acknowledgment, that *they are differently understood by learned men.* And now, reader! What dost thou imagine our Advocate capable of?

X. He goes on.—*And because the philosophers, speaking of the soul, often call it the image of God, divine and immortal, &c. he would lead the reader, from such expressions, unwarily to imagine, that it was literally a part of God, eternal à parte antè, the same as the soul of the world, &c. But I hope to make the contrary appear by some plain testimonies of antiquity: and the first I shall produce is one Mr. W. himself has helped me to, and is from Stobæus, where Speusippus, one of Plato's followers, says, "that the mind was neither the same with the "Onc or the Good, but had a peculiar nature of its own." This, Mr. W. owns, expressly contradicts what he asserted of Plato's holding the soul to be part of God; but he says that "Stobæus and the learned Stanley were both "mistaken in thinking Speusippus spoke of the human "mind, whereas, says he, it relates to the third person in "the trinity." Now supposing we take Mr. Warburton's judgment before that of Stobæus or Stanley, we may still fairly conclude, that if even the third person in the trinity was not the same as God, but had a peculiar nature of his own, much less was the soul of man the same; but that it had a distinct nature likewise. pp. 67, 68.—He would lead, says he, the reader by such expressions unwarily to imagine, that it was literally a part of God. Hear, then, by what kind of expressions I would mislead the unwary reader. *A natura Deorum (says Cicero) ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos & libatos habemus.* And again, *Humanus autem animus**

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

*decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo comparari potest* \*.—He will not dispute whether Stobæus and Stanley, or I, be in the right. He does well. But then he says, *We may still FAIRLY CONCLUDE, that if even the third person in the trinity was not the same as God, but had a peculiar nature of his own, much less was the soul of man the same; but that it had a distinct nature likewise.*—Such a concluder would have made Aristotle forswear syllogism. In the first volume of the *Divine Legation* † he saw these words: “Again, “the maintainers of the immateriality of the Divine “Substance were likewise divided into two parties; the “first of which held but one person in the Godhead; the “other two or three. So THAT AS THE FORMER BELIEVED THE SOUL TO BE PART OF THE SUPREME “GOD; THE LATTER BELIEVED IT TO BE PART ONLY “OF THE SECOND OR THIRD HYPOSTASIS.” What is to be done with this prevaricator? Will he plead guilty, to have the benefit of his clergy? Or will he own he could not read, and so stand upon his defence?—“You “may complain (I hear him say) but whose fault is it? “You had put this passage amongst your nice distinctions, divisions, and subdivisions: and those I was not “obliged to take notice of, after having so fairly given “you warning that I passed over all such, as needless “curiosities.”

But I begin to be quite weary of my Advocate; I am drawing towards a conclusion with him, and will dispatch him with all possible expedition. What follows won't stay us long.—*As to the passage which he quotes from M. Antoninus, it is nothing more than an exhortation to consider what will become of the soul when it is disunited or separated from the body: and though Mr. W. makes him to speak of its being resolved into the anima mundi; yet he owns at the same time, that neither Gataker in his notes, or Casaubon, had any notion that the doctrine of refusion was here alluded to.* p. 68.—Gataker and Casaubon did not understand it in my sense. Does he pretend to say I understand it wrong? He pretends to know nothing of the matter: so I leave it to those who do. For I should have a strange love for answering, if

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

† Ibid.

I gave this any other reply than *Antoninus's* own words: " [To die] is not only according to the course of Nature, " but of great use to it. [We should consider] how " closely Man is united to the Godhead, and in what " part of him that union resides ; and what will be the " condition of that part or portion of it when it is " resolved [into the *anima mundi*]\*."

The next authority (says he) I shall produce, is from *PLOTINUS*, who tells us that the soul is from God; and therefore necessarily loves him, yet it is a different existence from him.—Here again he plays his old trick upon us. *Plotinus*, a philosopher deep in the times of Christianity. I have tried in vain to make him understand. I will try now if I can make him blush; while he forces me to repeat, for the second time, the following words of the *Divine Legation*. " Such was the general " doctrine on this point" [namely, that the soul was God, or part of God] before the coming of Christianity ; " but then those philosophers, who held out against its " truth, after some time new-modelled both their philo- " sophy and religion; making their philosophy more " religious, and their religion more philosophical.—So, " amongst the many improvements of Paganism, THE " SOFTENING THIS DOCTRINE WAS ONE. The modern " *Platonists* confining the notion of the soul's being part " of the divine substance, to that of brutes.—And it is " remarkable that then, and not till then, the philoso- " phers began really to believe the doctrine of a future " state†." How true this is, we may see by this very quotation from *Plotinus*. And one of common apprehension would have seen, by his words, yet it is a different existence from him, that this was an innovation in philosophy. For were it not the common opinion, that the soul was of the same existence with God, or part of him, this caution and explanation had been impertinent. However, he goes on unmercifully to shew the orthodoxy of *Plotinus*, and of his commentator *Picinus*, in this point: Where speaking I don't know what, nor why, of the vegetative soul, he takes an opportunity to criticise a passage I brought from *Plutarch*. Of this soul [namely the vegetative] it is of which *Plutarch* manifestly speaks,

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

† Ibid.

where he says, "that Pythagoras and Plato held the soul  
"to be immortal; for that launching out into the soul of  
"the universe, it returned to its parent and original."

THAT THIS MUST BE INTENDED OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL IS PLAIN, from his mentioning two other souls from the same authorities, immediately after, in a quite different light. "Pythagoras and Plato, says he, hold  
"that the rational soul is immortal; for that this soul is  
"not God, but the workmanship of the Eternal God;  
"and it is the irrational soul which is mortal and corruptible." So that unless we can suppose Plutarch intended to make Pythagoras and Plato contradict themselves, we must conclude their opinions in this passage to be, that the vegetative soul was diffused into the life of the universe; that the sensitive or irrational soul was mortal and corruptible; and that the rational soul was a distinct existence made by God. But this last part is not at all taken notice of by Mr. Warburton, though in the very same paragraph with the first which he quotes. pp. 70, 71.

1. Unless we can suppose (says he) Plutarch intended to make Pythagoras and Plato contradict themselves. Suppose, Quotha! Did he never hear that this *Plutarch* wrote an express treatise on the *Contradictions of the Stoics*? A sect of as good a house as either *Pythagoras* or *Plato*. Will he never see, that if the philosophers had a double doctrine, which he has laboured to prove, they must perpetually *contradict themselves*? But our Advocate is so *captivated a lover* (Pref. p. v) so enamoured of his dear philosophers, that the very air of a contradiction shocks him.

2. Well then, not to disgust the delicacy of a lover, I will humour him. It shall be no contradiction; nor will I suppose Plutarch such a brutal as to insinuate any thing so gross. But now, if, like a true *inamorato*, he will not suffer them to be defended by any hand but his own, then we shall begin to differ. He tells us that *when Plutarch says Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal*, IT IS PLAIN THIS MUST BE INTENDED OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL.—*An immortal vegetative soul!* 'Tis a *prodigy* that deserves an *expiation*. But to know whether *Plutarch* or our *Advocate* be the real father of this

this monster, it will be necessary to transcribe the whole chapter: "*Pythagoras* and *Plato* held the soul to be "immortal; for that lanching out into the soul of the "universe, it returns to its parent and original. The "Stoics say, that on its leaving the body, the more infirm "*(that is, the soul of the ignorant)* suffers the lot of the "body: But the more vigorous *(that is, the soul of the "wise)* endures to the conflagration. *Democritus* and "*Epicurus* say the soul is mortal, and perishes with the "body: *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, that the reasonable soul "is uncorrupt *(for it is to be observed, the soul is not "God, but the workmanship of the Eternal God)* and "the irrational mortal." Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἀφθάρτου εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐξῆσαν γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῆ παντὸς ψυχῆν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. Οἱ Στωϊκοί, ἐξῆσαν τῶν σωμάτων ὑποφύεσθαι, τὴν μὲν ἀσθινεσέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι γενέσθαι. (ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροσέραν, οἷα ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰς σοφίας, καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως. Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος, φθαρτὴν, τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην. Πυθαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων, τὸ μὲν λογικόν, ἀφθάρτου (ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃ θεὸν, ἀλλ' ἔργον τῷ αἰδίδι θεῷ ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, φθαρτόν. Περὶ τῶν Ἀριστ. τοῖς φιλ. Βιβλ. δ'. Κ. ζ. Here we see, the soul first mentioned, and said to be *immortal*, and to lanch out into the soul of the universe, was the same which the Stoics held to endure, when it had been in their wise man, till the conflagration; was the same which *Democritus* and *Epicurus* held to be mortal. And was this the *VEGETATIVE* soul? How hard has the world dealt with *Democritus* and *Epicurus* for twenty round ages, only for holding that the *vegetative soul was mortal*! A very reasonable opinion, had there been any *vegetative soul* at all. But what then must we say to the *contradiction*, which I have promised to remove, and which seems now quite fixed, since we have evaporated this spirit of *vegetative immortality*, from the passage? The plain solution of the difficulty is this: When *Plutarch* had mentioned the impious notion of the soul's *mortality*, first started by *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, he opposes it by that of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. He had told us before, that these held the soul to be *immortal*: But now, using their authority to confute the other two, he, like a judicious writer, explains it with more exactness. He tells us, that *Pythagoras*

and *Plato* held the *reasonable* soul to be immortal, the *irrational* mortal. When, in the beginning of the chapter, he had said, they held the soul to be immortal, he added *their* reason, *for that launching out*, &c. ΓΑΡ οἷς τὸ τῷ παντί, &c. Now here, in the conclusion, mentioning again the same dogma, he adds *his own*, *For it is to be observed the soul is not God*, &c. ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τῆς ψυχῆς, &c. For *Plutarch* had, with the rest of the philosophers of the Christian times, refined his notions on this matter: *They said, the soul was immortal, because it was related to the soul of the universe: He said, it was immortal, because it was the work of God.* Henry Stephens, who, it seems probable, saw this was *Plutarch's*, and not *Pythagoras's* or *Plato's* philosophy, makes the words καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ ὧν ὅλα τὰ αἰδία θεῶν ἰσχυρίζεται a parenthesis, as he does ταύτην δὲ εἶναι σὺν ἀπαιδεύτων) and as he should have done οἷς ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς σοφίας; both which are the explanatory remarks of *Plutarch*. And now it is to be hoped our Advocate sees *why this last part was not at all taken notice of by Mr. Warburton though in the very same paragraph with the first which he quoted.* But what does he now see of his contradiction?

We have said what it was that induced *Plutarch* to interfere with his own opinion in this matter. The very same concern for the orthodoxy of old Pagan philosophy. (then to be opposed to Christianity) that now seems to distress our Advocate. The very same that made *Plotinus* cry out, as above, *The soul necessarily loves God, yet is a different existence from him.* And this will account for *Plutarch's* labouring so much as he does, in the place quoted by our Advocate, at his 75th page, to free *Plato* from the charge of making the soul eternal and uncreated. For a charge, it seems, it was, and a heavy one too, upon him. Now where *Plutarch* performs the faithful office of an historian, in delivering us the *placits* of the old philosophers, there, we see, he owns both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held this opinion; but here, where he acts the *Advocate*, I mean of old Pagan philosophy, he circlears to distinguish away the accusation. Thus at length we see the contradiction lies at *Plutarch's* door; which will require more than a *negative immortality* to remove: *Legutio dignus iudice nodus.*

These

These three passages, from *Stobæus*, *M. Antoninus*, and *Plutarch*, are the only three of the great number I brought to prove the *Greek* philosophers held the soul to be part of God, which our Advocate has ventured to undertake. These he thought he could manage: And envy must own he has acquitted himself to admiration.

XI. But that *Plato* was orthodox in this point, he will now shew from *Plato* himself.—*And that this was Plato's opinion* (says he) *concerning the human rational soul, I shall further prove—from himself.—In one place he says, "We have spoke most truly in asserting the soul was made before the body, and the body in the second place, and after the soul, forasmuch as the governing part ought in point of time to be created before that which is governed."* pp. 71, 72. Where says he this? Where think you but in the old place, his *Book of Laws*? It is an odd fancy this, in our Advocate, to go so continually to a *Book of Laws* for *Plato's* religious sentiments. *Law and Gospel*, let me tell him, agreed no better formerly than they do now. But he must needs go as his *index* led him. Which in this road always points *erotically*. Let us follow him then into his warehouse of *Laws*. Here, to our great surprise, we find, that *Plato* is not speaking of the origin of the human rational soul, but of a very different thing. This *tenth Book of Laws*, from whence he takes his quotation, is employed to prove the Being of a God against Atheism. One of his arguments, for an *eternal mind*, is, That that is the first efficient Cause which moves itself and all other things. But *MIND* moves itself and all other things: Therefore *MIND* is the first efficient. Hence, in the words of the quotation, it is inferred, *That the soul was before the body*, *Ψυχὴν μὲν προέβαν γενέσθαι σώματι ἡμῶν*. And farther, that there is one general Soul or Mind, that governs the universe, *Ψυχὴν δὲ διοικῶσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς πάλιν κινουμένοις ἡμῶν ἢ καὶ τὸν ἔρανὸν αὐτὴν ἀγχοῦ διοικεῖν εἶναι*; Now, who sees not that it was *Plato's* business here, to shew only in the *abstract*, that mind was prior to body; and altogether beside his purpose to speak of the origin of the human soul? Yet our Advocate, misled by the *Latin* translator, and unaided by any discernment of his own, makes *Plato's* words relate to the creation of the soul. *That the soul*



was MADE before the body; *animus ante corpus factus fuisse*. But *Plato* in his *Epinomis*, referring to this very place, explains the meaning in these words: *That every soul is elder than every body*; ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐστὶν ψυχὴ σώματι ἅπαντα παλός. Yet was this passage so far from helping our Advocate to the true sense of his quotation, that he even refers to it for the confirmation of his mistake. All therefore that *Plato's* argument required was to prove, that *mind* was before *body*. But had he thought proper to digress about the *origin* of the soul, he must needs have made it *ungenerated*, from a principle he lays down in this very place, namely, That the soul was a *self-moving substance*; Τὸ ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν φησὶ λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν ὕσταν, ἥπερ τ' ἄνομα ὁ δὲ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύμα; for a *self-moving* and an *eternal-moving* substance were the same thing amongst the Ancients. So *Plutarch* tells us, that *Thales* was the first who taught the soul to be an *eternal-moving* OR *self-moving* nature, Θαλῆς ἀπερήνατο πρῶτον τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον\*.

Our Advocate goes on with his *Plato*: In another place (says he) *God*, after having made the ANGELS, is introduced as delivering them materials to form man and other animals, and as speaking to them in this manner: "Go to then, turn yourself to the formation of animals, according to the laws of nature, and imitate that efficacious power which I myself used in your production; and since they will be created as it were fellow-citizens with yourselves, they shall be esteemed of divine extract, and shall have dominion over all other creatures." p. 72.

1. *God*, after having made the ANGELS (say he). Would the reader know what sort of angels he has here to do with? Our Advocate is silent. But honest *Plato* tells us their names: Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and the rest of the Pagan Gods and Demons. Περὶ εἰ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν—Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖτες Ὠκεανὸς τε καὶ Τηθύς ἐγενίσθησαν ἐκ τούτων δὲ, Φόρυξ τε καὶ Κρήνη καὶ Πείρα, &c. But if philosophers are to pass for apostles, why may not *Heathen Gods* stand for angels? Of these holy angels, *Plato* says it would be impiety not to believe what the ancient Mythologists taught concerning them, ΠΕΙΣΤΕΟΝ

\* Plat. Phil. l. 4. c. 2.

δι τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν ἔσιν ὡς ἔφασκεν, σαφῶς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν προγόνους εἰδόντιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι θεῶν πατρὶν ἀπιστεῖν. Being now in the humour, he tells us, that when God created souls, he disposed them *amongst the stars*: *ἐξυψήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διείκε ψυχὰς ἰσχυρίμους τοῖς ἀστροῖς, ἐναιμεθ' ἐκαστὴν πρὸς ἑκάστην*—That they suffered *transmigration into brutes*—*εἶδε καὶ εἰς θηρία βίον ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παύμεν*—*δεῖν πέτοις ἐπὶ κακίας, τρόπον δὲ κακόννοστο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά της τῇ τρέψει γενέσεως, εἰς τινα τοιαύτην αἰὲ μάλιστα θηρία φύσιν.* And is not this a likely place to find *Plato's real sentiments concerning the soul*?

2. But what do we talk of his real sentiments? The book, from whence our Advocate brings this passage, contains not *Plato's* sentiments at all, but another Man's, one *Timæus Locrus*, of whose book, *de Anima Mundi*, this work of *Plato's* is a *Comment*. The passage in question, particularly, being a *paraphrase* on these words of *Timæus*, *ΜΕΤΑ δὲ τῶν τῷ κόσμῳ εὐστάτων, &c.\**

But our Advocate, now grievously bemired, yet flounders on.—And again *PLATO MUCH TO THE SAME PURPOSE SAYS*, “that after God had formed the world, he allotted the human soul to be disposed of by Nature, as his vicegerent,” &c. p. 73. Can the reader now guess whither we are sent to look for these words?—To 3 *Plat.* 19 D. which fairly brings us a mile beyond *Plato*, to a treatise of *Timæus Locrus*, intitled, *De Anima Mundi*. The swallowing *Sigurnus* for *Cicero* was a trifle to this exploit. Here he saw writ in fair *Latin* characters, over the page, *Timæi Locri de Anima Mundi*. If one did not know him, one should take him to be of the humour of that critic, who had a great mind that every thing that was good should be his favourite author's. But he was puzzled with the two titles. One was, the *Timæus* of *Plato*; the other, the *Anima Mundi* of *Timæus*. This was the deep problem of the *Horse-mill*, and *Mill-horse*: but the best of the story is, he here again (as in the former case of the *Book of Laws* and *Epinomis*) brings these words of *Timæus* to confirm his sense of the foregoing quotation from the *Timæus* of *Plato*; and says, as well he might, 'tis much to the same purpose. This I remark to the honour of his penetration. For though

\* *Plato* Ferr. Vol III. p. 99.

he did not know one was the *text*, and the other the *comment*, yet he found out by mere dint of sagacity, that they were very near akin. And this is all the fruit of his *Platonic* journey. Unhappy Advocate! What a progress hast thou made! from *Plato* nothing to the purpose, to no *Plato* at all! But we had best stop here, lest the next quotation should be from *Nobody*. And indeed 'tis next to *nobody*; 'tis from *Apuleius*, a writer in the *Christian times*. A trick, now too stale even to laugh at.

We are come at last to our Advocate's *peroration*. And to say the truth, it was time for him to have done. *Therefore, after all this* (says he) *Mr. Warburton need not any longer admire, &c.* No, truly, he has eased me of this passion, The *admiring* at a free-thinker.—*It is very true, that some few expressions now and then may be found in the writings of the philosophers, as, that the soul is a part of God; comes from God; is discerned from him; is a ray of the divinity; is one with God, &c. if taken in a strict literal sense, might in some measure answer Mr. Warburton's purpose: BUT WHEN THE LITERAL SENSE IS PLAINLY ABSURD, and the contrary maintained by a multitude of clear expressions, we of course understand them FIGURATIVELY.* pp. 75, 76. Without doubt. So that when we are told *Epicurus* held the sun and moon to be no bigger than they seem; *Pyrro*, that nothing could be known; and *Zeno*, that all crimes were equal; *the literal sense being plainly absurd*; we must believe nothing of the matter. But as he hath talked of the *figurative* terms of a language, in which he understands no terms at all, he should now learn to hold his tongue, and hearken to his teachers. The great *Gassendi* was incomparably the best versed in ancient *Greek* philosophy of any man in these latter ages, and he never dreamt of this more than *figurative* folly of our Advocate. He knew the *Greek* and *Latin* expressions would bear no such interpretation: and therefore tells us roundly, that there was scarce an ancient philosopher, who was not what we now call a *Spinozist*. "*Interim* "*(says he) tamen vix ulli fuisse (quæ humanæ mentis* "*caligo, atque imbecillitas est) qui non inciderint in* "*errorem illum de REFUSIONE IS. ANIMAM MUNDI.* "*Nimirum,*

"Nimirum, sicut existimarunt SINGULORUM ANIMAS PARTICULAS ESSE ANIMÆ MUNDANÆ, quarum quælibet suo corpore, ut aqua vase, includeretur; ita & reputarunt unamquamque animam, corpore dissoluto, quasi diffracto vase, effluere, ac ANIMÆ MUNDI E QUÀ DEDUCTA FUERIT, ITERUM UNIRI\*."

And now, after all that has passed between us, I may be allowed at parting to ask my nameless adversary what he is? His betters, when they went *incognito*, have been thus questioned, and without offence. The great *Pythagoras* himself was asked it; and his answer will fit our Advocate as if it had been made for him. And that he may not be forced to descend from his present dignity of quotation, I will press him no farther, but suppose he gives an inquirer this, that his ancient master made to *Leon*, prince of the *Phliasians*, who asked him what he was: ART (says he) *I know none; but I am a PHILOSOPHER†.*

XII. Let us conclude with a general view of our Advocate's performances. He will write against the *Third Book of the Divine Legation of Moses*: but proposes only to consider what in *his apprehension* affects the argument. Yet of this *little*, for his *apprehension* is not *much*, he has not considered one tenth part. And how that abounds in all kind of *false reasoning*, and *absurd quotation*, we have given the reader a kind of specimen. But to make amends for an imperfect representation, he may be pleased to take notice, that, besides all particular local graces, there are FOUR GENERAL FALLACIES, that run throughout this noble work. Two in point of *quotation*, two of *reasoning*.

1. The first is in quoting poets, or any body, instead of philosophers.
  2. The second in quoting philosophers after *Christ*.
  3. The third in urging *exoteric* doctrines for *esoteric*.
  4. And the fourth in concluding from what was said of *false gods*, to what they thought of the *true*.
- I call these by the knavish title the *schools* of philosophy have given them, which, like the *courts of law*, make no

\* Div. Leg. Vol. III. p. 156.

† Artem quidem se seire nullum; sed esse philosophum. Cic Tusc. Disp. I. 5. c. 3.

provision for fools : but, upon my word, I am not satisfied whether they be not very honest *blunders*. However, he has now his choice to call them what he will, so he no longer pretend to call them arguments.

His *first* Chapter, as I said, is the only one with which I am concerned. His *second* is intitled, *The Opinions of the Philosophers concerning a future State*. It is made up of some six-dozen of ill-chosen quotations, which so amazed him that he could not forbear saying on the entrance to his labour, *It seems very surprising, notwithstanding all the following authorities, and many more which no doubt this learned gentleman must have met with to the contrary, that he should thus speak of the philosophers: "I have examined their writings with all the exactness I was able, and it appears evident to me that these men believed nothing of a future state of rewards and punishments, which they most industriously propagated in society."* p. 2. By this time, I suppose, I have eased him of his surprise : so that we are now even by a reciprocal cure. In one point however he is right. He supposes I could have furnished him with *many more authorities*, I could, I'll assure him : more than with six hundred to his six dozen. But it is pleasant to observe, in this *chapter of quotations*, with what judgment he brings in three *Epicureans*, *Virgil*, *Lucian*, and *Celsus*, to bear witness to a future state of rewards and punishments, who without doubt *believed* what they said. Honest *Celsus*, cries out, under the *mask* and in the *tone* of a modern free-thinker, *God forbid, that either they, or I, or any man living, should endeavour to subvert the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments.* p. 152. Who, when he hears this, can forbear concluding with our Advocate — *I say, when a man talks in this manner, it is hardly possible not to imagine him in earnest.* p. 82.

I call this his *chapter of quotations*. It is its proper title : it is made up of them, and a jolly company they are, but so transcendently chosen and translated, that some time or other it may chance to become as famous as *Scarron's chapter of Horse-Litters*, which once, indeed, on a time met together because they were forced ; but for all that, each of them, while in the disposal of their *concerns*, was taking a different road. At present I shall only

only desire the reader to observe, that the *three first* of the *four general sophisms* shine throughout this chapter with a distinguished lustre.

He has two more *chapters* upon something or other; and then concludes with a pastoral-letter to the free-thinkers, *Ut sobrii ad evertendam rempublicam Christianam accederent.*

Thus it hath been my fortune to displease the *bigots* on both sides. I make no question, but the impartial reader will be ready to congratulate with me on so fair an appearance of being in the right.

As for this fantastic zealot in the cause of Paganism, I have used him, it is true, with little ceremony. Let the reader judge, if he deserved more. I had put my name to what I wrote, and he attacks me in secret. Had either I concealed mine, or he told his, he might then have expected (if on other accounts he had a right to it) what the usual commerce of civility demands between people upon equal terms: but writing without a name, in the manner he has done, is least of all excusable. For, when a man's person or reputation is attacked, I know little difference between the ruffian, and the writer, in the dark.

I may be the rather allowed to speak freely on this head, because I never yet wrote against any book or author, whatsoever, any farther than occasional reflections on particular questions, which no one can avoid who treats of subjects like those I am engaged in. Once indeed, and but once, I took upon myself the honour of *defending* a sublime genius against the cavils of an injurious pretant. But an *attack by answer, remarks, confutation*, or any of the formal apparatus of literary assault, I never made on any author whatsoever. To say the truth, I prize my ease and quiet at too high a rate, to hazard them in the vain or *interested* employment of discrediting any popular or party writer whatsoever.—*Nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis!*

I should now, perhaps, crave pardon of the severer reader, for the levities that have escaped me both *here* and in the *Preface*. But if he that loses may have leave to speak, sure he that's libell'd though he loses nothing, may have leave to laugh. And what else was to be done  
with

with my *doctor and student* ? who, whether they railed or reasoned, how much sower in their own professions, were still on the wrong side common sense and common honesty. For they have managed things so well, that the one has lost his *reasoning* in the study of the *law*, and the other his *charity* in defence of the *gospel*. Besides, on some occasions, what mortal can forbear ? Who would have suspected our solemn tragic doctor for a *risible animal* ? Yet there are seasons, when his own blunders dispose him to be jocular, and he irreverently aims at wit with the face of an *Irish inquisitor* †.

In conclusion, *If any man* (to use the words of a great writer) *EQUAL TO THE MATTER\**, shall think it *appertains him to take in hand this controversy*, either *excepting against aught written; or persuaded he can shew better how this question may receive a true determination; if his intents be sincere to the public, and shall carry him on without BITTERNESS to the OPINION or to the PERSON dissenting*, let him not, I intreat him, guess by the *handling which meritoriously hath been bestowed on these Objects of contempt and laughter*, that I account it any *displeasure done to me to be contradicted in print* : But as it leads to the attainment of any thing more true, shall esteem it a benefit; and shall know how to return his *CIVILITY and FAIR ARGUMENT in such sort, as he shall confess that to do so is my choice, and to have done thus was my chance*.

\* See the Weekly Miscellany throughout.

† Mr. Chubb, I am told, has addressed something or other to me at the end of his late Discourse on Miracles. I suppose he only wants my acknowledgments; and he shall have them: For the reason above shews why I must always decline his kind overtures of farther acquaintance. I confess then he is a very extraordinary person: and thus, he may say with the subtil peasant in Moliere—*Oui, si j'avois étudié, j'aurois été sçavoir à des choses où l'on n'a jamais songé*.

## POSTSCRIPT

TO

## THE REMARKS;

In Answer to some OBJECTIONS of  
DR. SYKES.

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TO put things of a sort together, I shall take this occasion to pay my respects to the Author of the *Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion*\*, who has honoured me, in passing, with a couple of random reflections. A kind of fatality seems to attend these gentlemen; who, when I lie so open to them, have still the luck to offer at me in the wrong place.

In his 399th page he has these words: "It is not of any moment to enter further into what philosophers have said, when they attempt to account for the soul's eternity. Common sense taught them, that real proper punishments were inflicted upon men for sins. Who can read *Plato's Gorgias* (which is not ranked amongst the *exoterics* by a late Writer, in which alone the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, he thinks, are [is] detailed out); who can read that, and conceive that *Plato* did not really believe a state of future punishments and rewards? When he had professed at large, how wicked men are punished, and how good men are rewarded in a future state, he declares *That to be his full persuasion, and from thence it was, that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge having a most pure soul.* And it they imagined men to be punished for sin, and rewarded for virtue, even supposing this was talked of in a way that might be proved fabulous, yet the doctrine itself was unshaken. Suppose the fables of *Acheron*; and *Styx*, and *Cocytus*, and *Elysian Fields*, may be all demonstrated to be false; yet it does not

\* Arthur Ashley Sykes, D.D.

" follow,



“ follow, that the thing conveyed under these words  
 “ were [was] believed to be all false. It does not follow  
 “ that souls were believed to die, or to be incapable of  
 “ receiving punishments or rewards: but only that this  
 “ manner of representing them is false.” p. 400.—These  
 are his words; and they deserve to be well considered.

*It is not of any moment (he says) to enter further  
 into what philosophers have said, when they attempt to  
 account for the soul's ETERNITY. I thought it of great  
 moment. I am sure I found it of great difficulty. And  
 if I have ill explained what the philosophers meant by  
 the soul's eternity, one reason was, that I wanted more  
 helps than antiquity would afford me. But it is the  
 privilege of veteran disputers, to want nothing but willing  
 hearers. But why will he enter no further, when he  
 goes out of his way to pay me this visit?*

*Because common sense (he says) taught them, that real  
 proper punishments were inflicted upon men for sins.  
 I have shewn from fact that common sense did not teach  
 them. No matter: he will prove from reason that it  
 did. His argument is plain and simple. Common sense  
 might teach them: therefore common sense did teach  
 them. This it is to be a practised disputant. It is  
 but knowing what common sense might teach, and  
 he will presently tell you, by his scale of logic, what it  
 did. By the same way, I make no doubt, he could  
 prove that the Epicureans believed a Providence; the  
 Stoics inequality of crimes; and the Pyrrhonians the  
 certainty of truth. He has only to shew that common  
 sense taught them, or was ready to teach them; and we  
 have only to believe, that they were as ready to learn. I  
 had myself a kind of guess, that common sense might  
 have taught the philosophers that real proper punishments  
 were inflicted upon men for sins; and had I known no  
 more of antiquity than this Writer has entered into, 'tis  
 ten to one but I had concluded as he does, that common  
 sense did teach them. Though hardly, I think, after  
 another had clearly shewn the contrary from antiquity.  
 However, the reader may not be displeased to hear how  
 much I gave to common sense in the introduction to my  
 discourse on the philosophers. These were my words:—  
 “ It will be proper to premise, that the constitution of  
 6 “ the*

" the *Greek* philosophy being above measure refined and  
 " speculative, it always used to be determined by *meta-*  
 " *physical* rather than *moral* principles; and to stick to  
 " all consequences, how absurd soever, that were seen to  
 " arise from such principles. Of this we have a famous  
 " instance in the ancient *democritic* philosophy, &c.—So  
 " well supported, we see, is that censure which a cele-  
 " brated *French* writer passes upon them: *When the*  
 " *philosophers once besot themselves with a prejudice,*  
 " *they are even more incurable than the people them-*  
 " *selves: because they besot themselves not only with the*  
 " *prejudice, but with the false reasoning employed o*  
 " *support it.* The reverence and regard to *metaphysical*  
 " principles being so great, we shall see, that the *Greek*  
 " philosophers must of necessity reject the doctrine of a  
 " future state of rewards and punishments, how many  
 " *invincible* moral arguments soever there really be in  
 " support of it, when we come to shew, that there were  
 " two *metaphysical* principles concerning *God* and the  
 " *soul*, universally embraced by all, which necessarily  
 " exclude all notion of a future state of reward and  
 " punishment \*."

In the *conclusion* I repeat the same observation in the  
 following words:—" These two errors in the *metaphy-*  
 " *sical* speculations of the philosophers, concerning the  
 " nature of *God* and of the *soul*, were what necessarily  
 " kept them from giving credit to a doctrine highly pro-  
 " bable in itself, and rendered so even by themselves,  
 " from many moral considerations, perpetually preached  
 " up to the people. But, as we observed before, it was  
 " their ill fate to be determined, in their opinions, rather  
 " by *metaphysical* than *moral* arguments. This is seen  
 " by comparing the belief and conduct of *SOCRATES*  
 " with the rest. He was singular in confining himself to  
 " the study of *morality*, and as singular in *believing* the  
 " doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment.  
 " What could be the cause of this latter singularity but  
 " the former? Of which it was a natural consequence.  
 " For, having thrown aside all other speculations, he had  
 " nothing to mislead him. Whereas the rest of the  
 " philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of *tan-*

\* Div. Leg. Book I. c. 4.

" *ticism*,

\* ticism, to physics and metaphysics, had drawn a number  
 “ of absurd, though subtile conclusions, that directly  
 “ opposed the consequences of those moral arguments.  
 “ And as it is common for parents to be fondest of their  
 “ weakest and most deformed offspring, so these men, as  
 “ we said, were always more swayed by their metaphy-  
 “ sical than moral conclusions\*.” Now this was all I  
 could, in conscience, allow to *common sense*, when anti-  
 quity stood so directly in my way.

But lest it should be said he had overlooked *all* fact; he has thought fit to make the following observation: *Who can read Plato's Gorgias (which is not ranked amongst the exoterics by a late Writer, in which alone the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; he thinks, is detailed out); who can read that, and conceive that Plato did not really believe, &c.* The force of this observation, the reader sees, lies in the parenthesis, *that I have not ranked the Gorgias of Plato amongst his exoterics.* But how, if this be false? Let the following words of the *Divine Legation* determine: “ It is very  
 “ true, that, in his writings, he [*Plato*] inculcates the  
 “ doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments;  
 “ but this always in the grossest sense of the populace—  
 “ *that the souls of ill men descended into asses or swine—*  
 “ that the uninitiated lay in mire and filth: that there  
 “ were three judges of Hell; and talks much of *Styx*;  
 “ *Cocytus, Acheron, &c.* and all so *seriously* as shews he  
 “ had a mind to be believed. But did he himself believe  
 “ them? We may be assured he did not†.” Where, at  
 the word *seriously*, I expressly refer to the *GORGIAS*;  
*Phædo*, and *Republic*. Now, if the *Phædo* and *Republic*  
 (as he will not deny) be of the *exoteric* kind, and I place  
 the *Gorgias* in the same class, is not this *ranking the*  
*Gorgias amongst the exoterics*? What then was it that  
 could induce this Writer to say, I had not ranked it  
 there? Was it the following passage? “ But *Albinus*,  
 “ an old *Platonist*, has, in *some measure*, supplied this  
 “ loss [namely, the loss of a treatise of *Numenius*,  
 “ concerning the secret doctrine of *Plato*] by his *Intro-*  
 “ *duction to the Dialogues of Plato.* From whence it  
 “ appears, that those very books, in which *Plato* details

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

† Ibid. Book III. § 3.

"but the doctrines of a future state of reward and punishment, are all of the *exoteric* kind. For in that class Albinus ranks the *Criton*, *Phædo*, *Menon*, *Symposium*, *Læus*, *Epistles*, *Epinomis*, *Meneæmus*, *Clitophon*, and *Philebus*.\*" If this were the passage, 'tis plain the Writer mistook the latter part for a formal list of *Plato's* *exoteric* writings. But the very words might have taught him better: (I only say that in that class Albinus ranks such and such tracts.) Especially if he had looked into the discourse referred to: where he would have found the reason why I expressed myself in that manner. And: I don't use to write at hazard, as *hasty* as he thinks me. *Albinus*, in his fifth section, divides *Plato's* dialogues into classes. Not into the two general ones of *exoteric* and *esoteric*; but into the more minute, and different, of *natural*, *moral*, *dialectic*, *confutative*, *civil*, *explorative*, *obstetric*, and *subversive*†. It will be asked then, how I came to say, that *Albinus* ranked the *Criton*, *Phædo*, *Menon*, *Symposium*, *Læus*, *Epistles*, *Epinomis*, *Meneæmus*, *Clitophon* and *Philebus*, in the *exoteric* class? For this plain reason, he says they were all of the *civil* kind. And I hope I need not tell the learned reader, that all of that kind were *exoteric*. And now it is seen why I might well suppose the *Gorgias* of the *exoteric* kind; and yet, why I could not use *Albinus's* authority for placing it with the rest: because it is evidently of the *civil* class, and yet not ranked there by that old *Platonist*. The reason of his different assignment was this: The *Gorgias* is a dialogue concerning the use and abuse of rhetoric. The Sophists had abused this art to pervert public justice, and to amass wealth and power: They are here shewn that its true use was to aid and enforce the laws, and to render the members of a community wiser and better. Hence; in conclusion, the Author takes occasion to enforce the practice of virtue from consideration of future rewards and punishments: his usual manner of concluding his political discourses; the *Gorgias* being, indeed, properly a supplement to the books of *Læo* and

\* Div. Leg. Book III. § 3.

† Τῶ μὲν φυσικῷ, — τῶ δὲ ἠθικῷ — τῶ δὲ λογικῷ, — τῶ δὲ ἐλεγκτικῷ, — τῶ δὲ πολιτικῷ, — τῶ δὲ συμβουλευτικῷ, — τῶ δὲ μαθηματικῷ, — τῶ δὲ ἀναιρετικῷ. *Alb.* *Introduct. in Plat. Dial. sect. 5.* apud *Fabr. Bibl. Græc. lib. 3. c. 2.*

*Republic*: but it being at the same time altogether employed in overturning the practice of the *Sophists*, was, I suppose, the reason why *Albinus* thought it came more naturally into that class which he calls *subversive*. This is a true account of the *Gorgias*; as well as of my plain sentiments, concerning it, in the first volume of *The Divine Legation*. And yet this Writer cries out, *Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive that Plato did not really believe a future state of rewards and punishments?* Rather, let me ask, Who that *has* read the *Gorgias*, can talk at this rate?

Well, but his reason: "When he [*Plato*] had professed at large, how wicked men are punished, and how good men are rewarded in a future state, he declares that to be his full persuasion, and from thence it was, that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge having a most pure soul." The original is, Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ΤΠΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ πείπισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφαινῆμαι τῷ κρῖνι ὡς ὑγιεστάτην ἔχων τὴν ψυχὴν. Here, we see, the Writer has sunk upon us the important words ἐπὶ τέτων τῶν λόγων, upon which the whole sentence turns. This could hardly be by chance. The reasons of the omission are but too evident. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ΤΠΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ πείπισμαι, *I am persuaded* (says the speaker) (*O Callicles*, ON THE AUTHORITY OF THESE DOCTRINES. Say you so? To understand then how full the persuasion was, we must consider what credibility *these doctrines* had. Now he that reads the *Gorgias* will find, that they consisted of a long fabulous account of the establishment of the three judges of *Hell*\*: and of a strange opinion, that the dead not only retained the visible marks of the passions and affections of the soul, but also the scars and blemishes of the body†. It was on the authority, therefore, of these goodly doctrines, that the speaker founds his belief: and what is more, it was to these doctrines that the very words, in which he expresses this belief, allude: Ἀποφαινῶμαι τῷ ΚΡΙΘΗ, relating to the *infernal judges*; and the ΤΤΙΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ τὴν ψυχὴν, the *most sound or healthy soul*, to its affections,

\* *Tim. I.* p. 523. Ed. Serr.—See *Div. Leg.* Book II. § 4.

† *Plato*, ut *suprà*, *tom. I.* p. 524.—See *Div. Leg.* as above.

marks and blemishes. The speaker therefore must of course believe a future state thus circumstanced, if he believed any future state at all. Here is no room for the Writer's evasion: who supposes the philosophers *might reject the fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elysian Fields, and yet believe the thing conveyed under these words.* For here the belief of the *thing* is expressly said to be built on the authority of those *fables*: but those fables our Author gives up as not really believed. By his favour therefore I would conclude that the *thing* built upon them was not believed.

But as I little thought this Writer would have had the better of me on the believing side, I will suppose, as he docs contrary to evidence, that the speaker did indeed in this place deliver his real sentiments. Let us see now what will come of it. He asks, *Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive, that Plato did not really believe—when he has professed at large.*—So then; the dispute between us is, Whether PLATO believed a future state of rewards and punishments? And, to prove that PLATO did, he gives me a speech of SOCRATES. For unluckily what he quotes for the words of *Plato* are the words of his *master*; who, I have endeavoured to shew, by better reasons than such a kind of speech, did really believe a future state of rewards and punishments.

But he goes on:—*And IF THEY IMAGINED men to be punished for sin, and rewarded for virtue, even supposing that this was talked of in a way that might be PROVED fabulous, yet the doctrine itself was unshaken.* Without doubt, if I will allow *they imagined* a future state of rewards and punishments, he will prove *they believed* one; that being the conclusion he seems to aim at in the awkward expression of—*proved fabulous, and—was unshaken.* For the point between us is not about what was *true* or *false*, but about what was *believed* or *disbelieved*. But he himself seems dissatisfied with his expression, and therefore attempts to mend it in this repetition (for it would be hard that he who begs his question, should not be able to get to his conclusion). *Suppose the fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elysian Fields, may be all DEMONSTRATED to be false, yet it does not follow, that the thing conveyed under*

*these words was believed to be all false.* Here again his words, *demonstrated to be false*, leave him just where he was. For nothing can be concluded concerning the philosophers believing or not believing a thing, from our *demonstrating* it to be true or false. His expression fails him here again. He therefore attempts it a *third* time. *It does not follow, that souls were believed to die, or to be incapable of receiving punishments or rewards, but only that this manner of representing them is FALSE.* As ill as ever! He is still in the very place where he set out. And that which at first so perplexed him, has stuck by him through all his variation of phrase—*Is false*, for, *was not believed*. As if the philosophers must needs disbelieve all that was false, and believe all that was true. And indeed it seems to have been this strange prepossession that has made him run into all his confusion of language. A disease that fatally infected the Lawyer of late memory. I put his expressions in the most favourable light. For if there be no blunder, there is much malice: The period (supposing the words accurate) tending to prove the *credibility* of a future state of rewards and punishments; which, being directed against my discourse, necessarily insinuates, that I had wrote something against that *credibility*. But I have too good opinion of his honesty, to believe this to be his secret purpose.

What therefore this Writer so fruitlessly labours to bring forth, is this simple conception, That the philosophers might believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in general, and yet disbelieve all the particular fables of the populace concerning it. But those who are acquainted with antiquity, will know, that this *was not*, and *could not* be the case. I have given a reason in the first volume\* of *The Divine Legation*, to shew, *it was not*, in these words: “We have given just above a quotation from *Tully’s* oration for *Cluentius*, in which he having ridiculed the popular *fables* concerning a future state, subjoins, *If these be false, as all men see they are, what hath death deprived us of besides a sense of pain?* Nam nunc quidem *quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? Nisi forte ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos*

\* Div. Leg. Vol. III. pp. 122, 123.

“impiorum

“ *impiorum supplicia perferre, &c. Quæ si falsa sunt,*  
 “ *id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors*  
 “ *eripuit præter sensum doloris?* From this inference of  
 “ *Cicero's* it appears, that we have not concluded amiss,  
 “ when, from several quotations, interspersed throughout  
 “ this work, in which a disbelief of the *common notion* of  
 “ a future state of rewards and punishments is implied,  
 “ we have inferred the Writer's disbelief of a future state  
 “ of rewards and punishments in general.” There are  
 many reasons likewise, why it *could not be the case*; too  
 long indeed to mention here; however, I will just hint at  
 one. The Pagan notion of a future state of rewards and  
 punishments was founded in old tradition: but that  
 tradition, which conveyed down the general doctrine,  
 brought along these *circumstances* of it. But I forget,  
 that I am arguing with an enemy to all tradition: who, as  
 highly as he advances the knowledge of the philosophers,  
 yet is unwilling to allow they were indebted for it to any  
 thing but their own reason. So entirely has that childish  
 sophism got the better of him: *Whatsoever reason might*  
*teach, it did teach.* But how has he made out his point?  
 By encountering a few weak efforts of the *Fathers* in  
 support of traditional knowledge. He has great reason  
 to boast his victory: it is like his who triumphed for  
 having tript up a cripple. But reverence for age should  
 dispose us to spare the Fathers, especially when more  
 able-bodied men stand in our way. Till he meet with  
 these, I would recommend the following fact to his con-  
 sideration. The more ancient philosophers, in the deli-  
 very whether of their moral, natural, or theologic prin-  
 ciples, constantly recommend them on this footing,  
 that they received them from TRADITION: one truth  
 came from a *priest* of this religion; and another from  
 the *sucred books* of that. Scarce any thing is ever repre-  
 sented as the deduction of their own reasoning: though  
 such a representation had been attended with much  
 honour, and we know they were immoderately fond of  
 glory. Now if this were the case, I only ask, *Why should*  
*we not believe them?*

II. The Writer's second remark begins thus: “ It has  
 “ been maintained indeed by some, that all that the old  
 “ philosophers



“philosophers held, was a natural *metempsychosis*, or a transition from one body to another, without any moral designation whatsoever. But surely this conclusion is too hasty: for when it was said, that the souls of ill men descended into *asses* or *swine*, they did not suppose the souls of good men so to descend. The souls of evil men, e.g. of murderers, went into the bodies of beasts, those of lascivious men into the bodies of swine or goats, *πρὸς κέλασιν*, for punishment, says *Timæus* *Locrus*. Was this done for punishment, and yet was no regard paid to the morals of wicked men\*?”

*It hath been maintained* (says he) *by some, that the old philosophers held only a natural metempsychosis—but surely this conclusion is too hasty.* Who it is that has been too hasty, is submitted to the judgment of the public: whether I, in concluding from a hundred well-weighed circumstances; or he, in censuring from one only, and that, as we shall see, neither weighed nor understood.

But it is too hasty, FOR when it was SAID, that the souls of ill men descended into asses or swine, they did not suppose the souls of good men so to descend. How are we to understand him? If by SAID be only meant taught, then, from what they said of the souls of ill men, nothing can be concluded, concerning what they SUPPOSED or believed of the souls of good men: because it was their way to say one thing and suppose another. But if by SAID we are to understand supposed or believed, then I will readily grant, that, if they supposed the souls of ill men to descend, they did not suppose the souls of good men so to descend. But why this to me? Did I ever say, the old philosophers supposed, that is, believed, that the souls of ill men descended into asses or swine? He would insinuate I did; as appears not only from his address, but from his plain allusion to the following words of my book: *However, it is true, that in his writings he [Plato] inculcates the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment—that the souls of ill men descended into asses and swine—did he himself believe it? we may be assured he did not †, &c.* Was it from these words he gathered, that I held, *Plato supposed*, what,

\* Div. Leg. Vol. III. pp. 78, 79.

† Ibid. p. 94.

I own, he *inculcated*? Let him look again, and I imagine he will alter his opinion. But he will still say, though *I* do not hold, that the ancient philosophers so *supposed*; yet, what is more to the purpose, an *ancient philosopher* does.

For thus he goes on: *The souls of evil men, e. g. of murderers, went into the bodies of beasts, those of lascivious men into the bodies of swine and GOATS, πρὶ κίλασιν, for punishment, SAYS TIMÆUS LOCUS. Was this done for punishment, and yet was no regard paid to the morals of wicked men?* This is indeed amazing! The reader cannot forget, that I quoted this very passage at large\*, as the most incontestable evidence, that the *Pythagoreans* did not believe one word of all they taught concerning the souls of ill men descending into the bodies of brutes for punishment; Timæus Locrus prefacing the relation of those transitions in these very words: *For as we sometimes cure the body with unwholesome remedies, when such as are most wholesome have no effect, so we RESTRAIN THOSE MINDS BY FALSE RELATIONS which will not be persuaded by the true: there is a necessity therefore of instilling the dread of those foreign torments. As that the soul shifts and changes its habitation; that the coward is thrust ignominiously into a woman's form, the murderer imprisoned within the furr of a savage, the lascivious condemned to animate a boar or a sow†, &c.* Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσῶδεςι πόκα ὑγιάτομεν, εἴκα μὴ εἴη τοῖς ὑγιεινολάτοις· ἔτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργομεν ΨΕΤΔΕΣΙ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ, εἴκα μὴ ἀγῆται ἀλαθείῃ λέγοιτο δ' ἀναγκαίως καὶ τιμωρίας εἶναι ὡς μέινουμένην τῶν ψυχῶν, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν ἐς γυναικεία σκάνεα, ποθ' ὕβριν ἐκδιδόμενα· τῶν δὲ μισαιφόνων ἐς θηρίων σώματα, ΠΟΤΙ ΚΟΛΑΣΙΝ· λάλων δ', ἐς συῶν ἢ κάπρων μορφαίς‡.

Did *Timæus Locrus* then suppose, i. e. believe, that the souls of ill men descended into brutes? Does he not expressly tell us he supposed they did not, but that these fables were inculcated in order to restrain the populace from vice? To tamper then with my own evidence, and to turn it against me in this manner, as if nothing had been said, is so new a stroke in controversy; that we have yet no name for it; but, on occasion, shall now be able to assign it a Patronymic.

\* Div. Leg. Vol. III. pp. 78, 79. † Ibid. ‡ De Anima Mundi, sub fin.

However, to do the Writer justice, I must be so fair to say, that it may admit of some doubt, whether ever he read this passage in *The Divine Legation*, or only in the *Letters to Serena*, a book that undergoes his censure in the same place where I am so unhappy to incur it. I am inclined to think the latter, from this remarkable circumstance. The Author of the *Letters to Serena* had translated *ἡ συνὴ ἡ ΚΑΙΡΩΝ μορφὰς*, into the forms of *swine or GOATS*\*. And so too has this Writer: *into the bodies* (says he) *of swine or GOATS*†, which is so singular an interpretation, that, notwithstanding the proverb, that *good wits jump*, I can hardly think them to be both original. But perhaps that excellent correspondent of *Serena's* had here a mind to shew his learning; and knowing, that the *Tyrrhenians*, a *Greek colony in Italy*, used *κάπρ* for a goat, he would conclude, by analogy, that the *Locrians*, another *Greek colony in Italy*, did the same. Again, *Timæus Locrus* says, *ἡ θηρίων σῶμα*; *Toland*, into *beasts of prey*. This Writer, *into the bodies of beasts*. Here, where *Toland* is right, he leaves him; but sticks charitably by him while he continues wrong. For *θηρίων* signifies *beasts of prey*: and that precise idea is required to complete the sense; the habitation of the murderer being here spoken of. Again, *Timæus* says, *πρὸς κόλασιν*, which *Toland* faithfully renders *for a punishment*; and which this Writer particularly insists on, as the very cream of his argument: *murderers* (says he) *went into the bodies of beasts, those of lascivious men into the bodies of swine or goats, πρὸς κόλασιν*, FOR PUNISHMENT, says *Timæus Locrus*. *Was this done for punishment, and yet, &c.* But here I must retract my suspicion; for from this last instance it would seem, that he had read and compared my translation, in which the *English* of those formidable words, *πρὸς κόλασιν*, is not literally to be found. And now the secret is out. He seems to suppose I omitted them, as conscious of their containing some strange matter against my general opinion. But in truth, it was partly, because they were redundant; *Timæus* representing the whole affair under the general idea of a *punishment*; and partly, because the sense of *πρὸς κόλασιν* was comprized in the word *imprisoned*, which

\* *Letters to Serena*, p. 58.† P. 402 of his *Connexions*, &c.

I used in the very case to which those words are applied. As to the idea itself, that was so far from hurting my argument, that it could not do without it.

He goes on:—*They* [the philosophers] *really conceived punishments and rewards of evil or good actions in men; and some imagined a punishment by the means of transmigration, others imagined a punishment inflicted in Hades, others by IMMEDIATE ACTS OF PROVIDENCE; and all supposed rewards or punishments, notwithstanding they might treat as fables the stories of Cocytus and Acheron\**. He sticks to his point, we see; and will still have it, that they believed a *hell*, though they treated the stories of *Cocytus* and *Acheron* as fables, which (to tell him my mind once for all) is just as if one should say, some among us believe the miseries of the King's-Bench prison, and yet treat the stories of jailors, turnkeys, bailiffs, and attorneys, as mere fables. But what have *immediate acts of Providence* to do in this period? Did not I endeavour to prove, that *all* the Theistical philosophers believed a Providence in this life? These words therefore, as they are found in a paragraph that relates solely to my peculiar opinion, I can consider in no other light than as a false insinuation *ad invidiam*.

I have now attended this Writer quite through his little excursion. Let us see how he returns to himself; HOWEVER, *what I contend for, is, that the HEATHEN held a moral* [a future] *state of rewards and punishments, according to good and evil done here†*. It is worthy his contention; and I should be ready to be his *second* in it. But why then should he go out of his way, and *contend* for another thing, that will do neither himself nor his cause any credit? I mean him honour, when I say *his cause*: for I really believe it to be the cause of Christianity. Now, I conceive this not at all advanced by endeavouring to shew that the sacred writers had but small reason for their harsh censure of the *Greek* philosophy‡; as the *contending* for its orthodoxy in this point effectively does. But I will suppose the sacred writers have been misunderstood. And perhaps this may be no great reflection upon any party; if we consider, that the *Jansenists*, scarce inferior to any in their talents of rea-

\* Connexions, &c. p. 402.

† Ibid.

‡ Div. Leg. Book III. § 4.

soning and criticism, have strangely mistaken those censures, while they understood them to be directed against human science in general. I supposed therefore, that, to shew the sacred writers only censured the *Greek* philosophy, and that it deserved their censure, was not one of the least services one might render to our holy religion. But the occasion now seems to be more urgent. The pretensions of these philosophers have been of late highly advanced. The author of the book, intitled, *Future Rewards and Punishments believed by the Ancients*, hath, we see, forced the inspired teachers of mankind to give them the right hand of fellowship. I had exposed their *profane and vain babblings* in one capital instance, because it came directly into my particular design; as well for that I thought it useful to Revelation in general. I did not then indeed imagine the necessity so pressing. I may hereafter perhaps find occasion to examine these spurious rivals of the Apostolic function on every head of morality and religion, in the manner I have already done on one; and fully vindicate the majesty of Sacred Writ in the just sentence it hath passed upon them.

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A

## L E T T E R

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND

*DR. RICHARD SMALLBROOK,*

LORD BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY,

MY LORD,

THIS trouble is occasioned by a passage in your Lordship's *late* printed *Charge* \* to your Clergy, in which you have been pleased to censure me by name with some frankness, and, I am sorry to say, with equal injustice.

The regard due to your Lordship's *Order*, especially while in discharge of your function, would have certainly restrained me from complaining of aught that was a *mere declaration* of your Lordship's dislike of my Writings. It is your Lordship's *right and duty* to warn your Clergy against all ill books: and your Lordship is, in that place and on that occasion, an authorized denouncer of what are so. Had your Lordship therefore only said, that *The Divine Legation* was a very bad book, I had not attempted, by any address of this nature, to disturb you in the quiet possession of your opinion. But when a reason added to that declaration turns your vague censure into a *formal accusation*, then, my Lord, it becomes equally my *right and duty* to defend my character if I find it mistaken.

To put the public therefore (which your Lordship has forced me to appeal to) in possession of the fact, it will be necessary to go so far back as to tell them what it is your Lordship says you propose to make the subject of

\* Printed in 1741, by J. & P. Knapton, Octavo.

our

your *Charge*. It is (in your own words) *to lay before your Clergy some reasons, drawn from the Christian Revelation itself, which evince the pretensions of morality antecedently to divine Revelation, to be carried much too high, and vindicate the Christian Faith, as well as Morality, from those INVIDIOUS INSINUATIONS that have been CAST upon them by SEVERAL LATE WRITERS, WHO will occasionally be ANIMADVERTED upon in the following Discourse.* p. 2.

Your Lordship having gone through your *Reasons*, comes, in page 24, to draw your inferences from them. The second of which, you tell us, is, "That though Christian *Morality* is much superior to that of all other religions, yet it does not of itself (that is, abstractedly from the *facts* recorded in the Gospel, with which it is incorporated) evince the *truth*, though it does most clearly the *excellency* of the *Christian Religion*. It is certain (says your Lordship) that the reasonableness and sanctity of the *moral* precepts of the Gospel give great *advantages* to Christianity, as compared with any other religion ancient or modern. And this of itself is sufficient to give a well-disposed mind very favourable thoughts of the Christian Religion, and to induce it to make farther enquiries into the truth of those *facts* which establish its divine authority. And this is as far as the argument needs to be pushed; and in fact it is as far as one of the best modern Apologists for the truth of Christianity, the most learned *Grotius*, in concurrence with the principal Apologists amongst the Ancients, and more especially the famous *Origen*, thought fit to urge it. It is clear that they thought themselves obliged only to shew, that the *morality* of the Gospel does vastly excel that of all other religions and moral institutions, and is most worthy of God in all respects. But neither they nor any other thoughtful persons, that have formerly engaged on this subject (as far as I can recollect) have thought it reasonable to lay so great a stress on the excellency of the *morals* of the Gospel, considered distinctly from the *facts* of the Gospel, and in their own nature solely, as necessarily

“ to infer from thence the certainty of the Christian Revelation. And much less have they asserted, as has been done by some LATE WRITERS, that the morality of the Gospel, which they call the *internal evidence* of it (though indeed it has not the nature of *evidence* properly so called), is the strongest evidence of the truth of Christianity, and is highly superior to all its *external evidence*, that is, the evidence which arises from the *facts* recorded in the Gospel, and attended with other attestations of ancient writers, which support its divine authority.” This is all from your Lordship; where at the word WRITERS we find a mark of reference to the following Note—See Mr. Arscot’s *Considerations on the Christian Religion*, pp. 10. 51. 59, 60, &c. Part II. p. 63. Part III. and elsewhere. SEE TOO MR. WARBURTON’S DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c. pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5\*.

So that here, my Lord, I find this proposition affirmed, That Mr. Warburton, in his *Divine Legation of Moses*, &c. pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, has asserted THAT THE MORALITY OF THE GOSPEL, WHICH HE CALLS THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF IT, IS THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, AND IS HIGHLY SUPERIOR TO ALL ITS EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

This, my Lord, is your accusation; a very capital one it is; and such as, if true, would prove me devoid of common sense, as well as in all other respects unworthy the character I bear of a Christian, a clergyman, or a defender of Revelation. I am therefore necessitated to call upon your Lordship, in this public manner, either to make it good, or to give me reparation. Your Lordship confines the proof of your accusation to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth pages of the First Volume of *The Divine Legation*. But as I am not disposed to chicanery in so serious a matter, I hereby promise, that if either in those pages, or in any other pages of that work, or in any thing I have ever written, preached, or said, your Lordship produces the proposition in question as held and maintained by me, either in express terms, or deducible

\* Vol. I. pp. 193, &c.



by fair and logical consequence, I promise, I say, to submit to any censure your Lordship's self shall think fit to inflict. But if, on the other hand, you can produce no such proposition, I shall then expect so much from your Lordship's justice as to retract your accusation in the same public manner you have been pleased to advance it.

*I am, My LORD,*

*Your LORDSHIP'S*

*Most Obedient Servant,*

Nov. 17, 1741

W. WARBURTON.



REMARKS  
ON  
SEVERAL OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS:

IN ANSWER TO

The Rev. Dr. MIDDLETON,  
Dr. POCOCKE,  
The MASTER of The Charter House,  
Dr. RICHARD GREY,  
AND OTHERS;

Serving to explain and justify divers Passages, in

“*THE DIVINE LEGATION*,”

Objected to by those Learned Writers.

To which is added, A GENERAL REVIEW of the ARGUMENT  
of *The Divine Legation*, as far as is yet advanced: wherein  
is considered the Relation the several Parts bear to each  
other, and to the Whole,

Together with An APPENDIX, in answer to a late Pamphlet,  
entitled, *An Examination of Mr. W—’s Second Proposition*.

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IN TWO PARTS—PART I.

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Quid immerentes hospites voras, Canis,  
Ignavus adversum Lupos?  
Nam, qualis aut Molossus, aut fulvus Lacon,  
Amica vis Pastoribus,  
Agam per altas aure sublata nives,  
Quæcunque præcedet Fera.  
Tu quum timenda voce complesti Nemus,  
Projectum odoraris Cæcum. Her.

## **C O N T E N T S :**

**PREFACE** to PART I.

**REMARKS, &c.** Sec. 1. to Sec. 5.

**APPENDIX :** containing the Judgments of GROTIUS, EPISCORUS, and Bishop BULL.; shewing, that a Future State of Rewards and Punishments was not taught to the Jews by the Law and Religion of Moses.

**POSTSCRIPT.**

# P R E F A C E

TO

## REMARKS ON OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS;

### P A R T I.

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IN the Prefatory Discourse to the First Volume of the D. L. I spoke pretty largely of the *use* of *ridicule*, in religious subjects; as the *abuse* of it is amongst the fashionable arts of free-thinking: For which I have been just now called to account, without any ceremony, by the *nameless* Author of a Poem intitled, *The Pleasures of Imagination*. For 'tis my fortune to be still concerned with those who either *do* go masked, or those who *should*. I am a plain man, and on my first appearance in this way, I told my name, and who I belonged to. After this, if men will *rudely* come upon me in disguise, they can have no reason to complain, that (in my ignorance of their characters) I treat them all alike upon the same free footing they have put themselves.

This gentleman, a follower of Ld. S. and, as it should seem, one of those to whom that Preface was addressed; certainly, one of those to whom I applied the words of Tully, *non decet, non datum est*; who affect wit and raillery on subjects not meet, and with talents unequal; this Gentleman, I say, in the 105th and 106th pages of his Poem, animadverts upon me in the following manner:

*Since it is (says he) beyond all contradiction evident, that we have a natural sense or feeling of the ridiculous, and since so good a reason may be assigned to justify the Supreme Being for bestowing it; one cannot without astonishment reflect on the conduct of those men who imagine it for the service of true religion to vilify and blacken it without distinction, and endeavour to persuade us that it is never applied but in a bad cause. The reason here given, to shew, that ridicule and buffoonry may*

may be properly employed on *serious* and even *sacred* subjects, is admirable: it is, because we have a *natural sense or feeling of the ridiculous*, and because *no sensation was given us in vain*; which would serve just as well to excuse *adultery or incest*. For have we not as *natural a sense or feeling of the voluptuous*? And was it not given for as good purposes? But he will say, it has its proper objects. And does he think, I will not say the same of his *sense of ridicule*? For he stretch'd a point, when he told the reader I *vilified and blacken'd it without distinction*. The thing I there opposed, was only, *an extravagant disposition to unseasonable mirth*\*. The *abusive way of wit and raillery on serious subjects*†. With as little truth could he say, that *I endeavoured to persuade the public that it is never applied but in a bad cause*: For, in that very place, I apologized for an eminent writer who had applied it to a *good one*‡.

But, in the next words, if he means by, *is not*, ought not to be, he gives me up all I want. *Ridicule* (says he) *is not concerned with mere speculative truth or falsehood*. Certainly. And, for that very reason, I would exclude it from those subjects. What need? He will say, For when was it so employed? Hold a little. Was it not concerned with *mere speculative truth*, when his master ridiculed the *subject* of Mr. Locke's *Essay of Human Understanding*, in the manner mentioned in my Preface§? Was it not so concerned too, when the same noble person ridiculed Revelation, in the merry Story of the travelling Gentlemen, who put a *wrong bias on their reason* in order to believe right||?—Unless, by *mere speculative truths*, he means, truths of *no use*: and for all such, he has my free leave to treat them as he pleases. He has shewn, by his Poem, they are no improper subject for his talents.

He goes on, *It is not in abstract propositions or theorems, but in actions and passions, good and evil, beauty and deformity, that we find materials for it; and all these terms are relative, implying approbation or blame*. The reason here given, why, not *abstract propositions, &c.*

\* Div. Leg. Vol. I. Ded. p. 147, &c. † Ibid. p. 150.

‡ Ibid. p. 144 & seq. § Ibid. p. 164, Note (II).

|| Char. II. Vol. III. Misc. 2. c. 3, p. 99.

but *actions and passions*, &c. are the subject of *ridicule*, is, because these latter are *relative terms implying approbation and blame*. But are not the former as much *relative terms, implying assent and denial*? And does not an absurd proposition as frequently afford materials for ridicule as an absurd action? Let the reader determine by what he finds before him. To ask then, (says he) *whether ridicule be a test of truth, is, in other words, to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true; can be just and becoming; or whether that which is just and becoming can be ridiculous*. A question that does not deserve a serious answer. Why then did he put it? For it is of nobody's asking but his own. However, in civility to his master, or rather indeed to his master's masters, the ancient *sophists*, who, we are told\* in the *Characteristics*, said something very like it, I shall shew it deserves a very serious answer. For how, I pray, comes it to pass, that to ask *whether ridicule be a test of truth, is the same thing as to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true*? As if, whatever *ridicule* was applied to, as a *test*, must needs be *ridiculous*. Might not one ask, *Whether the copel† be a test of gold*, without incurring the absurdity of questioning *whether the matter of the copel was not standard gold*? What was the man dreaming of? That a *test of truth*, and a *detection of falsehood*, were one and the same thing? or that it was the practice to bring nothing to the *test* but what was known, beforehand, whether it was *true* or *false*? His master seems much better versed in the use of things. He says‡, *Now, what rule or measure is there in the world, except in considering the real temper of things, to find which are truly serious, and which ridiculous? And how can this be done, unless by applying the ridicule TO SEE WHETHER IT WILL BEAR?*

\* 'Twas the saying of an ancient Sage, that humour was the only test of ridicule. Vol. I. p. 74.

† I chuse this instance of the refiner's *copel*, because the *English* for it, which is *Italian*, is *test*; from whence the latter word was metaphorically used to signify all kinds of *sure trial*. This was proper to observe, as our Poet seems not to know the meaning of the word.

‡ Char. Vol. I. p. 12.

But if the reader be curious to see to the bottom of this affair, we must go a little deeper. Lord S——, we find, was willing to know, as every honest man would, whether those things, which had the appearance of seriousness and sanctity, were indeed what they appeared. The plain way of coming to this knowledge had been hitherto by the test of *reason*. But this was too long and too slow a progress for so sublime a genius. He would go a shorter and a quicker way to work, and do the business by *ridicule*, given us, as his disciple tells us, for this very end, *to aid the tardy steps of reason*. This therefore the noble Author would needs *apply*, to see *whether these appearances would bear the touch*. Now it was this ingenious expedient, which I thought I had cause to object to. For when you have applied this *touch*, and that, to which it is applied, is found to bear it, what reparation will you make to truth, for the ridiculous light in which you have placed her, in order only, as you pretend, to judge right of her? O, for that, says his Lordship, she has the amends in her own hands: let her railley again; *for why should fair honesty be denied the use of this weapon\**? To this so wanton a liberty with sacred truth, I thought I had many good reasons to oppose; and so, it seems, thought our Poet likewise: and therefore he endeavours to excuse his master, by putting another sense on *the application of ridicule as a test*, which supposes the truth or falsehood of the thing tried, to be *already known*. But the shift is unlucky; for while it covers his master, it exposes himself. For now it may be asked, what need of ridicule at all, after the truth is *known*; since you make its sole use to consist in the *discovery* of the true state of things?

But the odd fortune of our Poet's pen makes the pleasant part of the story. Here, we see, where he aims to make an absurd proposition, for the use of others, it proves a reasonable one: 'Tis odds but we find him, before we have done, trying to make a reasonable one, for his own use, that turns out at last an absurdity.

But let us come to the *philosophy* of his criticism: For *it is most evident, that as in a metaphysical proposition*

\* Char. Vol. I. p. 128.

*offered to the understanding for its assent, the faculty of reason examines the terms of the proposition; and finding one idea, which was supposed equal to another, to be in fact unequal, of consequence rejects the proposition as a falsehood: so in objects offered to the mind for its esteem or applause, the faculty of ridicule feeling an incongruity in the claim, urges the mind to reject it with laughter and contempt. And now, how does this sublime account, of reason and ridicule, prove the foregoing proposition to be absurd? Just as much, I suppose, as the height of St. Paul's proves Grantham steeple to stand awry. I, for my part, can collect nothing from it, unless it be that the Poet thought metaphysical propositions were the only proper objects of the understanding's assent, and the reason's examination.*

However, if it cannot prove what precedes, he will try to make it infer what follows: *When THEREFORE (says he) we observe such a claim obtruded upon mankind, and the inconsistent circumstances carefully concealed from the eye of the public, it is our business, if the matter be of importance to society, to drag out those latent circumstances, and, by setting them full in view, convince the world how ridiculous the claim is; and thus a double advantage is gained; for we both detect the moral falsehood sooner than in the way of speculative inquiry, and impress the minds of men with a stronger sense of the vanity and error of its authors. And this, and no more, is meant by the application of ridicule. A little more, if we may believe his master: who says, it is not only to detect error, but to try truth, that is, in his own expression, to see whether it will bear. But why all this ado; for now, we see, nobody mistook what was meant by the application of ridicule, but himself—As to what he said before, that when objects are offered to the mind for its esteem and applause, the faculty of ridicule, feeling an incongruity in the claim, urges the mind to reject it with laughter and contempt; it is so expressed, as if he intended it not for the description of the use, but the essence of ridicule. Whereas the dealers in this trash frequently urge the mind to reject many things with laughter and contempt, without feeling any other incon-*

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*gruity,*



gruity, than in their own pretensions to truth and honesty. And this our Poet very well knows.

For now he comes to the point. *But it is said the practice is dangerous, and may be inconsistent with the regard we owe to objects of real dignity and excellence. I answer, the practice FAIRLY MANAGED, can never be dangerous.* An answer which has only taught me to reply, that the use of stillettos and poisons, *fairly managed*, can never be dangerous. And yet all wise states, for the security of its members, when any of them have shewn a violent propensity to these things, have ever forbidden their promiscuous use and sale.

However, he allows at length, that *men may be dishonest in obtruding circumstances foreign to the object; and we may be inadvertent in allowing those circumstances to impose upon us; but—but what? Why the SENSE OF RIDICULE ALWAYS JUDGES RIGHT.* And, he had told us before, that this is a *natural sense, and bestowed upon us by the Supreme Being, to aid our tardy steps in pursuit of reason.* Why, as he says, who can withstand this? Nothing can be clearer! Writers may be dishonest; readers may be imposed on; the public may be misled; and men may judge wrong. But what then, the *sense of ridicule always judges right.* And while we can support our Platonic republic of *ideas*, what signifies what becomes of the *facies Romuli*, the *actions* of the people? And so again it is, we see, in the use of poisons: though *men may be dishonest in obtruding them, and we may be inadvertent enough to suffer them to impose upon us; yet what then? The efficacy of poison is without malice; and does but do its kind; is a natural power, and bestowed upon us by the Supreme Being, to aid our tardy steps in pursuit of vermin.—In truth, one would imagine, by so extraordinary an argument, that the question was not, of the injury to society by the abuse of ridicule, but of the injury to ridicule itself.*

But let us hear him out: *The Socrates of Aristophanes is as truly ridiculous a character as ever was drawn. True; but it is not the character of Socrates, the divine moralist, and father of ancient wisdom. Indeed!—But then, if, like the true Sosia, in the other comedy, he must bear*

bear the blows of his fictitious brother, what signifies it to injured virtue, to tell us, that he did not deserve them?

*What then? (says he) did the ridicule of the Poet hinder the philosopher from detecting and disclaiming those foreign circumstances which he had falsely introduced into his character, and thus rendering the Satirist doubly ridiculous in his turn.* See here again! all his concern, we find, is, lest good raillery should be beat at its own weapons. No, indeed, I cannot see how it could possibly hinder the philosopher from detecting and disclaiming. But *this* it did, which surely deserves a little reflection, it hindered the people from seeing what he had detected and disclaimed—A mighty consolation, truly, to expiring virtue, that he *disclaimed* the fool's coat they had put upon him; though it stuck to him like a *sambenito*; and at last brought him to his execution.

But what is the sacrifice of a *Socrates* now and then, to secure the free use of that inestimable blessing, *buffoonry*? So thinks our Poet; when all the answer he gives to so natural, so compassionate an objection as this, *No: but it nevertheless had an ill influence on the minds of the people*, is telling us a story of the Atheist *Spinoza*; while the godlike *Socrates* is left neglected, and in the hands of his judges; whither *ridicule*, this noble guide of truth, had safely brought him.

But let us hear the concluding answer which the respectable *Spinoza* is employed to illustrate.—*And so (says he) has the reasoning of Spinoza made many Atheists; he has founded it indeed on suppositions utterly false; but allow him these, and his conclusions are unavoidably true. And if we must reject the use of ridicule because, by the imposition of false circumstances, things may be made to seem ridiculous, which are not so in themselves; why we ought not in the same manner to reject the use of reason, because, by proceeding on false principles, conclusions will appear true which are impossible in nature, let the vehement and obstinate declaimers against ridicule determine.*

Nay, we dare trust it with any one; whose common sense is not all turned to *taste*. What! Because

REASON, the guide of life, the support of religion, the investigator of truth, must be still used though it be continually subject to abuse; therefore RIDICULE, the paltry *buffoon* of *reason*, must have the same indulgence! Because a king must be intrusted with government, though he may misuse his power; therefore the king's *fool* shall be suffered to play the madman! But upon what footing standeth this extraordinary claim? Why, we have a *natural sense of the ridiculous*; and the *ridiculous has a natural feeling of the incongruous*; and then—who can forbear laughing? If to this, you add *taste, beauty, deformity, moral sense, moral rectitude, moral falsehood*, you have then, I think, the whole theory of the *ridiculous*. But I can tell him of a plain *English* proverb worth all his modish *ideas of beauty and virtue* put together, and that is, TO BE MERRY AND WISE. Which concerns him nearer than one may think. For who would imagine, that, while he was supporting ridicule from the charge of *abuse*, he should be supplying his adversary with a fresh and flagrant exception to his own plea? Not indeed, that the comment disgraced the text; or that there was much *incongruity* in pleading for a fault he had just then committed. But so it is, kind reader, that, where he is marshalling the several classes of folly in human life, he places the whole *body of the Christian Clergy* in the first and foremost; amongst those, who, he tells us, *assume some desirable quality or possession which evidently does not belong to them* \*.

“ Others, of graver mien, behold; adorn'd  
 “ With holy ensigns, how *sublime* they move,  
 “ And, bending o’st their *sanctimonious* eyes,  
 “ Take homage of the *simple-minded* throng,  
 “ AMBASSADORS of Heaven†.”

And well do they deserve his *moral ridicule*, supposing them to be drawn *like*. For, if I understand any thing of his colouring, the features are, pride, hypocrisy, fraud, and imposture. I call it an insult on the whole body of the Clergy, because I know of no part of them who hold that the *ministry* of the Gospel (or, as St. Paul calls it,

\* P. 49.

† P. 96.

*of reconciliation*) was given them by the religion of *Christ*, but hold likewise, with the same Apostle (who speaks of himself here as a simple minister of the Gospel) *that they are AMBASSADORS for Christ*\*.— But let it go like what it is, a poor pitiful joke of his master's†, and spoil'd too in the telling. The *dulness* of the *ridicule* will sufficiently atone for the *abuse* of it. And I may find time to call the great man of *taste* himself to account, for his so frequent and ill-employed *raillery* against RELIGION.

\* 2 Cor. v. 23.

† Char. Vol. III. p. 336. Third edit.

## REMARKS,

&amp;c.

## PART I.

THE state of Authorship, whatever that of Nature be, is certainly a state of war: in which, especially if it be an *holy war*, every man's hand is set, not against his enemy, but his *brother*. But as these furious fighting men are generally as much mistaken in the use of their arms, as in the objects of their resentments, there is seldom any great harm done. I speak for myself. I have found none. And indeed no wonder. I have been all the while very much out of the question. For my Answerers write not so properly *against* me, as *for* something they like better than me. This, for his dear *orthodoxy*; that, for his dearer *philosophers*; a third, for his *lawyers*; a fourth, for his *Cabalists*; a fifth, for *himself*; and a sixth for, I don't know what, besides the pure *love of scribbling*\*. So that I have been now, for some time, only a silent looker-on; to see how the public and they would get acquainted. I have given them full liberty to try what they can make of it, or of them: and wish them better luck with their readers' intellects than I have had with theirs. For, from the first to the last of them, their constant cry has been, *They do not understand me*. Now, though I can allow this to be a better reason for their writing at me than any they have hitherto assigned; yet it would be a very bad one for my answering them; because it would keep me engaged *till they did understand me*; which I presume no gentle reader would think a reasonable task for one born when human life is at the shortest. When therefore I took my last leave of the whole tribe, in the person of their great exemplar and archetype, the learned *Advocate*

\* Webster, Tillard, W\*\*, Bate, Morgan, Bott.

of Pagan Philosophy, I engaged, that if any writers more equal to the subject should come abroad, I would return their civility and fair argument in such sort as that the world should see I esteemed every sincere inquirer after truth rather as a friend to the public than an enemy to myself. Since that time, the misfortune I had of differing in opinion from some writers of great merit and learning has been the disagreeable occasion of reminding me of my promise.

### Section 1.

[See Divine Legation, *Book iv. § 6. sub. fin.*]

OF these, the first place would be due to my very learned friend, the Author of the elegant and useful *Letter from Rome*; who, taking entirely to himself what was meant in general of the numerous writers on the same subject, and the more numerous followers of the same hypothesis, hath done a\* notion of mine the honour of his confutation, in a *Postscript* to that *Letter*. But the same friendly considerations, which induced him to end the *Postscript* with declaring his unwillingness to enter further into controversy with me, have disposed me not to enter into it at all. This, and neither any neglect of him, nor any force I apprehend in his arguments, have kept me silent. In the mean time, I owe so much both to myself and the public, as to take notice of a *misrepresentation* of my argument; and a *change* of the question in dispute between us: without which notice, the controversy (as I agree to leave it in his hands) could scarce receive an equitable decision. The *misrepresentation* I speak of is in these words: "He [the Author of the "D. L.] allows that the writers, who have undertaken to "deduce the rights of Popery from Paganism, have "shewn an exact and surprising likeness between them "in a great variety of instances. This (says he) one "would think, is allowing every thing that the cause "demands: it is every thing, I dare say, that those "writers desire†." That it is *every thing those writers desire*, I can easily believe, since I see my learned friend himself hath taken it for granted, that these two asser-

\* Div. Leg. lib. iv. § 6. sub. fin.      † *Postscript*, p. 228.

tions, 1 *The religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen ancestors*; and 2. *An exact conformity or uniformity rather of worship between Popery and Paganism*, are convertible propositions. For, undertaking, as his title page informs us, to prove, *the religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen ancestors*; and having gone through his arguments, he concludes them in these words, “But it is high time for me to conclude, being persuaded, if I do not flatter myself too much, that I have sufficiently made good WHAT I FIRST UNDERTOOK TO PROVE, an exact conformity or uniformity rather of worship between Popery and Paganism\*.” But what he *undertook to prove*, we see, was, *The religion of the present Romans derived from their heathen ancestors*. That I have, therefore, as my learned friend observes, *allowed every thing those writers desire*, is very likely. But then, whether I have *allowed every thing that the cause demands*, is another question. Which I think can never be determined in the affirmative, till it be shewn that no other probable cause can be assigned of this *exact conformity between Papists and Pagans*, but a *borrowing or derivation from one to the other*. And I guess, this is not now ever likely to be done, since I myself have actually assigned *another probable cause*, namely, the *same spirit of superstition operating in equal circumstances*.

But this justly celebrated writer goes on—“This question, according to his [the Author of *The Divine Legation*] notion, is not to be decided by *facts*, but by a principle of a different kind, a *superior knowledge of human nature*†.” Here I am forced to complain of a want of candour, a want not natural to my learned friend. For, whence is it, I would ask, that he collects, *that, according to my notion, this question is not to be decided by facts, but a superior knowledge of human nature?* From any thing I have said? Or from any thing I have omitted to say? Surely, not from any thing I have said (though he seems to insinuate so much by putting the words *a superior knowledge of human nature* in Italic characters, as they are called) because I leave him in possession of his *facts*, and give them all their

\* Letter, p. 224.

† Postscript, p. 228.

full validity; which he himself observes; and, from thence, as we see, endeavours to draw some advantage to his hypothesis: nor from any thing I *have omitted to say*; for, in the short paragraph where I delivered my opinion, and, by reason of its evidence, offered but one single argument in its support, that argument arises from a supposed FACT, *viz.* that the *superstitious customs in question were many ages later than the conversion of the imperial city to the Christian faith*: whence I concluded that the ruling churchmen could have no motive in borrowing from Pagan customs, either as they were then fashionable in themselves, or respectable for the number or quality of their followers. The *supposition* I could easily convert into a *proof*, were I not restrained by the considerations before spoken of. And what makes this the more extraordinary is, that my learned friend himself immediately afterwards quotes these words; and then tells the reader that *the argument consists of an HISTORICAL FACT and of a consequence deduced from it*. It appears therefore, that, according to my notion, the question is to be decided by *facts*, and not by a *superior knowledge of human nature*. Yet I must confess I then thought, and do so still, that a *superior knowledge of human nature* would do no harm, as it might enable men to judge better of *facts* than we generally find them accustomed to do. But will this excuse a candid representer for saying, that *the question, according to my notion, was not to be decided by facts, but a superior knowledge of human nature*? However, to do my learned friend all justice, I must needs say, that, as if these were only words of course, or words of controversy, he goes on, through the body of his *Postscript*, to invalidate my argument from *fact*; and we hear no more of a *superior knowledge of human nature* than in this place where it was brought in to be laughed at.

As to the argument, it must even shift for itself. It has done more mischief already than I was aware of: and forced my learned friend to extend his charge from the *modern* to the *ancient church of Rome*. For my argument, from the *low birth* of the superstitions in question, coming against his *hypothesis* after he had once and again declared the purpose of his *Letter* to be the exposing



exposing the heathenish idolatry and superstition of the *present church of Rome*; he was obliged, in support of that hypothesis, to shew that even the *early ages* of the church were not free from the infection. Which hath now quite shifted the subject with the scene, and will make the argument of his piece from henceforth to run thus, *The religion of the present Romans derived from their early Christian ancestors; and theirs, from the neighbouring Pagans*. To speak freely, my reasoning (which was an argument *ad hominem*, and, as such, I thought would have been reverenced) reduced the learned writer to this dilemma; either to allow the fact, and give up his hypothesis; or to deny the fact, and change his question. And he has chosen the latter as the lesser evil. For a simple *question* is but like a wife to wrangle with; and when we lose one we easily find another. But the *hypothesis* begot upon it is of the nature of one's offspring, whose loss perhaps is irreparable. I find, however, his *Lincoln's-Inn Advocate* never thought him wedded to his question; for he takes the change of it, like the change of a mistress, for *politeness*; and has accused me not only of ill-breeding, but of *contradiction*, because I would not change it too. I had *shewn*, in my *first* volume of *The Divine Legation*, that the *ancient Christians of Greece* had borrowed *several forms of speech* from the Pagan mysteries: and in my *second*, I had *denied* that the *modern Christians of Rome* had borrowed *several forms of worship* from the Pagan ritual. On which, our Advocate, catching me at this advantage, thus candidly expostulates with me. *Thus the SAME FACT, when it tends to prove a part of a favourite hypothesis, is in your hands notoriously true; but it is no sooner made use of by the ingenious author so often mentioned [Dr. M.] than it proves to be an utter mistake\**. And again, *the DIFFERENT OPINIONS which on different occasions you have entertained of this matter, may serve to teach us, &c. &c.* page 59. But let me assure this writer, that when I spoke of the *ancients borrowing words* from the *Pagan mysteries*, I no more meant the *moderns borrowing rites* from their *open worship*, than, when † I

\* Letter from a Gentleman of Lincoln's-Inn, p. 55.

† Div. Leg. Appendix to Book III.

spoke of *Answerers by profession*, I meant *Lawyers by profession*; who, without flattering them, I may say, deserve as little the character there given of the said *answerers* as I do the calumnies here bestowed by this *letter-writer*.

But his charge of *contradiction* was excusable. The Doctor had led him up to the *primitive church*, and there he found me; and there he supposed I had always been: and seeing me not quite conformable to the Doctor's decisions, he would quarrel with me for a schismatic. But I can easily overlook this (that he took upon trust, as he did his *Greek*) for the sake of so charitable an office as the teaching me how to write; which he kindly professes to be the whole purpose of his *Letter*.

My learned friend will excuse my speaking thus much of a controversy which he knows, from the time of the first publication of his *Postscript*, I had intended not to keep up. But thus much was necessary to state it truly, and to hold it fairly on the foot whereon he first placed it, and I had left it. As to the subject itself, so curious and interesting, if ever I should be disposed to treat it at large, as possibly I may, I would chuse to do it *in thesi*, and not in prosecution of any particular controversy.

## Section 2.

[See Divine Legation, *Book* iv. § 4.]

THE first writer I am concerned with is the Reverend Dr. *Richard Pococke*: who, in his late *Book of Travels*, hath a *Chapter on the ancient Hieroglyphics of the Egyptians*, wherein, in opposition to my account of the nature of that kind of writing, he expresseth himself as follows—"If hieroglyphical figures stood for words or  
 "sounds that signified certain things, the power of  
 "hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of  
 "letters composing such a sound, that by agreement was  
 "made to signify such a thing. For hieroglyphics, as  
 "words, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds  
 "signify things; as for instance, it might have been  
 "agreed that the figure of a crocodile might stand for  
 "the sound that meant what we call malice: the children  
 "of

“ of the priests were early taught that the figure of a  
 “ crocodile stood for such a sound, and, if they did not  
 “ know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly  
 “ stand with them for a sound; though, as the sound,  
 “ it signified also a quality or thing; and they might  
 “ afterwards be taught the meaning of this sound; as  
 “ words are only sounds, which sounds we agree shall  
 “ signify such and such things; so that, to children,  
 “ words only stand for sounds, which relate to such  
 “ things as they know nothing of; and, in this sense, we  
 “ say children learn many things like parrots, what they  
 “ do not understand, and their memories are exercised  
 “ only about sounds, till they are instructed in the  
 “ meaning of the words. This I thought it might be  
 “ proper to observe, *as some say hieroglyphics stood for*  
 “ *things and not for words*, if sounds articulated in a  
 “ certain manner are words. And though it may be  
 “ said, that in this case, when different nations, of dif-  
 “ ferent languages, agree on common characters, that  
 “ stand for certain things they agree on, that then such  
 “ figures stand for things: this will be allowed; but  
 “ then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in  
 “ each language that signify such things: and, as ob-  
 “ served before, to children, who know nothing of the  
 “ several things they stand for; to them they are only  
 “ marks that express such and such sounds: so that  
 “ these figures stand not for things alone, but as words,  
 “ for sounds and things\*.”

The design of this passage, the reader sees, is to oppose the principle I went upon, in explaining the Egyptian hieroglyphics, *That they stood for things, and not for words*. But that is all he sees; for the obscure expression, arising from a confusion of ideas, will not suffer one to do more than guess at the proof he aims at; which seems to be this—That hieroglyphics cannot be said to stand for things *only*; because things being denoted by words or sounds; and hieroglyphics exciting the idea of sounds (which are the notes of things), as well as the idea of the things themselves, hieroglyphics stand both for sounds and things.—This seems to be his argument, put into intelligible language. But, for fear

\* Pag. 228, 229, of a Book intitled, A Description of the East, &c.  
 of

of mistaking him, let us confine ourselves to his own words.

*If hieroglyphical figures (says he) stood for words or sounds that signified certain things, the power of hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a number of letters composing such a sound that by agreement was made to signify such a thing.* Without doubt, if hieroglyphics stood for sounds, they were of the nature of words, which stand for sounds. But this is only an *hypothetical* proposition : let us see therefore how he proves it.

FOR hieroglyphics, AS WORDS, seem to have stood for sounds, and sounds signify things; as for instance, it MIGHT have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand for the same sound that meant what we call malice. The propriety of the expression is as remarkable as the force of the reasoning. 1. Instead of saying, *but hieroglyphics*, he says, *for hieroglyphics*; which not expressing an *illation*, but implying a *reason*, obscures the argument he would illustrate. 2. He says, *hieroglyphics, as words, seem to have stood for sounds.* Just before he said, *hieroglyphics stood for words or sounds.* Here they are AS words, or, like words, and seem to stand FOR sound. What must we stick to? are words sound? or, do they stand for sound? He has given us both to chuse of. But it is fit himself should chuse first: which not having yet done, we go on, 3. Lastly, to complete all, he corroborates this *seeming* truth by an *instance* in which the *possibility* of its standing for a sound is made a proof of the *likelihood* of its so doing; *It MIGHT (says he) have been agreed that the figure of a crocodile MIGHT stand, &c.*

But he makes amends for his former diffidence in what follows. *The children of the priests were early taught that the figure of a crocodile stood for such a sound, and if they did not know the meaning of the sound, it would certainly stand with them for a sound.* This indeed is an anecdote. But where did he learn that these children, before they could decipher the sounds of their own language, were taught hieroglyphics? Till now, hieroglyphics were understood to be reserved for those instructed in their secret and mysterious science. But let us suppose that they were taught to children amongst their first

first elements: yet even here, as we shall see from the nature of the thing, they could never stand as marks for *words* or *sounds*. When a child is taught the power of letters, he learns that those letters, that compose the word *malice*, for instance, express the *sound*: which, naturally arising from a combination of the several powers of each letter, shews him that the letters stand for such a sound or word. But when he is taught that the figure or picture of a *crocodile* signifies *malice*, he as naturally and necessarily conceives (though he knows not the meaning of the word) that it stands for some *thing* signified by that word, and not for a *sound*: because there is no natural connexion between *figure* and a *sound*, as there is between *figure* and a *thing*. And the only reason why the word *malice* intervenes, in this connexion, is because of the necessity of the use of *words* to distinguish things, and rank them into sorts. But the veriest child could never be so childish as to conceive that, when he was told the figure of a beast with four legs and a long tail signified *malice*, that it signified the *sound* of *malice*; any more than if he were told it signified a *crocodile*, that it signified the *sound* of the word *crocodile*. The truth is, the ignorant often mistake words for things, but never things for words. The former is so true, that they frequently take the *name* of a thing for its *nature*; and rest contented in the knowledge which that gives them. I remember a country fellow staring at the picture of an elephant, a *thing* he had never seen before, asked his friend who stood by, *What it was?* and, on his answering, that it was *the great Czar*, inquired no further, but went away well satisfied in his acquaintance with the strange beast. Yet I apprehend he did not understand his informer to mean that it signified only the *sound* of that word. But perhaps our Author will say, the cases are different; that the *elephant* was a mere picture, and the *crocodile* a sign or mark. But I have proved at large that the ancient *Egyptian* hieroglyphics were at first *mere pictures*; and that all the alteration they received, in becoming *marks*, was only the having their general use of conveying knowledge rendered more extensive and expeditious.

To proceed; our Author considers next what he apprehends may be thought an objection to his opinion, *And though* (says he) *it may be said that, in this case, where different nations of different languages agree on common characters, that stand for certain things they agree on, that then such figures stand for things.* To which he answers, *This will be allowed, but then they stand for sounds too, that is, the sounds in each language that signify such things.* He who can allow this, and without injury to his cause, need be under no fear of ever giving his adversary advantages. We may expect to hear him say next, when disputing about the colour of an object—*that it is black, will be allowed; but then it is white too.* For a mark for things can no more be a mark for sounds, than *black* can be *white*. The reason is the same in both; the one property excludes the other: thus, if *hieroglyphic marks* stand for things, and are used as common characters by various nations differing in speech and language, they cannot stand for sounds; because these men express the same thing by different sounds; unless, to remove this difficulty, he will go farther, and say, not, as he did before, that one *hieroglyphic word* (to use his own language) stood for one sound, but, that it stands for an hundred. Again, if *hieroglyphic marks* stand for sounds, they cannot stand for things: not for those things which are not signified by such sounds; this himself will allow: nor yet, I affirm, for those which are; because it is the sound that stands for the thing signified by the sound, and not the hieroglyphic mark. But all this mistake proceeded from another as gross, though less glaring, namely, *that words stand both for sounds and things*, which we now come to. For he concludes thus, *So that these figures* (viz. *hieroglyphics*) *stand not for things alone, but, as words, for sounds and things.* An unhappy illustration! which has all the defects, both in point of sense and expression, that a proposition can well have. For if, by *words*, he meant articulated sounds, then the expression is nonsense, as affirming, that sounds stand for sounds. And that he meant so is possible, because, in the beginning of the passage quoted, he uses *words* for articulated sounds—*Hieroglyphics*, says he, *stood for words or sounds.* But

if, by *words*, he meant *letters* (and that he might mean so, is possible likewise, for he presently afterwards uses *words* in that sense too—*Hieroglyphics as words*, says he, *seem to have stood for sounds*) then the proposition is only false; the plain truth being this, *Letters stand for sounds only*; which sounds they *naturally* produce; as sounds *arbitrarily* denote things.

But to be a little more particular; as in this distinction lies the judgment which is to be made, if ever it be rightly made, of the controversy between us. All this confusion of counter-reasoning proceeds, as we observed before, *first*, from not reflecting that *letters*, which stand for words, and *hieroglyphics* which stand for things, have not an *arbitrary* but *natural* designation. For as the *powers* of letters naturally produce words or sounds, so the *figures* of hieroglyphics naturally signify things: either more simply, when they express *substances*; or more artificially, when they denote *modes*; yet in neither case arbitrarily: but by *representation* in the first, and by *analogy* in the last. *Secondly*, from his not considering, that as we cannot think nor converse about things either accurately or intelligibly without *words*, so their intervention becomes necessary in explaining the *marks of things*. But therefore, to make *hieroglyphics the marks of sounds*, because sounds accompany things, would be as absurd as to make *letters the marks of things*, because things accompany sounds. And, who ever (besides our Author) said that *letters signified things as well as sounds*? unless he had a mind to confound all human meaning. If he chose to instruct, or even to be understood, he would say, that letters *naturally* produced sounds or words; and that words *arbitrarily* denoted things: and had our Author spoken the same intelligible language, and told us that hieroglyphics *naturally* expressed things, and that things were *arbitrarily* denoted by words, he would indeed have spared both of us the present trouble, but then he had said nothing *new*. But it is possible he might be led into his conclusion by mistaking, for *Egyptian*, a ridiculous kind of *rebus-writing* more ridiculously called hieroglyphics, the senseless amusement of our idle people, in which, indeed, the figures stand only for sounds. As for those significative  
figures

figures properly called hieroglyphics, they never denoted other than *things*. If there ever were an exception, it was in a late traveller; whose significative Egyptian *figures*, I am told, are not so properly the representatives of the *things* themselves, as of the writer's *words*, or his verbal descriptions to the engraver.—But there is no end of correcting the extravagancies of a perverse imagination. Here we have one, who is for making the Egyptian *hieroglyphics* a kind of letters: we have lately heard of another, still more at defiance with common sense, who is for making the *Hebrew* letters a kind of *hieroglyphic* characters\*. And this without ever having travelled for it.

But

\* See *Proposals for printing by subscription the book of Job in the Hebrew character, and now first decyphered into English, dated July 1, 1743*. From which, I shall beg leave to borrow a specimen of the *Undertaker's* reasoning and eloquence. "To obviate," says he, "any scruples of alarm which the appearance of novelty and paradox might occasion, it may be proper to acquaint the reader—*What?*—that the new version of *Job*, now offered to the public, was made independently of any Translation, Commentator, or Critic," &c. Without doubt it was a ready way to quiet all alarms, arising from the appearance of novelty, to tell his readers, the appearance was *real*. But perhaps by—*obviating any scruples of alarm*, this great linguist might mean, what the words naturally imply, the freeing his reader from any *scruples* about the uncharitableness of being *alarmed* to one's neighbours discredit without very apparent cause. And if this were his meaning, he has certainly set his reader's conscience at ease. But with regard to the *alarm* itself, I know but one way of stilling *that*; which is, the reasonable prospect his reader has that this, which is now a *novelty* and *paradox*, is likely to continue so.

He goes on—"In the mean time, if the sagacious reader is prompted to search after truth, too long concealed in her mysterious recesses—let him guard against all systematical notions, and assume no other hypothesis but this, that the best sense which can be affixed to the *Hebrew* letters, consistently with the context, and with the laws of the character, is the genuine sense of the Writer." The *context*, does he say? Why, the *context* is yet to make; as well as the *sense that is to be affixed to the Hebrew letters*. And if, when he has them both in his hands, he cannot make them agree, he must be the very dullest of all his bungling tribe. The man had heard, somewhere or other, of that trite critical canon, of *interpreting agreeably to the context*, which means only that the parts should conform to the whole, and to one another; and the more obscure be explained by the more intelligible: and this, he has innocently applied to *parts* and a *whole* that



But our Author seems to have been misled by a wrong imagination; that the public would expect it of a *traveller* to be intimately conversant in all the old learning and religion of the places he had visited: as if these were to be picked out of the rubbish of the dead walls in which they were once contained, rather than from the living monuments of their contemporary inhabitants. But sure the learned world is less unreasonable; this would exceed even the old *Egyptian* exaction, and be requiring *brick*, not indeed without *straw*, for enough of that, we see, is to be *gathered* in *rambling through the land*; but, what is worse, without *materials*. However, to this imagination it appears we owe his account of the *hieroglyphics* in the *present*, and of the *mythology of the antient Egyptians*, in the preceding chapter; which he introduces in this extraordinary manner: "As the mythology, or fabulous religion of the ancient *Egyptians*;" "may be looked on, in a great measure, as the foundation of the heathen religion, in most other parts; so it" "may not be improper to give some account of the" "origin of it, as it is delivered by the most ancient" "authors,

are to be all of his own making; which he may make as obscure at least, if not as intelligible, as he pleases.

Having thus strongly *plumed* himself with his grey-goose quill, he at length takes his flight—"Thus prepared," he says, "he will" "defy difficulty and scorn assistance: esteeming an officious hint" "an affront to his genius, or suspecting he was envied the pleasure" "of investigating the theorem. Fantastic glory! short-lived pleasure! that must vanish into indignation, for not having sooner" "perceived so transparent an artifice." But here we leave him. He now soars out of sight, and becomes inscrutable to mortal eyes.

Indeed, he might have passed without any notice at all, had he not betrayed his *kind* when he attempted to *roar*. For, though it be his business to possess the public with an high idea of the knowledge he is about to open to them from the discovery of a *new real cipher*, yet he can't, for his life (even in this very specimen) forbear to call it a *SACERDOTAL jargon—a gibberish of their own*. Let the *priests* then look to themselves. Here is a *new church-decipherer*, who has not only discovered they are accustomed to write in *jargon*, but has also found the *key*. We know them to be always plotting against the *government of nature*: the public therefore cannot but be as impatient for their conviction, as this decipherer is for the filling his *subscription*: which, as it will be the means of satisfying both, I would beg leave to recommend to their consideration. *Subscriptions are taken in by J. Nourse at the Lamb without Temple-Bar.*

“ authors, which may give some light both to the description of *Egypt*, and also to the history of that country. We may suppose, that the ancients were the best judges of the nature of their religion; and consequently, that all interpretations of their mythology, by men of fruitful inventions, that have no sort of foundation in their writings, are forced, and such as might never be intended by them. On the contrary, it is necessary to retrench several things the ancients themselves seem to have invented, and grafted on true history; and, in order to account for many things, the genealogies and alliances they mention must in several respects be false or erroneous, and seem to have been invented to accommodate the honours of the same deities to different persons, they were obliged to deify, who lived at different times; and so they were obliged to give them new names, invent genealogies, and some different attributes.” pp. 221, 222.

He says, *We may suppose that the Ancients were the best judges of the nature of their religion.* But the *Ancients*, here spoken of, were not *Egyptians*, but *Greeks*; and the *mythology* here spoken of, was not *Greek*, but *Egyptian*: Therefore these *Ancients* might well be mistaken about the nature of a religion which they borrowed from strangers; the principles of which, they themselves tell us, were always kept secreted from them. But this is not all, they in fact were mistaken; and by no means *good judges of the nature of their religion*, if we may believe one of the most authentic of these *Ancients*, HERODOTUS himself, where discoursing of the *Greeks* he expressly says,—“ But the origin of each god, and whether they are all from eternity, and what is their several kinds or natures, to speak the truth, they neither knew at that time nor since\*.”

He goes on—and CONSEQUENTLY *that all interpretations of their mythology by men of fruitful inventions, that have no sort of foundation in their writings, are forced, and such as might never be intended by them.* This is indeed a *truth*, but it is no CONSEQUENCE,

\* Ἐρθεῖν δὲ ἱγίαια ἑκατός τῶν Θεῶν, οἷτι δ' αὖ ἦσαν πάσις, οὐκοῦν τι τοὺς τὰ εἶδαι, ἀκ ἐπιστάλο μέχρι ὅ ἔστιν τι καὶ χθις, ὡς εἰπὼν λόγῳ. Lib. ii. cap. 33.

therefore impertinent. For, whether the *Ancients* were, or were not, *the best judges*; whether the *moderns* have, or have not, *fruitful inventions*, yet if their *interpretations* have no sort of foundation in ancient writings, it is certain they are forced, and such as might never be intended by them. But what does he get by this hypothetical proposition, more than the discredit of begging his question?

But the most extraordinary, is his making it an additional reason for leaving the *moderns*, and sticking to the *Ancients*, that *the Ancients themselves seem to have invented and grafted on true history, and, in order* (he says) *to account for many things, the genealogies and alliances they mention, must in several respects be false or erroneous, and seem to have been invented, etc.* Now, if the ancients were thus mistaken, the moderns sure might be excused in endeavouring to set them right: therefore to a plain reasoner, this would seem to shew the use of *their interpretations*. But this use is better understood from our Author's own example; who, in the chapter we are upon, has attempted to give us some knowledge of antiquity without them.

And here we find, the *ancient account*, to which he so closely adheres, is not only fabulous, by his own *confession*; but contradictory, by his own *representation*; a confused collection of errors and absurdities; the very condition of antiquity which forced the *moderns* to have recourse to *interpretations*: and occasioned that variety whereon our Author grounds his charge against them. A charge however in which his *Ancients* themselves will be involved; for they likewise had their *interpretations*; and were, if their variety would give it them, at least, as *fruitful* in their *inventions*. How differing, for instance, were they in opinion concerning the origin of ANIMAL WORSHIP\*! Was our Author ignorant that so extraordinary a superstition wanted explanation? By no means. Yet for fear of incurring the censure of a *fruitful invention*, he, instead of taking the true solution of a *modern* critic; or even any rational interpretation† of the ancient

\* See Div. Leg. Book iv. § 4.

† This, at least, the learned author of the late *Defence of the prime Ministry of Joseph* has thought it but decent to do, (p. 522.)  
whom

ancient mythologist, whom yet he professes to follow, contents himself with that wretched fable of *Typhon's* dividing

whom I just mention here because he does not so properly come within the purpose of this Pamphlet. For as, in several parts of his *Defence*, he consents to me without acknowledgment; so, in others, he differs from me without contradiction. I have another reason not to examine the grounds of his difference, and that is, because I apprehend he may, on second thoughts, retract his opinion on every of those points, as he seems already to have done in one or two. Thus, for instance, speaking (p. 522.) of the *origin of Brute-worship*, in *Egypt*, he says, "But there is another reason [of *Brute-worship*] assigned by *Lucian*, that to me is the most probable of all. He tells us that the Egyptians found out how to measure the motions of the heavenly bodies, and how to compute years and months and seasons. They divided that part of the heavens and the fixed stars stationed in it, through which the moveable stars and planets pass, into twelve parts, and represented each part by some proper different animal of their own. And from hence arose many sorts of sacred rites in *Egypt*," &c. Yet, at p. 458, he assigns a very different original: "I think there is little doubt but that the monstrous figures of the Egyptian gods, and great part of their stupid idolatry and beast-worship, took its rise from these *hieroglyphic* characters."—So again, p. 472, speaking of the *origin of Idolatry*, he makes the first species of it to be *HERO-WORSHIP*: "And I think (says he) that the account given of them [*the Sons of the Elohim in the antediluvian World*] by the historian, that they were the mighty men of old, men of the name, as the Hebrew expresses it, famous and remarkable from ancient ages, points them out as the most ancient, gods and heroes; a supposition that we shall see presently confirmed by the testimony of profane history." Yet at p. 515, he makes the beginnings of idolatry to be the worship of the *HEAVENLY BODIES*. "These several accounts put together clearly shew us the rise and progress of superstition and false worship in the world. It began, as it was natural to imagine it should, in the adoration of the heavenly luminaries, the sun, moon, and stars, who were supposed to preside over the day and night, and the various seasons of the year, and to whom the earliest nations were taught to ascribe the origin and dissolution of all things. Next after these the earth, and the several elements of which the world was supposed to consist, had imaginary deity ascribed to them, and came in for their share of adoration. And as the glory of the celestial bodies, and the constant benefit men received by their light, warmth, and continual influences on the earth, first impressed men with wonder, drew them into adoration, excited their gratitude, and created in them an imagination of their being gods; they were afterwards led into an high veneration for their princes, whom they admired for their power, prudence, strength, and knowledge: considering them as their benefactors who first taught them the use of such things as greatly tended to the preservation, security, good order, and conveniencies of life."

dividing the body of *Osiris* into twenty-six parts, and distributing them to his accomplices: which, being afterwards found by *Isis*, and delivered by her to distinct bodies of priests to be buried with great secrecy, she enjoined them to pay divine honours to him, and to consecrate some particular animal to his memory. *From this account* (says our Author very gravely) *we may see the reason why so many sacred animals were worshipped in Egypt.* p. 226. Again, the *Greek* account, in *Diodorus*, of *Osiris's* expedition, has been shewn to be a heap of impossible absurdities; yet our Author believes it all; and would have believed as much more, rather than have run into the rashness of any *modern invention*. But this matter comes under our next *Section*; where we have to do with a very different sort of writer; whose regard, however, for antiquity in *that* point is, we conceive, as much too small as this Author's is too great.

### Section 3.

[See Divine Legation, Book iv. § 5.]

WHEN I entered on a confutation of Sir Isaac Newton's *Egyptian Chronology*, I was willing, for the greater satisfaction of the reader, to set his arguments for the *identity of Osiris and Sesostris*, on which that chronology was founded, in the strongest and clearest light. On this account I took them as I found them collected, ranged in order, and set together in one view, with the greatest advantage of representation, by the very worthy and learned *Master of the Charter-House*, in a professed apology for that excellent author. But this liberty the learned writer hath been pleased to animadvert upon in the late *Latin* edition\* of the tracts to which that apology was prefixed—"We are not (says he) ignorant

\* *De veris annis D. N. Jesu Christi natali & mortuali Dissertationes duæ Chronologicae.*

† "Non nescimus nuperrime accidisse, ut vir ingenio & eruditione præstans, quum ratus sit ad Divinam Legationem Mosis demonstrandum aliquo modo pertinere, ut probetur Osiris non esse idem cum Sesostris, omnia huc allata in lusum jocumque verterit, instituta comparatione Arthuri illius tabulosi cum Wilhelmo Norimanno, quos æquè bonis rationibus in unum homi-

“ ignorant of what has lately happened, that the Author  
 “ of *The Divine Legation*, supposing it, some how or  
 “ other, to concern *Moses's* divine mission to prove that  
 “ *Osiris* was not the same with *Sesostris*, hath turned all  
 “ that is here said into ridicule, by a comparison made  
 “ between the fabulous *Arthur* and *William the Norman*;  
 “ who, he says, may be made one by as good reasons  
 “ (though they have scarce any thing alike or in common  
 “ with one another) as those which we have brought to  
 “ confound *Osiris* with *Sesostris*: and on this point he  
 “ draws out a disputation through seventy pages and  
 “ upwards; wherein, notwithstanding, he neither denies  
 “ nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have here  
 “ said of *Sesostris*. It is true indeed that some other of  
 “ *Newton's* assertions he does oppose, as those concern-  
 “ ing the late invention of arts, arms, and instruments by  
 “ some certain king; and of this part of the argument  
 “ he has the better. For that these things were found  
 “ out by the *Egyptians* long before the age of *Sesostris*,  
 “ holy Scripture commands us to believe: but whether  
 “ found out by any of their kings, is not so certain.  
 “ However, these were matters we never touched upon,  
 “ as relating nothing to our purpose; nor do they yet  
 “ induce us to recede from that conclusion of the famous  
 “ *Newton*, That *Sesac* was *Sesostris*, *Osiris*, and *Bacchus*.  
 “ But the cause being now brought before the public, let  
 “ the learned determine of it.” Thus far this candid and  
 ingenuous writer.

He says, *the Author of the Divine Legation supposes that it some how or other concerns Moses's divine mission to prove Osiris not the same with Sesostris*; which seems to

“ nem confari posse ait (quamvis nihil fere habeant inter se com-  
 “ mune aut simile) ac nos Osirin cum Sesostris confundimus. Et de  
 “ hac re disputationem in 70 paginas & ultra producit. In qua  
 “ tamen hæc nostra de Sesostris neque negat neque refellit, sed  
 “ irridet. Alia vero quædam Newtoni dicta de sero inventas ab  
 “ aliquo rege artibus, armis, instrumentis oppugnat, et ea quidem  
 “ parte causæ vincit. Nam ut ista longe ante Sesostris ætatem  
 “ apud *Egyptios* reperta sint, Scriptura sacra jubet credere; ab  
 “ ullo unquam regum inventa esse haud ita certum. Sed ea prius  
 “ non attigimus, ut quæ nihil ad propositum nostrum attinent,  
 “ neque nunc nos movent, ut pedem retrahamus ab ista Cl. New-  
 “ toni conclusione *Sesacum*, *Sesostrin*, *Osirin* & *Bacchum* fuisse.  
 “ Lite jam contestata judicent eruditi.” In *Dedic.* pp. xii. xiii.

to imply that this learned person doth not see *how* it concerns it. And yet afterwards he owns, *that Scripture* (meaning the writings of Moses) *will not allow us to believe, with Sir Isaac, that the invention of arts, arms, and instruments, was so late as the time of Sesostris.* Now it follows, as I have shewn, by certain consequence, that, if *Osiris* and *Sesostris* were one and the same, then the invention of arts was as late as the time of *Sesostris*. But this contradicting *Scripture*, or the writings of *Moses*, as the learned writer himself confesseth, the reader sees *how it concerns* Moses's mission to prove *Osiris not the same with Sesostris.*

The learned writer, speaking of the comparison I had made between *Arthur* and *William the Norman*, says, *they have scarce any thing alike or in common with one another.* I had brought together *thirteen* circumstances (the very number the learned writer thinks sufficient to establish the identity of *Osiris* and *Sesostris*) in which they perfectly agreed. I am persuaded he does not suspect me of falsifying their history. He must mean therefore that *thirteen* in my comparison, is *scarce any thing*, which, in his, is *every thing*.

He goes on,—*in a disputation of seventy pages and upwards the Author of the Divine Legation neither denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have said of Sesostris.* What is it the learned writer *hath* said of *Sesostris*? Is it not this? That between his history and that of *Osiris* there are many strokes of resemblance: from whence he infers (with *Sir Isaac*) that these two heroes were one and the same. Now if he means I have not *denied* nor *confuted* this *resemblance*, he says true. I had no such design. It is too well marked by antiquity to be denied. Neither, let me add, did I *laugh* at it. What I *laughed* at (if my bringing a similar case is to be called by that word) was his *inference* from this *resemblance*, that therefore *Osiris* and *Sesostris* were one and the same. But then too I did more than *laugh*: I both *denied* and *confuted* it. First I *denied* it, by shewing that this *resemblance* might really be, though *Osiris* and *Sesostris* were *two different* men, as appeared by an equal resemblance in the actions of *two different* men, *Arthur* and *William the Norman*. But as the general history of  
ancient

ancient *Egypt* would not suffer us to believe all that the *Greek* writers have said of this *resemblance*, I then explained the causes that occasioned their mistaken accounts of the two persons, from whence so perfect a resemblance arose. Secondly, I *confuted* it, by shewing from the concurrent testimony of antiquity, and from several internal arguments deducible from that testimony, that *Osiris* and *Sesostris* were in fact two different persons, living in two very distant ages.

The learned writer proceeds—*It is true indeed that some other of Newton's assertions he does oppose, as those concerning the late invention of arts, arms, and instruments, and in this part of the argument he gets the better.* But if I have the better here, it is past dispute I overthrow the whole hypothesis of the *identity of Osiris and Sesostris*. For, as to that *resemblance*, which antiquity hath given them, *that*, considered singly, when the pretended *late invention* of arts hath been proved a mistake, will indeed deserve *only to be laughed at*. But were it, as Sir *Isaac Newton* endeavoured to prove, that the invention of arts was no earlier than the time of *Sesostris* or *Sesac*, there is then indeed an end of the *ancient Osiris of Egypt*; and *he* so much boasted of by that people can be no other than the *Sesostris* of this Author. For the very foundation of the existence of the *ancient Osiris* was his civilizing *Egypt*, and teaching them the arts of life: but if this were done by *Sesostris*, or in his reign, then is *he* the true *Osiris of Egypt*. As on the contrary, were the *invention of arts* as early as Scripture history represents it, then is *Egypt* to be believed, when she tells us that *Osiris*, their inventor of arts, was many ages earlier than *Sesostris* their conqueror: and consequently all Sir *Isaac Newton's identity* separates and falls to pieces. In a word, take it which way you will, if *Osiris* were the same as *Sesostris*, then must the invention of arts (for all antiquity have concurred in giving that invention to *Osiris*) be as late as the age of *Sesostris*, the *Sesac* of *Newton*: but this, Scripture history will not suffer us to believe. If, on the other hand, *Osiris* and *Sesostris* were not the same, then was the invention of arts (and for the same reason) much earlier than the age of *Sesostris*; as indeed all mankind thought before



before Sir *Isaac*. These were the considerations which induced that great man, who so well understood the nature and force of evidence, to employ his whole sagacity of criticism in proving the invention of arts to be about the age of his *Sesostris* or *Sesac*. And is it possible he should have a follower who cannot *see* that he hath done this? or the *necessity* he had of doing it? It will be said, perhaps, "that Sir *Isaac* has, indeed, argued much "for the low invention of arts: but hath neither enforced "it under the name of an argument, nor stated it in the "form here represented." The objection would ill become a follower of the great *Newton*, who should know that his master's method, as well in these his *critical* as in his *physical* inquiries, was to form the principal members of his demonstration with an unornamented brevity, and leave the suppliing of the small connecting parts to his reader's capacity. Besides, in so obvious, so capital, so necessary an argument for this *identity*, it had been a ridiculous distrust of common sense, after he had spent so much pains in endeavouring to prove *the low invention of arts*, to have ended his reasoning in this formal manner: "And now, reader, take notice that "this is a conclusive argument for the *identity* of *Oxiris* "and *Sesostris*." Lastly, let me observe, that this very reason which induced Sir *Isaac* to be so large in the *establishment* of his point, *the low invention of arts*, induced me to be as large in the *subversion* of it. And now some reasonable account, I hope, is given of the seventy long pages.

What follows is still more extraordinary.—*However, these were matters* (says the learned writer, speaking of the invention of arts) *we never touched upon, as relating nothing to our purpose*. Here I cannot but lament the learned writer's ill fortune. There was but one single point, in the book he would defend, which is essentially to his purpose, and *that*, he hath given up as *nothing to his purpose*; and more unlucky still, on a review of the argument, hath treated it as an error in his author who took so much pains about it, but yet as an error that does not at all affect the question. For,

He concludes thus—*nor do they yet induce me to recede from that conclusion of the famous Newton, that*

Sesac was Sesostris, Osiris, and Bacchus.—*Sesac*, as I said before, I have no concern with. And as to *Bacchus*, it is agreed to be only a different name for *Osiris*. The thing I undertook to prove was, that *Osiris* and *Sesostris* were not one and the same person: But, in doing this, I did not mean to say that *Osiris* was not one of the names of *Sesostris*. This is a very different proposition; and the rather to be taken notice of, because I suspect a quibble in the words of the learned writer, which would confound the *difference*. Nor is this suspicion unreasonable. For I have met with some who have even ventured to say that Sir *Isaac* meant no more than that *Sesostris* was AN *Osiris*. But if he meant no more, I would allow him to mean any thing, and never to have his meaning disputed. I, for my part, and so I suppose the rest of the world, understood him to mean, “That the old *Osiris*, famous amongst the *Egyptians* for legislation and the invention of the arts of life, was the very same man with *Sesostris*, who, those *Egyptians* say, was a different man, of a later age, and famous for the conquest of the habitable world.” This was the proposition I undertook to confute. Wherein I endeavoured to shew “that there was a *real Osiris*, such as the *Egyptians* represented him, much *earlier* than their *Sesostris*.” And now (to use this writer’s words) *the cause being brought before the Public, let the learned determine of it*. As to the other point, that *Sesostris* went by the name of the earlier hero, this I not only allow, but contend for, as it opens to us one of the principal grounds of that confusion in their stories which hath produced a similitude of actions whereon Sir *Isaac Newton* layeth the foundation of their *IDENTITY*.

#### Section 4.

[See Divine Legation, Book vi. § 2.]

THE reverend and learned Dr. *Richard Grey* having lately epitomized the Commentary of one *Albert Schultens* on the Book of *Job*, hath thought fit, in the *Preface* to his Abstract, to criticise my Dissertation on the same Book in the following manner:—“Nor should we omit, in the fourth place, the opinion of our countryman, Mr. *Warburton*,

“*Warburton*, who, with great sharpness of wit and  
 “many arguments sufficiently specious, endeavours to  
 “prove that the whole book of *Job* is dramatical and  
 “allegorical, yet founded in true history, and written by  
 “*Esdra* in solace of the *Jews*, now returned from *Ba-*  
 “*bylon* into their own country, and about to experience,  
 “contrary to their expectations, an ordinary and unequal  
 “providence. Now in a matter very uncertain, and  
 “which hitherto hath been made more uncertain by the  
 “different opinions of learned men, hardly any hypo-  
 “thesis perhaps can be thought of which will satisfy in  
 “all its parts\*.” Then having told us what *Spanheim*  
 said,

\* —Non autem prætermittenda est, quarto, sententia doctis-  
 simi viri Warburtoni nostri, qui magno ingenii acumine, multisque  
 argumentis, satis quidem speciosis, probare nititur, Totum librum  
 esse opus dramaticum & allegoricum, veræ tamen historiæ super-  
 structum, ab Esdra conscriptum, in solatium Judæorum, qui e  
 Babylone in suam patriam reversi, providentiam ordinariam &  
 inæqualem, contra atque expectabant, jam erant experturi. In re  
 admodum sane incerta, & quæ cruditorum hominum dissensione  
 incertior adhuc reddita est, vix ulla forsân hypothesis excogitari  
 possit, quæ ex omni parte satisfaciât.—Ut ad eorum itaque sen-  
 tentiam accedo, qui librum Jobi omnium sacrorum codicum anti-  
 quissimum esse putant; ita a Moyse quidem ex authenticis monu-  
 mentis desumptum, poeticeque ornatum fuisse, nullus dubito.—  
 Atque ex nostra hac opinione ratio satis idonea reddi potest  
 omnium eorum textuum, siqui sint, in quibus sive ad legem, sive  
 ad historiam Judaicam ante scriptum librum, allusum est, non  
 minus acsi ab Esdra eum scriptum fuisse concedatur, de quo viro  
 diversa sentiunt eruditi. Quod vero ad eos locos, quos ad sequi-  
 orum temporum historias referre putat vir doctissimus, nempe ad  
 Hezekiæ ægritudinem & convalescentiam, cap. xxxiii. 25. & exer-  
 citus Assyrii internecionem, cap. xxxiv. 20. ita eos intelligi ut  
 nihil necesse est, ita commodius aliter accipi posse, ex notis, ad  
 quas lectorem remitto, satis apparebit. Porro, opus esse drama-  
 ticum, seu potius veram historiam forma dramatica, habituque  
 poetico exornatam, semper existimavi; at vero subesse quoque  
 allegoriam, persuaderi nequeo, siquidem non scriptoris tantum  
 ætus, sed & libri scopus, quantum ego quidem video, ei sententiæ  
 adversatur. Nam quod dicit vir clariss. id præcipue in hoc libro  
 disceptari, nempe an bonis semper bona, malisque mala, an utris-  
 que utraque promiscue obtingant: hanc autem quæestionem (a  
 nobis quidem alienam, minusque ideo perpensam) nusquam alibi  
 gentium præterquam in Judæa, nec apud ipsos Judæos alio quovis  
 tempore, quam quod assignat, moveri potuisse, id omne ex veritate  
 snæ hypotheseos pendet, et mea quidem sententia, longe aliter se  
 habet. Nempe id unum voluisse mihi videtur sacer scriptor, ut  
 piis omnibus, utcunque afflictis, humilitatis & patientiæ perpetuum  
 extaret documentum ex contemplatione gemina, hinc infinitæ Dei  
 perfectionis,

said, and what his author *Schultens* says, which are nothing to the matter in hand, he goes on thus: "There-  
" fore,

perfectionis, sapientiæ ac potentiæ; illinc humanæ, quæ in sanctissimis quoque viris inest, corruptionis, imbecillitatis, & ignorantie. Quamvis enim in sermonibus, qui in eo habentur, de religione, de virtute, de providentia, Deique in mundo gubernando sapientia, justitia, sanctitate, de uno rerum omnium principio, aliisque gravissimis veritatibus dissertetur, hunc tamen quem dixi unicuique esse libri scopum, tam ex initio & fine, quam ex universa ejus æconomia cuivis opinor manifestum erit. Ea enim, ut rem omnem summationem complectatur, Jobum exhibet, primo quidem querentem, expostulantem, effræni luctui indulgentem; mox (quum, ut sacri dramatis natura postulabat, amicorum contradictione sinistrisque suspicionibus magis magisque irritatus & laceratus esset) imprudenter Deum provocantem, atque in justitia sua gloriantem; ad debitam tandem submissionem suique cognitionem revocatum, tum demum, nec antea, integritatis suæ tam præmium, quam testimonium a Deo reportantem. Ex his, inquam, apparet, non primario agi in hoc libro de providentia, sive æquali, sive inæquali, sed de personali Jobi integritate. Hanc enim (quod omnino observandum est) in dubium vocaverant amici, non ideo tantum quod afflictus esset, sed quod afflictus impatientius se gereret, Deique justitiæ obmurmuraret: & qui strenuus videlicet aliorum hortator fuerat ad fortitudinem & constantiam, quum ipse tentaretur, victus labasceret. Quum accesserat sanctissimi viri malis hæc gravissima omnium tentatio, ut tanquam improbus & hypocrita ab amicis damnaretur, & quod unicuique ei supererat, conscientie suæ testimonio ac solatio, quantum ipsi potuerunt, privandus foret, quid misero faciendum erat? Amicos perfidiæ & crudelitatis arguit: Deum integritatis suæ testem vindicemque appellat: quum autem nec Deus interveniret, ad innocentiam ejus vindicandam, nec remitterent quicquam amici de acerbis suis censuris, injustisque criminationibus, ad supremum illud judicium provocat in quo redemptorem sibi affuturum, Deumque a suis partibus staturum, summa cum fiducia se novisse affirmat. Jam vero si cardo controversiæ fuisset, utrum, salva Dei justitia, sancti in hac vita affligi possent, hæc ipsa declaratio litem finire debuerat. Sin autem de personali Jobi innocentia disceptetur, nil mirum quod veterem canere cantilenam, Jobumque ut fecerant, condemnare pergerent socii, quum Dei solius erat, qui corda hominum explorat, pro certo scire, an jure merito sibi Jobus hoc solamen attribueret, an falsam sibi fiduciam vanus arrogaret. Hac igitur difficultate sublata, nempe cur non statim obmutuerunt amici, quum de futuro judicio tam solenniter magnificeque dixisset Jobus, nil obstat quo minus celeberrimum illum contextum cap. xix. non de temporali in integrum restitutione, sed de resurrectione ad vitam æternam, intelligere possis. Quod si argumentis a commentatore nostro allatis, ea quoque adjeceris quæ vir omni laude major, jam episcopus Sarisburiensis, in dissertatione sua, *De sententia veterum de circumstantiis & consequentiis lapsus humani* pulcherrime contextuit, nil ultra, credo, desideraris, vel ad libri antiquitatem, vel ad vexatissimum hujus loci sensum, confirmandum. *Præf.* pp. x—xv.

" fore as I am of their opinion who think the book of  
 " *Job* the oldest in the canon, so I am fully persuaded that  
 " it was written by *Moses* himself, who took it from  
 " authentic records, and put it into the dress of poetry.  
 " And, on this our opinion, a good account may be given  
 " of all those texts, if any such there be, wherein allusion  
 " is made to the Jewish law or history before the book was  
 " written, no less than if we should allow it to have been  
 " written by *Esdras*, of whom the learned think differ-  
 " rently. And as to those places which, in the opinion  
 " of the Author of *The Divine Legation*, refer to his-  
 " tories of later times, such as the sickness and recovery  
 " of *Hezekiah*, cap. xxxiii. 25. and the destruction of the  
 " *Assyrian* army, cap. xxxiv. 20. it will sufficiently appear  
 " by the notes, to which I refer the reader, that there is  
 " no need to understand them in this sense, and that they  
 " are more commodiously understood otherwise. Fur-  
 " ther, that the work is dramatical, or, to speak more  
 " properly, a true history in the form of a drama, and  
 " adorned with a poetic dress, was always my opinion :  
 " but that any allegory lies under it I can by no means  
 " persuade myself to believe ; because not only the age  
 " of the writer, but the very scope of the book (as far as  
 " I can see) leads us to conclude otherwise. For as to  
 " what this writer says, that the main question handled  
 " in the book of *Job* is whether good happens to the good,  
 " and evil to evil men, or whether both happen not  
 " promiscuously to both : and that this question (a very  
 " foreign one to us, and therefore the less attended to)  
 " could never be the subject of disputation any where  
 " but in the land of *Judah*, nor there neither at any other  
 " time than that which he assigns : all this, I say,  
 " depends on the truth of his hypothesis ; and is, in my  
 " opinion, far otherwise. For the sole purpose of the  
 " sacred writer seems to me to be this, to compose a  
 " work that should remain a perpetual document of  
 " humility and patience to all good men in affliction, from  
 " this two-fold consideration, as on the one hand, of the  
 " infinite perfection, power, and wisdom of God ; so on  
 " the other, of human corruption, imbecility, and igno-  
 " rance, discoverable even in the best of men. For  
 " although in the speeches that occur there be much talk  
 " of

" of religion, virtue, and Providence ; of God's wisdom,  
 " justice, and holiness, in the government of the world ;  
 " of one principle of all things, and other most impor-  
 " tant truths ; yet that this, which I have assigned, is the  
 " only scope of the book, will appear manifest to every  
 " one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from  
 " the economy of the whole. For to say all in a word,  
 " it first presents *Job* complaining, expostulating, and  
 " indulging himself in an ungovernable grief, but soon  
 " after (when, as the nature of the sacred Drama re-  
 " quired, by the contradiction of his friends and their  
 " sinister suspicions he became more and more teased  
 " and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in  
 " his own integrity ; yet at length brought back to a due  
 " submission and knowledge of himself ; and then, at last,  
 " and not before, receiving from God both the reward  
 " and testimony of his uprightness. From all this, I say,  
 " it appears that the personal integrity of *Job*, and not  
 " the question concerning an equal or unequal provi-  
 " dence, is the principal subject of the book. For *that*  
 " it was (and there our attention should be fixed), which  
 " his friends doubted of ; not so much on account of his  
 " affliction, as for the not bearing his affliction with  
 " patience, but complaining of the justice of God. And  
 " that he who was an able adviser of others to fortitude  
 " and constancy, should, when his own trial came, sink  
 " under the stroke of his disasters. See cap. iv. ver. 12.  
 " 34. Now when the most grievous trial of all was  
 " added to the other evils of this holy person, to be con-  
 " demned by his friends as a profligate and a hypocrite,  
 " and to be deprived, as much as in them lay, of his only  
 " remaining support, the testimony of a good conscience,  
 " what was left for the unhappy man to do ? He accuses  
 " his friends of perfidy and cruelty ; he calls upon God  
 " as the witness and avenger of his integrity : but when  
 " neither God interposed to vindicate his innocence, nor  
 " his friends forbore to urge their harsh censures and  
 " unjust accusations, he appeals to that last judgment, in  
 " which, with the utmost confidence, he affirms that he  
 " knew, his Redeemer would be present to him, and that  
 " God would declare in his favour. But now, if the  
 " hinge of the controversy had turned on this, Whether

“ or no, consistently with God’s justice, good men could  
 “ be afflicted in this life, this declaration ought to have  
 “ finished the debate: but if the question were concern-  
 “ ing the personal innocence of *Job*, it was no wonder that  
 “ they still sung their old song, and went on as they had  
 “ begun, to condemn their old afflicted friend, since it  
 “ was in the power of God alone to explore the hearts  
 “ of men, and to know for certain whether it was *Job*’s  
 “ piety that rightly applied a consolation, or whether it  
 “ was his vanity that arrogated a false confidence to  
 “ himself.

“ This difficulty therefore being removed, namely, why  
 “ his friends were not immediately put to silence when  
 “ *Job* had so solemnly and magnificently talked of a  
 “ future judgment, nothing hinders us from applying  
 “ that celebrated text cap. xix. not to a temporal resti-  
 “ tution to his former condition, but to a resurrection to  
 “ eternal life. But if, to the arguments brought by our  
 “ Commentator, you add also those, which a writer  
 “ above all praise, the present Bishop of *Sarum*, hath  
 “ most beautifully interwoven in his *Dissertation on the*  
 “ *Opinion of the Ancients concerning the Circumstances*  
 “ *and Consequences of the Lapse of Mankind*, I believe you  
 “ will want nothing to confirm you in the opinion of the  
 “ antiquity of the book, and my sense of this most  
 “ perplexed passage.” Thus far the very candid and  
 learned writer; who will not be displeased with me for  
 examining the reasons he hath here offered against my  
 explanation of the book of *Job*.

He begins with saying, that *I have by many arguments sufficiently specious, endeavoured to prove that the whole book of Job is dramatical and allegorical, yet founded in true history, and written by Esdra in solace of the Jews, &c.* And then immediately subjoins, *Now in a matter very uncertain, and which hitherto hath been made more uncertain by the different opinions of learned men, hardly any hypothesis can be thought of which will satisfy in all its parts.* Let us attend to the opening of his cause.

1. He owns my *hypothesis to be sufficiently specious*, and yet calls the subject, which this *hypothesis* explains, a *matter very uncertain*; nay, *hitherto rendered more uncertain*.—By what? why, if you will believe himself;

by

by *many arguments sufficiently specious*; for this is the character he is pleased to give of these of mine, which fill up the measure of those *different opinions*, from whence so great *uncertainty* is accumulated. 2. He says that *in an uncertain matter scarce any hypothesis can satisfy*. Now, though this be a common-place thought, it is nevertheless a very false one. For it is only in *uncertain matters* that *hypotheses* are invented, to be applied, to account for the appearances of things: and sure it is not of the *nature* of an hypothesis to be *unsatisfactory*? 3. It is equally false that an *uncertain matter is*, otherwise than by accident, *rendered more uncertain by diversity of opinions*. For the greater the diversity is, the greater is the chance of coming to the truth: as the more roads men take in an uncertain way, the greater the likelihood of finding out the right. 4. It is not required in a *satisfactory hypothesis* that it should *satisfy in all its parts*: for then the greatest and most momentous truths would never be acquiesced in, since some of the fundamental points of religion, natural and revealed, do not *satisfy in all their parts*; there being inexplicable objections even to *demonstrative propositions*. 5. But what is strangest of all, though he says *hardly any hypothesis can be thought of which will satisfy in all its parts*; yet, before he comes to the end of his paragraph, he has found one that does *satisfy*: and, stranger still, it is the *common* one, whose incapacity of giving *satisfaction* was the reason for the critics excogitating *so many different ones*. However, in this hypothesis he rests, like a prudent man as he is. *Therefore* (says he) *as I am of their opinion who think the book of Job the oldest in the canon, so I am fully persuaded that it was written by Moses himself, who took it from authentic records, and put it into the dress of poetry*. Indeed, to make way through so much doubt and uncertainty, to an opinion he may find his account in, he has kept a wicket open by the insertion of the particle *vix*; *vix ulla forsán hypothesis*—but this will scarce serve his purpose; for the reasons why *hardly any hypothesis can satisfy*, extend as well to *that* he has given as to those he has rejected: unless he will suppose the rest to be discredited by dissenting from

that,



that, and not *that* from the rest: which perhaps after all may be his thought.

He proceeds—*And on this our opinion a good account may be given of all those texts, if any such there be, wherein allusion is made to the Jewish law or history before the book was written, no less than if we should allow it to have been written by Esdra, of whom the learned think differently.* Now, not to insist upon this, that the *common hypothesis*, here followed, which makes *Moses* the author, supposes him to have wrote it *before* his mission; and consequently, *before* the *Jewish* law and affairs, alluded to, were given and transacted: not, I say, to insist on this, though no probable reason can be assigned for *Moses's* writing such a work but for the people in *captivity*; I will readily allow that *Moses* might write any thing that happened to him or his people, in or before his administration, as easily as *Esdra* could do. But the question is, which of the two is most *likely* to have done so. Our Author grants this to be a work of *imitation*, or of the dramatic kind; in which the manners and adventures of the persons acting are to be represented. Now could *Moses* mistake, or, in such a work, give without mistaking, the history of his own time for the history of *Job's*? that is, make *Job* speak of the *Egyptian* darkness, or the passage of the Red Sea? Adventures of the writer's own achieving. *Esdra* indeed either way might well do this, as he lived so many ages after the facts in question. Could *Euripides*, for example, have been so absurd as to make *Orestes* and *Clytemnestra* speak of *his own* time or actions? Though he might, without much absurdity, have made them mix the manners, or allude to some adventures of the time of *Draco*. But our Author's caution deserves commendation; *if* (says he) *there be any such*: the use of this is evident, that if his own solution will not hold, he may be at liberty to deny the thing itself. But what he means, by observing it, in discredit of *Esdra's* claim, that *learned men think differently of him*, as if they did not think differently of *Moses* too, is, I confess, not so evident.

He goes on—*And as to those places, which in the opinion of the Author of the D. L. refer to histories of later times,*

*times, such as the sickness and recovery of Hezekiah, chap. xxxiii. ver. 25. and the destruction of the Assyrian army, chap. xxxiv. ver. 20. it will sufficiently appear, by the notes to which I refer the reader, that there is no need to understand them in this sense, and that they are more commodiously understood otherwise. On this point I agree to join issue with him, and to refer myself to the judgment of the public.*

*Further, (says he) that the work is dramatical, or, to speak more properly, a true history in the form of a drama, and adorned with a poetical dress, was always my opinion: but that any allegory lies under it, I can by no means persuade myself to believe; because not only the age of the writer, but the very scope of the book (as far as I can see) leads us to conclude otherwise. As to the scope of the book, we shall examine that matter by and by: but his other argument, from the age of the writer, deserves no examination at all, as it is a downright begging the question; which is concerning the writer and his age. Now these, by reason of the writer's silence, being uncertain, must be determined by the subject and circumstances of the work, which are certain: for our Author, therefore, to disprove a circumstance, brought to determine the question, by an argument in which the question is taken for granted, I should think unfair, were it not become the authorized logic of all those writers who give their own opinions for principles. It rests then at last, we see, in his belief and persuasion: and this is always regulated on the belief and persuasion of those who went before. Thus he believes the book to be dramatical, because others have believed so too: he believes it not to be allegorical, because he could find no other in that belief before the Author of the D. L.-- But let us now hear what he has to say concerning the scope of the book.*

*For as to what this Writer [the Author of the D. L.] says, that the main question handled in the book of Job is whether good happens to the good, and evil to evil men, or whether both happen not promiscuously to both; and that this question (a very foreign one to us, and therefore the less attended to) could never be the subject of disputation any where but in the land of Judæa, nor there neither at*

*any other time than that which he assigns; all this, I say, depends on the truth of his hypothesis, and is, in my opinion, far otherwise.* That which depends on the truth of an hypothesis has, indeed, generally speaking, a very slender foundation: and I am partly of opinion it was the common prejudice against this support, that inclined our Author to give my notions no better. But he should have been a little more careful in timing his observation: for, as it happens, what I have shewn to be the subject of the book, is so far from depending on the truth of my hypothesis, that the truth of my hypothesis depends on what I have shewn to be the subject of the book; and very fitly so, as every reasonable hypothesis should be supported on *fact*. Now I appeal to the whole learned world, whether it be not as clear a *fact* that the subject of the book of *Job* is *whether good happens to the good, and evil to evil men, or whether both happen not promiscuously to both*; as that the subject of the first book of *Tusculan Disputations* is *de contemnenda morte*. On this I establish my hypothesis, that the book of *Job* must have been written about the time of *Esdra*, because no other assignable time can be suited to the subject.—But 'tis possible I may mistake what he calls *my hypothesis*: for aught I know he may understand not *that* of the book of *Job*, but *that* of the book of the *Divine Legislation*. And then, by *my hypothesis*, he must mean the great religious principle I endeavour to evince, THAT THE JEWS WERE IN REALITY UNDER AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. But it will be paying me a very unusual compliment to call *that* my hypothesis which the Bible was written to testify; which all Christians *profess* to believe; and which none but Infidels *directly* deny. However, if this be the *hypothesis* he means, I need desire no better a support. But the truth is, my interpretation of the book of *Job* seeks support from nothing but those common rules of grammar and logic on which the sense of all kinds of writings are or ought to be interpreted.

He goes on in this manner. *For the sole purpose of the sacred Writer seems to me to be this, to compose a work that should remain a perpetual document of humility and patience to all good men in affliction, from this two-*  
fold

*fold consideration, as on the one hand of the infinite perfection, power, and wisdom of God; so on the other, of human corruption, imbecility, and ignorance, discoverable even in the best of men.* Such talk, in a sermon to his parish for the sake of a moral application, might be right: but to speak thus to the *learned world*, is surely out of season. The critic will be apt to tell him he has mistaken the *actor* for the *subject*, and might on the same principle as well conclude that the purpose of *Virgil's Poem* is not the establishment of an empire in *Italy*, but the personal piety of *Aeneas*. But to be a little more explicit, as the peculiar nature of this work demands. The book of *Job* consists of two distinct parts; the *narrative*, contained in the prologue and epilogue; and the *argumentative*, which composes the body of the work. Now when the question is of the subject of a book, who means other than the body of it? Yet here our Author, by a strange fatality, mistaking the *narrative* part for the *argumentative*, gives us the subject of the Introduction and Conclusion for that of the Work itself. And it is very true, that the *beginning* and the *end* do exhibit a perpetual document of *humility and patience to all good men in affliction*. But it is as true, that the *body* of the Work neither *does* nor *could* exhibit any such document. First it *does not*; for, that humility and patience, which *Job* manifests before his entering into dispute, is succeeded by rage and ostentation when he becomes heated with unreasonable opposition. Secondly, it *could not*; because it is altogether *argumentative*; the subject of which must necessarily be a *proposition* debated, and not a *document* exemplified. A *precept* may be conveyed in history, but a *disputation* can exhibit only a debated *question*. I have shewn what that *question* is; and he, instead of proving that I have assigned a wrong one, goes about to persuade the reader, that there is no question at all.

He proceeds. *For although in the speeches that occur there be much talk of religion, virtue, and Providence, of God's wisdom, justice, and holiness in the government of the world, of one principle of all things, and other most important truths, yet that this which I have assigned is the only scope of the book will appear manifest*

to every one, as well from the beginning and the end as from the economy of the whole. For to say all in a word, it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief; but soon after (when as the nature of the sacred Drama required, by the contradiction of his friends, and their sinister suspicions, he became more and more teased and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity: yet at length brought back to a due submission and knowledge of himself. The reader now sees that all this is just as pertinent as if I should say, Mr. *Chillingworth's* famous book against *Knot* was not to prove the religion of Protestants a safe way to salvation, but to give the picture of an artful caviller and a candid disputer. For, although, in the arguments that occur, there be much talk of Protestantism, Popery, infallibility, a judge of controversies, fundamentals of faith, and other most important matters, yet that this which I have assigned is the only scope of the book, will appear manifest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from the economy of the whole. For it first of all presents the sophist quibbling, chicaning, and indulging himself in all the imaginable methods of false reasoning: and soon after, as the course of disputation required, resting on his own authority, and loading his adversary with personal calumnies; yet at length, by the force of truth and good logic, brought back to the point, confuted, exposed, and put to silence. Now if I should say this of the book of *Chillingworth*, would it not be as true, and as much to the purpose, as what our Author hath said of the book of *Job*? The matters in the discourse of the *Religion of Protestants* could not be treated as they are, without exhibiting the two characters of a sophist and a true logician. Nor could the matters in the book of *Job* be treated as they are, without exhibiting a good man in afflictions, complaining and expostulating, impatient under the contradiction of his friends, yet at length brought back to a due submission, and knowledge of himself. But therefore to make this the sole or chief scope of the book, (for in this he varies) is perverting all the rules of interpretation.—But what misled him we have taken notice of above. And he himself points to it,

it, where he says, *the subject I have assigned to the book of Job appears the true both from the BEGINNING and the END.* It is true, he adds, and *from the economy of the whole* likewise.

Which he endeavours to prove in this manner :

*For it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief: but soon after (when, as the nature of the sacred Drama required, by the contradiction of his friends, and their sinister suspicions, he became more and more teased and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity: yet at length brought back to a due submission and knowledge of himself; and then at last, and not before, receiving from God both the reward and testimony of his uprightness.* This is indeed a fair account of the conduct of the Drama. And from this it appears, *first*, that that which he assigns for the sole scope of the book, cannot be the true. For if its design were to give *a perpetual document of humility and patience*, how comes it to pass, that the author, in the execution of this design, represents *Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable grief, rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own integrity?* Could a painter, think you, in order to represent the ease and safety of navigation, draw a vessel getting with much pains and difficulty into harbour, after having lost all her lading and been miserably torn and shattered by a tempest? And yet you think a writer, in order to give a *document of humility and patience*, had sufficiently discharged his plan if he made *Job* conclude *resigned and submissive*, though he had drawn him turbulent, impatient, and almost blasphemous throughout the whole piece. *Secondly*, it appears from the learned Author's account of the conduct of the Drama, that that which I have assigned for the sole scope of the book is the true. For if, in *Job's* distressful circumstance, the question concerning an *equal or unequal Providence* were to be debated: his friends, if they held the former part, must *needs* doubt of his integrity; this doubt would naturally provoke *Job's* indignation; and, when persisted in, cause him to fly out into the intemperate excesses so well described by our Author; yet conscious innocence would at length enable patience to

to do its office, and the conclusive argument for his integrity would be his resignation and submission.

The learned writer shuts up the argument thus. *From all this, I say, it appears, that the personal integrity of Job, and not the question concerning an equal or unequal Providence, is the principal subject of the book.* He had before only told us his *opinion*; and now, from his *opinion*, he says it *appears*. But appearances, we see, are deceitful; as indeed they will always be, when they arise only out of the fancy or inclination, and not from the real nature of things.

But he proceeds to push his advantages. *For that [i. e. his personal integrity] it was which his friends doubted of, not so much on account of his affliction, as for the not bearing his affliction with patience, but complaining of the justice of God.* And that he, who was an able adviser of others to fortitude and constancy, should, when his own trial came, sink under the stroke of his disasters.—But why not on account of his afflictions? Do not we find that even now, under this *unequal* distribution of things, censorious men (and such doubtless he will confess Job's comforters to have been) are but too apt to suspect great afflictions for the punishment of secret sins? How much more prone to the same suspicion would such men be in the time of Job, when the ways of Providence were more *equal*? As to his *impatience in bearing affliction*, that symptom was altogether ambiguous, and might as likely denote want of fortitude as want of innocence, and proceed as well from the pain of an ulcerated body as the anguish of a distracted conscience.

Well, our Author has brought the Patriarch thus far on his way to expose his *bad temper*. From hence he accompanies him to his place of rest; which, he makes to be in a *bad argument*.—*Now when* (says the learned Writer) *the most grievous trial of all was added to the other evils of this holy person, to be condemned by his friends as a profligate, and an hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much as in them lay, of his only remaining support, the testimony of a good conscience, what was left for the unhappy man to do?* He accuses his friends of *perfidy and cruelty*; he calls upon God as the witness and avenger of his integrity; but when neither God

*interposed*

*interposed to vindicate his innocence, nor his friends forbore to urge their harsh censures and unjust accusations, he appeals to that last judgment, in which with the utmost confidence he affirms that he knew that his Redeemer would be present to him, and that God would declare in his favour.* To understand the force of this representation, we must have in mind this unquestionable truth: "That be the subject of the book what it will, yet if the sacred Writer bring in the persons of the Drama disputing, he will take care that they talk to the purpose." Now we both agree that *Job's* friends had pretended to suspect his integrity. This suspicion it was *Job's* business to remove: and, if our Author's account of the subject be true, his only business. To this end he offers various arguments, which failing of their effect, he, at last (as our Author will have it), appeals to the second coming of the Redeemer of Mankind. But was this likely to satisfy them? They demand a present solution of their doubts, and he sends them to a future judgment. Nor can our Author say, though he would insinuate, that this was such a sort of appeal as disputants are sometimes forced to have recourse to, when they are run aground and have nothing more to offer: for *Job*, after this, proceeds in the dispute; and urges many other arguments with the utmost propriety. Indeed there is one way, and but one, to make the appeal pertinent: and that is, to suppose our Author mistaken, when he said that *the personal integrity of Job, and not the question concerning an equal or unequal Providence, was the main subject of the book*: and we may venture to suppose so without much danger of doing him wrong: for, the doctrine of a future judgment affords a principle whercon to determine the question of an equal or unequal Providence; but leaves the personal integrity of *Job* just as it found it. But the learned Author is so little solicitous for the pertinency of the argument, that he makes, as we shall now see, its impertinence one of the great supports of his system. For thus he goes on: *But now if the hinge of the controversy had turned on this, whether or no, consistently with God's justice, good men could be afflicted in this life, this declaration ought to have finished the debate: but if the question were*  
concerning



concerning the personal innocence of Job, it was no wonder that they still sung their old song, and went on as they had begun, to condemn their old afflicted friend; since it was in the power of God alone to explore the hearts of men, and to know for certain whether it was Job's piety that rightly applied a consolation, or whether it was his vanity that arrogated a false confidence to himself. This is a very pleasant way of coming to the sense of a disputed passage: not, as of old, by shewing it supports the *Writer's argument*, but by shewing it supports nothing but the *Critic's hypothesis*. I had taken it for granted that Job reasoned to the purpose, and therefore urged this argument against understanding him as speaking of the Resurrection in the sixth chapter: "The disputants (say I, Div. Leg. Book vi. § 2.) are all equally embarrassed in adjusting the ways of Providence. Job affirms that the good man is sometimes unhappy: the three friends pretend that he never can; because such a situation would reflect upon God's justice. Now the doctrine of a resurrection supposed to be urged by Job, cleared up all this embarrass. If therefore his friends thought it true, it ended the dispute; if false, it lay upon them to confute it. Yet they do neither: they neither call it into question, nor allow it to be decisive. But without the least notice that any such thing had been urged, they go on as they begun, to inforce their former arguments, and to confute that which they seem to understand was the only one Job had urged against them, viz. the consciousness of his own innocence." Now what says our learned Author to this? Why, he says, that if I be mistaken, and he right, in his account of the book of Job, the reason is plain why the three friends took no notice of Job's appeal to a resurrection; namely, because it deserved none. As to his being in the *right*, the reader, I suppose, will not be greatly solicitous, if it be one of the consequences that the sacred Reasoner is in the *wrong*. However, before we allow him to be right, it will be expected he should answer the following questions. If, as he says, the point in the book of Job was only his personal innocence, and this, not (as I say) upon the principle of no innocent person punished, I would ask, how it was possible

possible that *Job's* friends and intimates should be so obstinately bent on pronouncing him guilty, the purity of whose former life and conversation they were so well acquainted with? If he will say, the disputants went *upon that principle*; I then ask, how came *Job's* appeal to a resurrection not to silence his opposers? as it accounted for the justice of God in the present unequal distribution of things.

The learned Writer proceeds—*This difficulty therefore being removed, namely, why his friends were not immediately put to silence when Job had so solemnly and magnificently talked of a future judgment, nothing hinders us from applying that celebrated text chap. xix. not to a temporal restitution to his former condition, but to a resurrection to eternal life.* How well he has removed the difficulty, the reader now sees. But he is too hasty, when he adds, that *now nothing hinders us from applying the celebrated text chap. xix. to a resurrection to eternal life.* I have shewn, in my Discourse on *Job*, that many things hinder us from understanding it in this sense, besides the silence of the three friends; such as the silence of *Elihu* the moderator, nay even of God himself the determiner of the dispute\*. Which difficulties become still more perplexing, if indeed the *sole scope* of the book be, as our Author supposes, to give a *perpetual document of humility and patience to all good men in affliction*: for then the doctrine needed the sanction of the most deliberate and authoritative speakers. Add to this; that the learned Writer's account of the *author* creates new difficulties. For, can we suppose, *Moses* would so clearly mention a *future judgment* here, and entirely omit it in the *Pentateuch*? Or is it a matter of so slight moment that a single mention of it would suffice? Indeed, were *Esdra* (as I suppose) the author, much more might be said in behalf of this interpretation; as we have shewn that the later Prophets opened, by degrees, the great principles of the Gospel Dispensation: of which I would fain think the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body* to be one.

He concludes—*But if, to the arguments brought by our Commentator, you add also those, which a writer*

\* Div. Leg. Book vi. § 2.

*above all praise, the present Bishop of Sarum, hath most beautifully interwoven in his Dissertation on The Opinion of the Ancients concerning the Circumstances and Consequences of the Lapse of Mankind, I believe you will want nothing to confirm you in the opinion of the antiquity of the book, and my sense of this most perplexed passage. To seek refuge in that excellent Prelate, whose notions of the nature and design of the book of Job overthrow all he has been saying, and confirm all he has been opposing, looks very much like distress. However, if he will submit to the Bishop's authority for the scope of the book in general, I shall be very willing to allow his interpretation of the nineteenth chapter. Our Author indeed does that great man's character but justice. Yet how Dr. Schultens and Dr. Sherlock came to hit the same palate, to me, I confess, is as hard to reconcile, as how *Bacius* and *Virgil* should meet for a model to the same writer.*

But the *name* of that great man is *auspicious* to sacred truth. One can no sooner mention him, on any occasion of literature, than one sees him pointing out some truth or other, capable, if attended to, of clearing up whatever may be in question. His fine Discourse on the Book of *Job* abounds with instances of this kind. One of which falls here naturally in my way. And as it seems the least supported of his interpretations, and, at the same time, greatly confirms what I have advanced concerning the *age* of the book, I shall endeavour to set it in a just light. The *truth* I mean is in his interpretation of these words of *Job*, *By his Spirit the heavens are garnished; his hand formed the CROOKED SERPENT* \*. By which, he supposes, is meant the DEVIL, the apostate dragon, δράκων ἀποστάτης, as the *Septuagint*, by thus translating it, seems to have understood the place. For he reasonably asks, *How came the forming of a crooked serpent to be mentioned as an instance of Almighty power, and to be set, as it were, upon an equal foot with the creation of the heavens and all the host of them.—Can it possibly be imagined (says he) that the forming the crooked serpent meant no more than that God created snakes and adders* †.

\* Cap. xxvi. ver. 13.

† The Use and Intent of Prophecy, &c. 3d Edit. pp. 213, 214.

Certainly,

Certainly, this could never be the meaning. But then it will be objected by those who are as loth to find a *devil* for their *tempter*, as a *God* for their *Redeemer* (imagining they are well capable of performing both parts themselves), that, by the *crooked serpent*, is meant a *great constellation* near the Arctic Pole, so called; or, at least, that *enormous* trail of light to which the Pagans have given the name of the *Via Lactea*: either of which will beautify the sense, and ennoble the expression of the context; the circumstance, of *garnishing the heavens*, being immediately precedent. It must be owned that this interpretation has an extreme air of probability. But it is nevertheless a false one; as I shall now endeavour to shew.

It is certain then that the ancient *Hebrews* (if we may believe the Rabbins, who seem, in this case, to be unexceptionable evidence) did not, in their astronomy, represent the stars, either single, or in constellations, by the name, or figure, of any animal whatsoever; or distinguish them any otherwise than by the letters of their alphabet artificially applied. And this, they tell us, was their constant practice, till in the latter ages; when they got acquainted with the science of the *Greeks*: then indeed, they learnt the art of new tricking up their *sphere*, and making it as fashionable as their neighbours. But they did it still with modesty and reserve; and scrupled, even then, to admit of any human figure. The reason given for this prudery (which was *the danger of idolatry*) is the highest confirmation of the truth of their account. For it is not to be believed, that when the *astronomy* and *superstition* of *Egypt* were so closely collocated, and that by this very means, the *names* given to the constellations, that *Moses*, who, under the ministry of God, forbade the *Israelites to make any likeness of any thing in heaven above*, would suffer them to make *new likenesses* there: which if not, in the first intention, set up to be worshipped, yet we know never waited long without obtaining that honour. From all this it appears, that neither *Moses* nor *Esdra* could call a constellation by the name of the *crooked serpent*. The consequence is, that his Lordship's interpretation is to be received; there being nothing else of moment to be opposed to its truth.

But this sense, we say, gives strong support to what we have observed, in *The Divine Legation*, (book ix. ch. 1.) concerning the age of the author. It being there shewn, that, according to the method used by Providence for the gradual opening of the Gospel principles, we might look to find, in this very place (as we in fact do find) the *first* more express information concerning the *real* author of the Fall of Man, as recorded in the *third* chapter of *Genesis*.

But, to conclude with the learned Editor of the book of *Job*. He had, I presume, given the intelligent reader more satisfaction, if, instead of labouring to evade two or three independent though corroborating proofs of the *truth* of my hypothesis, he had well accounted how that hypothesis, which he affects to represent as a *false* one, should be able to lay open and unfold the whole Poem upon one entire, elegant, and noble plan, that does honour to the sacred Writer who composed it. And not only so, but to clear up, consistently with that *plan*, all those particular texts, whose want of light had made them hitherto an easy prey to critics and interpreters from every quarter. And this, in a Poem become through time and negligence so desperately perplexed, that commentators chose rather to find their own notions in it than to seek for those of the author. This, how negligently soever the learned Writer may think of it, the Public, I am persuaded, will consider as a very uncommon mark of truth; and deserving of another kind of confutation than what he hath bestowed upon it.

#### Section 5.

[See Divine Legation, Books i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi.]

HERE I should have ended, had I not been told there was something still more wanted than a defence of particular passages; which commonly indeed carry their own evidence along with them; and that was a general review of the argument of *The Divine Legation*, so far as it was yet advanced; explaining the relation which the several parts bear to each other, and to the whole: for that the deep professor who had digested his theology into *sums* and *systems*, and the gentle preacher who never ventured

ventured to let a thought expatiate beyond the limits of a *pulpit essay*, would join to tell me, I had promised to DEMONSTRATE THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES; and that now, I had written two large volumes with that *title*, all that they could find in them were discourses on the *Foundation of Morality*; the *Origin of civil and religious Society*; the *Alliance between Church and State*; the *Policy of ancient Lawgivers*; the *Mysteries of the Priests*, and the *Opinions of the Greek Philosophers*; the *Antiquity of Egypt*, their *Hieroglyphics*, their *Heroes*, and their *Brutal-Worship*. That, indeed, at last, I speak a little of the *Jewish Policy*, but I soon break away again as from a subject I would avoid; and employ the remaining part of the volume on the *Sacrifice of Isaac*, the *Book of Job*, and on *primary and secondary Prophecies*. But what, say they, is all this to the DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES?

*Dic, Posthume! de tribus Capellis.*

—To call the *notion* a PARADOX was very well: but not to see that I had attempted to prove it, must be owned to be still better. I was aware of this complaint, because I knew with whom I had to do; and therefore, in the entry of my second volume, was willing that CICERO, who had been in the like circumstance himself, should speak for me\*.

But (as it proved) to little purpose. The greatness of his authority, and the docility of his readers, which made a few words sufficient in his case, were both wanting in mine. So that I soon found myself under a necessity of speaking for *myself*; or rather, for my *argument*. Which as it was drawn out to an uncommon length, and raised upon a great variety of supports, sought out from every quarter of antiquity, and sometimes from the most remote and darkest, it was the less to be admired if every

\* Video hanc primam ingressionein meam non ex Oratoris disputationibus ductam, sed à mediâ Philosophiâ repetitam, & eam quidem cum antiquam tum subobscuram, aut *reprehensionis* aliquid, aut certe *admirationis* habituram. Nam aut mirabantur *quid hæc pertineant ad ea quæ quarimus*: quibus satisfaciet res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa alte repetita videatur: aut reprehendent, *quod inusitatas vias indagemus tritas relinquamus*. Ego autem me sæpe nova videre dicere intelligo cum pervetera dicam, sed inaudita plerisque. Cicero.

*candid* reader should not see their full force and various purpose; and still less, if the *enthus* and *prejudiced* should concur to represent it as an inconnected heap of discourses put together to disburthen a common-place. For the satisfaction therefore of the *former*, I shall endeavour to expose, in one clear and simple light, the whole conduct of these *mysterious* volumes.

Nor should the *latter* be neglected. Though 'tis odds but we part as dissatisfied with one another, as *Bertrand* and his customer. Of whom the story goes, that a grave well-dressed man, coming to the shop of that ingenious inventer and reliever of the distresses of all those who are too dull to know what they want, and too rich to be at ease with what they have, demanded one of his best reading glasses; which when he had examined upon all sorts of print, he returned back with solemn assurance that he could not read at all in it. *Bertrand*, when he had recovered from the surprise of so strange a phenomenon, fairly asked him, *Sir, could you ever read at all?* To which the other as fairly replied, *Had I been so happy, I had not come hither for your assistance.* Should I not therefore, with the same forecast, have asked these people, "Gentlemen, before I put my argument for you in a new light, pray tell me, do you understand an argument in any light at all?" But would they have answered with the same ingenuity? They are silent. They modestly let their *works* speak for them. To go on, therefore, with our subject.

In reading the *law* and *history* of the *Jews*, with all the attention I was able, amongst the many very singular circumstances of that amazing dispensation (from each of which, as I conceive, the *divinity* of its original may be clearly deduced), these two particulars more forcibly struck my observation, *first*, the *omission of the doctrine of a future state* of rewards and punishments in the religion of that people; no instance of the like nature being to be found throughout the whole history of mankind: in all the infinite variety of Gentile religions this doctrine ever making a principal and most essential part. The *other* was no less singular, that the founder of this religion should pretend *his dispensation was to be administered by an extraordinary providence*; that his laws

should

should have all one constant direction pursuant to this pretence; and that the succeeding writers of the Jewish history should all concur in the same representation: no lawgiver or founder of religion ever promising the like distinction; and no historian ever daring to record so singular a prerogative.

As unaccountable as the *former* circumstance appeared, when considered separately and alone, yet when set against the *latter*, and their relations to each other examined, one illustrious reason of the *omission of the doctrine of a future state* was not only immediately perceived, but, from that very *omission*, the *divinity* of the Jewish religion clearly demonstrated. Which as unbelievers had been long accustomed to decry from that very circumstance, I chose *that* preferably to all other, as a proof of THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES. The argument is, in a supreme degree, strong and simple; and not needing many words to make it understood.

I. *Religion*, such as teaches a God, the rewarder of good, and the punisher of evil actions, is absolutely necessary for the support of *civil society*: because human laws alone are not sufficient to restrain men from evil in any degree necessary for the carrying on the affairs of public regimen. But the *inequality* of events here below shaking the belief of that *Providence* on which all religion must be founded (for *he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently seek him*) there was no other way of supporting and re-establishing that belief than by the doctrine of *a future state*, wherein all these inequalities should be set even, and every action receive *its due recompence of reward*. The doctrine therefore of *a future state* is *immediately* necessary to *religion*; and, through that, *ultimately* to *civil society*. Yet, here we find a religion *without a future state*, professed with great advantage through many ages by a civil-policed and powerful people. It appears, from what has been said above, that, under the *common* dispensations of Providence, *such* a religion would be so far from supporting society, that it could not even subsist itself. We must conclude, therefore, that the *Jewish people* were, as their founder



and their historians pretended, *indeed* under the dispensation of an *extraordinary* providence.

II. Again, it appears from the universal *practice* of the ancient *lawgivers*, and the *principles* of the ancient *sages*, that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was esteemed thus necessary to religion and society, under the common dispensations of Providence. The *Egyptian* policy and wisdom particularly, from whence those *lawgivers* and *sages* borrowed *theirs*, cultivated this doctrine, for these ends, with an amazing assiduity. Now *Moses*, who, as we are assured by the infallible testimony of the Holy Spirit, was *learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians*, and whose laws themselves, as the Deist confesses, bespeak him a consummate master in his art; this *Moses*, I say, when instituting a *new* religion, and forming an *uncivilized* people to society, hath been so far from inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, that he hath even *omitted* to make the least mention of it. Who sees not then that one reason of the *omission* must needs be, that this wise lawgiver understood, his religion and policy might well subsist without it? But, under the common dispensations of Providence, his principles of *Egyptian* wisdom had taught him, that neither one nor the other could do so. What therefore are we to conclude, but that he himself was fully convinced of the *truth* of what he taught his countrymen, *That they were thenceforward to live under the extraordinary providence of God*.

These two proofs of my MAIN PROPOSITION, from the *thing omitted*, and the *person omitting* (which as they are distinct and independent of one another, so I would desire the reader to observe that they are either of them *alone* sufficient to establish my demonstration) may be reduced to these two SYLLOGISMS:

I. Whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence.

The Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support.

Therefore the Jewish religion and society were supported by an extraordinary providence.

Again,

Again, II. It was universally believed by the Ancients, on their common principles of legislation and wisdom, that whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support must be supported by an extraordinary providence.

*Moses*, skilled in all that legislation and wisdom, instituted the *Jewish* religion and society without a future state for its support.

Therefore *Moses* who taught, believed likewise, that *this* religion and society were to be supported by an extraordinary providence.

This is the grand PARADOX I have been accused of advancing: in the meanwhile, the *free-thinker* esteems it *none* to contradict the universal voice of antiquity; nor the *system-maker*, to explain away the whole letter of sacred Scripture. For had not libertines denied the MAJOR propositions of these two *sylogisms*; and certain bigoted believers, the MINOR; my demonstration of *The Divine Legation of Moses* had not only been as *strong*, but as *short* too as any of *Euclid's*: whose *theorems*, as *Hobbes* somewhere truly observes, were but the passions and prejudices of men equally concerned in, would soon be made as much matter of dispute as any *moral* or *theological* proposition whatsoever.

It was not long then before I found that the discovery of this important truth would engage me in a full dilucidation of my *four propositions*: neither a short, nor an easy task. The *two first* requiring a severe search into the civil policy, religion, and philosophy of ancient times: and the *two latter*, a minute inquiry concerning the nature and genius of the *Jewish* constitution. To the *first* part of this inquiry, therefore, I assigned the *first* volume; and to the *other*, the *second*\*.

### I.

I. The FIRST volume begins with proving the MAJOR proposition of the *first* *sylogism*, that *whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence*. Where it is shewn, that *civil society*, which was instituted as a remedy against *force* and *injustice*, falls short in many

\* Books i. ii. iii. & iv. v. vi. originally appeared in two vols. 4to.

instances, of its effect; as it cannot, by its own proper force, provide for the observance of above one *third* part of *moral* duties; and, of that third, but *imperfectly*: and, which is still of greater importance, that it totally wants the *first* of those two powers, *reward* and *punishment*, which are owned by all to be the necessary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be carried on. To supply which wants and imperfections, some other coactive power was to be added. This power is shewn to be *religion*; which teaching the *providence* and *justice* of the Deity, provides for all the natural deficiencies of *civil society*. But then those *attributes*, as we shew, can be supported only by the doctrine of a *future state* of rewards and punishments; or by a present dispensation of things very different from that which we experience to be here administered.

The point being thus proved, the discourse proceeds in removing *objections*. The reader observes, that the steps and gradations of this great truth rise thus—A *future state* is necessary, as it supports *religion*; religion is necessary, as it supports *morality*; and morality, as it supports *society*. Hence I *concluded* the doctrine of a *future state* to be necessary to society. Now there are various degrees in *libertinism*. Some, though they own morality, yet deny *religion*, to be necessary to society: others again go still further, and deny even *morality* to be necessary. As these equally attempt to break the chain of my reasoning, they come equally under my examination. And luckily, in the *first* instance, a great name, and in the *second*, a great book, invited me to this entertainment. 1. The famous Mr. *Bayle*, had attempted to prove that *religion* was not necessary to society; that *morality*, as distinguished from religion, might well supply its place; and that an *ATHEIST* might have this morality. His arguments in support of these propositions I have examined at large. And having occasion, when I come to the last of them, to inquire into the *true foundation of morality*, I consider all its pretences; inquire into all its advantages; and shew that *obligation*, properly so called, proceeds from *will*, and will *only*. This inquiry was *directly* to my point, as the result of it proves that the morality of the *Atheist* must be without any true foundation,

foundation, and consequently weak and easily shaken. Yet it had a further propriety, as the religion, whose divine original I was here attempting to demonstrate, has founded moral obligation in *will only*; and a peculiar expediency, as it is become the humour of the times to seek for this *foundation* in any thing rather than in what *religion* places it. 2. But the author of the *Fable of the Bees* went a large step further, and endeavoured to prove that *morality* was so far from being necessary to society, that, on the contrary, it was vice, not virtue, which rendered states flourishing and happy. This pernicious doctrine, which would cut away our argument by the root, was enforced with much laboured art and plausible insinuation. I undertook therefore to examine and confute the principles it went upon: which I presume to have done so effectually, as will secure the reader from the danger of being any longer misled by it. In this manner I endeavoured to prove the MAJOR proposition of the *first* syllogism: and, with this, the *first* book of *The Divine Legation of Moses* concludes.

II. The *second* begins with proving the MAJOR proposition of the *second* syllogism, that *It was universally believed by the Ancients, on their common principles of legislation and wisdom, that whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence.* This proof divides itself into two parts, the *conduct of the lawgivers*, and the *opinion of the philosophers.* The *first* part is examined in the *present* book, and the *second* in the *following.*

In proving the proposition from the *conduct of the lawgivers*, I shew, I. Their care to PROPAGATE, First, *Religion in general.* 1. As it appears from the *reason of things*, viz. the state of religion all over the civilized world. 2. As it appears from *fact*, such as their universal pretence to *inspiration*; which, it is shewn, was made only to establish the opinion of the superintendency of the gods over human affairs: and such as their universal practice in the manner of *prefacing* their laws; where the same superintendency was taught and inculcated. And here I desire it may be observed, that the proving their care to propagate *religion in general*, proves, at the same time, their propagating the doctrine of a *future state*;

*state*; because there never was any religion in the world but the *Jewish*, of which that doctrine did not make an essential part. I shew, secondly, their care to *propagate the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in particular*. And, as the most effectual method they employed to this purpose was the institution of the MYSTERIES, I give a large account of their rise and progress; which I shew to have been from *Egypt* into *Greece*. The detection of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of these *mysteries*, which were the *unity of the Godhead*, and the *error of the grosser Polytheism*, not only confirms all that is advanced concerning the rise, progress, and order of the several species of idolatry, but rectifies and clears up much einbarras and mistake even in the best modern critics, such as *Cudworth, Prideaux, Newton, &c.* while they ventured, contrary to the tenour of Holy Scripture, to suppose that the *One God* was commonly known and worshipped in the Pagan world. For finding many, in divers countries, speaking of the One God, they concluded he must needs have a national worship paid to him; though the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, represent the Gentiles in a total ignorance of the true God, and entirely given up to Polytheism. This, as we say, has occasioned much confusion and mistake in our best writers on this subject, while they would reconcile their own conclusions to Scripture premises. Now the discovery of the ἀπέρρητα of the mysteries, enables us to explain the perfect consistency between sacred and profane antiquity; which, left to speak for themselves, and without interpreters, inform us of this plain and consistent truth, "That the doctrine of the One God was taught " in all places, as a profound secret to a *few* in the celebration of their mysterious rites; but that a public or " *national worship* was paid to him no where but in the " *land of Judæa*." Where, as *Eusebius* well expresses it, *for the Hebrew PEOPLE alone was reserved the honour of being initiated into the knowledge of the Creator of all things*. And, of this difference, God himself speaks, by the Prophet, *I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth; I said not unto the seed of Jacob, seek ye me in vain*\*. And the holy Apostle informs us of the

\* Isaiah xlv. 19.

consequence

consequence of this mysterious manner of teaching the true God, that when, by this means, they came to the *knowledge of him, they glorified him not as God\**. To confirm my account of the mysteries, I subjoin a critical dissertation on the *sixth Book of Virgil's Æneis*; and another, on the *Metamorphosis of Apuleius*. The *first* of which I prove to be one continued *description* of the *mysteries*; and the *second*, to be written purposely to *recommend* their use and efficacy. But by mischance (and the only one of this kind in the two volumes) the dissertation on *Apuleius* is misplaced. The reader will observe, that, through the course of this whole argument, on the conduct of the ancient lawgivers, it appears that all the fundamental principles of their policy were borrowed from EGYPT. A truth that will be made greatly subservient to the *minor* of my *second* syllogism (that *Moses was skilled in all the ancient legislation and wisdom, and yet instituted the Jewish religion and society without a future state for its support*) as well when I prove the *latter* part of the proposition in the *second* volume, as the *former* part, in the *third*; where the character of *Moses* is vindicated from the objections of infidelity. From this, and from what has been said above of *moral obligation*, the intelligent reader will take notice, that throughout *The Divine Legation*, I have all along endeavoured to select for my purpose such kind of arguments, in support of the *particular* question in hand, as may, at the same time, either illustrate the truth of *Revelation in general*, or serve as a principle to proceed upon in the *progress of the argument*. Of which we shall give, as occasion serves, several further instances in the course of this *review*.

Thus, having shewn the legislator's care to *propagate* religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular (in which is seen their sense of the inseparable connexion between them), I go on, II. To explain the contrivances they employed to PERPETUATE them: by which it may appear that, in their opinion, *religion* was not a temporary expedient to secure their own power, but a necessary support of civil government. 1. The first instance of their care to this end was, as we shew, the

\* Romans i. 21.

ESTABLISHING every where a *national religion protected by the laws of the state*. But men ignorant of true religion could hardly avoid falling into mistakes in the *mode* of this *establishment*; pursuing a right end by very wrong means: therefore, as the subject of our book is no idle unconcerning speculation, but such as affects us in all our highest interests as men and citizens, I thought a defence of the justice and equity of an ESTABLISHED RELIGION would well deserve the reader's best attention; and this I have given him, in an explanation of the true *theory* of the *alliance between church and state*. 2. The second expedient the legislator used for *perpetuating* religion, I shew was the allowance of a GENERAL TOLERATION, which, as it would, for the same reason, be as wrongly conceived as an *establishment*, I have attempted to give the true *theory* of that likewise. Where, speaking of the cause and first occasion of its violation, the subject naturally led me to vindicate true religion from the aspersions of infidelity. And here I shew that the first persecution for religion was not *that* which was *committed*, but *that* which was *undergone*, by the Christian church. And thus ends the *second* book of *The Divine Legation*.

III. The *third* begins with the *latter part* of the proof of the MAJOR proposition of the *second* syllogism; namely, *the opinions of the philosophers*. For as the great waste of time hath destroyed most of the monuments of ancient *legislation*, I thought it proper to strengthen my position, of the sense of their lawgivers, by that of their sages and philosophers. Where I shew *first*, from their own words, the sense they had in general of the necessity of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments to civil society. But to set the fact in the strongest light, I *next* endeavour to prove, that even those of them (namely, the several sects of *Grecian* philosophers) who did not believe this future state, yet, for the sake of society, sedulously taught and propagated it. That they *taught* it, is confessed. That they did *not believe* it, was my business to prove. Which I first do, by the three following *general* reasons: 1. That they all thought it allowable to say one thing and think another. 2. That they perpetually practised what they thus professed to be

be lawful. And, 3. That they practised it with regard to the very doctrine in question. To explain and verify the two first of these propositions, I had occasion to inquire into the rise, progress, perfection, decline, and genius of the ancient *Greek* philosophy under all its several divisions. In which, as its rise and genius are shewn to have been from *Egypt*, we lay in a still further support for the *minor* proposition of the *second* syllogism.

The discourse then proceeds to a *particular* inquiry into the sentiments of *each* sect of philosophy on this point. Where it is shewn, from the *character* and *genius* of each school, and from the *writings* of each man, that none of them did indeed believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. But, from almost every argument brought for this purpose, it, at the same time, appears of how high importance they *all* thought it to society.

Further, to support this fact, I prove next, that these philosophers not only *did not*, but *could not* possibly, believe the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, because it contradicted two metaphysical principles universally held and believed by them concerning the nature of *GOD* and of the *SOUL*; which were, that *God could not be angry, nor hurt any one*; and that *the soul was part of God, and resolved again into him*. In explaining, and *verifying the reception* of this latter principle, I take occasion to speak of its original; which I shew was *Grecian*, and not *Egyptian*, as appears from the different genius and character of the two philosophies; though the spurious books going under the name of *Hermes*, but indeed written by late *Greek* Platonists, would persuade us to believe the contrary. The use of *this* inquiry likewise (concerning *the origin of this principle*) will be seen when we come to clear up the *character of Moses* as aforesaid. But with regard to the general question (concerning *the belief of the philosophers*) besides the direct and principal use of it for the support of the *MAJOR* proposition of the *second* syllogism, it has (as I said before I had contrived my arguments should have) two further uses; the one *to serve as a principle in the progress of my argument*; the other *to illustrate the truth of Revelation in general*. For, 1. It will serve for  
ufficient



a sufficient answer to that objection of the Deists, to be considered in the last volume, that *Moses did not propagate the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, because he did not believe it*: it being shewn, from *fact*, that the not believing a doctrine, so useful to society, was esteemed no reason why the legislator should not propagate it. 2. It is a very strong proof of the *necessity* of the Gospel of *Jesus*, that the sages of *Greece*, with whom all the wisdom of the world was supposed to be deposited, had *philosophised* themselves out of one of the most evident and useful truths with which mankind is concerned. Nor need we seek any other justification of the severity with which the holy Apostles always speak of the philosophers or philosophy of *Greece*, than this, the shewing it was directed against these pernicious principles; and not, as both *Deists* and *Fanatics* have concurred to represent it, a condemnation of human learning in general.

But as now it might be objected, that, by this representation, we lose on the one hand what we gain on the other; and that while we shew the *necessity* of the Gospel, we run a risk of discrediting its *reasonableness*: for that nothing can seem to bear harder upon *this*, than that the best and wisest persons of antiquity did not believe a future state of rewards and punishments: as this, I say, might be objected, we have given a full answer to it; and, to support our answer, shewn, that the two extremes of this representation, which divines have been accustomed to go into by contrary ways, are attended with great and real mischief to Revelation. While the only view of antiquity, which yields solid advantage to the *Christian* cause, is such a one as this here given; such a one as shews natural reason to be *clear* enough to *perceive* truth, and the necessity of its deductions when proposed; but not generally strong enough to *discover* it, and draw right deductions from it. And we presume the *objectors* may allow this to be the *true*, as we have *Cicero* himself for our warrant, who, with an ingenuity becoming his profound knowledge of human nature, thus decisively expresses himself: “*Nam neque tam est acris acies in*  
*“ naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam,*  
*“ nisi monstratas, possit videre; neque tanta tamen in*  
*“ rebus*

“*rebus obscuritas, ut eas non peritus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo adspexerit\**.” In explaining this matter, it is occasionally shewn that of the *ancient* and *modern* systems of *deistical morality*, the confessedly superior perfection in the *latter* is entirely owing to the *unacknowledged* aid of Revelation.—Thus the reader sees in what manner we have endeavoured to prove the *MAJOR* propositions of the two *sylogisms*, that *whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary providence*: and that *this was universally believed by the Ancients, on their common principles of legislation and wisdom*. For, having shewn that religion and society were *unable*, and *believed to be unable*, to support themselves under an *ordinary providence* without a future state; if they were supported without that doctrine, it *could be*, and *could be believed to be*, only by an *extraordinary providence*.

But now, as this proof is conducted through a long detail of circumstances, shewing the *absolute necessity* of religion in general to civil society, and the *sense* which all the wise and learned of antiquity had of *that* necessity; lest this should be abused to countenance the idle and impious conceit, that *religion was the invention of politicians*, I concluded the third book and the volume together, with proving, that the notion is both impertinent and false. *Impertinent*, for that, were this account of religion right, it would not follow that religion itself was visionary; but, on the contrary, that it was most real, and supported on the eternal relations of things: *false*, for that *religion*, in fact, existed before the *civil magistrate* was in being. But my end in this was not *barely* to remove an objection against the truths *here* delivered; but to prepare an opening for those which were to *follow*. For if religion were so useful to society, and yet not the invention of the magistrate, we must seek its origin in another quarter: either from *Nature*, or *Revelation*, or *both*.—Such is the subject of the *first* volume of *The Divine Legation*: which, as I thought proper to publish separately, I contrived should not only contain *part* of that proof, but likewise be a *complete* treatise of itself,

\* De Orat. l. iii. c. xxxi,

establishing one of the most important truths with which we have to do, viz. *The necessity of religion for the support of civil government.* And if, in this view, I have been more than ordinary minute, while treating some capital articles in support of that question, I presume I shall not want the reader's pardon.

## II.

We come now to the SECOND volume of *The Divine Legation*; which is employed in proving the MINOR propositions of the two syllogisms; the first, *That the Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support*; the other, *That Moses, skilled in all the ancient legislation and wisdom, instituted the Jewish religion and society without a future state for its support.* But in proving the MINOR, a method something different from that observed in proving the MAJOR propositions was to be followed. The MAJOR, in the first volume, were proved *successively*, and in their order; but in this, the MINOR propositions are enforced all the way *together*: and this, from the reason of the thing; the facts brought to prove the doctrine omitted, at the same time, *accidentally* shew the omission designed; and the facts, brought to prove it designed, *necessarily* shew it omitted. To proceed therefore with the subject of the *second* volume.

IV. I just before observed, that the conclusion of the *first* volume, which detected the *absurdity* and *falsity* of the atheistic principle, that *religion was a creature of the state*, opened the way to a fair inquiry whether its original were not as well from *Revelation* as from natural reason.

In the introduction therefore to this volume, I took the advantage which that open afforded me, of shewing that the universal pretence to revelation proves *some* revelation must be true: that this *true* Revelation must have some *characteristic marks* to distinguish it from the *false*: and that these marks are to be found in the institution of *Moses*. But thus far only by way of *introduction*, and to lead the reader more easily into the main road of our inquiry; by shewing him that we pursued no desperate adventure while we endeavoured to deduce the divinity of *Moses's* law from the circumstances of the law itself.

I proceeded

I proceeded then to the proof of the MINOR propositions, *That the Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support; and that their lawgiver purposely omitted it.* To evince these truths, with sufficient evidence, the *nature* of that institution was to be well understood. But to form a right idea of *that*, it was expedient we should know the *manners* and *genius* of the *Hebrew* people, and the *character* and *abilities* of their lawgiver. Now these having been entirely fashioned on *Egyptian* models, it was *further* expedient we should know the *state* of *Egyptian* superstition and learning in those early ages.

In order to this, therefore, I first advanced this proposition, *That the Egyptian learning celebrated in Scripture, and the Egyptian superstition there condemned, were the very learning and superstition represented by the Greek writers, as the honour and opprobrium of that kingdom.* Where, I first state the question, and shew the equal extravagancies of both parties in unreasonably advancing or depressing the high antiquity of *Egypt*.

I then support my *proposition*, first by *fact*, the testimony of holy Scripture, and of the ancient *Greek* writers set together, and supporting one another.

Secondly by *reason*, in an argument deduced from the nature, origin, and various use, of their so famed *HIEROGLYPHICS*. Where it is shewn, 1. That these were employed as the sole vehicle of *Egyptian* learning even *after* the invention of *letters*. For which no good reason can be assigned but this, that they were employed to the same purpose, *before*. Now *letters* were in use in the time of *Moses*. 2. Again, it is further shewn that the *ONIROCRITICS* borrowed their art of deciphering from *hieroglyphic symbols*. But *hieroglyphic symbols* were the mysterious vehicle of the *Egyptian* learning and theology. Now *oniocritic*, or the art of interpreting dreams, was practised in the time of *Joseph*. 3. And again, that *hieroglyphic symbols* were the true original of *ANIMAL WORSHIP* in *Egypt*. Now *animal worship* was established before the times of *Moses*. From all this it appears that *Egypt* was of that high antiquity, which Scripture and the best *Greek* writers represent it. By  
which

which we come to understand what were the specific manners and superstitions of *Egypt* in the time of *Moses*; they being, as now appears, identically the same with what the *Greek* writers have delivered to us. In the course of this proof from *reason*, in opening at large the nature, origin, and various kinds of *Egyptian hieroglyphics*, I interweave (as the necessary explanation of my subject required) a detailed history of the various *modes* of ancient *information by speech and action*. As (on the same account) in the original of *brute-worship*, I give the history of the various *modes* of ancient *idolatry* in the order they arose out of one another. Now *these* I have not only made to serve in support of the question I am *here* upon; but likewise in support of a *future*, and a *past*. For, in this history of the *various modes of ancient information* was laid, as the reader will find, the foundation of my discourse on the *Nature of ancient Prophecies*, in the *sixth* book; the connexion of which discourse with my *main subject*, and its high importance to *religion in general*, will be explained when we come to that place: and, in the history of the *various modes of ancient idolatry*, he may see my reasoning in the latter end of the *third* book, against the Atheistic origin of religion, supported and confirmed. So studious have we been to observe what a great master of reason lays down as the *rule and test* of good disposition, *that every former part may give strength unto all that follow; and every latter bring light unto all before*.

But the *high antiquity* of *Egypt*, though proved from *antiquity* itself, seemed not enough secured while the authority of one great *modern* remained entire and unanswered. In the next place, therefore, I ventured to examine Sir *I. Newton's Chronology of the Egyptian Empire*, as it is founded in the supposed *identity* of *Osiris* and *Sesostris*; which I shew not only contradicts all *profane*, but, what is more, all *sacred antiquity*; and, still more, the very *nature of things*. In the course of this confutation, the *causes* of that endless confusion in the ancient *Greek history and mythology* are inquired into and explained; which serves, at the same time, to confirm and illustrate all that hath been said, occasionally in the

the *first* volume, concerning the origin and progress of idolatry, the genius of Pagan religion, their modes of worship, and their theological opinions.

Thus far concerning the *high antiquity of Egypt*. Which, besides the *immediate* purpose, of leading us into a true idea of the *Jewish* institution, hath these *further* uses. We have seen, in the foregoing volume, that *Egypt*, as it was most famed for the arts of legislation, so it most of all inculcated the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. Now if *Egypt* were of the high antiquity I contend for, the doctrine was inculcated in the time of the *Hebrew* captivity: the *Israelites* therefore who lived so long in *Egypt*, and had so thoroughly imbibed the religious notions of the place, must needs have been much prejudiced in favour of so reasonable and flattering a doctrine: and, consequently, their Lawgiver, who had been bred up in all the learning of *Egypt*, if he had acted only by human direction, must needs, in imitation of his masters, have taken advantage of this favourable prejudice to make the doctrine of a future state the grand *sanction* of his religion and law. Again, the proof of the high antiquity of *Egypt* was a necessary vindication of Sacred Scripture; which all along declares for that antiquity. But which the *Deist* having endeavoured to take advantage of against *Moses's* claim to inspiration, *believers* were grown not unwilling to explain away. And while this CHRONOLOGY offered itself to support the Bible *divinity*, they seemed little attentive to the liberties it took with the Bible *history*.

To proceed: in order to bring on this truth of the *high antiquity of Egypt* nearer to my purpose, I next advanced this *second* proposition, That the *Jewish people* were extremely fond of Egyptian manners, and did frequently fall into Egyptian superstitions: and that many of the laws given to them by the ministry of *Moses* were instituted partly in compliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to those superstitions. Through the proof of the *first* part of the proposition was proposed to be shewn the high probability of an institution formed with reference to *Egyptian* manners; and through the proof of the *second*, a demonstration that it was, in fact, so formed. In the progress of this argument is

given an historical account of the amazing perversity of the *Jewish* people, from the time of *Moses's* first mission, to their settlement in the land of *Canaan*. Which serves not only to evince the fact we are here upon, *their fondness for Egyptian manners*; but to prove (what will stand us in stead hereafter), that a people so obstinate and headstrong needed, in the institution of their civil government and religion, all possible curbs to disorder; of which, for this end, the doctrine of a *future state* was ever held the chief in ancient policy.

But now, as it might be objected, that while I am endeavouring to get, this way, into the *interior* of the *Jewish* constitution, I open a door to the ravages of infidelity; it was thought necessary, in order to prevent their taking advantage of the great truth contained under the last proposition, to guard it by the two following,

*First*, That *Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, and in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, are no reasonable objection to the divinity of his mission*. Where, in answering an objection to the proof of the *first* part of this proposition, I had occasion to explain the nature and origin of the *schools of the Prophets*: which, the reader will find of this *further* use, to give strength and support to what is said, in the *sixth* book, of the *Nature of Prophecy*; and particularly to what is remarked of *Grotius's* mistakes in his manner of interpreting them. And, after having established the proof of the *second* part, from the nature of things, I examine all the arguments which have been urged to the contrary, by the learned *Herman Witsius*, in his *Ægyptiaca*, as that book had been publicly recommended, for a *distinct and solid confutation of* *Spencer, De Legibus Hebræorum ritualibus*.

But I go further in the *second proposition*; and prove, that *these very circumstances of Moses's Egyptian learning, and the laws instituted in compliance to the people's prejudices, and in opposition to Egyptian superstitions, are a strong confirmation of the divinity of his mission*; For, that one, bred up in the arts of *Egyptian* legislation, could never, on his own head, have thought of reducing an unruly people to government on maxims of religion.

and policy fundamentally opposite to all the principles of *Egyptian* wisdom. And yet *Moses* did this, in *enjoining* the worship of the *true God* only; and, in *omitting* the doctrine of a *future state*. And again, that one who *falsely* pretended to inspiration, and to receive the whole frame of a national constitution from God himself, would never have risked his pretences by a ritual law, which the people could see was politically instituted, partly in compliance to their prejudices, and partly in opposition to *Egyptian* superstitions. And with this the *fourth* book concludes.

V. What hath been hitherto said was to let us, in *general* only, into the genius of the *Jewish* policy; in order to our judging more exactly of the *peculiar nature* of its government; that from thence, we might be enabled to determine, with full certainty, on the matters in question, as they are contained in the two *MINOR* propositions.

The *fifth* book, therefore, comes *still nearer* to the point, and considers this *peculiar nature* of the *Jewish* government. Which is shewn to have been a *THEOCRACY*, properly so called, where God himself became the supreme civil magistrate. This form of government is shewn to have been *necessary* for the times. In proving which, the law of *punishing for opinions*, under a *theocracy*, is occasionally explained. And as the *Deists* have been accustomed to object this punishment against the divine original of the Law, it is justified at large, on the principles of natural equity: which serves, at the same time, both to confirm the *reality* of a *theocracy*, and also to give new strength and support to what had been said on the subject of *Toleration*, in the *first* volume.

2. This Theocracy, which was *necessary*, was (as I then shew from the notions and opinions of those times concerning *Tutelary Deities*) of the most *easy introduction* likewise. But here, speaking of the method of Providence in employing the *prejudices* of men to the great ends of its dispensations, I observe, that whenever Divine Wisdom thought fit so to do, it was always accustomed to insert some characteristic note of difference, to mark the institution, it established, for its own: which leading me to enumerate some of those *notes*,



I insisted chiefly upon this, "that the *Mosaic* religion "was built upon a former, namely, the *Patriarchal*: "whereas the various religions of the *Pagan* world were "all *unrelated to, and independent of one another.*" As this was a circumstance necessarily to be well understood for a perfect comprehension of the *Jewish* Establishment (the subject in hand), I took the advantage which the celebrated author of *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* had afforded me, (who, to discredit *Revelation*, has thought fit to affirm the direct contrary) of supporting it against him in an examination of his *facts* and *reasonings* on this head.

3. I proceed, in the next place, to shew, that those prejudices which made the *introduction* of a *theocracy* so *easy*, occasioned as *easy a defection* from the laws of it. In which I had occasion to explain the nature of the *worship of tutelary gods*, and of that *idolatry* wherewith the *Jewish* people were so obstinately besotted. Both which discourses serve these further purposes, the *former*, to support and explain what had been said, in the *first* volume, concerning the genius of *Pagan intercommunity* of worship: and the *latter* (besides a particular use to be made of it in the *third* volume) to obviate a common objection of unbelievers; who, from this circumstance of the continual defection of the *Jews* into idolatry, would infer, that God's dispensation to them could never have been so illustrious as their history represents it: these men supposing that this idolatry consisted in *renouncing* the law of *Moses*; and renouncing it as *dissatisfied of its truth*: both which suppositions are here shewn to be false.

Having explained the *nature* of the *theocracy*, and the *attendant circumstances* of its *erection*; we then inquire concerning its *duration*. A *theocracy*, therefore, in strict truth and propriety, we shew, continued throughout the whole period of the *Jewish* state, even to the coming of *Christ*. The use to be made hereafter of this truth, is to inforce the *connexion* between the two religions; a circumstance, though much neglected, incumbent on every rational defender of *Revelation* to support.

We come next to the *peculiar consequences attending the administration of a theocracy*: which bring us yet nearer

*nearer* to our point. Here, it is shewn that one *necessary consequence*, was an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. And agreeably to this, (as deduced from the *nature of things*) that holy Scripture does *in fact* exhibit to us this very representation of God's government: and further, that there are many favourable circumstances, in the *character* of the *Jewish* people, to induce a candid examiner to conclude this representation *true*. Though here the reader should observe, that my argument does not require me to prove more, in this place, than that an *extraordinary providence* is *represented* in Scripture, to be administered: The proof of its *real* administration it is the purpose of this work to give through the great MEDIUM of my Theses, *the Omission of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments*. If therefore I clearly shew, from the whole *Jewish* history, that the matter is thus *represented*, the inference from my *medium*, which proves the representation *true*, answers all objections, both as to our inadequate conception of the manner how such a providence could be administered; and as to certain passages in holy Scripture that seem to clash with this its general *representation*. And yet both these objections (to leave no shadow of doubt unsatisfied) are considered likewise: but as important as this fact, of an *extraordinary providence represented*, is, even to our present purpose, it has a still further use when employed amongst those distinguishing *marks* of the truth of *Moses's* divine mission in *general*. For, from hence, we may observe, the unnecessary trouble and hazard to which he exposed himself, had that mission been only pretended. Had he, like the rest of the ancient lawgivers, done no more than barely affected *inspiration*, he had then no occasion to propagate the belief of a *constant equal providence*; a dispensation, if only feigned, so easy to be confuted. But, by deviating from their general practice, and persuading the people, that the *inspiring tutelary god* would become their *king*, he laid himself under a necessity of teaching an *extraordinary providence*; and perpetually insisting on it as the great sanction of his laws; a dead weight, if he were an impostor, that nothing but downright folly could have brought him to undergo.

To proceed : after having laid this strong and necessary foundation, we come at length DIRECTLY to our point. If the *Jewish* government were a *theocracy*, it was administered by an *extraordinary providence*; the consequence of which is, that *temporal rewards and punishments* (the effects of this providence) and not *future*, were the SANCTION of their law and religion. Thus far therefore hath the *very nature* of the *Jewish* government brought us. And this methinks is bringing us fairly up to the proof of our two MINOR propositions. So necessary, as the reader now sees, was this *long* discourse of *the nature of the Jewish government*. But, to prevent all cavil, I go further; and shew, that the doctrine of a *future state* of rewards and punishments, which could not, from the nature of things, be the *sanction* of the Law, *was not*, in fact, *taught in it at all*; but purposely omitted by their great Prophet. This is proved from several circumstances in the books of *Genesis* and the *Law*. Where, to shew, that *Moses*, who, it is seen, *studiously* omitted it, was well *apprised* of its importance, I prove that the *punishment of children for the crimes of their parents* was brought into this institution purposely to supply some advantages to government, which the doctrine of a *future state* affords. This, at the same time that it further supports the opinion of *no future state* in the *Mosaic* dispensation, gives me a fair occasion of vindicating the justice and equity of the *law, of punishing children for the crimes of their parents*; and proving the perfect agreement between *Moses* and the *Prophets* concerning it: which had been, in all ages, the stumbling-block of infidelity.

But we go yet further, and shew, that, as *Moses* forbore to teach the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, so neither had the ancient *Jews*, that is to say, the *body* of the people, any knowledge of it. The proof is striking, and scarce to be resisted by any party or profession but the *system-maker's*. The Bible contains a very circumstantial history of this people from the time of *Moses* to the great Captivity. Not only of public occurrences, but the private adventures of persons of both sexes, and of all ages and stations, of all characters and

and complexions ; in the lives of virgins, matrons, kings, soldiers, scholars, priests, merchants, husbandmen. They are given too in every circumstance of life, victorious, captive, sick, and in health ; in full security and amidst impending dangers ; plunged in civil business, or retired and sequestered in the service of religion. Together with their *story*, we have their *compositions* likewise. Here they sing their triumphs ; there their *patinodia* : here they offer up their hymns of praise and petitions to the Deity ; here they urge their moral precepts to their countrymen ; and here again they treasure up their prophecies and predictions for posterity : yet in none of these different circumstances of life, in none of these various casts of composition, do we ever find them acting on the motives, or influenced by the prospect of a *future state* ; or indeed expressing the least *hopes or fears*, or even common *curiosity* concerning it : but every thing they do or say respects the present life only ; the good and ill of which are the sole objects of all their pursuits and aversions\*. And here I will appeal to my adversaries themselves. Let them speak, and tell me, if they were now first shewn some history of an old *Greek* republic, delivered in the form and manner of the *Jewish*, and no more notice in it of a future state, whether they could possibly believe that that doctrine was national, or generally known in it ? If they have the least ingenuity, they will answer, *they could not*. On what then do they support their belief here, but on *religious prejudices* ? Prejudices of no higher an original neither than some *Dutch* or *German* system : for, as to the *Bible*, one half of it is silent concerning *life and immortality* ; and the other half declares the doctrines were brought to light

\* It is very remarkable, that nothing more strongly evinces the desperate folly of those who imagine the Bible has been adulterated by the *Jews* (unless it be their own scheme of reforming it, by the assistance of a *Jew*, who has accommodated it to the taste of *Paganism*) than this very circumstance of the profound silence throughout, concerning a *future state*. For had the *Rabbins* ever tampered with it on any head, it had certainly been on this, which they hold to be the very *Fundamental of Fundamentals*†. And which yet, after all their sweat and labour, to discover in the Bible, they could never get to ; but are forced at last to take it upon trust or tradition, as the *Indians* do their *fundamental Tortoise*.

† Maimonides.

*through the Gospel*; which too is a circumstance in support of our conclusion from the *Jewish history*, that would be wanting in the case given of a *Grecian*.

The strength of this argument is still further supported by a view of the general history of mankind: and particularly of those nations most resembling the *Jewish* by their genius and circumstances: in which we find the doctrine of a future state was always pushing on its influence. It was their constant *viaticum* through life; it stimulated them to war, and spirited their songs of triumph; it made them insensible of pain, immoveable in danger, and superior to the hour of death. But this is not all: we observe that even in the *Jewish annals*, when this doctrine was become national, it made as considerable a figure in their history, as in that of any other people. In the last place we shew, that it is not on the *negative silence only* of the sacred writers, or of the speakers they introduce, that we support our conclusion; but from their *positive declarations*, by which they plainly discover, that there was no popular expectation of a future state or resurrection. Such as these; *That he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more\**.—*That in death there is no remembrance of God, and in the grave no one shall give him thanks†*.—*That the dead know not any thing, neither have any more a reward‡*.—*That they who go down to the pit cannot hope for God's truth§*.—*That those who are dead, are not||*. Where we find it to be the same popular language throughout, and in every circumstance of life; as well in the *cool philosophy* of the author of *Ecclesiastes*, as amidst the *distresses* of the *Psalmist*, the *Lamentations* of the Prophet, and the *exultations* of good *Hezekiah*. But is it possible this could be the language of a people instructed in the doctrine of *life and immortality*? Or do we find one word of it, on any occasion whatsoever, in the writers of the *New Testament*, but where it is brought in to be confuted and condemned? The people in *Jeremiah* say, that *those who are dead, are not: Jesus*, in the Gospel, that *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are amongst the living*. Good men amongst the *Jews* said, that *those who go*

\* 2 Sam. xiv. 14.

† Psalm vi. 5.

‡ Eccles. ix. 5.

§ Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19.

|| Jer. v. 7.

*down to the grave come up no more, know not any thing, have no reward,* and therefore prayed for long life here, to praise the God of their salvation: *St. Paul*, on the contrary, devoutly wished for his dissolution, in order to receive elsewhere the reward of his faith and spiritual warfare. Here, therefore, let me admonish certain *dealers in systems*, for once to suspend their *trade*, and attend a moment to the arguments they write against. For it will not be thought enough that they prove, on the principles of their systems, that *the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments OUGHT to be in the religion of Moses, and therefore is there.* The public will now expect, that they directly apply themselves to the refutation of *these* arguments; which, being founded on *no system*, proceed in a different manner; and, from the *proof* of what *is not* there, *conclude*, what *ought not* to be there. But it is much easier to tell us, *what should be* in a book, than to account for *what is* in it.

From the *Old Testament*, we proceed to the *New*; by which it appears, from the inspired writers of *this* likewise, that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments did not make part of the *Mosaic* dispensation. Their evidence we have divided into two parts, the *first* proving that *temporal* rewards and punishments were the *sanction* of the *Jewish* dispensation; the *second*, that it had *no other*. And thus, with the directest and most unexceptionable proof of the two *MINOR* propositions, the *fifth* book concludes.

VI. But to remove, as far as I was able, all grounds of *prejudice* to this momentous truth, I employed the *sixth* and last book of this volume in examining those texts of the *Old* and *New Testament*, which had been commonly urged to prove that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments *did* make part of the *Mosaic* dispensation,

Amongst those of the *Old Testament*, the famous passage in the sixth chapter of the book of *Job* holding the principal place, I judged it of importance, for the reasons there assigned, to examine this matter to the bottom; which necessarily engaged me in an inquiry into the *nature* and *genius* of that book; *when* written, and to *what purpose*; whereby not only a fair account is given of  
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the sense of that passage, consistent with my proposition ; but a strong support is provided for what will be further said in the *third* and last volume, concerning the *gradual decay* of the extraordinary providence, from the time of *Saul* to the return from the great Captivity, and resettlement in the land of *Judæa*.

But this dissertation has still a further, and very important use, regarding *Revelation in general*. For shewing therein, how the principles of the Gospel doctrine *opened by degrees*, fully obviates the calumnies of *Tindal* and *Collins*: who pretend that the priests and leaders of the *Jews* refined their old doctrines concerning the Deity, and invented new ones, just as they advanced in knowledge or the people in curiosity ; or as both were better instructed in the country to which they were led captive.

In examining the texts of the *New Testament*, the famous *eleventh chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews* was not forgotten ; the sense of which is cleared up from the strongest and most inveterate mistakes of systematical divines. In this place is occasionally explained and illustrated a matter of the highest moment for the understanding *St. Paul's* epistles, namely, *the nature of the Apostolic reasoning against the errors of the Jewish converts* ; and this likewise contributes still further to support the truth of our two *MINOR* propositions.

As in all this I taught nothing contrary to the doctrine of our excellent Church, my profession, in common decency, not to say *justice* both to myself and others, required I should vindicate the reality of my conformity. Having therefore declared it as my unfeigned opinion that, “ though a future state of rewards and punishments “ made no part of the *Mosaic* dispensation, yet that the “ Law had a *spiritual* meaning, to be understood when “ the fulness of time should come, and hence received “ the *nature*, and afforded the *efficacy* of *prophecy* ; and “ that in the *interim*, the *mystery of the Gospel* was “ occasionally revealed by God to his chosen servants, the “ *leaders* and *fathers* of the *Jewish* nation ; and the “ *dawning* of it gradually opened by the prophets to the “ people.” Having, I say, declared this to be my unfeigned opinion, I shew, from the words of the *Seventh Article of Religion*, that it is the opinion of our excellent Church

Church likewise. And that I may not be suspected of tergiversation, when I subscribe to this *article*, that *They are not to be heard which feign, that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises*, I attempt to illustrate the words of *Jesus*, where he says that *Abraham rejoiced to see Christ's day, and saw it, and was glad*, by the noblest instance that ever was given of the *harmony* between the *Old* and *New Testament*, on the principles before laid down in the discourse on the *hieroglyphics*; and shew that the command to *Abraham* to offer *Isaac* was merely an information (given at *Abraham's* earnest request) in a *representative action*, instead of *words*, of the redemption of mankind by the great sacrifice of *Christ*. From whence we gain two other advantages, besides that more *immediate*, of justifying the doctrine of our *national Church*. The *first* of which is the supporting a real and essential *connexion* between *Judaism* and *Christianity*. The *other* is, disposing the Deists to think more favourably of their Bible: for our interpretation overthrows all objections to this part of *Abraham's* history. The matter therefore being of this high importance, it was proper to fix it on such principles as would leave no room for doubt or objection. And this could be done only by explaining the nature of those various *modes of information* in use amongst the *Ancients*; for which explanation likewise a proper foundation had been laid in the discourse on the *hieroglyphics*. But this is not all; we get a yet further and much more considerable benefit by it, and that is the clearing up and vindicating the logical truth and propriety of *types in action*, and *secondary senses in speech*; whereon the divinity of the ancient *prophecies concerning Christ* are to be supported; and which, at this time, most needed a support. For though the greater part of these *prophecies* relate to *Jesus* only in a *secondary* sense, yet had some men of name and in the interests of religion, through ignorance of the true original and nature of *secondary senses*, rashly concurred with modern *Judaism* and *infidelity*, to give up all such as *illogical* and *enthusiastic*, to the imminent hazard of overturning the very foundation of our faith. In the course of this inquiry, I had an opportunity of examining and confuting one of the most able and plausible books  
ever



ever written against Revelation, *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, which goes entirely upon the illogical fanaticism of a *secondary sense of prophecies*.

The intelligent reader will, I presume, allow these reasons sufficient to justify the length of this *dissertation*: but there were two other more *immediately* relative to my question, that engaged me in the inquiry. The *one* was to shew, that those, who contend for the *Christian* doctrine of a *future state's* being revealed to the early *Jews*, destroy all *reason* of a *secondary* sense of prophecies; (a matter, as we have shewn, of the utmost importance to Revelation :) for how can it be *certainly* known, from the prophecies themselves, that they contain *double senses*, but from hence, that the *old* Law was preparatory to, and the rudiments of, the *New*? How shall *this* relation be *certainly* known, but from hence, *that no future state of rewards and punishments is to be found in the Mosaic dispensation*? So close a dependence have all these momentous principles on one another. The *other* more *immediate* reason for this dissertation, on *types and secondary senses*, was this: As I had shewn that a future state of rewards and punishments was revealed under no part of the *Jewish* economy any otherwise than by *those* modes of information, it was necessary, in order to shew the *real* connexion between *Judaism* and *Christianity* (the truth of the latter religion depending on that *real* connexion) to prove *those* modes logical and rational. For as on the one hand, had the doctrine of life and immortality been *revealed* under the *Mosaic* economy, *Judaism* had been *more* than a *rudiment* and *preparation* of *Christianity*; so had no *covert* intimations at all been given of the doctrine, it had been *less*: That is, the dependency and connexion between the two religions had not been sufficiently marked out and ascertained. With this *necessary* dissertation, therefore, the *sixth* and last book of the *second* volume concludes.

Thus the reader sees at length, how *regularly* and *intently* these two volumes have been carried on: the *first* in proving the *MAJOR*, and the *second*, the *MINOR* propositions of the two *sylogisms*. In which, though the Author (whose passion is not so much a fondness for his own argument as for the honour and support of religion

religion itself) has neglected no fair occasion of enforcing every circumstance, that might serve to illustrate the truth of *Revelation in general*; yet he never loses sight of his end; but, as the rule for conducting the most regular works prescribes,

*Scemper ad ecentum festinat.*

*This* volume too I thought fit to publish *alone*, as I did the *first*; though not *merely* for the same reason, its being a perfect and entire *whole* of itself, explaining the *nature and genius of the Jewish constitution*; but for a much better—that it *fairly finished the argument*. For my logic teaches me, that, *when the MAJOR and the MINOR are once proved, the CONCLUSION follows of course*. And this is, that THE JEWISH RELIGION AND SOCIETY WERE SUPPORTED BY AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE: For be this never so furious a PARADOX, it may be rendered as tame and harmless as any other truth by the common advantages of argument; unless a raiser of *paradoxes*, like a raiser of *rebellion*, is to be *ipso facto, outlaxed*; and the *one* denied all benefit of the *logic*, as the *other* is, of the *law*, of his country.

### III.

VII. It may be asked then, what I mean by a *third* volume, if the argument be *ended* in the *second*? To this I answer, That it is one thing to satisfy truth; and another, her pretended followers. He who engages for *Revelation*, has many prejudices to encounter; but he who engages for it, under *reason* only, has *many more*. I cannot then make too sure of my reader. And, luckily, the *plan* of my work obliging me to continue the *history of the religious doctrines of the Jews*, from the time of the first *Prophets*, to that of the *Maccabees*, when the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments first became *national*; this history will afford abundant proofs for the further illustration of the MAJOR propositions of the two syllogisms. And this will make the subject of the *seventh* book of *The Divine Legation*, or the *first* part of the *third* volume.

VIII. Having in this manner gone through my *general argument*, what remains is an examination of the principal *objections* that may be urged against it: and these  
being

being founded in the supposed views and objects of the *Jewish* Lawgiver, this examination will be chiefly employed in explaining and vindicating the true CHARACTER of MOSES: from whence will arise a new series of arguments for the support of the MINOR propositions of the two *sylogisms*: and, particularly, a demonstration that shews the *conclusion* of the *second* *sylogism*\*, to have all the force of the *first*†: the only thing it might seem to want. This demonstration may be reduced to this *sylogism*:

None, but one ignorant of the world, or an enthusiast, who had received a promise like that given to the *Jews*, and had lived to the time marked for its accomplishment, could be mistaken either about the promise or its completion.

But *Moses* received such a promise, and lived to the time marked for its accomplishment, and was neither ignorant of the world, nor an enthusiast.

Therefore *Moses* was not mistaken either about the promise or its accomplishment.

This will make the subject of the *eighth* book, or the *second* part of the *third* volume.

IX. But having, towards the conclusion of the *eighth* book, in answer to various infidel *objections*, examined the *pretended reasons* of the *omission* of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments in the *Mosaic* dispensation; I am naturally and necessarily led to inquire, further, into the TRUE. For now it might be *finally objected*, that though, under an *extraordinary providence*, there might be *no occasion* for the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, in support of religion, or the ends of government; yet, as that doctrine was *true*, and, consequently, under every regimen of Providence, *useful*; it seems hard to conceive that the religious Leader of the *Jews*, because, as a lawgiver, he could do without it, that therefore, as a divine, he would omit it. The objection is of weight in itself, and receives much additional strength from what we have observed in

\* Namely, that *Moses*, who taught, believed likewise, that the Jewish religion and society were to be supported by an extraordinary providence.

† Namely, that they were under an extraordinary providence.

the *fifth* book concerning the *reason* of the law of *punishing children for the crimes of their parents*. I hold it therefore not sufficient barely to reply, *Moses omitted it, that his law might thereby remain throughout all ages an invincible monument of the truth of his pretences*; but proceed to explain the *great and principal reason* of the omission. And now, *ventum ad verum est*. This leads me into one general view of the whole course of God's universal economy from *Adam* to *Christ*, ending in a dissertation on the true nature and genius of the *CHRISTIAN FAITH*, and so adding new and irresistible force to the *CONCLUSIONS* of both my *sylogisms*. With this the *ninth* book, or *third* part of the last volume, concludes.

This I purpose to give the Public without delay\*: not for any pressing necessity *my argument* has of it, for I left it not, as was insinuated, naked and supportless; but, as the reader now sees, surrounded with various *outworks*, and standing strongly on its *conclusion*; but, principally, that I may be at liberty to address myself to a much larger work—*A full Defence of Revelation in general and of the Christian Faith in particular, against Unbelievers of all Denominations*—A work long projected, and which my Christian profession, and still more solemn engagements in the service of religion, persuaded me was my duty, with the good leave of my brethren, to devote myself unto—Not to speak at present of the high encouragement to all attempts of this nature from the felicity of the times, which is, or would be, always urging me on, in the words of the Poet:

“ ——— Va pâler sur la Bible;

“ Va marquer les écueils de cette mer terrible :

“ Perce la sainte horreur de ce Livre divin :

“ Confons dans un Ouvrage et Tindal et Collin :

“ Débrouille des vieux tems les querelles célèbres ;

“ Eclairci des Rabins les savantes ténèbres :

“ Afin qu'en ta vieillesse, un livre en maroquin

“ Aille offrir ton travail à quelque heureux Faquin,

“ Qui, pour digne loier de la Bible éclaircie,

“ Te paie en l'acceptant d'un JE VOUS REMERCIE.”

BOILEAU.

\* See Note (\*) p. 144. vol. vi.

## APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

THE JUDGMENTS OF GROTIUS, EPISCOPIUS,  
AND BISHOP BULL;

SHewing

*That a future State of Rewards and Punishments was not taught to the People of the JEWS by the Law and Religion of MOSES.*

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GROTIUS.—“ Moses in Religionis Judaicæ Institutione, si diserta Legis respiciamus, nihil promisit supra  
 “ hujus vitæ bona, terram, uberem, penum copiosum,  
 “ victoriam de hostibus, longam & valentem senectutem,  
 “ posteros cum bona spe superstites. Nam, si QUID EST  
 “ ULTRA, in umbris obtegatur, aut sapienti ac DIFFICILI  
 “ ratiocinatione colligendum est.”

EPISCOPIUS.—“ In tota Lege Mosaica nullum  
 “ vitæ æternæ præmium, ac ne æterni quidem præmii  
 “ INDICIUM VEL VESTIGIUM extat: quicquid nunc  
 “ Judæi multum de futuro seculo, de resurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna loquantur, & ex Legis verbis ea  
 “ extorquere potius quam ostendere conentur, NE LEGEM  
 “ MOSIS IMPERFECTAM ESSE cogantur agnoscere cum  
 “ Sadducæis; quos olim (&, uti observo ex scriptis  
 “ Rabbiorum, hodieque) vitam futuri sæculi Lege Mosis  
 “ nec promitti nec contineri adfirmasse, quin tamen  
 “ Judæi essent, certissimum est. Nempe non, nisi per  
 “ Cabalam sive Traditionem, quam illi in universum  
 “ rejiciebant, opinionem sive fidem illam irrepsisse asserabant. Et sane opinionum, quæ inter Judæos erat,  
 “ circa vitam futuri sæculi discrepantia, arguit promissiones Lege factas tales esse ut ex iis certi quid de vita  
 “ futuri sæculi non possit colligi. Quod & Servator  
 “ noster non obscure innuit, cum resurrectionem mortuorum  
 “ tuorum

“tuorum colligit Matt. xxii. non ex promisso aliquo  
 “Legi addito, sed ex generali tantum illo promisso Dei,  
 “quo se Deum Abrahami, Isaaci, & Jacobi futurum  
 “sponderat: quæ tamen illa collectio magis nititur  
 “cognitione intentionis divinæ sub generalibus istis verbis  
 “occultatæ aut comprehensæ, de qua Christo certo con-  
 “stabat, quàm necessaria consequentia sive verborum vi  
 “ac virtute manifestâ, qualis nunc & in verbis Novi  
 “Testamenti, ubi vita æterna & resurrectio mortuorum  
 “proram & puppim faciunt totius Religionis Christianæ,  
 “& tam clarè ac disertè promittuntur ut ne hiscere  
 “quidem contra quis possit.” Instit. Theol. lib. iii.  
 sect. 1. c. 2.

BULL.—“Primo quæritur an in Vet. Testamento  
 “nullum omnino extet vitæ æternæ promissum? de eo  
 “enim a nonnullis dubitatur. Resp. Huic quæstioni  
 “optimè mihi videtur respondere Augustinus, distinguens  
 “nomen Veteris Testamenti; nam eo intelligi ait aut  
 “pactum illud, quod in monte Sinai factum est, aut  
 “omnia, quæ in Mose, Hagiographis, ac Prophetis con-  
 “tinentur. Si Vetus Testamentum posteriori sensu acci-  
 “piatur, concedi FORSITAN possit, esse in eo nonnulla  
 “futuræ vitæ non obscura indicia; præsertim in libro  
 “Psalmorum, Daniele, & Ezekiele: quanquam vel in his  
 “Libris clarum ac disertum æternæ vitæ promissum VIX  
 “AC NE VIX quidem reperias. Sed hæc qualiacunque  
 “erant, non erant nisi præludia & anticipationes gratiæ  
 “Evangelicæ, AD LEGEM NON PERTINEBANT.—LEX  
 “enim promissa habuit terrena, & terrena TANTUM.—  
 “Si quis contra sentiat ejus est locum dare, ubi æternæ  
 “vitæ promissio extat; QUOD CERTE IMPOSSIBILE EST,  
 “—Sub his autem verbis [legis ipsius] Dei intentione  
 “comprehensam fuisse vitam æternam, ex interpretatione  
 “ipsius Christi ejusque Apostolorum manifestum est.  
 “Verùm hæc non sufficiunt ut dicamus vitam æternam  
 “in Fœdere Mosaico promissam fuisse. Nam primo  
 “promissa, præsertim Fœderi annexa, debent esse clara  
 “ac diserta, & ejusmodi, ut ab utraque parte stipulante  
 “intelligi possint. Promissa autem hæc typica & gene-  
 “ralia, non addita aliunde interpretatione, PENE IMPOS-  
 “SIBILE ERAT UT QUIS ISTO SENSU INTELLIGERET.”

Harmonia Apostolica, Dissert. poster. c. x. sect. viii. p. 474. inter Op. Om. Ed. 1721.

1. Thus these three great ornaments of the Protestant Religion. And what more has been said or done by the Author of the *Divine Legation*? Only this, he has shewn, that the absence or omission of a future state of rewards and punishments in the *Mosaic* religion is a certain mark of its divinity. *Forgive me this wrong.* It has indeed been objected that Bishop *Bull* talked very differently in an *English* posthumous sermon. All that I can say to this is, that, if he did so, it was not by my direction; who hold it to be unlawful to say one thing to the people, and another to their pastors. But Bishop *Bull*, it seems, might say what he pleased. He might, to support his opinion, say without censure, nay, with commendation, *that the doctrine of a future state was amongst the Arcana of the Jews: that there was a two-fold manner of teaching amongst them, one suited to vulgar apprehensions, the other to those who had made some proficiency in knowledge*\*. But if I venture to say so, a legion of ligots are in arms. And do I say any other, in affirming, that *during the early ages of the Jewish republic a future state was not a national doctrine, but known only to some few of their leaders*? Thus can the Writer quoted above abuse me, throughout a whole pamphlet, for holding the very same thing for which Bishop *Bull* merited his commendation; and this in an outrageous manner too, as if I had said something most derogatory to the honour and attributes of God. But this is the *hocus pocus* of controversy. When the Bishop and I have paid him in the same coin, that, from the Bishop's pocket, shall be true orthodox sterling; which, from mine, comes out clipt, washt, and counterfeit. But the man's a bungler; and neither understands clean conveyance, nor has assurance enough to outface the fraud. For, conscious, as it were, of an ill-played trick, he patches up the cheat in this slovenly manner, *Surely, (says he) there is a great difference between industriously keeping a thing out of sight, and industriously*

\* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's Second Proposition, &c. in an epistolary dissertation addressed to the Author, p. 125, just now come to my hands.

*propagating it amongst all WHO WERE ABLE AND WILLING TO RECEIVE IT.* p. 125. Illustrious distinguisher! Does not the BISHOP'S *industriously propagating it amongst all who are able and willing to receive it*, imply the *keeping it out of sight* from the rest? And does not MY *industriously keeping it out of sight* from the rest, imply the *propagating it amongst all who were able and willing to receive it*? But, in this case, I have done more than by implication; I have said over and over again, that it was communicated to the few *able* to receive it. I did not indeed add *willing*. That discovery was reserved for the wonderful penetration of our Author. I had no conception but that every Jew was *willing* enough to receive *not only the promise of the life that now is, but of that which is to come*: but it is a reasonable question whether they were as *able*; and would not then have quitted both the school and *school-master that was to bring them to Christ* long before the good time he had appointed. But these are matters above our Author's comprehension. He will needs know why God acted thus mysteriously. I will tell him when he informs me (and perhaps before) why *America* for so many ages was debarred the light of the Gospel. Were not these his offspring as well as the sons of *Abraham*? But this is the advantage that he and his fellows take with the ignorant. They cry out, What! a religion from God without a future state? No. Rather than this, any thing. They will go a text-hunting, lie at catch for an ambiguity, divorce the sentence from its context, strip it naked; and if, after all this violence, it does but squint their way, see here, say they, as clear a proof of it as from the preaching of *Jesus*. Yet let these texts but speak for themselves, or without any other prompter than the context, and we shall soon see that there is not one of all they have ever produced, in the period in question, that can by any rules of good criticism be made to signify the least notice of a future state, otherwise than in a secondary and spiritual sense. In the mean time let no good man be scandalized with their clamour. All such shall soon see this tempest of malice and bigotry dispersed, and the Scripture of God at last vindicated even from its worst and most fatal mischief;



the virulenee of false zeal. But this and bigotry have so blinded our Anonymous, that in another place he insultingly asks me, (p. 70) *WHERE I learnt that death doth not now reign?* and yet before he ends his page he himself quotes these words of the Apostle, *Jesus Christ hath abolished death* \*.

2. But now, if the bringing over such kind of writers, and leading them into the *dawn of sense*, were any matter of merit, I had much to boast of. When I first adventured to fall upon their systems, nothing was heard amongst them but “that *Moses did teach a future state*; “and plainly too; if not, the worse for him; for he “*ought to have taught it.*” This was then the cry. But now their note is altered. This Anonymous owns very frankly that *Moses taught no future state*, nay more, *could not teach it.* *Moses* (says he) *as an authorized teacher could not declare the doctrine of a future state. This doctrine was not in his commission.* pp. 5 & 7. And so, in other places, to the same purpose. Thus, after having fought through all *their own* weapons in vain, they will now try if they cannot silence me with *mine*; and make that very principle on which I raised my *second proposition* serve to the subversion of it. For the reader must not fancy that they now begin to embrace any of my principles in the love of truth, but of contention only. But let us take him as we find him. He says, *Moses had it not in commission to teach a future state.* Be it so. I ask then, first, how he comes to *know* this? If he says, because *Moses did not teach it*, he will argue as becomes him. But I will suppose him to say *because it was reserved for the commission of Jesus.* Then thus I argue—That *traditional knowledge*, which this man says they had of the doctrine, was either a *divine* or *human* tradition. If he says, a *divine*, then some holy man had it in *commission* to teach before *Moses*, or God himself taught it. In either case, I ask why it could not have been intrusted to *Moses*, when instituting a new religion and civil government, since it was of a *nature to be intrusted*? If he will say, of *human tradition*, it is then certain *Moses’s* silence, in a religion to which nothing was to be added, and from which nothing was to be taken, must have very

\* 2 Tim. i. 10.

soon erased all human traditions from the minds and memory of the people; which indeed was the case. Though human traditions, in after-ages, they had enough. And when I come to shew why they took them up, and whence they had them, that they had them not in the times in question will be seen to a demonstration. I only mention this, to shew the wretched futility of such a writer, who, when he steals a true principle, knows so little what to make of it. It is very true, *This doctrine was not in Moses's commission*. And from this great truth I shall prove, to the shame of all such writers, that it *could not* be a national doctrine amongst the *Jews* in the times I mention. But this in my *last* volume. For I proceed very differently from these writers. They, from what they imagine, *could not be*, would prove it *was not*. I, from what I prove *was not*, shew afterwards what *could not be*. But he saw not this, that the people's *not having* the doctrine was a necessary consequence of *Moses's not teaching* it. And no wonder, when we consider how he came by his principle, that he should understand none of its consequences. Hence it is that he so ignorantly accuses me of *having confounded these two things throughout my book*. That is, of taking advantage of, and, all the way, enforcing a necessary consequence from a certain principle.

But, one word more with him on this head. He says, *Moses had it not in commission*. What thinks he of the book of *Job*? He says he thinks of it very *differently from me*. It is prudently said, and enough to secure his credit, and keep him orthodox. We will for once support his modesty; and conceive him to hold, that the book was written by *Moses*; and that the famous text, in the nineteenth chapter, relates to the resurrection. But then what becomes of the *principle of Moses's no commission*? Or will he say *Moses* did not write it, and that the text in the nineteenth chapter does not relate to a resurrection? What then becomes of his *orthodoxy*? See now what it is to be sharking the principles of the profane. Common sense cries out against this unsanctified commerce,

*Veto esse tale luminis commercium.*

If the good man will believe me, he is out of his way. I would advise him to return again as fast as he can into the old *Dunstable* road of *Moses* and a *future state* for ever. This was only an intemperate fit of zeal that hurried him half seas over, before he knew where he was, or had time to look about him. For what is it he is doing? "*Moses* instituted the whole of an entire new religion: enjoins nothing to be added to, nor taken from it: purposely omits the doctrine of a future state, because it was not in his commission, but reserved for the great Redeemer of mankind; and yet the people, to whom he gave this religion, *had* the doctrine of a future state as of national belief, all along from his time, to the Captivity, though we can find no footsteps or traces of it in their history."

*Credat JUDÆUS Apella,*

may, I believe, be given in answer to this man's *creed* with greater propriety than ever it was applied since *Horace* first used it. After this, Is such a writer to be argued with? To talk of a doctrine not being in the commission of a minister of God, because it was reserved for a future age; and yet that the people on whom his ministry was employed had all along this very doctrine, is a mockery both of God and man. For why was not *Moses* permitted to teach it, but because the knowledge of it was reserved for a future age? Or if they were then taught it, or had it, what hindered but *Moses* might have taught it? Be not deceived; as *God is not mocked*. so neither does he mock his creatures. In short, this reasoning of my adversary is, *verbis tollere, re ponere*, the reverse of the *Epicurean*: but perhaps he may like it the better for it, as 'tis paying those *Jewish Epicureans*, the *Sadducees*, in kind: and with this class of Answerers the reverse of *wrong* is always *right*. But I am quite ashamed of my Anonymous.—Let the reader only take notice, that this is the sole point now remaining in dispute between us.

3. As to the *palmary* argument, (of a future state of rewards and punishments not being known to the *Jews*, or making part of their national doctrine from *Moses* to the Captivity) taken from the consideration of *their whole history*, as delivered in the Bible; which the reader has

an account of in this *Review* [p. 294]; our Answerer has not so much as attempted to touch upon it: though against him, who owns *Moses* neither did, nor could teach a future state, it comes with a redoubled bound. Indeed at page 102, of his pamphlet, he has the *courage* to quote it in part, and still greater neither to pretend to answer it, nor to confess its force; but, to end all, he drops it in this manner—*Why, truly Sir, there is a difficulty in conceiving it: and yet were the case as you have represented it, I should not venture to call it a DEMONSTRATION. Mere negative proofs are of all others most uncertain, &c. Venture!* Why I see you dare not *venture* so much as to look it in the face. And what you may *call* it behind its back, will be but the railing of a baffled coward. No, your genius has directed you to a fitter task; and you go on to prove that the body of the *Jews* had the doctrine, from texts nothing relating to the matter, but such as have been forced into this service by *Jews* and system-makers—as, *days of pilgrimage—being gather'd to their fathers—giving up the ghost—God's bringing every work into judgment—the righteous having hope in his death—David's hope being in God—his being a stranger and sojourner—*And the joke of it is, he tells me I might have found out this meaning in them too, had I but consulted his *commentators*. And with this miserable *recocta crumbe* his whole pamphlet is stuffed out from side to side.

4. I had introduced my evidence from the writers of the New Testament in this manner. “But what is of greatest weight, the inspired writers of the New Testament expressly declare the same. They assure us that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments did *not* make part of the *Mosaic* dispensation\*.” On which our Writer thus remarks: “The Christian reader perhaps may be at a loss to know why the testimony of the inspired writers of the New Testament should be of *greater* weight in this case than the inspired writers of the *Old*. But what is worse, unbelievers (for whose conviction I presume your demonstration is intended) may ask by what right the authors of the New Testament came to be admitted as

\* Div. Leg. Book v. § vi. iuit,

“evidence, who lived at the distance of so many hundred years,” &c. p. 66. Which shall we here most admire? the charitable insinuation in the first part? or the strewd remark in the second? Thou flower of divines! I did not say that the *testimony* of the inspired writers of the *New Testament* has greater weight than an equal testimony of the inspired writers of the *Old*. But that their testimony in the case in hand had greater weight, as (in the opinion of such as you whom I am here endeavouring in vain to convince) a positive proof by express declaration, is stronger than a *negative* arising from an omission. It was but just before this very man was quarrelling with *negative* evidence. *But what is worse*, says he, *unbelievers may ask*, &c. What! that which nothing concerns them? I had observed over and over, that they all agreed to *this truth*, and that therefore, *in this part*, I addressed myself to *believers*. But, ashamed himself of this disingenuity, he retracts his own objection:—*But as I am arguing*, says he, *with you on Christian principles, I can have no benefit from this plea*. p. 67. And was not I arguing with him, as well as he with me? Can he blush for this, or must I?

5. In sect. vi. of the fifth book of *The Divine Legation*, where I endeavour to prove the *minor* proposition from the New Testament, I introduce the discourse thus, “This evidence may be divided into two parts, the *first* proving “that temporal rewards and punishments were the sanction of the *Jewish* dispensation; the *second*, that it had “no other.” Now let the reader turn to this Writer, p. 67, & *seq.* and he will see how, by the vilest prevarication, he has argued against the *first* sort brought by me to prove *temporal rewards the sanction*, as if I had brought them to the same purpose with the *second*; namely, to prove, that there was *no other*.

6. With the same spirit it is that he endeavours to make me contradict myself, where in one place\*, speaking of the patriarchs (who, I own, referred to *Heb. xi. ver. 13 and 14. saw the promises afar off and were persuaded, &c.*) I say that *even they*, the sacred writer assures us, *had not received the promises*, referring to ver. 39. And, in another place\*, speaking of

\* Div. Leg. Book vi. § 4.

the same 39th verse, I say the sacred writer is speaking here of *the faithful Israelites in general*. Hence this great critic says I am guilty of a manifest *contradiction*, and laments in his kind way, *that these passages are both suffered to stand to shame one another*. p. 97. They shall stand for a better purpose, to *shame* all such scribblers as are not yet come to their elements; and do not so much as know that *omne majus continet in se minus*. For if in verse 39 the sacred writer be speaking of the faithful *Israelites in general*, had I not reason to say from thence, *that EVEN the Patriarchs* were included? However, he might at least have understood so much *English* as to know that the conjunction *even* implies not *exclusion*, but *extension*.

7. He insults me, and puzzles himself with this question, "If the ancient heathen legislators taught it [a "future state] or if the main body of the *Jewish* nation "believed it before the coming of *Christ*, how was it "brought to *light by the Gospel*? If this text will stand "with supposing that the general knowledge of a future "state was generally received amongst the *Jews* from the "time of the *Maccabees* down to *Christ*, will you be "pleased to inform me why it will not as well stand with "supposing that they had this doctrine for as many ages "backward?"—And for fear I should not answer him (as indeed he had reason) he answers it himself. *To bring to light does not here signify to discover what before was absolutely unknown. It signifies THEREFORE the more open or public manifestation of what before was known either imperfectly or but to a few*. pp. 72, 73. Egregious divine! If it does not signify *that* (you say) it must signify *this*. Beat your brains no further: for once I'll tell you, it signifies *neither*; but (what your systems never dreamt of) that this was the first time of its being *revealed by God*, either to the *Jewish* people as a nation, or to mankind in general. The sacred writer did not deign to call that, *bringing to light*, which was hatched in the bosom of superstition, and soon became polluted with a thousand fables in passing through the impure hands of system-making *Jews* and *Gentiles*. From whence I reasonably concluded it was never taught *by God* to the *Jewish* people throughout the period in question. What was

was taught *by man* is another thing, and entirely out of the question. But you do not understand this: I believe so: nor, I will say that for you, scarce any one general proposition throughout my whole book.

8. I said that the doctrine of a future life and resurrection was not national till the time of the *Maccabees*. He tells me, he *knows* I will say that they had it from the prophets, yet the prophets were dead two hundred years before. *Why then* (says he) *could not the Jews learn this doctrine from the very first, as well as their posterity at the distance of ages afterwards?* pp. 112, 113. This sorely distresses our theologaster: yet, instead of humbling himself under the weight of his own dulness, he turns, as is his way throughout, to insult the Author of *The Divine Legation*. Now, though this usage deserve no favour, I will try to open his understanding.—The prophets had expressed a *temporal destruction* and *restoration* in the figurative terms of *death* and *resurrection*. This being agreeable to the language of those times, the people, full only of ideas of a temporal nature, rested in the *primary* sense. But when by the total withdrawing the *extraordinary* providence of God, these people (who had right notions of his Being and attributes) had once begun to entertain the reasonable hopes of a future state; they would then as naturally search their scriptures for support. And then it was they first began to understand that those prophecies had a *secondary* sense, and a sublimer meaning. In this sense, and on this account it is that I say, *they receive the doctrine of the resurrection from the prophets*. If he ask me, with his usual insolence, how I come to know that they received the doctrine of the *resurrection* from the prophets, I will tell him this too, which is more than his *Geneva* systems could inform him of, that the doctrine was no where else to be *had*. If all this will not satisfy him, let us turn the tables, while I *question* him. The prophets prophesy of the birth, office, death, and passion of *Jesus*. The *Jews* in general, till the coming of *Christ*, and some time after, mistook this prophecy for the promise of a *temporal deliverer*, quite different from the Messiah of mankind; yet, after the resurrection, they understood better. *How so?* I ask in his own words,

*Is it likely that the sons should have learnt from the dead prophets what the fathers could not learn from the living?* p. 112. He would be hard put to it, I believe, for a pertinent reply, without condescending to use the answer I have provided for him above.—What is here said will serve for an answer to the same kind of objection urged again at page 50, where, from my owning that some passages, which relate *literally* to temporal things, had a *spiritual* and sublimer meaning, he supposes the *Jews* of those times must needs have found it out.

9. Again, “Though here (says he) you seem to be of opinion that it will in *nothing* affect the practice of virtue whether a future state is believed or not, provided the will of God is allowed to be the foundation of morality; yet, in your Preface to the *Jews*, you tell them that the *Jewish* religion must want much of absolute perfection, because it wants a doctrine so essential to religion. It is inexplicable to me, Sir, how that should be essential to religion, by the want of which the practice of virtue will in nothing be affected.” pp. 130, 131.—And are you indeed so dull as you pretend? or is this only a mask for your modesty, to hide your blushes, for so shameless a prevarication? What man living but your learned self does not see, that where I speak, in the first case, of the practice of virtue, on, what *I call*, the true foundation of morality, I am considering it under an extraordinary providence amongst the *Jews* of old: and where, in the Preface, of a future state as essential to religion, I am considering it under an ordinary and common providence, amongst the *Jews* of the present times? Yet in this very page (p. 131) has this man the modest assurance to say, TRUTH IS WHAT I SEEK.—It may possibly be so; and therefore I will take a little more pains with him. What, then, let me ask him, has the purity of virtue to do with the perfection of religion, so as that they must necessarily imply one another; and I be accused of contradiction, for saying, that the *Jewish* virtue was pure; and yet their religion imperfect? Will not this very man himself say the same thing, though, I woen, for different reasons? But do the different reasons



reasons of an assertion, make the same assertion a *contradiction* in me, and a *plain truth* in him? Allow him but a future state for his *Jews*, and their virtue, then, becomes *pure*: but will he say their religion is *perfect*? But, because there can be no *perfect* religion without *pure* virtue, he concluded the other way, that there could be no *pure* virtue without a *perfect* religion; and so has caught me in his contradiction-trap, which he has laid, with the same success, I don't know how often, throughout the course of this debate.

And here the judicious reader, I am sure, cannot but smile to see him insinuate (p. 129), with a sneer, that Bishop *Bull* must needs be a stranger to my scheme, as he thinks it, of *moral obligation*. He supposed, in good earnest, the Bishop could read his Bible, as he has done, without seeing that the *ground* of this *obligation* is *there* made to be *the will of God*. But this it is to have to do with a head whose sense is all run to system.

10. Once more. In that miserable sophistical shuffle with those few of my arguments, on the *Case of Abraham*, which he dares venture to encounter in his *Appendix*, he brings it as a *contradiction*, that, after I had said, the information, conveyed in the command to offer *Isaac*, was for *Abraham's sole use*, I should then suppose his *family* knew of it. And in this he triumphs with his usual vivacity and success. pp. 167, 168. Here again I am at a loss, as things are so equally balanced, to know which was at fault in this place, his head or heart; but no matter: they are both past my mending. I will turn to the reader.—Where I speak of the information's being given for *Abraham's sole use*, I am assigning a reason for the obscurity of the historical relation, so far as concerns the *information*, which I supposed to be conveyed in the command: consequently, *his sole use* is opposed to the *Jewish people*, when the history of the command was written; and not to his own family, *Isaac* and *Jacob*, when the command was given; whom I all along reckon amongst those patriarchs who had some knowledge of the redemption of mankind.—Suppose it should be thought proper to give this man a *dignity* for his *work's sake*, in this labour of love; and he should be told it was for his  
sole

*sole use*; he would be apt, I suspect, to think that this rather excluded the body of the poor and needy, than his own dear family.

11. Again—"Nor (says he) will the *Pagan* Fable of "*Diana's* substituting a hind in the place of *Iphigenia* at all help your unbeliever. *This did not*, say you, "*make idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred human sacrifices*. But do not they themselves, or have not you assigned a very proper and sufficient reason why it did not, viz. that *they had been before persuaded to the contrary*? Where human sacrifices make a part of the settled standing religion; the refusal to accept a human sacrifice in one particular instance, may indeed rather be looked upon as a particular indulgence than as a declaration against the thing in gross. But where the thing was commanded but in one single instance, and the command revoked in that very instance (which is our present case) such revocation in all reasonable construction is as effectual a condemnation of the thing as if God had told *Abraham*, in so many words, that he delighted not in such sacrifices." p. 161. I quote this out of mere charity, because it looks like sense; and is the only thing that does so throughout the whole pamphlet. But this fair appearance is only in profile. What it has on one side, it wants on another; and betrays the grossest ignorance of antiquity. At this very time human sacrifices had overspread the superstition of *Canaan*. And thence it is that the Deist's argument receives its force. The family of *Abraham*, say they, who found the same practice commanded him which they saw esteemed by all the *Pagans* round about as the sublimest height of piety, a practice, as appears from Scripture, not *positively* forbidden but by the law of *Moses*, would, in the case they put, be naturally tempted to think as favourably of it as those *Pagans*, who understood that *Diana* required *Iphigenia*, though she accepted a hind in her stead.

12. After all these victories, he may be well excused the interposing with his own good will and pleasure. "If it is your intention (says he) to proceed, and it were not too great a presumption in me to offer my advice; it should be to lay the weight of your argument, not  
" upo

“ upon *this*, that the *Jews knew nothing* of a future state ;  
 “ but upon *this*, that the *law of Moses* had made *no pro-*  
 “ *vision* for it. IF THIS PRINCIPLE IS ALL YOU WANT,  
 “ IT WILL STAND, and you will have nothing to answer  
 “ for, but the ill judgment of advancing and taking so  
 “ much pains to support another point with which your  
 “ conclusion has nothing to do.” p. 134. Goodly and  
 gracious ! Here he shews how capable a reader he is of  
*The Divine Legation*. He confesses not to know whe-  
 ther *this principle is all I want* to establish my demon-  
 stration ; and yet he will turn *answerer*. But what the  
 connexion of a long chain of reasoning hindered him  
 from seeing, I hope this short *view* will bring to light :  
 and that the *second syllogism* will inform him, that WHAT  
 HE GRANTS IS ALL I WANT. For if *Moses* would leave  
 his people to get or keep a doctrine as they could, so  
 necessary, and believed by him to be so necessary, under  
 an *ordinary providence*, to religion and society, we must  
 needs conclude, he was well assured, that his institution  
 could do without it ; or, in other words, that the defect  
 would be supplied by the administration of an *extraordi-*  
*nary providence*. The dispute, therefore, seems now to  
 be at an end between us. He owns, I have gained my  
 point : that I have got to the goal : all that he would  
 now dispute with me is the road. I must take the track  
 he marks out to me ; and *I have nothing to answer for*  
*but the ill judgment of advancing and taking so much*  
*pains to support another point with which my conclusion*  
*has nothing to do*. Say you so, kind Sir ! with what face  
 then could you tell the world, just before, that *I ought*  
*to make amends for the wrong I have done to religion in*  
*the second volume of The Divine Legation, in which,*  
*instead of placing Christianity on a surer bottom, I have*  
*only furnished out more handles to unbelievers ?* p. 132.  
 What ! Is proving the *divinity* of *Moses's* religion, a  
 thing for which I ought to make *amends* and repent, as a  
*wrong* done to Christianity ? Suppose I was willing to  
 support the proof in a way you do not like ; you confess  
 that, in this, *I have nothing to answer for but the ill*  
 JUDGMENT of *taking pains to support another point with*  
*which my conclusion has nothing to do*. Am I therefore,  
 for my *ill judgment*, to be ranked amongst the injurious  
 subverters

subverters of Revelation? What then will become of you? But such as these seem to care little whether religion be true or false, unless it can be supported on their systems. They had been bred up in the belief that the old *Jews*, as well as their *law*, were *spiritual*, and then

—*Turpe putant parere minoribus, & quæ  
Imberbes didicere, senes perdenda fateri.*

After this, it was in vain for the Apostle to tell them, in the person of a *Jew*, *We know that the law is SPIRITUAL, but I am CARNAL*. However, let him set his heart at rest (if at least the conscience of so unjust a calumny will suffer him). For though this principle, *that the law of Moses made no provision for a future state*, be all I want to support my demonstration; yet I mean, I can assure him, to secure it with this other, *that the body of the Jews for some ages knew nothing of it*. This I should do, were it for nothing else but that it is a **TRUTH** offensive to bigots and their systems; by which they have done their best to render both the *word of God*, and reason of man, *of no effect*. But I have weightier motives: I shall make it serve for the noblest purposes of religious truth and piety.

But why do I speak of these matters to him; who is so exceeding ignorant even of the very *forms* of argument, that having given us to understand that he saw I had finished the *major* proposition in the first volume, and the *minor* in the second, he goes on thus—"As your conclusion is "to be the subject of a future book, I think I have no "right to meddle with it at present. I will prejudge you "in nothing, and shall therefore leave you at full "liberty to **CONNECT IT WITH YOUR PREMISES**, as you "shall find yourself able." p. 4. Here he plainly appears not to understand *what natural connexion* there is between the *major*, *minor*, and *conclusion*. I had learnt that the **CONCLUSION** had been **CONNECTED** with the **PREMISES** by *Aristotle* long ago; but it seems, so unhappy still am I, that the thing is yet to do. Thanks indeed to this merciful divine!—*I am left at full liberty to do it, as I shall find myself able.*

13. But one word more, and I have done. "Whether" (says he) you intend to proceed, or will suffer yourself "to be wholly diverted from your purpose by matters of" "another kind *less suitable to your clerical function, you best know*. But give me leave to say, Sir, you are a "debtor to the public; and I hope that in your next "volume you will make some *amends*, for the *wrong you have done to religion in this*; in which, instead of "placing Christianity upon a surer bottom, you have "only furnished out *more handles to unbelievers*." p. 132. I scarce know whether I am not to take this for pure kindness, and a sort of friendly impatience for my third volume: which certainly, if it would hold, he has contrived a very speedy way to obtain: and that is by proving it a *debt*. And this at least I will do him the justice to say, that if I be a *debtor to the public*, it must be for the reason he so candidly suggests, or none at all. But, alas! he has, as a good friend in the like case might have, his doubts and his fears. He questions whether I will not suffer myself to be wholly diverted from my purpose by matters of another kind *less suitable to my clerical function*. Less suitable than what? why, according to him, than *writing to the wrong and injury of religion, and giving more handles to unbelievers*. What I am then *diverted* by, must be very *unsuitable* indeed. But will the good man be so kind to tell us what this *diversion* is? Thank you for that indeed. As things are now carried, and left in the dark, who knows but the reader, in excess of charity, may take it to be a whore, or a horse-race, or a good job of simony; a party pamphlet, or levee-hunting, or Exchange Alley, or, in short, twenty things besides; each of them sufficient to discredit the mere unorthodox man! With this good luck, I make no doubt but he would *wipe his mouth*, and applaud his innocent address. Well, then, since the meaness and malignity of his heart will not suffer *him* to tell, *I* will. The *diversion* he hints at, and yet dare not name, is a critical defence and illustration of the writings of one of the greatest Geniuses of this, or indeed of any age, to convince the prejudiced and ignorant, that the incomparable writer hath been always on the side of truth, virtue, and

and religion. And now the secret is out. In the mean time, I dare suppose, that our *Anonymous* holds it as a thing very *suitable to clerical profession*, to calumniate his brother only for differing from him in opinion, though in the support of that very cause which himself pretends to espouse. I give *handles to unbelievers*, while I endeavoured to prove an *extraordinary providence*, administered in the *Jewish* republic, a fact, by the truth or falsehood of which, the religion of *Moses* must stand or fall. But this man, and his fellows, it seems, give none, who, in writing against me, are so far from saying one word in its *behalf*, that they seem rather to treat it as a vision of the Author of the *D. L.* This Writer particularly seems to have given no obscure intimations, up and down his pamphlet, that he believes nothing of the matter. But how has my saying, that the doctrine was not national, but unknown to the body of the *Jewish* people between the times of *Moses* and the Captivity, *given more handles to unbelievers*? Was I the first broacher of the opinion? Look upon the three great testimonies above. Or would it have remained hid, had I not divulged it? Has this man never heard of the present overflow of infidelity? Or has he ever heard of *one Deist* that believed a future state to be a national doctrine amongst the *Jews* within the period aforesaid? Or, to be plain with him, is there indeed more than a few bigots like himself that now believe it? What was then to be done? Here was a very general opinion, grounded upon common sense, supposed to be discreditable to Revelation. I examined it. On examination it appeared to me a truth. Was I to disguise or hide it (according to the principle and practices of these men) because it gave scandal? Far be those arts from every minister of the Gospel! I well knew, if it were a truth, it would never hurt Revelation. I chose then to give glory to truth; and, in that, to the God of truth: and, by so doing, I became enabled to demonstrate to unbelievers that this, which they esteemed a discredit to the religion of *Moses*, was a convincing mark of its divinity. And for this, and this only, I am said by this writer to *have wronged religion, and given more handles to infidelity*. But I forgive him, and pray

that God, whose holy religion I am defending, may forgive him too.

14. But the reader, by this time, must needs be curious to know what it was that could provoke our *Anonymous* to write with so much acrimony against his brother, embarked with him in the same cause of religion, while there were so many *Infidel-writers* remained unanswered,

*Cumque superba foret Babylon spolianda trophæis.*

And for what? a vision, nobody will thank him for, unless it be half a dozen bigots: always excepting the venerable *Jewish church*, of which he has shewn himself so zealous a support. She surely owes him her best acknowledgments for keeping her children close attached to her, and hardening them in their infidelity. For, were it not for this inveterate error, they had long since come over to the faith of *Jesus*, there being then nothing to obstruct their sight in the manifest *imperfection of the Law*: to prevent which, their Leaders, as the great *Episcopus* informs us, took so much pains (so well seconded here by our *Anonymous*) TO ASSERT THE FAITH OF THE ANCIENT JEWISH CHURCH; and to prove, that their forefathers always had the doctrine of a future state, *Quicquid nunc Judei multum de futuro seculo de resurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna loquantur, & ex Legis verbis ea extorquere potius quam ostendere contentur, NE LEGEM MOSIS IMPERFECTAM ESSE cogantur agnoscere*\*. For he cannot sure be so weak to think it possible, that, when he has agreed with them, that their church always had a future state, they will agree with him, that *Moses* did not teach it. All this considered, it would have been very difficult to divine his *motive* for writing against me, had not he himself fairly, and without disguise, informed us of it, in the very entrance on his work. Not to mince the matter, it was that *little* reputation, (yet *more* than he could bear) which, it seems, the *Divine Legation* had accidentally bestowed upon its Author.—“That you have given (says our *Anonymous*) great proofs of your learning and ingenuity, “I shall not dispute: and you have had a fair time

\* See the quotation above.

“allowed.

“allowed you to receive the COMPLIMENTS OF THE PUBLIC on that score. It may now be seasonable to call you to something, which, though perhaps less agreeable to you, may yet be more profitable; and that is, to consider how much truth you have advanced, and what real service you have done, or are likely to do to religion, by this undertaking.” p. 34. And why will he not *dispute the great proofs of my learning and ingenuity*? He has disputed a more incontestible thing; the *truth*, which that *learning and ingenuity* were employed to illustrate: and, if these appeared with any distinction, it was solely owing to the advantage of the *subject*.

But *I have had a fair-time allowed me to receive the compliments of the Public*. How allowed me? and by whom? certainly not by such writers as these. For if their clamours could have prevailed, I had received the *public odium* rather than its *compliments*. And the reader may see, by the short list given of them in the beginning of this pamphlet, that those clamours began the very moment the first volume of *The Divine Legation* appeared; and have continued ever since, without interruption, to the publication of our Author's *Epistolary Dissertation*.

But, after all, what were these *compliments*? And where have they lain hid? Nothing, from the Public, ever came to my knowledge but the *calumnies* of my adversaries. In some sense, indeed, these may be called *compliments*, and substantial ones too. For, next to the old way of complimenting, *Laudari a laudato Viru*, I prize the *new*, now all in fashion, *vituperari a perditissimo quoque*. He, perhaps, may think the sale of the book a good substantial compliment. But, for that, my bookseller must thank them; especially if he gave them not their pennyworth for their money.

However, to take these *compliments* in their obvious sense. I know of nothing for which I had more reason to expect *the compliments of the public*, than for *the Alliance between Church and State*, as it was a defence (and I will presume, from its being yet unanswered, an *effectual* one) of the justice and equity of our present happy establishment; at a time when the enemies of all



Church establishments were commonly supposed to have demonstrated it to be indefensible. Yet what *public compliment* did I ever receive for this service? unless it may be reckoned a compliment, that those, in whose behalf it was particularly written, have never yet publicly disavowed the free and moderate principles on which it goes. But *that*, the honest layman will perhaps say, is no bad compli<sup>ment</sup> to themselves.

I am here all along pleading for my adversary. For had I *indeed* received the *compliments* he talks of, he would find it very difficult to bring his *modesty* off unhurt. The *wrong judgment of the Public* being, in *that* case, the principal object of his pamphlet: the drift of which is to shew that I *deserved no compliment*, as I had confounded and mistaken the question, run into contradictions, and done injury to Christianity: nay, even in this very place, where he talks of the *great proofs of my learning and ingenuity*, he cannot forbear insinuating that I have *advanced no truth, nor done any real service to religion*. Miserable then, indeed, is that *learning and ingenuity*! Well does he say he would not *dispute* them. For, for any thing they are worth, there they may lie; and he may safely trust to time to revenge his quarrel on them.

From all this, then, we must conclude that these *public compliments* are but the *mormos* of his own brain: things he rather *feared* than *saw*; and that, through the false consciousness of a supposed worth, he is no judge of. In this troublesome situation, the only way he had of *easing himself* was to attempt to give *me pain*; indeed the only *ease* such writers are capable of, when they see, or imagine they see, a *merit* in others. *It is time* (says he) *to call you to something less agreeable*.

Well, but if it be, as he promises, *more profitable*, he makes me sufficient amends. And there was no danger of his not keeping his word: for an use is always to be made of the calumnies of one's enemies. Besides, it must be a poor thing indeed that will not afford more *profit* than the airy compliments he talks of: which were they as real as, for aught appears, they are imaginary, I solemnly assure him, I would give them all for the honest satisfaction of

having made one single convert; and I have reason to hope I have made many by my writings, from irreligion to the faith of *Jesus*.

However, the *profit I may get* by an adversary is one thing; and the *profit he may propose* is another. Let us see then what our *Anonymous* aims at. *It is* (he tells us) *to consider how much truth I have advanced, or what real service I have done, or am likely to do to religion, by this undertaking.* Modestly intimating, that I have advanced no truth; done no real service, nor likely to do any to religion. And now, methinks, I hear the equitable and indignant reader crying out, *Sume superbiam, &c.* And certainly if this liberty may be allowed in any case, it must in this, where a man's honest endeavours, in his proper station, to serve his country and mankind, are blackened by the dull low envy of an anonymous slanderer. What! *Was it advancing no truth, was it doing no service to religion,* to confute the Atheistic principles of *Bayle*, the immoral doctrine of *Mandeville*, and settling morality on its true basis, and shewing it to be that on which Revelation hath placed it? To justify the equity of an established religion; vindicate the Christian from the charge of a persecuting spirit; shew the absolute necessity of religion for the support of society, and yet that it had its original, neither from priests nor statesmen, but from truth, and truth's great Author? Again, *Was it advancing no truth, was it doing no service to religion,* to shew that the *Mosaic* had all the distinguishing marks of divinity; to vindicate the Bible history against the greatest modern Philosopher and Chronologer; to explain the nature of the *Jewish* theocracy, and, by that, to justify the equity of those two famous laws, of *punishing for opinions*, and *punishing posterity for the crimes of their forefathers*; to confute the most able book ever wrote against Revelation, *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*; and, above all, to explain, and to be the *first* who ever did explain, the nature of *types* in action, and *secondary senses* in speech, on which, depend altogether the rational interpretation of ancient prophecies, and the truth of the mission of *Jesus*?—But for the further confutation of so wretched a calumny, the reader need only turn back again to

the *vicw* I have here given of the *argument* of the *Divine Legation*. Yet none of these matters, no, nor an hundred more, has he so much as touched upon, or pretended to confute. Will he say therefore that these are not what he meant, when he promised to shew, *that I had advanced no truth, done no real service to religion?* But only my *peculiar* argument for *The Divine Legation of Moses*. Why then did he make his *charge* so *general*, when his *proof* was so *confined*? As his modesty will not suffer him to tell, it shall be helped out. The reader then must know, that it is a fundamental maxim with all the writers of this class (as it is amongst the *Jesuits*) never to acknowledge that an adversary can do any thing *well*, lest the public should take it into their heads that other things are not so ill as is represented. This is the wicked spirit of controversy, and under the possession of it I leave him. For I am ashamed of having wasted a moment with so unprofitable a writer.

The judicious reader, I am sure, would not excuse me if he thought many were so misemployed. The truth is, the reading his book (which is the first I ever read through, of all that have been hitherto wrote against me), and the writing this *Appendix*, took me up but a part only of this one evening. Though I have answered every thing in it worth notice; or that had the least chance of misleading a well-meaning reader. However, if he will tell his name, and shew his face; and it appears that the one has been heard of, or the other ever seen in good company, I do hereby promise to give his *Considerations on the Case of Abraham*, &c. a distinct answer, paragraph by paragraph, in the manner of *that*, to one much his betters, the truly learned and worthy Editor of the book of *Job*. Nay, I will do more for his encouragement: I will shew as particular a respect to the *rest* of his pamphlet; but on this further condition, however, that he, at the same time, produce me some ONE competent judge who shall say, on his credit, that it deserves any other answer than what has been already given to it. But without this, a final adieu to his *nameless nothing*; but with this testimony, however, that a duller, a more disingenuous, or ignorant book, I never read.

*December 17, 1743.*

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## P O S T S C R I P T.

I HAVE said, that all this *writer* has urged, from *texts* of Scripture, to prove a *future state* in the *Jewish* dispensation, is so utterly contemptible, and void of sense, as to deserve no kind of answer. But that he may not flatter himself in the imagination of any other cause of my neglect of him, I shall here examine a single *objection* (sent me in a private *anonymous Letter*), which has more plausibility of reason than all his arguments, on this head, put together. And, as the Author's manner of communicating it has the appearance of candour and love of truth, he will always deserve more regard than a thousand such writers as the *Examiner of the second Proposition*. The objection is in these words: "*Moses* inforces the obedience of the *Israelites* upon this consideration, *Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them*\*. Here is a promise of life made to those who should observe the statutes and judgments which God gave them by his servant *Moses*; which cannot be understood of this temporal life only, because the best men were often cut off in the midst of their days, and frequently suffered greater adversities than the most profligate sinners. The *Jews* therefore have constantly believed that it had a respect to the life to come. When the lawyer in the Gospel had made that most important demand, *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life* †? our blessed Lord refers him to what was written in the Law; and, upon his making a sound and judicious answer, approves of it; and for satisfaction to his question tells him, *This do, and thou shalt live*."—The objection is very ingenious; and, as we shall see, not less *artfully* managed.

The objector would have the promise of *life* in *Leviticus* to signify *eternal life*. But St. *Paul* himself has long ago moderated this question for us, and declared for the negative. A dispute arose between him, and the

\* Levit. xviii. 5.

† Luke x. 25.

Judaizing Christians, concerning *what it was that justified before God*, or entitled to that *eternal life* brought to light by the Gospel. They held it to be the *works of the Law* (*believing*, perhaps, as the objector assures us they did, that this text, in *Leviticus*, had a respect to the life to come): St. Paul, on the contrary, that it was *faith in Jesus the Messiah*. And thus he argues—"But that no man is justified by the Law in the sight of God it is evident; for, *the just shall live by faith*. And the Law is not of faith: but the man that *doth* them shall live in them\*."—As much as to say—That no man can obtain *eternal life* by virtue of the *Law* is evident from one of your own prophets [*Hab.*] who expressly says, that *the just shall LIVE by FAITH*†. Now, by the *Law*, no rewards are promised to *faith*, but to *works only*. The man that *DOETH* them (says the *Law*, in *Levit.*‡) *shall live in them*.—Here then we see that this very text which the objector brings to prove *eternal life by the Law*, St. Paul urges, to prove it *not by the Law*. Let us attend to the apostle's argument. He is to shew, that *justification*, or *eternal life*, is by *faith*. This he does, even on the concession of a *Jew*, the prophet *Habakkuk*; who expressly owns it to be by *faith*. But the *Law*, says the apostle, attributes nothing to *faith*; but, to *deeds* only, "which if a man *do* he shall live in them." Now, if, by *life*, be here meant, as the objector supposes, *eternal life*, then St Paul's argument does not come out as he intended it; namely, that *faith and not the works of the Law justify*; but thus, that *both faith and the works of the Law justify*, which would have satisfied these *Judaizers*, (as reconciling, on their own prejudices, *Moses* and *Habakkuk*); but, by no means, our apostle; whose *conclusion* on this question (where discussed at large, in his epistle to the *Romans*) is, that *a man is justified by faith WITHOUT the deeds of the Law*§. The very drift of his argument therefore shews us, that he must necessarily understand the *life*, promised in this text of *Leviticus*, to be *TEMPORAL life only*. But charitably studious, as it were, to prevent all possible chance of our mistaking him on so important a point,

\* Gal. iii. 11, 12.

† Ch. xviii. 5.

‡ Ch. ii. 4.

§ Rom. iii. 28.

he immediately subjoins, *Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law*\*. Now we know that our redemption by *Christ* was from that death which the first man brought into the world: this was the *curse* he entailed upon his posterity. The apostle's transferring this term from *Adam* to the *Law* shews, therefore, that, in his sentiments, the *Law* had no more a share in the redemption of fallen man than *Adam* himself had. Yet it is certain, that if the *Law*, when it said, *He who keeps these statutes and judgments shall live in them, meant for ever*, it proposed the redemption of mankind as certainly as the blessed *Jesus* himself did, when he said, *He that believeth in me shall have everlasting life*. This becomes demonstrably clear if *St. Paul's* reasoning will hold, who surely had heard nothing of this prerogative of the *Law*, when he said, *If there had been a Law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the Law*. Where observe, I pray you, the force of the word ζωοποιῆσαι, which signifies to quicken, or to make alive; plainly intimating the same he had said in the place before quoted, that those in subjection to the *Law* were under a *curse*, or in the state of *death*.—Let me add only this further observation, that if (as the objector pretends by *life*, in the text of *Levit.* he meant *eternal life*; and if (as the apostle pretends) by *life* in the text of *Habakkuk* he meant *eternal life*: then will *Moses* and *Habakkuk* be made directly to contradict one another; the first giving *eternal life* to *works*; the latter, to *faith*.

But the objector would insinuate, that *Jesus* himself seems to have fixed this sense to the text in *Leviticus*; at least that he has plainly inferred, that eternal life was taught, if not obtained by the *Law*.—"When the lawyer "in the Gospel (says he) had made that most important "demand, *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal "life* †? our blessed Lord refers him to what was written "in the *Law*, and upon his making a sound and judicious "answer, approves of it; and for satisfaction to his "question, tells him, *This do and thou shalt live*."—Would not any one now conclude from the sense here put upon the words of *Jesus*, that the sound and judicious

\* Gal. iii. 13.

† Luke x. 25.

answer of the lawyer must have been a quotation of the text in *Leviticus*, or at least some general promise made to the observers of the whole Law of Moses? Nothing like it. On the contrary, the lawyer's answer was a quotation of only one precept of the Law, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, &c. and thy neighbour as thy self*. Now how much soever we may differ about a future life's being held out by the Law through a Messiah that was to come, I suppose we are both agreed that *faith in the Messiah*, either actual or imputed, is necessary to obtain this future life. There are but two ways then of understanding this text of St. Luke, neither of which is to his purpose. The first is supposing Jesus included *faith in himself* in this precept of *loving God with all the heart, &c.* which will appear no forced interpretation to him who holds Jesus to be *really and truly God*; as I suppose we both do; and may be supported by a circumstance in the story, as told by St. *Matthæw*\*, though omitted by St. *Luke*, which is Jesus's saying, *that on these two commandments hang all the Law and the prophets*. The second and exacter interpretation is, that Jesus spoke to a professing follower, who pretended to acknowledge his mission, and wanted only a rule of life. For Jesus is here preaching the Gospel to his disciples, and a lawyer stood up and tempted him, that is, on the false footing of a disciple required a rule of life. Now in either case, this reference of Jesus to the Law must imply this, and this only, *that without righteousness and holiness no man shall see the Lord*. A point in which, I suppose, we are agreed.—But still the objector will say that these words of Jesus allude to the words of Moses. Admit they do. It will not follow, as he seems to think, that they were given to explain them. How many allusions are there in the New Testament to passages in the Old, accommodated to a spiritual sense, where the texts alluded to are seen, by all but Fanatics, to have only a carnal? And even in this very allusion, if it be one, we find that the promise made to the observers of the whole Law is transferred to the observance of one single precept in the moral part of it. but let us grant him all he would have; and

\* Matt. xxii. 40.

admit that these words of *Jesus* were given to *explain* the words of *Moses*. What would follow from thence, but that the promise in *Leviticus* was *prophetic*, and had a *secondary* sense, of a spiritual and sublimer import? Will this give any advantage to our adversaries? surely none at all. And yet the abuse of this concession is all they have for it, to support their systems. Thus the reader has seen how the *Examiner* of the *second Proposition* triumphs on my assertion, *that the later Jews exco-*  
*gitated the doctrine of the resurrection from the prophetic language of former ages*; and asks (with an ignorance excusable only in a savage to his catechist) how *these Jews* came to be more quick-sighted than *those* contemporary with the prophets? I had in vain endeavoured to teach him that a *carnal* and a *spiritual* sense (both of which, we are agreed, the Law had, in order to fit *God's word* to the use of *two* dispensations) implied an *ignorance* of the *spiritual* sense during the *first* of them. But my word ought to go for nothing, in this case, when unsupported by Scripture. Let us hear then what the apostles themselves say to this matter: who, in order to shew the superior excellence of the *Gospel*, in their reasoning against *Jews* and Judaizing Christians, set the *Law* in contrast to it, under the titles of *the law of a carnal commandment*; *the ministration of death*; *the law of works*: and call subjection to it, *subjection to the flesh*. Yet these very writers at the same time own that *the Law was SPIRITUAL*, or had a *spiritual sense*. But if by this they meant, that *that sense* was generally understood during the *Law dispensation*, their whole argument had ended in the highest utility. For then it was not *a law of a carnal commandment, a ministration of death*; but, indeed *a law of the spirit, a ministration of life*; only under a dead and carnal cover; which, being clearly seen through, was no other than a foil to set it the better off: and consequently was of equal dignity, and, though not of equal simplicity, yet, indeed, essentially the same with the *Gospel*. Thus we see into how high a degree of contempt with unbelievers, these principles of my adversaries would naturally bring the holy apostles, did not those admirable reasoners take care themselves to guard against so horrid  
a perversion



a perversion of their meaning. They owned, we see, that the Law had a *spiritual sense*: but *when*, and by whom *discovered*, the apostle *Paul* informs us, by calling *that sense* the *NEWNESS OF SPIRIT* \*; which he opposes to the *oldness of the letter*, that is, the *letter* of the *Law*. In the former part of the verse, he speaks of the *Law being dead*; and, here, of its being *revived* again with a *new spirit*, in contradistinction to the *oldness of the letter*. So true was it, what, in another place, he observes, that *the Law was a shadow of things to come*; but *the body was of Christ* †. The *shadow* not of a *body* then to be seen or understood, as our adversaries imagine, but of a *body that was to come*, and, by its presence, explain the meaning and reason of the *shadow*. For the *Jews* being, as the apostle says, *in bondage under the elements of the world* ‡, were as men shut up in prison, with their faces kept turned from the light, towards the whited wall of ceremonies: on which indeed they saw many *shadows*; but the *body* or opposite substance at their backs, to which they could not turn, they saw not. And in this state, says the same apostle, they were *kept shut up unto the faith, which should afterwards be revealed* §. Till *that time*, therefore, it appears that the *body* of the *Jews* had no knowledge of this *faith*; one of the essential articles of which is *life everlasting*. This we must needs have concluded, even though he had not said that till *that time* they were *in bondage under the elements of the world*. A proper character truly of a people acquainted with the *revealed* doctrine of *life and immortality*!

But, as the *epistle to the Hebrews*, is so much insisted on by my adversaries, I shall, in the last place, produce a text or two from it, sufficient alone to determine the controversy between us; and to justify what I said of it in the *Divine Legation*, that *in this epistle there are more express declarations that life and immortality was not taught by nor known under the Law, than in all the other books of the New Testament*. For which indeed a very good reason may be given; as it was addressed solely to the *Jews*; amongst whom this fatal prejudice, that *a future state was taught by the Law*, was then, and

\* Rom. vii. 6. † Col. ii. 17. ‡ Gal. iv. 3. § Gal. iii. 23.

has continued ever since, to be the strongest impediment to their conversion. But to come to the point. The inspired writer, in the second chapter and second verse, hath these remarkable words, *For if the word spoken by angels was stedfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward; how shall we escape, &c.* By the word spoken by angels every one knows is meant the Law delivered to *Moses* by them for his people: so that here is an express declaration, 1. *That the sanctions of this Law* were of a temporal kind. He then goes on, verse the fifth, *For unto the angels hath he not put in subjection the world to come, whereof we speak.* And this is as express a declaration, 2. *That the Law taught no future state.* Thus far then we are got. Let us next attend to the fourteenth and fifteenth verses; he [Christ] *also himself likewise took part of the same* [flesh and blood;] *that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage.* The devil is here said to have the power of death, as he brought it in by the delusion of the *first man*; therefore, before death can be abolished, he must be destroyed. But his destruction is the work of the *second man*. Till then, we infer from hence, that death reigned under the devil. But this is not all; we are expressly told, that the *Jews, all their lifetime, were through fear of death subject to bondage.* Which certainly can imply no other than, 3. *That they had no future state* to secure them from this fear. See here then, for a conclusion, the principle of the *Divine Legation* justified on the plainest and most consequential reasoning of the holy apostle.

But now, say these men, if the early *Jews* had no knowledge of a future state, the chosen people of God were in a much worse condition than the Gentiles, who all had it.—To this purpose let us hear our anonymous *Examiner*, who has not only spoken the full sense of his party, but has urged it too with a candour peculiar to himself.

“You consider (says he) the ignorance of the *Jews* as to the doctrine of a future state, as one of the most momentous truths that religion has to boast of. I, on  
“ the

“ the other hand, look upon it as a DISGRACE to Revelation ; as, by the very act of God himself, it shuts out his own chosen people, for many ages, from that single point of knowledge, which could be the foundation of a reasonable worship ; while by the directions of his providence, all the world besides were permitted to have the benefit of it.” pp. 131, 132.

He says, *He looks upon no future state amongst the Jews as a disgrace to Revelation.* Why so? *Because by the very act of God himself it shut out his own chosen people, &c.* Sure he has forgot what he so oft told his reader, that *Moses taught not, nor had it in his commission to teach, a future state to the Israelites*: otherwise he would have seen that *this*, alone, went a great way towards shutting out the chosen people. And if they were let in at all, it certainly was not by this prophet of God. Consequently, if the holding, that *God shut them out*, be disgraceful to Revelation, this very orthodox gentleman, we see, is got as deep in the mire as the Author of the *Divine Legation*. In truth, I pity the poor man, who thus, at every step, brings himself into these distresses: and all, from a *false modesty*. He was ashamed of the absurdity of his party, in holding that *Moses taught, or ought to have taught, a future state*; and therefore, at this turn, leaves them in the lurch, and takes up the better principle of his adversary, that *Moses had no commission to teach it*: for he must have been dull indeed not to have collected that this was his adversary's principle, after he had seen him write a book to prove that *Moses did not teach it*.—And be not offended, good Sir, that I call this a *false modesty*; for what is it else, to be shocked with *one* absurdity in your party, and yet to defend all the *rest*? Whose only plausible support, too, happens to be in that *one* which you reject. Indeed, indeed, my kind friend,

—*Pudor te malus urget,  
Insancti qui inter vereare insanus haberi.*

—But the cause, though not the Advocate, demands a serious confutation. And as the only support of it, against the *argument* of the *Divine Legation*, lies in these calumnious appeals to vulgar prejudices; which  
our

our *Anonymous*, in the passage above, has inforced with his heartiest malice ; I will here, once for all, examine their pretensions : and so as they shall never henceforward be considered, in the learned world at least, as any other than mere vulgar prejudices.

To begin then with the *subject* of the *first* proposition, That *God shut out the Israelites from the knowledge of a future state* ; which (in the case given) is throwing that upon *God* for which man only is accountable. The *Israelites* were indeed *shut out* ; yet, not as he dreams, *by the very act of God himself* ; but, if he will have the truth who never seeks it as he ought, by the very act of their forefather, *Adam*. It was the *first man* who *shut them out* : and the door of Paradise was never opened again till the coming of the *second man, the Lord from Heaven*. But this, I own, is answering him in a strange language ; the language of Scripture. A language his systems will never enable him to understand.—But more of this secret, for such, I find, it is to our *Examiner*, in my next volume.

But, to shew what infinite loss they sustained in this exclusion, he goes on, and says, that *a future state is the single point of knowledge which can be the foundation of a reasonable worship*. Here, doctors differ. St. PAUL places the *foundation of a reasonable worship* in another thing. He saith, that HE THAT COMETH TO GOD MUST BELIEVE THAT HE IS, AND THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM \*. What is man's purpose in coming to God ? Why, certainly, to worship him. And what doth the apostle tell us is the true, the *reasonable foundation of this worship* ? Why, to believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him. What becomes then of our *Examiner's only foundation of a reasonable worship* ? The apostle, we see, places it in the nature, and not (as our *Examiner*) in the *inessential circumstances, of reward* : consequently a reward given here, was as true a *foundation of reasonable worship* to the early *Jews*, living under an extraordinary providence, as a reward given hereafter is to us Christians, living under an ordinary one : and consequently our *Examiner* must have been mistaken, when he made a FUTURE

\* Heb. xi. 6.

*STATE the single point of knowledge which can be the foundation of a reasonable worship.—But does not common sense say the same thing?*

For, to come a little closer to this formidable man, now I have got an apostle on my side; I will undertake to *demonstrate* (how much soever he dislikes the word) that a *FUTURE STATE* is so far from being *the only foundation of a reasonable worship*, that, while *God is believed the rewarder of them that diligently seek him* (and that is the case of a people under an *extraordinary* providence) the *ignorance of a future state* neither affects *piety* nor *morality*; the two things which constitute a *reasonable worship*, and perfect mankind in *virtue*.

Not *piety*, because that (in the case given) depends solely on the *belief that God is*.

Not *morality*, because that depends solely on the *knowledge of what God commands*.

And this, which *right reason* teaches, the *Law of Moses* has promulged. We are commanded to *love God* for his sake, that is, for the excellence of his nature, the most lovely of all objects. We are commanded to *love our neighbour*; and the prescribed measure, *as our selves*, points to the equity of the command; for, being all equal by nature, we should have but one rule of acting, for ourselves and others. This is resolvable into the natural relations of things; and those *relations* are the *declarations* of God's *will*, the only true foundation of morality; and, as such, perpetually enforced by the *Law of Moses*. Thus firmly established are the duties of the first and second table. Now, *on the love of God and of our neighbour hang all the law and the prophets*. That these therefore should not be able at the same time to support a *reasonable worship*, when, to all this *Mosaic* enforcement of the *belief that God is*, it is added, that he is an exact *rewarder of them that diligently seek him*, would be a very hard case indeed; especially if we consider, that, to our corrupt nature, it is not the immeasurable reward at distance, but that which is present, and understood by us, that most forcibly attracts us. And this it was, which the *Law of Moses* held out.

In a word then, since *pure virtue*, under which term I comprise *piety* and *morality*, consists in acting  
agraceably

agreeably to those relations in which we stand to all beings whatsoever; is it possible there can be any more forcible inducement to our *reasonable nature* for the practice of it, than that which is proposed by the Law of *Moses*, namely, that God commands it out of our love and fear and duty towards him? Or any more forcible inducement to our *corrupt nature*, than that every work shall receive its full recompence of reward, through the administration of an *extraordinary* providence? How then is it possible that a *long*, or *short duration*, the rewards of *this*, or of *another* life, should in the least *essentially* affect the purity, or integrity of human virtue, so taught and recommended; that is, a *reasonable worship*, in the *spirit* of piety, and *truth* of morality?

To suppose that virtue cannot be pure and perfect but when forced upon men by the immensity of punishment, is having no better an idea of it than the Pagan slave in the Poet,

*Sum bonus ac frugi: renuit negitatque Sabellus.*

Indeed, in the *ordinary* distribution of things, where the rewards and punishments of religion lie at distance, I believe nothing less than the promises and terrors of the *Christian* would be, generally, sufficient to support the practice it enjoins. But here too, it is still the love and fear of *God*; not of *reward* and *punishment*, that are held out to us, to perfect and sublime our virtue; though the *others* likewise be laid before us to raise and quicken it.

But here, let me not be again misunderstood, as I have been once already, by this super-subtile *Examiner*. I deny indeed that the want of a future state in the *Jewish* religion, under an *extraordinary* providence, could at all affect the truth and purity of human virtue, as there founded and enforced: yet, at the same time, I am very far from denying but that other things did hinder that religion from being perfect. Nay, in my Address to the *Jews*, prefixed to the second \* volume of *The Divine Legation*, I have shewn what these things were: as, first, *the whole turn of their ritual law*: and, secondly,

\* See vol. iv. p. 13. of this Edit.

the want of a future state under the ordinary and common providence of mankind. For I am there applying, to these mistaken people, a view of *Moses's* religion as it appears under their present condition, in order to convince them of the necessity of having its imperfection supplied by the religion of *Jesus*; in which, I suppose, all Christians are agreed. At least, as many as are out of the thick darkness of controversy will see these to be very different and distinct positions. The one saying, that their virtue might be pure and perfect, *during the times of an extraordinary providence*, for any thing that the ignorance of a future state could affect to the contrary. The other, that a religion without a future state, on the supposition of its being to serve *for all times*, must be very imperfect.

I might now expect, after so full a confutation of this erroneous opinion, concerning *the foundation of a reasonable worship*, that our *Examiner* should blush for his rashness in asserting, that *the ignorance of the Jews concerning a future state is a DISGRACE to Revelation*. An expression, which, were there but a chance of his being wrong, a sober divine would carefully have avoided; as altogether unsuitable to that reverence we owe to God, while measuring his tremendous providence by our scanty and uncertain ideas of *fit* and *right*. I might say, indeed, that the *Jews's* ignorance of a future state was a truth of *so high importance*, that, from thence, could be demonstrated the divinity of their dispensation; and, I presume, without offence to any sober man; because, if I were mistaken, no injury was done to Revelation; I left it whole and entire, just as I took it up. But should the *Examiner* be mistaken, his calling this ignorance a DISGRACE TO REVELATION would be affording such an handle to the enemies of religion to blaspheme, as he should tremble to think of.

But, if I know him well, he is not a writer of *retractions*. He has another reason for calling it *a disgrace to Revelation*. For, *It shuts up* (he says) *God's own chosen people from a future state, while by the directions of his providence all the world besides were permitted to have the benefit of it*. And now, good people, you have it

it all : and if this will not move you, why—The Author of *The Divine Legation*, for any thing I see, may go on.

This *second* proposition we see is, that (in the case given) “all the Pagan world were by the divine Providence *permitted* to enjoy a *benefit* which was denied to “the *Jews*.” Examining the *predicate* of this proposition, we shall first consider the PERMISSION, and then the BENEFIT.

*All the world besides*, says he, *were permitted*.—By what instrument ? By the use of their reason.—And had not the *Jews* the use of theirs ? Not the *free* use : for their prophet delivering to them, from God, a new law and religion, in which the doctrine of a future state was not found, this would naturally lead them to conclude against it.—What, in defiance of all the deductions of reason, which, from God’s demonstrable attributes of goodness and justice, made the Pagan world conclude, that, as moral good and evil had not their retribution *here*, they would have it *hereafter* ? Yes indeed, so we find it was.—Strange ! that this *Moses* should have such an influence over a people’s understanding ! Why, if you will have it, he promised that good and evil should have their retribution *here*.—Aye, now the secret is out. Well, indeed, might this *shut* them *up* from looking further ; especially if (as you pretend to *believe*) he not only *promised*, but *performed*, likewise. See then to what this PERMISSION amounts, so invidiously urged, not against me, for that is nothing, but against the Scriptures of God. Just to thus much, “That *all the world besides* “were *permitted* to find out, by *reason*, what his own “chosen people were taught, by the practical demonstration of an *extraordinary providence* ; namely, that “God would act with justice and goodness towards “man.”

Come we now to the *benefit*. The benefit of the doctrine of a *future state* is twofold. To *society as such*, as it is a curb to *vice* by supporting the belief of a Providence, under the *unequal* distribution of things : and to *religion as such*, as it is an incentive to *virtue*, by shewing the rate set upon it. The doctrine of a *future state*, in the Pagan world, afforded indeed that *benefit* to



*society*: but then, *that* benefit the *Jewish* state did not want, as being under an *equal* distribution of things. *Benefit to religion*, their *doctrine* of a future state afforded none. It was overrun with superstitions; and generally gave the rewards of another life, not to *moral* but to *ritual* observances. And when not so, as in the open teaching of the *mysteries*, yet even there the severest punishments in the Pagan hell were allotted to the *Atheists*, or the rejectors of the vulgar *Polytheism*; which, not only utterly depraved religion, but riveted men in its depravity. So that, in the sense of our *Examiner* (who is here speaking of the benefit of a future state to religion, *as such*), this *future state of all the world besides* was indeed no *benefit* at all. But he will say, I have shewn, that the ἀπορία of the *mysteries* removed these errors. It is true, I have. But, at the same time, likewise, that these were revealed to very *few*. And, to set matters even, has not he shewn from Bishop Bull, (p. 123) *that the hidden mysteries of the Law were opened to fit hearers, wherever they were found?* though, from the *total silence* of a future state, in the old *Jewish* history, I suspect, *these were still fewer*. Which opinion I will be ready to retract, when he shall shew me, in the *Jewish antiquities*, as plain intimations of a *future state*, amongst the *hidden mysteries of the Law*, as I have shewn him in the *Grecian*, of the doctrine of the *Unity*, and the *detection of vulgar Polytheism* amongst the *mysteries of Paganism*. But had a future state afforded the *Pagans* never so much benefit to religion *as such*: yet neither this did the *Jewish* people want, and for the same reason as above, because they were under an *extraordinary providence*. And now let us see to what the BENEFIT amounts.

The *Pagans* had a *future state* to support their society and religion.

But then, so circumstanced, that it was of service to *society* only, although *both* wanted it.

The *Jews* had no *future state* to support their society and religion.

But then, *neither* wanted it.

And now, I pray you, on which side lies the balance of the *benefit*? We commonly hear it said, that *seeing is believing*: but I suspect our *Examiner* has been imposed on by a very different aphorism, as absurd in the thought as the other is in the expression, that *believing is having*, a principle not unworthy of his school. Else how comes he to place so great a *benefit* in the point in question, if he did not suppose that the *Jews'* want of the *doctrine* deprived them of the *thing*?

But have I not been reckoning all this time without my host, while I argued against these silly prejudices, upon the confession of an *extraordinary providence*? For, disputing here with *Christian men*, I have supposed that they *believed* such a dispensation. And prudent was it in me so to do. For had I been called upon to prove my *supposition*, I do not know whether what I could say would have satisfied the judicious reader, who had observed that all the arguments they use against me receive the little force they have on a *contrary* supposition. And even this *private* Letter-writer, one of the most candid of his kind, had still a reason in reserve, to prove why the promise of *life*, in his favourite text of *Leviticus*, must needs mean *eternal life*, and not *temporal* only, which looks very much that way; it is, *because the best men* (he says) *were often cut off in the midst of their days, and frequently suffered greater adversities than the most profligate sinners*. Who now that had even a mind to let us see he believed nothing of the matter, could have expressed his meaning in stronger or more significant terms? I am not ashamed to confess I read my Bible; and believed what it told me of this *extraordinary providence*; and, in the simplicity of my heart, would needs try if I could make the Deist believe too. I found it was this that most revolted him: and therefore undertook to prove, from the very constitution of their economy, that the *representation* must needs be true, and so, while I was removing his *objections* to Revelation, give him a demonstration of its *truth*. In the mean time, I little suspected that a set of men, who call themselves Believers, would, for the sake only of combating the *medium* of my demonstration, ever venture to

call in question that very fact for which I was contending with *their* adversaries ; and in a way their adversaries (except it were perhaps *Spinosa* and his man *Toland*) had never attempted, namely, by a virtual denial of the *representation*. If this was to be contested me, I could have wished, for the honour of *Revelation*, it had been done by the professed enemies of it : and then I could have exposed their *prevarication* without much regret. As it is, I rather chuse to draw a veil over this *infirmity of the flesh* ; AND WAIT FOR the renewal of a right spirit *within them*.

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END OF THE FIRST PART.

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**R E M A R K S**  
**ON**  
**SEVERAL OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS;**  
**IN ANSWER TO THE**  
**REV. Dns. STEBBING & SYKES:**  
Serving to explain and justify the two Dissertations in  
“ *THE DIVINE LEGATION,*”  
**CONCERNING**  
**THE COMMAND TO ABRAHAM TO OFFER UP HIS SON,**  
**AND**  
**THE NATURE OF THE JEWISH THEOCRACY;**  
Objected to by those Learned Writers.

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. . . . Arcades ambo,  
Et cantare pares, et respondere parati.      Vire.

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**PART II. and Last.**

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Quid immerentes hospites vexas, Canis,  
Ignavus adversum Lupos?  
Nam, qualis aut Molossus, aut fulvus Lacon,  
AMICA VIS PASTORIBUS,  
Agam per altas aure sublata nives,  
Quæcunque præcedet Fera.  
Tu quum timenda voce complesti Nemus,  
Projectum odoraris CIBUM. *Hor.*

# P R E F A C E

TO

REMARKS ON OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS;

P A R T II.

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THE two SUBJECTS here debated will deserve the attention of every serious Believer; especially, those of my own Order. For the sake of such, I shall just hazard a few observations, which I thought rather too good to be thrown away upon those whom the following sheets more immediately concerned.

I. The Reader finds here, what the learned Dr. *Stebbing* has been able to object to my interpretation of the COMMAND TO ABRAHAM: Which, I presume, when fairly attended to, will be no light confirmation of its truth. But, as I have no notions to advance, not founded in a sincere desire to demonstrate the divinity of our holy religion, I would by no means take the advantage of a weak Adversary, to recommend them to the public acceptance. I hold it not honest, therefore, to conceal an objection to my interpretation, by far more plausible than any that zealous Gentleman has urged against it; which is this, “That it is difficult to conceive how a  
“circumstance of so much importance to Revelation,  
“as the removing one of the strongest infidel objections  
“against its truth, and proving a real connexion between  
“the two dispensations of it, should never be clearly  
“explained and insisted on by the Writers of the New  
“Testament, though the Historian of the *Old* might  
“have had sufficient reasons for concealing it.” To which I beg leave to reply, that it is very certain, that many truths of great importance, for the support of religion against infidelity, were taught by *Jesus* to his disciples (amongst which, I reckon this interpretation to  
be

be one) which never came down, by their conveyance, to the church. But being, by the assistance of God's Holy Spirit, discoverable by those who devote themselves to the study of the Scriptures with a pure mind, have, for the wise ends of Providence; inscrutable to us, been left for the industry of man to find out, that, as occasion required, every age might supply new evidence of God's truth, to *put to silence the ignorance of foolish men*: and that, in proportion as the power of darkness thickened, so might the splendour of the Gospel light; that light which was ordained, at last, entirely to disperse it. In support of what is here said, I beg the reader to reflect on what is told us by the Evangelist, of the conversation between *Jesus* (after his resurrection) and the two disciples journeying to *Emmaus*; where their Master says unto them, *O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at Moses, and all the prophets, he expounded unto them the things concerning himself*\*. Now who can doubt but that many things were here revealed, which would have greatly contributed to the demonstration of the Gospel truth? Yet hath it pleased Providence that this discourse should never be recorded. But that the apostles used, and made a good use too, of those instructions, we have the plainest evidence from their amazing success in the conversion of the world, by this application of the writings of *Moses and the prophets*. And if I be not greatly deceived, amongst truths enforced on those occasions, that, which I presume to have discovered in the *Command to Abraham*, was not forgotten. Let the unprejudiced reader judge. *St. Paul*, making his apology before king *Agrippa*, recapitulates his defence in these words: *Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this day witnessing both to small and great, saying none other things than those which the prophets, and MOSES, DID SAY SHOULD COME; that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead*†. The Greek is rather stronger, in predicating this circumstance of *Moses*—ὡς τε ὁ προφήταις ἐλάλησαν μελλόντων γίνεσθαι ΚΑΙ ΜΩΣΗΣ.

\* *St. Luke* xxiv. 26, 27.† *Acts* xxvi. 22, 23.

Now

Now where, let me ask, in all his writings, except in the *Command to Abraham*, is there the least trace of any such circumstance, as *that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead?* Or in that command either, if not understood according to our interpretation?

But further, as the apostles did not convey several illustrious truths taught them by their Master to the churches which they founded: so neither (and doubtless for the same wise ends of Providence) did the churches convey down to posterity several truths revealed to them by the apostles. An instance of which we have in St. Paul's second Epistle to the *Thessalonians*, where, speaking of *Antichrist*, or the *Mun of Sin*, he reminds the church of what it was he told them yet *let* or hindered his coming—*Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things? And now you know, what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his time.* But the knowledge of this *let* or *hindrance* the Church of God hath long lost. And yet it is a matter of very high concernment. I have ever thought, the prophecies relating to *Antichrist*, interspersed up and down the New and Old Testament, the most convincing proof of the truth of the Christian religion that any moral matter is capable of receiving. That a *Roman* power is meant, is so exceeding evident, that it is that point in which all parties are agreed. But to fix it to the individual power (a determination highly interesting both the truth and purity of religion) it must first be known whether the power spoken of be *civil* or *ecclesiastical*. Protestants, in general, think they see all the marks of the latter. The Catholics, as they are called, contend of necessity for the former: and they have many great names even among us on their side (by what odd concurrence of circumstances, may be considered in another place). This has long embarrassed a question, on the right determination of which alone, I am fully persuaded, one might rest the whole truth of the Christian cause. Now the knowledge of what it was that *let* or *hindered* the appearance of *Antichrist*, which St. Paul communicated to the church of *Thessalonica*, would at once determine the question. But this is the state in which it hath pleased



pleased Providence to place the Church of *Christ*: with abundant evidence to support itself against infidelity; yet so much left to be discovered as may rightly exercise the faith and industry of all humble and sober adorers of the Cross. Which however shews it was not the intent of Providence that one of these virtues should thrive at the expence of the other. Therefore when my learned Adversary\*, in order, I will believe, to advance Christian faith, would discourage Christian industry, by calumniating, and rendering suspected, what he is pleased to call EXPERIMENTS in religion, it is, I am afraid, at best, but a *zeal without knowledge*. Indeed, if men will come to this study with *unwashed hands*, that is, without a due reverence of the dignity of these sacred volumes; or, what is as ill in the other extreme, with *unpurged heads*, that is, stuffed full of systems, or made giddy by enthusiasm, it is not unreasonable to expect the success which Dr. Stebbing pretends to have observed. But then, let him keep his advice for those whom it concerns.

II. The other subject debated in this pamphlet is of the THEOCRACY of the *Jews*. Having undertaken to prove the divinity of the *Mosaic* religion from the actual administration of an extraordinary providence over that state in general, and over private men in particular, by the medium of the omission of a future state of rewards and punishments in their economy; what I had to do was to shew from Scripture, that such a dispensation of Providence was there *represented* to have been administered. This I did two ways, from the nature of the thing; and from the express words of Scripture. Under the first head, I shewed † that, from the nature of a *theocracy*, it necessarily followed, by as plain an induction as that protection follows obedience to the civil magistrate, that there must be an extraordinary providence over the state in general, and over all the members of it in particular. And that though a theocracy were only pretended, yet, if the institutor of it knew the meaning of his own contrivance, he must, of course, pretend *this* extraordinary providence likewise. In support of which last observation I have shewn †, in the

\* Dr. Stebbing.

† Both in *The Divine Legation* and in this Pamphlet.

second place, that such a dispensation of Providence is actually, and in express words of Scripture, said to be administered. After this, what has an unbeliever to do (for it is hard to think how any other should have any thing to do in it) who would invalidate this *representation*, but either to deny that the *Jewish* form of government was *theocratical*, and, by that means, endeavour to deprive me of the *first* of my proofs, from the nature of the thing: or to allow this pretended *theocracy*, yet shew from fact, by Scripture history, that such a dispensation of Providence was not administered; which would subvert *both* my proofs. And this sure none but an unbeliever could deliberately do, because it argues *Moses* of imposture. For if an extraordinary providence to the state and to particulars necessarily follows a theocracy, and yet such a providence was not actually administered, then this theocracy was not real, but pretended only. Now Dr. *Sykes* has undertaken to prove that the extraordinary dispensation of Providence did not extend to particulars. In this I blame him not. Every man must think for himself; and the objection is fairly urged. But what creates my wonder is, that when, contrary to common sense and common Scripture, he pretends to admit an extraordinary providence to the state in consequence of a *theocracy*, while he opposes that to particulars, he should yet think to pass upon his reader for an advocate of the Bible. If he sees the thing in the light here stated, what an opinion must he have of the Public! If he sees it not, what an opinion must the Public have of him! But let him debate this point with himself at leisure. All the advantage I have taken of his bad reasoning, is not to discover, nor consequently to discredit, his opinions; but merely to support my own.

III. In the last place, it may be permitted me to observe, that these two learned Doctors, who imagine, that all the time they have been writing against me, they were opposing the *conclusion* of *The Divine Legation*, have, indeed, allowed all I wanted to make my argument demonstrative: Dr. *Stebbing*, by owning that *Moses did not teach, nor had it in commission to teach, a future state of rewards and punishments*; and Dr. *Sykes*, by owning that *an extraordinary providence was administered*

*administered over the Jewish state and people in general.* If it be asked, then, why I would clog my argument, by insisting on *the Jewish people's ignorance in general of a future state*, and the administration of an *extraordinary providence to particulars*; I reply, it was on the same principle that *Moses* clogged his institution with a *theocracy*. He did it in obedience to the Divine command; and I, out of my observance to truth. But had he been of that species of lawgivers in which Dr. *Sykes* seems to rank him, I conclude he would not have unnecessarily instituted a form of government that must, at every step, have detected his imposture. And had I wrote to advance my own notions, the equitable reader will conclude I should never have given so many needless provocations to this testy race of ANSWERERS.

April 14, 1745.

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## REMARKS,

&amp;c.

## PART II.

THE curious reader of the many and various Answerers of the *Divine Legation* (if any such there be) cannot chuse but smile to see them so unanimously concur in representing me as desperately enaimoured of controversy, and resolute and determined for the last word; especially, when it is observed, that, of ten or twelve very sizable books, written against it, I have taken notice of a small part only of two or three. What their motives were, in this representation, is neither worth mine, nor the reader's while, to conjecture. The plain fact is, I would willingly avoid all controversy, so far as is consistent with a regard to the Public; to which I have thought fit to appeal; and, to which, consequently, I have given a kind of right to expect, either an answer to all material objections, or a confession of their force.

For such as these I have still waited; and now find I am likely to wait. In the mean time, I must either be silent, or take up with what fortune sends. And who could be long undetermined? For he must be very fond of controversy indeed, who would think of entering into a serious dispute, either with *him*, who holds *That natural religion has not, and yet the law of Moses has, the sanction of a future state of rewards and punishments*\*: or with that *other*, who *cannot see*, and therefore, with a modest boldness peculiar to the blind, affirms "there *is not* the least connexion between the two propositions, "an *extraordinary providence* and the *omission of a*

\* An Essay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue, by T. Rutherforth, B. D. Fellow of St. John's College in Cambridge, and of the Royal Society. Cambridge.

"future

“*future state*\*.” With the same quickness of sight, I make no doubt he would affirm, *that there is not the least connexion* between the old *English* honour, and the long *omission* of a qualification law for members of the House of Commons : and is therefore to be referred to the class of those whom I send for an answer, to the story of *Bertrand* and his reading glasses †.

But when, at present, no urgent occasion drove me to trouble the reader in my own vindication, an inviting

\* The Belief of a Future State proved to be a Fundamental Article of the Religion of the Hebrews, &c. By John Jackson, Rector of Rosington, &c. London.—p. 64. Where the reader will see, that all his objections, even to the very blunders, have been obviated or answered by me long ago. An instance of this, as it now happens to lie before me, will not be unentertaining.—“As a future state” (says he) may be demonstrably deduced from principles of “natural reason, so IT IS CONTAINED in the proposition laid down “by St. Paul, *He that cometh to God (as a worshipper of him) must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him*, Heb. xi. 6.” p. 9. His argument requires him to mean necessarily contained. But before that can be shewn, it must be proved that God cannot, in this world, reward those who diligently seek him; and he who should go about to prove that, would go near to contradict all which Moses has said, in the sanction of his law, “that God not only could, but would, reward those, in this world, who diligently seek him.” But St. Paul knew what he said, though this man does not. He knew the proposition did not necessarily, but might, or might not, contain a future state, just as the writer applied it: and he delivered it accordingly. First, As he was an exact reasoner, because the support of religion depends not on rewards here or hereafter; but on the equal distribution of them, *wheresoever* they are conferred. Secondly, he was a pertinent reasoner, because he would include the sanction of the *Mosaic* as well as *Christian* religion; the first of which (as he tells us elsewhere) had the promise of the life that now is; the other, of that which is to come. This blunder, as the reader may remember, was exposed in the first part of these Remarks, pp. 335, &c. But I would recommend Mr. Jackson’s whole pamphlet to his perusal, as a specimen of that illustrious band, in which he has thought fit to inlist; and which indeed would have been imperfect without this *Answerer General*; who has all his life long opposed himself to whatever received the public approbation: and after having written against the *Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, does me too much honour to be entirely overlooked. Which however, it is probable he had been, but for these words in his Title Page,—*The Doctrine of the ancient Philosophers concerning a future State shewn to be consistent with Reason*. A vile insinuation! Intimating that I had written something against the reasonableness of that doctrine.

† See p. 274 of this vol.—Ed.

opportunity

opportunity offered itself, of revenging letters in general, on their very worst and most relentless enemy, the ANSWERER BY PROFESSION. Of whose trade happening to speak with the contempt that it deserves, I was accused by the *dull malice of these Answerers* themselves to mean the gentlemen of the long-robe; the most learned as well as useful body in the state; and, by far, the most capable part of that public to whose lay-judgment I had appealed: the only men who speak sense concerning MORAL OBLIGATION, and the best judges of truth, by their knowledge of MORAL EVIDENCE: their habitual acquaintance with its nature and with the proportioned weight accompanying every varying degree of probability, (a knowledge where reason is in its sovereignty) qualifying them to determine in all clear questions of religion. But as the plainest description could not secure me against so ridiculous a calumny; it may be proper to present the reader with the originals themselves. Two of which, fortune hath just thrown into my hands; and two the most curious of their kind. They had been *Answerers* from their early youth; and, as the heads of opposite parties, never yet agreed in any one thing but in writing against the *Divine Legation*. Here they went to work as brethren: and, indeed, not without reason: the book was manifestly calculated to spoil their trade.

These reverend veterans, whom one may, not improperly, call *Wardens of the Company*, had both, as we say, trod the same path to glory,

*Ille pedum melior motu —*

*Hic membris et mole valens —*

and stuck themselves to the fortunes and principles of two truly great men, to whom, the present happy establishment is exceedingly indebted: to the one, for his support of our *religious* constitution; to the other, for that of our *civil*. In the prosecution of which services, just reasons of church and state had drawn them into different ways of thinking and engaged in a very warm controversy, where the interests of both were capitally concerned.

Into this famous dispute, without any other preparation than a willing mind, and a strong desire to be doing, our

two squires-errant would needs thrust themselves, to bear the wallet, for salve and lint, and the balsam of *Fierabras*: where they battled it, unasked, with the broken lances, that fell on each side, from the conflict of their masters. But let not the reader imagine these were only things they picked up in the combat. For, though the dispute was, whether a pure virgin church should be given up to the polluted and profane embraces of old civil policy; yet our squires, like honest *Sancho Pancha* at the marriage-feast of the fair *Quiteria*, agreed not to quarrel with the *scum* of good *Camacho's* kitchen. In a word, not to dishonour them by comparisons, like *Homer's* heroes, they did their work, and dined.

But now that both have been so much luckier than men generally are after a drawn-battle, one would imagine they should have been glad to give the poor remainder of their lives a little rest; and not go out again seeking adventures, where nothing was to be expected but dry blows. For the golden days of controversy had been long over. Here was no church to be defended but that of *Moses*; which would hardly bear its own charges. A *Jewish* theocracy was a barren field, compared to an *English* establishment; and a conflict in those quarters was like a battle in fairy-land, which affords no spoils but in description. The sage *Sancho* might, here again, have been their example, who was glad at last, even unknighthed, to retire with the moderate gratification of *a bill of exchange for three asses*. But,

“ Our beavor'd knights, who bear upon their shield

“ Three steeples argent in a sable field,”

are still restless and unsatisfied, and aspiring after the GOLDEN HELMET OF MAMBRINO.

Since therefore they have thought fit once more to entertain the Public, I will do my part that they lose not the last and only reward yet unpaid them, a ceremonial and solemn *plaudite*: that the posterity of those whom they so well entertained in the last age, may understand what good judges their fathers were of merit. For merit they laid claim to; and this search after adventures, they called *a search after truth*. For the easiest of all things is to give a good name; as the hardest is to deserve one.

Thus, (in the manner of these moderators between truth and falsehood) the TOYMAN OF BATH, with great solemnity of face informs you, that he is a *factor between the poor and the rich*. Not that this importance would be much amiss, if it stopt there; as affording others (who take the thing right, in the sense of *making the most of both*) a very innocent occasion of mirth: but the mischief is, it is apt to give them wrong notions of themselves: and the *Answerer* begins to think himself a servant of truth; and the toyman, an useful member in the state.

But I should be very unjust to my own order, did I suffer the reader to remain under a wrong impression, as if these were the usual ways of rising to the honours of the gown. I have the pleasure of seeing, in the number of my friends, many who have made their fortune by supporting the dignity of scholars, and preserving the integrity of churchmen. And it is with high satisfaction I can take this occasion of doing justice to the merit of two of them in particular, who have both greatly distinguished themselves, in the common service of religion, against libertinism and infidelity. In which, the one has so employed his great talents of reasoning, and profound knowledge in true philosophy; and the other, his familiar acquaintance with antiquity, and his exact and critical skill in the languages; as to do all that can, in these times, be expected from the ablest servants of truth, to put infidelity to silence: while at the same time, to approve their own sincerity, they have been so far from looking with a jealous or suspicious eye on others engaged with them in the same service, that it was with pleasure they saw new lights attempted to be struck out for its support; and with readiness that they lent their best assistance to put them in a way of being fairly considered. I need not tell the reader, that in this account I pay a very sparing tribute to the merit of the worthy deans of *Christ-Church* and *Winchester*\*.

REMARK I.—BUT it is now time our Heroes should *answer* for themselves. The *Examiner of my second Proposition* leads the way: who, at the time of writing my *Appendix* to the first part of these *Remarks*, I had not

\* Dr. John Conybear, and Dr. Zach. Pearce.



the least conception to be Dr. *Stebbing*. And when afterwards I found the pamphlet generally given to him, I had still one very particular reason not to credit the report. But when (on the best information) I could no longer doubt of the author, I sent him word, that, if he would own his book, I would give it a full answer. He desired to be excused: and still hides his head; so that we must try to catch this eel of controversy by the tail; the only part which sticks out of the mud; more dirty indeed than slippery; and still more weak than dirty: as passing through a trap where he was forced, at every step, to leave part of his skin, that is, his system\*, behind him. His *Appendix* therefore, the part yet untouched, shall be the subject of our following Remarks: it is intitled, *Considerations on the Command to offer up his Son*. In this he opposes an explanation, which, if true, will be owned by all to be of the highest service to religion. I shall therefore beg leave to quote and re-examine it paragraph by paragraph.

By which it will be seen, that, as *Cicero* says of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, “He fears nothing so much as to appear  
“to the reader to doubt of any thing†:” And hopes nothing so much as that the reader will never doubt of him. Hence it is, that he, all the way, boldly denies what he does not understand; and prudently conceals what he is unable to confute. But soft! before this important APPENDIX shews itself, we are gradually brought on and prepared for its appearance by this inquisitorial sentence, which concludes his EXAMINATION. “Whe-  
“ther you intend (*says he*) to proceed, or will suffer  
“yourself to be wholly diverted from your purpose by  
“matters of another kind, LESS SUITABLE TO YOUR  
“CLERICAL FUNCTION; you best know. But give me  
“leave to say, Sir, you are a debtor to the Public; and  
“I hope that in your next volume YOU WILL MAKE  
“SOME AMENDS FOR THE WRONG YOU HAVE DONE TO  
“RELIGION in this; in which, instead of placing Chris-  
“tianity upon a surer bottom, YOU HAVE ONLY FUR-  
“NISHED OUT MORE HANDLES TO UNBELIEVERS—  
“Do you think such an image of Revelation as this is

\* See p. 308, et seq. of this volume.

† Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur.

“likely

“likely to cure unbelievers of their prejudices, and will  
 “not rather minister fresh OFFENCE? If any thing  
 “hinders this effect, it must be the ABSURDITY OF THE  
 “CONCEIT. But ENOUGH of this. If the reader has  
 “a mind to see another very STRONG EXAMPLE OF THE  
 “SAME SORT OF MANAGEMENT, he may find it in the  
 “APPENDIX\*.”

And in this manner has every honest man been treated before me, whenever he did, or did but endeavour to serve mankind. *Harvey* himself, who had more and much abler examiners of the *absurdity of his conceit* than I have had of mine, scarce got better off with one *Æmilius Parisanus*, a man of great name in *Italy*, who wrote a complete *refutation* (as he called it) of the Doctor’s arguments for the circulation of the blood: a discovery which appears to have given this *Italian* no less disturbance than *The Divine Legation* has given our Examiner.—“*Quamobrem nos aliter philosophati et ratiocinati de Harveii fidentia (says he) admirati; de clar. Londinensis Academicæ consensu et conspiratione obstupetacti, &c.—Verum enimvero collecto spiritu, missa tandem maximæ novitatis admiratione, melius nobis consulti, ad vivum Harveii allata resecantes, ut commenticia et ficta excogitata colligentes, propria nostra sententia permansimus.—Semper in ore atque in animo habere debemus, ut homines nos esse meminimus, ea lege natos, ut exposita fortunæ telis omnibus et nostra sit vita, & nostræ actiones cunctæ sub Censoribus semper extent: Proindeque PERPETUO PUGNANDUM SIT; & nunc quam maxime, quum pro aris et focis atque etiam Larariis (quippe de Corde, &c.) fortiter decertandum.*”—Seriously, this was a sad story. The poor gentleman was plainly frightened. But still he laments like a gentleman. Here are no insinuations that *Harvey* had suffered himself to be diverted by matters less suitable to his medical function, while he was exploring the use of the *venal valves*. Nor does he take the liberty to tell him, that he ought to make amends for the wrong he has done to *physic*; though he thought he had done a great deal: or that he had furnished out more handles for *empirics*: though he

\* Exam. of Mr. W’s second Prop. pp. 132, 133.

thought they had already too many: but he politely lays the fault upon the restless temper of human nature itself: which will never suffer us to enjoy our old opinions in quiet. But our Examiner is of another cast. And nothing can save you harmless, when once you have incurred the danger of OFFENCE, but the *absurdity of your conceits*: though *offence*, that fatal enemy to truth, be, of all *conceits*, the most *absurd* whenever it is taken before it be given. It is true, the good *Æmilius* comes a little to himself, and nearer to our Examiner, in the language of his conclusion. He had recovered heart; his victories had elated him; and *Harvey's* numerous experiments upon all animal nature afforded him as happy an occasion of raillery, as the *Dissertations* in *The Divine Legation* have given those who took them for *digressions*. “Jam diu (says he) per dumeta, vepres, “syrtis, ac scopulos, duxit nos Harveius; diuque in ejus “vivariis et piscinis inter testudines, anguillas, cochleas, “ranas, bufones, et serpentes, vagati sumus; omnia “tamen evertimus, ejusque perversa vestigia cuncta deteximus; omnia cum pulvisculo everrentes quàm longissime ablegavimus. Quæ in celebrium antiquorum “recentiorumque omnium ab Harveio immerito notatorum, “defensionem dicta sunt. Heic—redeamus; ut quæ jam “reprobata et ablegata sunt, ratione, sensu, AUTOPSIA, “experimentis, in veritatis gratiam fortius obstringantur “—prædictæ opinionis omnia destruendo, et inter sese “pugnantia ulterius ostendendo,” &c. &c. And in the same strain, our Examiner. Who assures his reader, that, if any thing can hinder the ill effects which my interpretation of *the command to Abraham* must have upon religion, it will be his exposing the *absurdity of the conceit*. This is confidently said. But, what then? He can prove it. So it is to be hoped. If not --- However let us first give him a fair hearing.

“I nunc, et verbis virtutem illude superbis.”

II. He begins with telling me “that my account of “the command to *Abraham* to offer up his son *Isaac*, “has no foundation in truth; and that in attempting to “remove objections, very well GUARDED against by the “common interpretation, I have raised new ones not to  
“be

“ be answered upon mine. And of this (*says he*) let “ the reader judge\*.”—Agreed—“ Your position then “ (continues he) is this: *That when God says to Abra- “ ham, Take thou thy son, thy only son Isaac, &c. the “ command is merely an information by action instead of “ words, of the great sacrifice of the redemption of man- “ kind, given at the request of Abraham; who longed, “ impatiently, to see Christ’s day.* The foundation of “ your thesis you lay in that Scripture of St. John “ (ch. viii. 56.) where *Jesus* says to the unbelieving *Jews*, “ *Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he “ saw it and was glad.* As this text is your corner- “ stone, your interpretation ought to be very strongly “ supported.”—p. 138. Well, as he doubts its strength, and loves the solid buttress of an authority, let him even take, before we go any further, this old seasoned one from the famous *Hammond*; who when he had translated ἡγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, by—*Was exceeding glad THAT HE MIGHT SEE my day*, proceeds to para- phrase the text in the following words, which our Phari- saical Examiner may very naturally consider as addressed to himself. *And because you talk so much of ABRAHAM, I will now say of him, that he, having received the promise of the Messiah, Gen. xi. 35. DID THEREUPON VEHEMENTLY and with great pleasure and exiliency of mind DESIRE TO LOOK NEARER INTO IT, to see my coming into the world, and a REVELATION of it WAS MADE UNTO HIM, and in it of the state of the Gospel, and he was heartily joyed at it†.* However, the force of our Examiner’s concluding Remark will be seen when he comes to give us the reason of it in its place. In the mean time, let me observe, that, if he will needs make *this text* my corner-stone, he should have shewn it fairly as it was laid in *The Divine Legation*; and not have taken it out of its cement, to make it fit for nothing but the blind corner of an incoherent pamphlet. But it was not for the credit of his examination to acquaint the reader that my observations on the text of St. John were introduced in this manner. *If we consider Abraham’s*

\* Considerations on the command to *Abraham* to offer up *Isaac*, pp. 137, 138.

† Paraph. on the New Testament, in loc.

personal character, together with the choice made of him for the head and origin of that people, which God would make holy and separate to himself, from whence was to arise the Redeemer of mankind, the ultimate end of that separation, we cannot but conclude it probable that the knowledge of this Redeemer would be revealed to him. Shall I hide from Abraham the thing which I do? says God, in a matter that much less concerned the Father of the faithful. And here in the words of Jesus, Abraham rejoiced, &c. we have this PROBABLE FACT made certain\*, &c. And then I went on to prove, that by the word *day*, in the text, was meant the great sacrifice of Christ—But let us take it as it lies in our Considerer. “You say then (continues he, addressing himself to the Author of *The Divine Legation*) that by the word *day* is meant the great sacrifice of Christ; which is thus proved: *When the figurative word DAY is used not to express in general the period of any one’s existence, but to denote his peculiar office and employment; it must needs signify, that very circumstance of his life, which is the characteristic of such office and employment. But Jesus is here speaking of his peculiar office and employment, i. e. his office of Redeemer. Therefore, by the word DAY must needs be meant the characteristic circumstance of his life. But that circumstance was laying it down for the redemption of mankind. Consequently by the word DAY is meant the GREAT SACRIFICE of Christ †.*” This is indeed my argument, fairly stated. And to that he replies, “Really, Sir, I see no manner of consequence in this reasoning. That Christ’s day hath reference to his office as Redeemer, I grant. The day of Christ denotes the time when Christ should come, *i. e.* when HE should come who was to be such by office and employment. But why it must import *also* that when Christ came he should be offered up as a sacrifice, I do not in the least apprehend: because I can very easily understand, that Abraham might have been informed that Christ was to come, without being informed that he was to lay down his life as a sacrifice. If Abraham saw that a time would come when one of his seed should take

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. pp. 6, 7. of this edit. † Consid. pp. 138, 139.

“away the curse, he saw *Christ's* day. And this I say “he might see, whether he saw by what act the curse “was taken away or not.” (p. 139).

The reader sees here, that, at first sight, he would seem to grant my premises.—“That *Christ's* day (says “he) hath reference to the office as Redeemer, I grant.” Yet the very next words which he uses to explain it contradict it: *the day of Christ denotes the TIME when Christ should come.* All the sense therefore, I can make of the concession, when joined to the explanation of it, amounts to this—“*Christ's* day has reference to his office: no, not to his office, but to his *time*.” But he may grow clearer as he runs. “But why it must import “ALSO that when *Christ* came he should be offered up “as a sacrifice, I do not in the least apprehend.” Nor I, neither. Had I said, that the word *day* in the text, imported the *time*, I could have as little apprehended as he does, how that which imports *time*, imports ALSO the *thing done* in time. Let him take this nonsense, therefore, to himself. I argued in a plain manner, thus—When the word *day* is used to express, in general, the period of any one's existence, then it denotes *time*; when to express his peculiar *office* and employment, then it denotes, *not the time*, but that circumstance of life characteristic of such *office* and employment. *Day*, in the text, is used to express *Christ's* peculiar *office* and employment. Therefore\*—But what follows is still better. His want of apprehension, it seems, is founded in this, “That he can easily understand, that *Abraham* might “have been informed that *Christ* was to come; without “being informed that he was to lay down his life as a “sacrifice.” Yes, and so could I likewise; or I had never been at the pains of making the criticism on the word *day*: which takes all its force from this very truth, that *Abraham* might have been informed of one, without the other. And, therefore, to prove he was informed of *that other*, I produced the text in question, which afforded the occasion of the criticism. He goes on—“If *Abra-*

\* But the reader may see this truth very well enforced, from observations on the context, by a learned and sensible writer, in a pamphlet signed *L. U. P.* and intitled, *A Letter to the Author of a late Epistolary Dissertation, addressed to Mr. Warburton,* pp. 38 to 41.

“*ham* saw, that a time would come when one of his seed should take away the curse, he saw *Christ's DAY*.” Without doubt he did. Because it is agreed that *day* may signify either *time*, or *circumstance of action*. But what is this to the purpose? The question is not whether the word may not, indefinitely, signify *time*; but whether it signifies *time* in this text. I have shewn it does not. And what has he said to prove it does? Why that it may do so, in another place. His whole answer, therefore, to the argument, we see, proceeds on an intire inapprehension of the very drift and purpose of it.

III. I had said, That not only the matter, but the manner, *likewise, of this great Revelation, is delivered in the text*.—Abraham rejoiced to SEE my day, and he SAW it, and was glad. ἵνα ἴΔΗ τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς ἐμοῦ, καὶ ΕἶΔΕ. Which evidently shews it to have been made, not by relation in words, but by REPRESENTATION in action. That the verb ἰδῶ is frequently used, in the New Testament, in its proper signification, to see sensibly. But whether literally or figuratively, it always denotes a full intuition. That the expression was as strong in the Syrian language, used by Jesus, as here, in the Greek of his historian; which appears from the reply the Jews made to him.—Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou SEEN Abraham? Plainly intimating, that they understood the assertion, of Abraham's seeing Christ's day, to be a real beholding him in person. That we are therefore to conclude, from the words of the text, that the redemption of mankind was not only revealed to Abraham, but was revealed likewise by representation\*. This argument our punctual Examiner represents in the following manner: “You are not more successful in your next point, “Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was “glad. ἵνα ἴΔΗ τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς ἐμοῦ, καὶ ΕἶΔΕ.—This (say “you) evidently shews it [the Revelation] to have been “made not by relation in words, but by representation “in action. How so? The reason follows. The verb “ἰδῶ is frequently used in the New Testament, in its “proper signification, to see sensibly.—In the New Tes- “tament do you say? Yes, Sir, and in every Greek

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. p. 8. of this edit.

"look you ever read in your life. What you SHOULD have said is, that it is so used here; and I suppose you would have said so, if you had known how to have proved it." pp. 139, 140.

"The reason follows" (says he). Where? In *The Divine Legation* indeed, but not in his imperfect quotation; which breaks off *before* he comes to my argument. One who knew him not so well as I do, would suspect this was done to serve a purpose. No such matter: 'twas all pure innocence. He mistook the *introduction* of my argument for the argument *itself*. The argument itself, which he omits in the quotation (and which was all I wanted for the proof of my point), was, *That the verb ὁρᾶω, whether used literally or figuratively, always denotes a full intuition*. And this argument, I introduced in the following manner, *The verb ὁρᾶω is frequently used in the New Testament in its proper signification, to see sensibly*. Unluckily, as we say, he took this for the argument itself, and thus corrects me for it: "What you SHOULD have said, is, that it is so used here; and I suppose you would have said so, if you had known how to have proved it." See, here, the true origin both of *pre-scribing* and *divining*! His IGNORANCE of what *I did say*, leads him to tell me what *I should have said*; and to *divine* what *I would have said*. But, what I said, I'll stand to, *That the verb ὁρᾶω always denotes a full intuition*. This was all I wanted from the text; and on this foundation I proceeded, in the sequel of the discourse, to prove that *Abraham saw sensibly*. Therefore, when my Examiner takes it (as he does) for granted, that because in *this place*, I had not proved that the word implied to *see sensibly*; I had not proved it *at all*; he is a *second time* mistaken.

He goes on, "One thing needs no proof, which is, that, in all languages, seeing and knowing are frequently used as equivalent terms." p. 140. As I don't know what he means by this one *thing*, I can only requite him with another, that needs as little; which is, that, in all churches, *seeing* and *believing* are frequently used, by bigots, as *equivalent terms*. Here's my observation for his observation; and, I think, a good deal more to the purpose.

IV. But



IV. But our Examiner will now shew, that, seeing *Christ's day*, and seeing the *promises afar off*, are one and the same thing. "We have an instance (*says he*) directly to the point in hand, *Heb. xi. 13. These all died in faith, not having received the promises; ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἰδεῖν αὐτοὺς ἸΔΟΝΤΕΣ*, but having SEEN them afar off. You will remember, Sir, that *Abraham* stands in this catalogue, amongst the rest; and the Apostle says of them all indifferently, that they saw the promises, *i. e. that blessing* which was the subject of these promises. How did they see them? By representation in action, will you say? I suppose not. But the apostle tells you how. They saw them by faith, a great way off: and why may not this be all that our Saviour intended? What difference, in sense, is there between saying, that *he saw the promises afar off*; and that he *saw Christ's day*?" p. 140.

"We have an instance (*says he*) directly to the point in hand." Of what? Why, that the verb *ἰδω* signifies the same in this place of the epistle to the *Hebrews* as in the text in question. Now, there it is applied to *promises*, so cannot be literal: and here it is applied to *day*, and so, very well, may. Yet this he calls "an instance directly to the point in hand."

"You will remember, Sir (*says he*) that *Abraham* stands in that catalogue amongst the rest." And you will remember, Sir, say I, That *Abraham stands alone* in the words of *Jesus*. But your logic, I suppose, concludes thus: if *Abraham* knew as much as the rest; why, then the rest knew as much as *Abraham*. Otherwise you would have observed, that the seeing the promises afar off related to that time of the life of each Patriarch in which he performed the act of faith there celebrated. For the argument stands thus: by faith, *Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham*, did so and so; yet, as illustrious as those acts of faith were, they had then only seen the *promises afar off*: therefore you Christians, &c. And it is remarkable that the acts of faith, for which *Abraham* is here celebrated, were prior in time to the command to offer up his son. Now, after this, what hinders our concluding, from the words of *Jesus*, that *Abraham* had a still more illustrious manifestation of the promise?

However,

However, if I should fail in reconciling *Jesus* and the author of the epistle to the *Hebrews*, let the reader remember, that it is our Examiner who has set them at variance. And he only makes the breach wider, where he tries to bring them to a temper. "The apostle (*says he*) tells you, they saw the promises, by faith, a great way off: and why may not this be all that our Saviour intended? What difference IN SENSE, is there between saying, that he saw the promises afar off, and, that he saw *Christ's* day?" What difference do you ask? Why, about as much as between your sight and *Chillingworth's*. Or as much as between an object seen, at a distance, through a mist; and one, at hand, in broad daylight.

V. "But, *he owns*, that, if this was all, perhaps I should tell him, that it was a very strange answer of the *Jews*, *thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham.*" p. 140. He is very right. He might be sure I would. In answer therefore to this difficulty, he goes on and says, "No doubt, Sir, the *Jews* answer our Saviour, as if he had said, that *Abraham* and *he* were contemporaries; in which, they answered very foolishly, as they did on many other occasions; and the answer will as little agree with your interpretation as it does with mine. For does your interpretation suppose that *Abraham* saw *Christ* in person? No; you say it was by representation only." pp. 140, 141.

"The *Jews* answer our Saviour as if he had said, that *Abraham* and he were contemporaries." Do they so? Why then, 'tis plain, the expression was as strong in the Syrian Language, used by *Jesus*, as in the Greek of his historian, which was all I aimed to prove by it. But "in this (*says he*) they answered very foolishly." What then? Did I quote them for their wisdom? A little common sense was all I wanted of them: and that, 'tis plain, they had. For the folly of their answer arises from it. They heard *Jesus* use a word in their vulgar idiom, which signified to see corporeally; and common sense led them to conclude he used it in the vulgar meaning. In this they were not mistaken. But, from thence, they inferred, that he meant it in the sense of  
seeing

seeing personally; and in this, they were. And now let the reader judge whether the *folly* of their *answer* shews the *folly* of my argument, or of my Examiner's. Nay further, he tells us, they answered "as foolishly on many "other occasions." They did so; and I will remind him of one. *Jesus* says to *Nicodemus*, *except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God\**, &c. Suppose now, from these words, I should attempt to prove that *regeneration* and *divine grace* were realities, and not mere metaphors. For that *Jesus*, in declaring the necessity of them, used such strong expressions that *Nicodemus* understood him to mean the being physically *born again, and entering the second time into the womb*. Would it be sufficient, let me ask my Examiner, to reply in this manner, "No doubt, Sir, *Nicodemus* answered "our Saviour as if he had said, that a follower of the "Gospel must *enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born*: in which he answered very foolishly; and the answer will as little agree with your interpretation as it does with mine. For does your interpretation suppose he should so enter? No; but "that he *should be born of water and of the spirit*." Would this, I say, be deemed, by our Examiner, a sufficient answer? When he has resolved me this, I shall, perhaps, have something farther to say to him. In the mean time I go on. And, in returning him his last words restored to their subject, help him forward in the solution of what I expect from him. "The answer " (*says he*) will as little agree with your interpretation "as it does with mine. For does your interpretation "suppose that *Abraham* saw *Christ* in person? No; "you say, it was by representation only." Very well. Let me ask then, in the first place, whether he supposes what I said on this occasion, was to prove that *Abraham saw Christ* from the reverend authority of his *Jewish* adversaries; or to prove that the verb *είδω* signified to *see literally*, from their mistaken answer? He thought me here, it seems, in the way of those writers, who are quoting *authorities*, when they should be giving *arguments*. Hence, he calls the answer the *Jews* here gave, a *foolish one*: as if I stood sponsor for its orthodoxy.

\* St. John iii. 3.

But our Examiner is still farther mistaken. The point I was upon, in support of which I urged the answer of the *Jews*, was not the seeing *this*, or *that person*: but the seeing *corporeally*, and not *mentally*. Now, if the *Jews* understood *Jesus*, as saying that *Abraham* saw *corporeally*, I concluded, that the expression, used by *Jesus*, had that import: and this was all I was concerned to prove. *Difference*, therefore, between their *answer* as I quoted it, and my *interpretation*, there was none. Their answer implied that *Abraham* was said to see corporeally; and my interpretation supposes that the words used had that import. But to make a distinction where there was no difference, *seeing in person*, and *seeing by representation*, are brought in, into a question, where they have nothing to do.

VI. Our Examiner, after all these feats, now stops and looks about him; as waiting modestly for his reader's approbation and applause; and to shew how well he deserves it, purposes, out of pure love of justice, to resume his task, and kill me over again. "To do you full justice (*says he*) I will take in one observation more, by which, you have endeavoured to strengthen yourself, and which relates to the former part of the text. That *Abraham* had a general promise, that in him *all the families of the earth should be blessed*, which general promise comprehends or contains the promise of the redemption, is agreed between us. And this general promise, I suppose, might be the subject of the patriarch's joy. You (in favour of your hypothesis) suppose, that, subsequent to this general promise, *Abraham* had, upon his earnest request, some special promise made to him of a more distinct communication of the manner how, and the means by which this great work should be accomplished; and that this special promise was the matter of his rejoicing. *This history of Abraham* (say you) *had plainly three distinct periods. The first contains God's promise to grant his request, when Abraham rejoiced that he SHOULD SEE—Within the second, was the delivery of the command to sacrifice his son—And Abraham's obedience, through which he saw Christ's day and was*  
*glad,*

"*glad, includes the third.* The promise, which you say God made to *Abraham* to grant his request, cannot be the general promise, that he should be a blessing to all nations; for this was given upon his first vocation without his request. Therefore it must be a special subsequent promise. But there is not one word in the history of the Old Testament to justify this three-fold distinction: as you confess yourself. For you say that *Moses's* history begins with the second period; and that the first was wisely omitted by the historian. If there never was any such period, never any such special promise requested or made; it was very honest in the historian to say nothing about it: and YOU WILL BE THE WISE MAN, WHO CAN SEE WHAT IS NOT TO BE FOUND." pp. 141, 142.

"The general promise made to *Abraham*, that in him *all the families of the earth should be blessed*, it is agreed (*he tells us*) comprehends the promise of the redemption: and this general promise, he supposes, might be the subject of the patriarch's joy," mentioned by *Jesus*, in the text in question. Which observation, he is so fond of, that he repeats it again in p. 145. "*Abraham*, seeing a redemption to come through his seed, REJOICED at the blessing." But now, if *Abraham* was ignorant that this *general promise* comprehended in it the *promise of redemption*, how could that redemption be the *subject of the patriarch's joy*? That he was ignorant, I prove from the best authority with our Examiner; I mean his own. This *general promise*, as a prophecy of the Messiah or Redeemer, is agreed on all hands, to be obscure. Now our Examiner has laid it down as a maxim, that "so far as prophecy is obscure (and it is in the nature of prophecy to be obscure more or less) so far it was obscure to the prophets themselves." p. 156. This, in satisfaction to himself. But in satisfaction to his reader, I go further; and shew, that the *general promise*, mentioned by *Moses*, could not be the occasion of the patriarch's *joy*, mentioned by *Jesus*; even on our Examiner's own contradictory conception of things. I will suppose, for once, that *Abraham* did understand, that, in the *general promise*, was contained a *promise of redemption*. But will he say the *time*, too, was

was contained in it? Now he owns, that the occasion of *Abraham's joy* was the knowledge of the TIME when *Christ* should come. "The day of *Christ* (*says he*) "denotes the time when *Christ* should come." p. 139. I conclude, therefore, from his own words, that "the subject of the patriarch's joy COULD NOT be this "general promise." And, by this conclusion, expose the injustice of his following remark, that it "was in favour "of my HYPOTHESIS that I supposed there was a *special* "promise made to *Abraham* at his earnest request, subsequent to the general one." If it was in favour of any thing but *truth*, it was in favour of *common-sense*, which always leads to it. And which pointed out to me the *three periods* I discovered in this *special promise*. "But (*he tells me*) there is not one word, in the history "of the *Old Testament*, to justify this threefold distinction." And that I myself CONFESS as much. It is true, that I confess not to find in the *Old Testament* what is not there. And had the like modesty been in him, he would have been content to have found a *future state* in the *New Testament* only. But where is it, I would ask, that, "I confess there is not one word, in "the history of the *Old Testament*, to justify this threefold distinction?" For this is news. So far was I from any thoughts of such confession, that I gave a large critical epitome\* of *Abraham's* whole history, to shew that it *justified this threefold distinction*, in every part of it. But his manner of proving my *confession*, will clearly convict him of the falsehood of his *charge*. For, instead of doing it from *my own* words, he will argue me into it from *his own* inferences. "You confess it (*says he*) FOR "you say, that *Moses's* history begins with the second "period, and that the first was wisely omitted by the "historian." See, here, the perversity of our Examiner! When the point is a question of *right*, he gives his reader an authority: when a question of *fact*, a reason. But what sort of reason let us now see, by applying it to a parallel case. I will suppose him to tell me, (for, after this, he may tell me any thing) "that I myself confess "there is not one word in the *Iliad* of *Homer*, to justify "the being three periods in the destruction of *Troy*,

\* From p. 10 to 15, of *The Divine Legation*, vol. vi.

“ (the first the robbery of *Helen*; the second, the coming before the town; and the third, the storming of it by the *Greeks*) for that I say, that *Homer's* poem begins at the second period; wisely omitting the first and last.” Now will any one conclude, from *this reason*, that I had made *that confession*?—He is so far from owning that I had given any reasons (though I had given many) of *Moses's* wisdom in omitting the mention of the first period, that his following words, if they have any meaning, insinuate I had given none. “ If there never was any such period; it was very honest in the historian to say nothing about it.” The reader sees, I question his having a *meaning*; and my reason is, because, I find, it was to introduce a piece of *wit*. For, as the town-poet frequently compounds for the *rhime*, with one half of his distich; so the town-prose-man for the *wit*, with one half of his sentence.—“ And you (*says he*) will be the WISE MAN who can see what is not to be found.” Now the two members of his wit do not agree.—“ It was very honest in the historian—and you will be the wise man.”—The careless reader may think he only meant, here, to call me *fool*. But, indeed, it was my *knavery* that was to stand in opposition to *Moses's honesty*. This, therefore, is to be considered as one of those *disguised sentences*, which the critics so much admire in the works of the greatest writers. However, I here call upon him first to prove that I did *confess* what he charges upon me, in pain of being deemed a false accuser.—And this for the *First Time*.

VII. He proceeds—“ But what is wanting in *history*, it seems, *criticism* is to supply. The words in the original are, ἡγαλλιάσατο INA ΙΔΗ; i. e. (say you) *he rejoiced that HE MIGHT SEE; which implies that the period of this joy was in the space between the promise that the favour should be conferred, and the actual conferring it, in the delivery of the command.—The English phrase, to see, is equivocal; and means either the present time, that he did then see; or the future, that he should see. But the original ἡγαλλιάσατο has only the latter sense: so that the text plainly distinguishes two different periods of joy: the first, when it was promised*  
“ *he*

“ *he should see; the second, when he actually saw: and*  
 “ *it is to be observed, that in the exact use of the word,*  
 “ *ἀγαλλιάομαι signifies that tumultuous pleasure which*  
 “ *the certain expectation of an approaching blessing,*  
 “ *understood only in the gross, occasions; and χαίρω that*  
 “ *calm and settled joy, that arises from our knowledge in*  
 “ *the possession of it.* Where are your authorities for all  
 “ this? You produce none. Wherever you had your  
 “ *Greek*, I am very sure you had it not from the *New*  
 “ *Testament*, where these words are used indiscrimi-  
 “ nately.” pp. 142, 143.—“ Where are your authorities?  
 “ You produce none.” No. I wrote to those who under-  
 stood their grammar, and read *Greek*: and such want  
 none in a case so clear and notorious. But this is to  
 insinuate, that I had none to produce. He dare not,  
 indeed, say so. And in this I commend his prudence,  
 as he knew nothing of the matter. However, in *this*, he  
 is positive, that “ wherever I had my *Greek*, I had it not  
 “ from the *New Testament*.” The gentleman is hard to  
 please: here he is offended that I had it not; and,  
 before, that I had it from the *New Testament*. Here I  
 impose upon him; there I trifled with him. But, in all  
 this diversity of acceptance, 'tis still the same spirit; of  
 an *answerer by profession*.

I had said, the two *Greek* words, in *their exact use*,  
 signify so and so. Which surely implied an acknow-  
 ledgment, that this exactness was not, *always*, kept up  
 to; especially by the writers of the *New Testament*;  
 who, whatever some may have dream'd, did not pique  
 themselves upon a classical elegance. Now, this impli-  
 cation, our Examiner takes upon him to confirm, but by  
 way of confutation. “ In the *New Testament* (*says he*)  
 “ these words are used indiscriminately.” I had plainly  
 insinuated the same; and he had better have let it rest  
 on my acknowledgment: for the instances he brings, to  
 prove the *words used indiscriminately in the New Testa-*  
*ment*, are even enough to persuade the reader that they  
 are *not*. His first instance is, 1 *Pet.* iv. 13. “ *Rejoice*  
 “ [*χαίρετε*] *inasmuch as ye are partakers of Christ's suf-*  
 “ *ferings; that when his glory shall be revealed* [*χαρῆτε*  
 “ *ἀγαλλιώμενοι*] *ye may be glad with exceeding joy.* See  
 “ you not here (*says he*) the direct reverse of what you



“say; that χαίρω signifies the joy which arises upon prospect, and ἀγαλλιάομαι that which arises from possession.” p. 143. No indeed. I see nothing like it. All the *reverse* here, is the *reverse* of common sense. Yet in that *reverse*, (a feat none but himself could have brought about) the confirmation of my own remark.—Amazing! The followers of *Christ* are bid to *rejoice*, χαίρειτε. For what? *For being partakers of Christ's sufferings*. And was not this a *blessing in possession*? But some divines, it seems, have no notion how *suffering* can be a *blessing*. Yet *St. Paul* reckons the *fellowship of Christ's sufferings* amongst the great privileges of the Gospel, such as *the excellency of the knowledge of Christ and the power of his resurrection\**. And *St. John* couples it with *Christ's kingdom*†—*the kingdom and patience of Jesus Christ*. And how great a *blessing* *St. Peter* (in the Examiner's text) esteemed it, appears by what follows,—*that when his glory shall be revealed, χαρήτε ἀγαλλιώμενοι, ye may be glad with exceeding joy*. But I have other business with these last words. For as he quoted the foregoing, to prove that χαίρω signifies the joy which arises upon *prospect*; so he quotes these to prove that ἀγαλλιάομαι signifies that which arises on *possession*. And with equal success. They are bid to *rejoice* now in sufferings, that they might rejoice and be exceeding glad at *Christ's second coming*. And is this a rejoicing at a good in *possession*? Is it not for a good in *prospect*? The reward they were going to receive. For I suppose the appearance of *Christ's glory* will precede the reward of his followers. Unless our Examiner has another mystery to shew us, which *St. Paul* left untold, That the reward is to come first, and the glory follow. So that now the reader sees he has himself fairly proved, by a good substantial text, the truth of my observation, *That in the exact use of the words, ἀγαλλιάομαι signifies that tumultuous pleasure which the certain expectation of an approaching blessing occasions; and χαίρω that calm and settled joy that arises from our knowledge in the possession of it.*

His other instances are, Rev. xix. 7. “Let us be glad and rejoice [χαίρωμεν καὶ ἀγαλλιώμεθα]—for the marriage

\* Phil. iii. 8—10.

† Rev. i. 9.

"of the Lamb is come. Where both words refer to "blessings in possession. Again, *Matt. v. 12. Rejoice and be exceeding glad* [*χαίριτε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε*] *for great is your reward in Heaven*: where both refer to blessings in prospect." pp. 143, 144. His villainous old luck still pursues him. The first text from the *Revelations*; *Be glad and rejoice, for the marriage of the Lamb is come*; bids the followers of *Christ now* do that, which they were bid to *prepare* for in the words of St. Peter, *that, when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad with exceeding joy*. If, therefore, where they are bid to *prepare* for their rejoicing, the joy is for a good in prospect (as we have proved it was), then, certainly, where they are told that this time of rejoicing *is come*, the joy must still be for a good in prospect. And yet he says, *the words refer to blessings in possession*. Again, the text from St. *Matthew*—*Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in Heaven*, has the same relation to the former part of St. *Peter's* words, [*Rejoice inasmuch as ye are partakers of Christ's sufferings*] as the text, in the *Revelations*, has to the latter. *Blessed are ye* (says *Jesus* in this Gospel) *when men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in Heaven*. Rejoice! For what? Is it not for the persecutions they suffer for his sake? A present blessing sure; though not, it may be, to our Author's taste. The reason why they should rejoice, follows, *for great is your reward in Heaven*. And yet here, he says, *the words refer to blessings in prospect*. In truth what led him into all these cross purposes, of reasoning, was a very pleasant mistake. The one text says—*Be glad and rejoice, FOR ὅτι*—The other, *Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, FOR ὅτι*—Now he took the particle, in both places, to signify *propter, for the sake of*; whereas it signifies, *quoniam, quia*, and is, *in proof of something going before*. So that he read the text—*Rejoice, for the marriage of the Lamb is come*;—as if it had been—*Rejoice for the marriage of the Lamb, which is come*: and—*rejoice, for great is your reward in Heaven*; as if it had been,—*Rejoice for your great reward in Heaven*.

But now let us consider all these texts in another view, in order to do justice to his *delicacy of judgment*. I had said that, in the *exact use* of the two *Greek* words, they signified so and so ; and applied that observation to a *fact* ; where a person *was said to have rejoiced, &c.* In order to disprove this criticism, he brings three passages, in which those *Greek* words are used, where no *fact* is related ; but where men are, in a rhetorical manner, *called upon, and bid to rejoice, &c.* In which case, the use of one word for another, is an elegant conversion. Those, in possession of a blessing, are bid to rejoice with that exceeding joy, which men generally have in the certain expectation of one approaching ; and those in expectation, with that calm and settled joy, that attends full possession. And now who but our Examiner would not see that all his instances fall short and wide of the point in question : the *use* of words being *one thing*, in an historical assertion ; and *another* in a rhetorical invocation\*?

VIII. However, having so ably acquitted himself of one criticism, he falls upon another. " But what then (*says he*) shall we do with *ἵνα*? To rejoice *that he might* see the blessing which he already *had* ; in the *English* language, is not sense. I grant it. And therefore our translators avoid it, and render the passage thus ; *Abraham rejoiced to see my day* ; which rendering will very well stand with the *Greek* ; where *ἵνα* is often put for *ὅτι* or *ὅτι* ; POSITIVE AS YOU ARE THAT IT ALWAYS REFERS TO A FUTURE TIME." p. 144.

" What shall we do with *ἵνα*? "—What indeed ! But no sooner said than done. He fathers it upon me. And having stript it of all its relations, will needs make me maintain it. "*ἵνα* (*says he*) is often put for *ὅτι* or *ὅτι*, positive as you are, that it always refers to a future time." p. 144. Now, so far from being *positive* of this, I positively deny that I ever so much as gave the least hint of such a thing. And here I again call upon him to prove it, as he values his character of an *answerer by profession* ; and this for the *second*

\* See what the Letter Writer, quoted above, has said concerning the use of these two *Greek* verbs, pp. 62 to 65, with much learning and judgment.

**Time\*.** I said, indeed, that *ἵνα ἴδῃ*, in the text *refers only to a future time*. And this I say still, though the translators have rendered it, equivocally, *to see*; whether for the reason assigned by me, or my Examiner, is left to the judgment of the reader. Yet he affirms, that I say, "*ἵνα* always refers to a future time." That I am positive of it, nay very positive, "positive as *you are*," says he. And to cure me of this fault, he proceeds to shew, from several texts, that *ἵνα* is often put for *ὅτι* or *ὅτι*. "Thus *John* xvi. 2. *The time cometh, THAT [ἵνα] whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth God service*. Again: *1 Cor*, iv. 3. *With me it is a small thing THAT [ἵνα] I should be judged of you*. And nearer to the point yet, *3 John* 4. *I have no greater joy [ἵνα ᾤξέω] than THAT I hear, or than to hear that my children walk in the truth*. And why not here, Sir; *Abraham rejoiced [ἵνα ἴδῃ] WHEN he saw, or, THAT he saw, or, which is equivalent, TO SEE my day*." p. 144. In acknowledgment of which kindness, all I can do is, to return him back his own criticism; only with the *Greek* words put into *Latin*. The translator of the *vulgar Latin* has rendered *ἵνα ἴδῃ* by *ut videret*, which words I will suppose him to say (as indifferent a *Latinist* as he appears to have been) *refer only to a future time*. On which I will be very arch and critical: *Positive as you are, Sir, that ut always refers to a future time, I will shew you that it is sometimes put for postquam, the past,*

Ut vidi, ut perii, ut me malus abstulit error!

*and, nearer to the point yet, sometimes for quanto,—Ut quisque optime Græcè sciret, ita esse nequissimum.* "And why not here, Sir, *Abraham rejoiced [ut videret] WHEN HE saw, or THAT he saw, or, which is equivalent, TO SEE my day.*"

IX. And now he tells us, "There is but one difficulty that stands in the way." And what is *one* to a man

\* Here the learned writer above mentioned is justly scandalized at his man. "Pray, Sir, (*says he*) what authority have you for this, that Mr. *W.* is positive *ἵνα* always refers to a future time?—What he saith is, that *ἵνα ἴδῃ* in the text signifies the future time: and this, Sir, it does, and needs must, for abundance of reasons." —p. 59.

who can surmount them with the same ease he makes them? The difficulty is this;—"That according to his "*[the Examiner's]* interpretation, the latter part of the "sentence is a repetition of the former. Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad; i. e. "Abraham rejoiced to see, and then saw and rejoiced. "But such kind of repetitions are frequent in the sacred "dialect; and, in my humble opinion, it has an elegance "here; Abraham rejoiced to see my day; וְיֵאָדָה, וְיָרָא, וְיִשְׂמָח, "HE BOTH SAW AND WAS GLAD." pp. 144, 145.

I had talked much of repetitions in the sacred style; and he will do so too; but without knowing the difference between a *pleonasm* and a *tautology*; the first of which is, indeed, often a beauty; the other, always a blemish in expression: and in this number is the *elegant repetition* of our Examiner's own making. But, for the reader's better information, I shall transcribe what I said on this subject in *The Divine Legation*. The Pleonasm evidently arose from the narrowness of a simple language: The Hebrew, in which this figure abounds, is the scantiest of all the learned languages of the East: Anian (says Grotius) Hebræi verborum copia; itaque rem eandem multis verbis exprimunt. He does not tell us the reason; but we have given it above, and it seems a very natural one: for when the speaker's phrase comes not up to his ideas (as in a scanty language it often will not) he endeavours, of course, to explain himself by a repetition of the thought in other words; as he, whose body is straitened in room, is always dissatisfied with his present posture\*. A repetition of this kind, made in different words, is called a *pleonasm*: but when in the same words, (as it is in the text in question, if there be any repetition at all) it is then a *tautology*; which, being without reason, our Examiner will find a beauty in it. "In my humble "opinion (*says he*) it has an elegance." This is not ill expressed. Humility of opinion well becomes him who begs his question; and still better, him who is about to steal it; which we shall see under the next Remark, he was just now projecting—But the only pretence to elegance, nay even to sense, in his translation of the text, arises from our being able to understand the equivocal

\* See Div. Leg. vol. iv. p. 170.

phrase *to see* in my meaning of, *that he might see*; as will appear to the reader, by confining it to the Examiner's meaning; thus, *Abraham rejoiced when he had seen my day, and he saw it and was glad*. The absurdity of which expression arises from hence, that the latter part of the sentence, beginning with the conjunction *completive*, *and*, naturally implies a further predication. Yet there is no further. But our Examiner, willing to avoid so glaring an absurdity, artfully drops the *sense* of *and* in the *sound* of BOTH. I call it the sound, for sense there is none. *Abraham rejoiced to see my day; he both saw and was glad*, says our elegant translator. As if, when *he rejoiced to see*, there could be any doubt whether he did not BOTH *see and rejoice*. Therefore I should advise him not to despise the assistance the learned Letter-writer gives him, who tells him here, that the best sense, he will ever be able to make of it, will be this, *Abraham rejoiced to see my day; aye, that he did\**. But then as for the elegance of it, he must look to that himself.

X. Having now so happily got through his criticism on my text, he draws one concluding argument; with which he runs a muck at my *whole* dissertation. "I suppose, Sir, it may now be granted that it is not clear from these words of our Saviour; that *Abraham* had any such notice of *Christ's* sacrifice as you contend for.—Here THEN, Sir, your argument must necessarily have its period. For this text stands as the FOUNDATION of all that follows." p. 145. Fair and softly, good Sir, for, (though your argument be already answered, in a confutation of your *premisses*) I would not have you run away with the opinion that there is any relation between *them* and your *conclusion*; further than what arises from an equivocation, which is a very bad bond of connexion. The word FOUNDATION, when applied, figuratively, to a *thesis*, signifies either the *support* of it; or the *orderly introduction* to it. That I used it in the latter sense, appears, not only from the nature of the thing, but from my own *express words*, in the very place where I speak of this *foundation*. *The foundation of my thesis I lay in that Scripture of St. John, where Jesus says to the unbelieving Jews, Your father Abraham*

\* Letter to the Author of a late Epist. Diss. p. 66.

rejoiced

rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad. *If we consider Abraham's personal character, together with the choice made of him for head and origin of that people which God would make holy and separate to himself, from whence was to rise the Redeemer of Mankind, the ultimate end of that separation, we CANNOT BUT CONCLUDE IT PROBABLE that the knowledge of this Redeemer should be revealed to him. Shall I hide from Abraham the thing which I do, says God, in a matter that much less concerned the Father of the Faithful. And here, in the words of Jesus, we have this PROBABLE FACT, ARISING FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING, made certain and put out of all reasonable question\*.*" Here the reader sees that I use the words of *Jesus* which I call the *foundation*, as the orderly introduction to and confirmation only of a thesis which I call *probable*, and prove by other *media*. And as I shew, both from the words of *Jesus*, and *the nature of the thing*, that *Abraham* saw *Christ's day*: so, from both, I prove that this truth must be recorded somewhere or other in the Old Testament. From thence I proceed to the proof of these two points, "1. That there is no place in the whole history of *Abraham*, but that where he is commanded to offer up his son, which bears the least marks or traces of the revelation of *Christ's day*. 2. That this command has all the marks of it, and is, indeed, that very revelation †." In doing this, amongst the various arguments employed, I shew that, at the time of *Abraham*, information by action was the most familiar mode of conversation;—that the history of the *Command* has all the marks of such a conversation;—that, if it be not so understood, the story of *Abraham* is abrupt and unconnected;—and the history of the *Command* attended with insuperable difficulties. Yet for all this, my Examiner tells you, That my thesis "must necessarily have its period," when he has taken away the *foundation* in my text ‡.

'Tis true, he gives a reason for this definitive sentence, which is this: "That the tendency of all that follows is

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. pp. 6, 7. † Ibid. p. 10.

‡ See this point well argued by the learned writer of the Letter before-mentioned, in which, from p. 3 to 12, he very ably confutes the Examiner's conclusion.

“ ONLY TO SHEW THAT ADMITTING, OR ALLOWING  
 “ THAT ABRAHAM WAS ACQUAINTED WITH THE  
 “ GREAT SACRIFICE OF CHRIST, that then it is reason-  
 “ able to expect an account of it in his history,” &c. &c.  
 p. 145. The reader observes from my own words, in  
*The Divine Legation*, quoted above, that I thought we  
 might *from the nature of the thing, expect an account of*  
*it in his history*. This is therefore the **Third Time**  
 I am obliged to call solemnly upon him, to shew that all  
 my proofs of the *command's* being the revelation of  
 Christ's day, rest upon “ the admission or allowance  
 “ that *Abraham* was acquainted with the great sacrifice  
 “ of *Christ*, as it is to be collected from the text in St.  
 “ *John*.” The last words I have added; and thereby  
 hangs a tale. The reader is now to be let into a secret.  
 The Examiner, in giving the finishing stroke to the *Dis-*  
*sertation on the Case of Abraham*, had reserved, as was  
 fit, one of the neatest tricks of his trade to be played off  
 on this occasion. And thus he does the feat. “ Your  
 “ foundation (*says he*) is subverted; therefore all that  
 “ follows is overthrown.” Why so?—Why so! Because  
 “ the tendency of all is to shew, that, admitting or allow-  
 “ ing that *Abraham* was acquainted—then it is reasonable  
 “ to expect”—Well, but may it not be *admitted or*  
*allowed*, from other arguments produced in *The Divine*  
*Legation* besides the text in question, that *Abraham* was  
*acquainted with the great sacrifice of Christ*? Your  
 humble servant, Sir, says he, for that. The force of my  
 consequence depends upon the honest reader's taking it,  
 as I design he should; that it could only be *admitted or*  
*allowed* from the text in question: for if once he conceives  
 that it might be *allowed* from other arguments in *The*  
*Divine Legation*, there is an end of my consequence;  
 and yet you would put me upon explaining.

XI. However, our Examiner, as if not quite satisfied  
 himself, with *this period he hath put to my argument*, goes  
 on thus: “ But to make good the defect in this conse-  
 “ quential reasoning, you offer at one direct proof, to  
 “ shew that the command, and the transaction consequent  
 “ upon it, was indeed as a representative information to  
 “ *Abraham* of the redemption of mankind, by the sacri-  
 “ fice of *Christ*; which is, That the author of the epistle  
 “ to



“ to the *Hebrews* has plainly hinted that he considered  
 “ it in this light. Your proof is from these words,  
 “ chap. xi. 17—19. *By faith, Abraham offered up*  
 “ *Isaac—accounting that God was able to raise him from*  
 “ *the dead; from whence also he received him in a figure,*  
 “ EN ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ; in a parable: *A mode of information*  
 “ *by words or actions, which consists in putting one thing*  
 “ *for another. Now in a writer (say you) who re-*  
 “ *garded this commanded action, as a representative*  
 “ *information of the redemption of mankind, nothing*  
 “ *could be more fine or easy than this expression. For*  
 “ *though Abraham did not, indeed, receive Isaac restored*  
 “ *to life after a real dissolution; yet the son being, in*  
 “ *this action, to represent Christ suffering death for the*  
 “ *sins of the world, when the Father brought him safe*  
 “ *from Mount Moriah, after three days, during which*  
 “ *he was in a state of condemnation to death; he plainly*  
 “ *received him under the character of Christ's represen-*  
 “ *tative, as restored from the dead. For as his coming*  
 “ *to the Mount, and binding, and laying on the altar,*  
 “ *figured the sufferings and death of Christ; so his being*  
 “ *taken from thence alive, as properly figured Christ's*  
 “ *resurrection from the dead. With the highest pro-*  
 “ *priety, therefore, and elegance of speech, might*  
 “ *Abraham be said to receive Isaac from the dead in a*  
 “ *parable, or in representation.”* pp. 146, 147.

Let us see now what our Examiner has to object to this criticism.—“ By your leave, Sir,” says he—which, by the way, he never asks, but to abuse me; nor never takes, but to misrepresent me—“ If the Apostle had  
 “ meant by this expression, to signify, that *Isaac* stood  
 “ as the *representative of Christ*, and that his being taken  
 “ from the Mount alive was the figure of *Christ's* resur-  
 “ rection; it *should* have been said, that *Abraham*  
 “ received *CHRIST* from the dead in a figure,” p. 147.  
 See here, ye little critics; that *Nās*, that *soul of criticism*, which *Bentley* so much lamented he could find no where, out of himself. The writer of the *epistle to the Hebrews* is giving an instance of *Abraham's* faith; *who, against hope, believed in hope*, where his only son (through whom he was promised to be the father of a mighty nation) was commanded to be offered up in sacrifice.

sacrifice. In which account, the sacred writer hath used an expression which I supposed doth intimate that he understood the nature of the command to be, what I have attempted to explain it. To this our Examiner says, *No*. Had he thus understood it, he SHOULD have said, not that *Abraham* received *ISAAC*, but that he *received CHRIST from the dead in a figure*. What? where the discourse was not concerning *Christ*, but *Isaac*? Had, indeed, the sacred writer been speaking of *Abraham's knowledge of Christ*, something might have been said; but he is speaking of a very different thing, his *faith in God*; and only intimates, by a forcible term, what he understood that action to be, which he gives, as an instance of the most illustrious act of faith. I say, had this been the case, *something* might have been said; *something*, I mean, to keep him in countenance; yet still, nothing to the purpose, as I shall now shew. The *transaction of the sacrifice of Christ*, related to *God*. The *figure* of that transaction, in the command to offer *Isaac*, related (according to my interpretation) to *Abraham*. Now, it was *God* who received *Christ*: as it was *Abraham* who received *Isaac*. To tell us then, that (according to my interpretation) it SHOULD have been said, that *Abraham* received *CHRIST from the dead in a figure*, is only shewing us that he knows just as much of logical expression, as of theological argumentation\*. It is true, could he shew the expression improper, in the sense I understand it, he would then speak more to the purpose; and this, to do him justice, he would fain be at. For thus it follows, "For (*says he*) *Christ* it was, " (according to your interpretation) that was received " from the dead *in a figure*, by *Isaac* his representative, " who *really* came alive from the Mount. If the reading had been, not *ἐν παραβολῇ*, but *ἐκ παραβολῆς*, it " would have suited your notion; for it might properly " have been said, that *Isaac* came alive from the Mount " as a figure, or that he might be a figure, of the resurrection of *Christ*." p. 147. Miserable chicane! As, on the one hand, I might say with propriety, that *CHRIST was received from the dead in a figure*, i. e. BY a repre-

\* See here again the learned writer of the letter above-mentioned, p. 43.

*representative*: so could I not as well say, on the other, that ISAAC *was received from the dead in a figure, i. e. as a representative?* For he, sustaining the *person of Christ*, who was raised from the dead, might *in a figure, i. e. as that person*, be said to be received: yet this our Examiner denies, and says, the Apostle SHOULD *have said that Abraham received CHRIST*, and not ISAAC. “But (*says he*) if the reading had been not *ἐν Παραβολῇ*, “but *εἰς Παραβολὴν*, it would have suited YOUR notion.” And the reason he gives is this: “For it might properly “have been said that *Isaac* came alive from the Mount “as a figure, or THAT HE MIGHT BE a figure, of the “resurrection of *Christ*.” Amazing! he says this would have suited my notion; and the reason he gives shews it suits only his own, which is that the *exactness of the resemblance*, not the *declaration of the giver* of the command, made it a figure. This is the more extraordinary, as I myself had shewn that the old Latin translator had turned the words into IN PARABOLAM instead of *in parabola* for this very reason, that he understood the command in the sense our Examiner contends for; viz. That *Isaac*, by the resemblance of the actions, MIGHT BE, or might become a figure, &c. *But the nature* (say I) *of the command being unknown*, these words of the epistle have been understood to signify only that Isaac was a type of *Christ*, in the same sense, that the Old Tabernacle in this epistle is called a type—*ἡ τὴν ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ*, that is, a thing designed by the Holy Spirit, to have both a present significancy and a future. Which amounts but just to this, that Abraham receiving Isaac safe from Mount Moriah, in the manner Scripture relates, he, thereby, became a type. An ancient interpretation, as appears by the reading of the vulgate Latin. Unde eum IN PARABOLAM accepit, for in parabola, as it ought to have been translated, conformably to the Greek\*.

XII. But to return to our Examiner; who, after all this expence of criticism, owns, at last, that “a reason “will be wanting, why instead of speaking the fact as it “really was, that *Isaac* came alive from the Mount, the “Apostle chose rather to say (what was not really the

\* Divine Legat. vol. vi. pp. 27, 28.

"case) that *Abraham* received him *from the dead*." Well; and have not I given a reason? And what then? For what did I commence Examiner, if I may'nt have reasons of my own?—They follow thus, "If *Isaac* did not die (as it is certain he did not) *Abraham* could not receive him from the dead. And yet the Apostle says, he received him *from the dead*. The clearing up this difficulty, will shew the true sense of the passage." pp. 147, 148. What, will the clearing up a difficulty of his own making, discover the true sense of another man's writing? This is one of his new improvements in logic; in which, as in arithmetic, he has introduced a *rule of false*, whereby an unknown truth is to be ferretted out by a known untruth. For there is none of this difficulty in the sacred text; it is not there, as in our Examiner's expression, said by the apostle, simply, that *Abraham received Isaac from the dead*, but that he received him, from thence, IN A FIGURE, or under the assumed personage of *Christ*. Now if *Christ* died, then he, who assumed his personage, in order to represent his passion and resurrection, might, surely, well be said to be *received from the dead in a figure*. A wonderful difficulty, truly! and as wonderfully solved, by a conundrum! But with propriety sufficient: for as a real difficulty requires sense and criticism, an imaginary one may well enough be managed by a quibble. Because the translators of *St. Mark's* gospel have rendered *ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ*, by—*with what comparison shall we compare it*, therefore *ἐν παραβολῇ*, in the text in question, he says, signifies COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING. But no words can shew him equal to his own—"The Apostle does not say *simply* and *absolutely*, that *Abraham* received *Isaac* from the dead; but that he received him from the dead, *ἐν παραβολῇ*, in a *parable*." See here now! Did not I tell you so? There was no difficulty all this while: the sentence only opened to the right and left to make room for his objection: and now closes again. "It was not simply said"—No. "But that he received him—*ἐν παραβολῇ*, in a *parable*, i. e. in a comparison, or by comparison. Thus the word is used *Mark* iv. 30. *Whereunto shall we liken the kingdom of God, or with what comparison* [*ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ*] *shall we compare it*. The meaning

"then

“ then may be, that *Abraham's* receiving *Isaac* alive  
 “ (after his death was denounced) by the revocation of  
 “ the command, was AS IF HE HAD received him from  
 “ the dead. Thus several interpreters understand the  
 “ place. Or it may be, as others will have it, that the  
 “ Apostle here refers to the birth of *Isaac*; which was  
 “ [*ἐν παραβολῇ*] COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING, a receiving  
 “ him from the dead; his father being old, and his  
 “ mother past the age of child-bearing, on which account  
 “ the Apostle styles them both *dead*. Which interpreta-  
 “ tion, I the rather approve, because it suggests the  
 “ proper grounds of *Abraham's* faith.” pp. 148, 149.

He says, *ἐν παραβολῇ* signifies *in or by comparison*; and that the word is so used in *St. Mark*; to prove which, he quotes the *English* translation. Now I must take the liberty to tell him, that the translators were mistaken; and he with them. *Παραβολῇ*, in *St. Mark*, is not used in the sense of a *similitude* or *comparison*, but of a *parable*. The Ancients had two ways of illustrating the things they inforced; the one was by a *parable*, the other by a simple *comparison* or *simile*. How the latter of these arose out of the former, I have shewn in *The Divine Legation* \*. Now, I say, that both these modes of illustration are referred to in the text of *St. Mark*; which should have been translated thus, *To what shall we COMPARE the kingdom of God, or with what PARABLE shall we illustrate or parabolize it—ὁμοιάσωμεν—παραβάλωμεν.*—So that the latter part of the verse is not a repetition, as the translators seem to have thought, of the former; so frequent in the Scripture style; but, both together, express two different and well-known modes of illustration.

But now suppose, *ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ* had signified *with what comparison*: How comes it to pass the *ἐν παραβολῇ* should signify *by comparison*, or *as it were*, or COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING? In plain truth, his critical analogy has terminated in a pleasant blunder. How so? says he.—Nay 'tis true there's no denying, but that *speaking by comparison* is *comparatively speaking*: and, if men will needs put another sense upon it, who can help that? Was it a time for our Author, when he was

\* Vol. iv. p. 138.

writing *examinations*, to spoil a good argument by nicely enquiring into the *sense* of an expression? He left it to those whom it more concerned, to tell the reader, that *comparatively speaking* does not at present (whatever it might heretofore) signify, *speaking by a comparison*; but speaking loosely and incorrectly; which sense of the phrase, I suppose, arose from the *comparisons* of such kind of Writers as our Examiner; that were generally observed to be lame and inaccurate. However, though I am no great friend to the *innocence of error*, I should have been ready enough to think it a simple blunder, had I not observed him to go into it with much artful preparation; a circumstance by no means characteristic of that *genuine turn of mind*, which is quick and sudden, and over head and ears in an instant: but he begins with explaining, *in a comparison*, by—*by comparison*: in which, you just get the first glimpse, as it were, of an enascent equivocation; and this [*by comparison*] is presently, afterwards, turned into, *as it were*, or, *as if he had*; and then, *comparatively speaking* brings up the rear, and closes the criticism three deep. But he “approves of the interpretation” which makes the author of the epistle to the *Hebrews* “refer to the birth of *Isaac*, because it “suggests (*he says*) the PROPER grounds of *Abraham’s* “faith.” Till now I thought the *proper grounds* of *Abraham’s* faith (as of every other man’s) had been his knowledge of the nature of the Godhead, one of whose attributes is veracity. No, says this great philosopher and divine; his *proper grounds* were these, that God had told him truth once already.—And now had he not reason, after all this, to turn to me, and with an air of triumph and gaiety to accost me in the following manner? “It is not to be supposed, Sir, that you are a stranger “to these interpretations, which are in every body’s “hands; but as if nothing of this sort had ever been “thought of, you pass it over with absolute neglect; and “will needs have it, that the Apostle was *full of your* “*ideas*; for no other reason that I can see, than because “you are full of them yourself.” pp. 148, 9. Indeed, Sir, *comparatively speaking*, I was much a stranger to them. For what were they, till seen in the pleasant light in which you have placed them? I will only say

one thing to your argument (as I now hasten to your wit); which is, that, had you known the force of the word *ἐνομήσατο*, in the text, you had known that the *deadness of Sarah's womb could not be meant*. But, since you love the authority of interpreters\*, I will give you what the great *Scaliger* says on the words *ἐν παραβολῇ*, "*In imagine quadam resurrectionis: quia qui immolationi addictus erat, & postea liberatus, videtur tanquam resurrexisse. Hæc est Calvinii expositio, longe omnium optima.*"

But, says our Examiner, "you will needs have it that the Apostle was full of your ideas." *My ideas*, intimates ideas discovered by me; and to suppose the Apostle full of these, would have been, I confess, a little extraordinary. The truth is, I said nothing so silly. I said, *THESE ideas*. But what then? It was necessary, perhaps, to the wit that follows—"for no other reason, that I can see, than because you are full of them yourself." And shall I be angry with him for this? Surely, no. I can easily forgive the false quotation, for the sake of so much wit. For, as *Stephano* says to his viceroy on the like occasion, "I thank thee for that jest; 'tis an excellent pass of pate: and wit shall not go unrewarded while I am king of this island."

XIII. Our Examiner goes on: "The last step (*says he*) you take in this argument, is to raise objections against the common account of this history; in order to draw an inference from thence, that your account must be the true one; and this is what I shall next consider." p. 149. He had said before, that having struck my *corner-stone*, and unsettled my *foundation*, he had stopt me short, and put a *period to my argument*. But it seems, somehow or other, I had recovered myself, and pushed it forward. For now he talks of *another* *step* I had taken in this argument. Happily indeed, both for himself and me, it is the *last*. "You tell us then (*says he*) that the command, as it hath been hitherto understood—occupies a place in Abraham's history, that, according to our ideas of things, it cannot properly have. The command is supposed to be given as a trial

\* The learned Letter Writer above-mentioned gives another good reason, and produces another good authority, against this fancy.—See p. 46.

"only."

“ only. Now when the great Searcher of Hearts is  
 “ pleased to try any of his servants, either for example-  
 “ sake, or for some other end—as in this he condescends  
 “ to the manner of men—so, we may be assured, he  
 “ would accommodate himself to their manner likewise,  
 “ in the most material circumstance of the trial. But  
 “ amongst men, the agent is always tried before he is set  
 “ on work, or rewarded, and not after—on the contrary—  
 “ this trial was made after all Abraham’s work was done;  
 “ and all God’s mercies received—nay, what is still more  
 “ strange, after he had been once tried already.—We  
 “ must needs conclude therefore, that the command was  
 “ not (according to the common notion) a trial only,  
 “ because it comes after all God’s dispensations. Yet,  
 “ as the sacred text assures us, it was a trial, and as a  
 “ trial necessarily precedes the employment or reward of  
 “ the person tried; we must needs conclude, that as no  
 “ employment, so some benefit followed this trial. Now  
 “ on our interpretation, a benefit, as we shall see, did  
 “ follow. We have reason therefore to conclude this  
 “ interpretation to be the true.” pp. 149, 150. To this  
 he answers, “ You lay it down here as the common in-  
 “ terpretation, that the command to *Abraham* to offer  
 “ up his son was given as a trial ONLY; WHICH IS NOT  
 “ TRUE.” Why? Because “ the common opinion is,  
 “ that God’s intention in this command was not only to  
 “ try *Abraham*, but also to PREFIGURE the sacrifice of  
 “ *Christ*.” p. 150\*.” Excellent! I speak here of the  
 command’s being given. But given to whom? To all  
 the faithful, for whose sake it was recorded? or to  
*Abraham* only, for whose sake it was revealed? Does  
 not the very subject confine my meaning to this latter  
 sense? Now, to *Abraham*, I say (according to the com-  
 mon opinion) it was given as a trial only. To the  
 faithful, if you will, as a prefiguration. If, to extricate  
 himself from his confused or sophistical reasoning, he  
 will say it prefigured to *Abraham* likewise; he then  
 gives up all he has been contending for, against my in-  
 terpretation, viz. that *Abraham* knew this to be a repre-  
 sentation of the great sacrifice of *Christ*: I call his

\* Here again the learned Writer in his Letter to our Examiner,  
 p. 14, very clearly exposes this sophism.



reasoning *confused* or *sophistical*. See, if he be not obliged to me for my indcision. Where I speak of the common opinion, I say, *the command is supposed to be GIVEN as a trial only*. He thinks fit to tell me, *I say not true*. But when he comes to prove it, he changes the terms of the question thus, "For the common opinion is that GOD'S INTENTION in this command was," &c. Now the purpose of God's *giving a command to Abraham*, for his sake, might be one thing; and his general *intention*, in that command, as it concerned the whole of his dispensation, another. I leave it therefore to the reader to determine, whether our Examiner changed the terms of the question by design or ignorance. But I have another reason why he should have allowed me, in this place at least, not to have been mistaken. And that is, because a great man (whose authority is deservedly the highest in the learned world, and which our Examiner has more reasons than one to pay a due regard to) is in the same sentiments; and takes it for granted, as we shall see by the words that follow, that the *common opinion* is that God's *giving* this command was "only to try *Abraham*." "I was (says he) under a difficulty [a case, which, I dare say, never happened to our Examiner] to account for this action on the foot of its being a trial only\*." But to prove further that I said *not true*, when I said, that, *according to the common interpretation the command was given for a trial only*; he observes, that I myself had owned that the *resemblance to Christ's sacrifice was so strong, that interpreters could never overlook it*. How much this is to the purpose, unless we allow *Abraham's knowledge* of the figure, has been seen already. Nor does he appear to be less conscious of its impertinence; therefore, instead of attempting to inforce it to the purpose for which he quotes it, he turns, all on a sudden, to shew that it makes nothing to the purpose for which I employed it. But let us follow this *Proteus* through all his windings. "The resemblance (says he), no doubt, is very strong; but how this corroborates your sense of the command, I do not see. Your sense is, that it was an *actual information* given to *Abraham*, of the sacrifice of

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. p. 5.

“ *Christ*. But to *prefigure*, and to *inform*, are different things. This transaction *might prefigure*, and *does prefigure*, the sacrifice of *Christ*; whether *Abraham* *knew* any thing of the sacrifice of *Christ* or no. For it does not follow, that because a thing is *prefigured*; therefore it must be *seen* and *understood*, at the time “ when it is *prefigured*.” pp. 150, 151. Could it have been believed that these words should immediately follow an argument, whose force, that little it has, is founded on the principle, *That to prefigure and to inform are not different things*? But retrospects, with bad reckoners, are troublesome things. At this rate, I should soon find my task double. I shall therefore take his accounts as they lie. And if they betray themselves, why so. He says then, “ he does not see how this CORROBORATES “ my sense, *because* to *prefigure* and to *inform* are different things.” It was that very *difference* which made me call it a *corroboration* of my sense. Had there been *no difference*, I should not have called it a *corroboration* of my sense, but my very sense itself. As to the observation that follows, and the explanation of it, all he says is very true. But a truth the most unlooked for; 1. Because it is a truth I myself had much inculcated throughout *The Divine Legation*. 2. Because it is a full answer to all he has himself urged in the body of his pamphlet for a future state’s being known or taught to the *Jewish* people. 3. Because (as is hinted at above) it is as full an answer to the very question we are upon, *viz.* Whether, according to the common opinion, the command was given *only to try* *Abraham*; or whether *both to try and to prefigure*, &c. Now I was there speaking of the command, as given to *Abraham*. Therefore *to prefigure* could not be one end, because it was not to *inform*.

XIV. But we are yet only in the skirts of his argument, on which, indeed, I have set too long. “ *Thy much (says he) being observed to PREVENT confusion* p. 151. This puts me in mind of the *constable*, who being called in to appease a quarrel, first knocked down every one he met; and then said, “ *Thus much to prevent disorder.*” For the reader sees all the *confusion* of his own making; and that, I have reason to fear, will keep rising by every new *observation*. “ Let us now

(*says he*) attend to your argument." p. 151. Indeed it is time; and so, without more ceremony, take it. One of my proofs against the common interpretation was, that according to *that*, there was no reward subsequent to the trial. To which he answers, "But how can you prove that, according to the common interpretation, 'there was no reward subsequent to the trial?'" p. 151. How shall I be able to please him? Before he was offended that I supposed the author of the book of *Genesis* might omit relating the *mode* of a fact, when he had good reason \* so to do. Here, because I suppose *no fact*, from there being none recorded, when no reason hindered, he is as captious on this side. "How will you prove it?" (*says he*). From the silence of the historian, say I, when nothing hindered him from speaking. Well, but he will shew it fairly recorded in Scripture, that there *were rewards subsequent to the trial*. This, indeed, is to the purpose: "*Abraham (says he)* lived a great many years after that transaction happened. He lived to dispose of his son *Isaac* in marriage, and to see his seed. He lived to be married himself to another wife, and to have several children by her; he had not THEN received all God's mercies, nor were all God's dispensations towards him at an end; and it is to be remembered that it is expressly said of *Abraham*, *Gen. xxiv. 1*. '(a long time after the transaction in question) *that God had blessed him in all things*.'" pp. 151, 152. The question here is, of the *extraordinary* and uncommon rewards bestowed by God on *Abraham*; and he decides upon it, by an enumeration of the *ordinary and common*. And, to fill up the measure of these blessings, he makes the marrying of *another wife* one. Though unluckily, this wife at last proves but a *concubine*; as appears plainly from the place where she is mentioned. But let me ask him seriously; Could he, indeed, suppose me to mean (though he attended not to the drift of the argument) that God immediately withdrew all his favours from the Father of the Faithful, after the last great reward he conferred upon him, though he lived many years after? I can hardly, I confess, account for this, any otherwise than from a certain turn of mind which I

\* See the reason assigned, Div. Leg. Book vi. § 5.

don't care to give a name to: but which, the habit of answering has made so common that nobody either mistakes it, or is much scandalized at it. Though I, for my part, should esteem a total ignorance of letters a much happier lot than such a learned depravity. "But this is not all," (*says he.*)—No? I am sorry for it! 'Twas enough in conscience.—"What surprizes me most is, "that you should argue so *WEAKLY*, as if the reward "of good men had respect to this life only. Be it, that "Abraham had received all God's mercies; and that all "God's dispensations towards him, in this world, were "at an end; was there not a life yet to come, with "respect to which the whole period of our existence "here is to be considered as a state of trial; and where "we are all of us to look for that reward of our virtues "which we very often fail of in this?" p. 152. Well, if it was *NOT ALL*, we find, at least, 'twas all of a piece. For as before he would sophistically obtrude upon us *common*, for extraordinary *rewards*; so here (true to the genius of his trade) he puts *common* for extraordinary *trials*. The case, to which I applied my argument, was this;—God, determining to select a chosen people from the loins of *Abraham*, would manifest to the world that this patriarch was worthy of the distinction shewn him, by having his faith found superior to the hardest trials. In speaking of these *trials*, I said, that the command to offer *Isaac* was the *last*. "No, *says the Examiner*, that "cannot be, for, with respect to a life to come, the "whole period of our existence here, is to be considered "as a state of trial." And so again, (*says he*) with regard to the *reward*; which you pretend, in the order of God's dispensations, should follow the trial: Why? We are to "look after it in another world."—Holy Scripture records the history of one, to whom God only promised (in the clear and obvious sense) temporal blessings. It records, that these temporal blessings were dispensed. One species of which were extraordinary rewards after extraordinary trials. In the most extraordinary of all, no reward followed: this was my difficulty. See here, how he has cleared it up.—I would willingly believe the best: yet the bringing in a *future state* (no more to clearing up the difficulty than a *future parliament*)

ment) looks so very like, what the logicians call, *argumentum ad invidiam*, that I don't know whether I shall bring the reader to believe with me. "What surprizes me most (*says he*) is, that you should argue so weakly."—*Weakly*, does he say? Let him speak out, and rather say *wickedly*; which is indeed what he would have the reader understand, though in tenderness he prefers a softer word: for he roundly asserts, that *I have argued as if the reward of good men had respect to this life only*. I had said, indeed, frequently said, that many good men had no respect to any other reward; *but that the reward of good men had respect to this life only*, I not only never said, but even abhor the thoughts of. I must therefore call upon my Examiner, for this **fourth Time**, to prove that I ever argued in that manner, on pain of passing for a calumniator.

XV. But he seems to be sensible of his bad argument; whatever might be his intention in using it; and would save all by another fetch: for the weakest are ever most fruitful in expedients. "And what (*says he*) "if, after all this, the wisdom of God should have "thought fit, that this very man, whom he had singled "out to be an eminent example of piety to all generations, should, at the very close of his life, give evidence "of it, by an instance that exceeded all that had gone "before; that he might be a pattern of patient suffering, "even unto the end? Would there not be SENSE in "such a supposition?" p. 153. In truth, I doubt not, as he has put it: and I will tell him, why. *Abraham* was not a *mere instrument* to stand for an example only, but a *moral agent* likewise; and to be dealt with as such. Now, though, as he stands for an *example*, we may admit of as many *trials* for *patient suffering* as our good-natured Examiner thinks fitting; yet, as a *moral agent*, it is required (as I have proved from the method of God's dealing with his servants, recorded in sacred history) that each trial be attended with some work done, or some reward conferred. But these two circumstances in *Abraham's* character, our Examiner perpetually confounds. He supposes nothing to be done for *Abraham's own sake*; but every thing for the *example's sake*. Yet, did the good cause of *answering* require, he could as easily

easily suppose the contrary. And that I do him no wrong, I will here give the reader a remarkable instance of this dexterity, in the counter-exercise of his arms. In p. 150, of these *Considerations*, (*he says*) "IT DOES NOT FOLLOW, that, because a thing is prefigured, therefore it must be seen and understood AT THE TIME when it is prefigured." Yet in the body of the pamphlet, pp. 112, 113, having another point to puzzle; he says (on my observing that a future state and resurrection were not national doctrines till the time of the *Maccabees*) "he knows I will say they had these doctrines from the prophets—yet the prophets were dead two hundred years before."—But if the prophets were dead, their writings were extant—"And what then? is it LIKELY that the sons should have learnt from the dead prophets, what the fathers could not learn from the living?—Why could not the *Jews* learn this doctrine from THE VERY FIRST, as well as their posterity at the distance of ages afterwards?" In the first case we find he expressly says, *it does not follow*; in the second, he as plainly supposes, that *it does*.

XVI. "But there are other objections besides this (*he says*) to my interpretation of the command: as first it doth not *appear* how *Abraham* could collect from this transaction, that *Christ* was to be offered up as a sacrifice. I can easily understand that *converse* may be maintained by *actions* as well as by *words*. What you have said upon that subject \*, &c. no doubt is very just; and the instances you have produced from Scripture, where actions have been used as foreshewing the determinations of Providence, are beyond all exception. But whereas you have considered the action of *Abraham* in offering up his son as a case parallel to these; it differs from them all in a very material circumstance, *viz.* that nothing is here added by way of *explication* to *show* the import of it. When *Zedekiah* made him horns of iron, he said,—THUS shalt thou push the *Syrians*, 1 *Kings* xxii. 11. When *Jeremiah* was bid to take a linen girdle and hide it in the hole of a rock; &c. the explanation immediately follows:—Thus saith the Lord, AFTER THIS MANNER will I mar the

\* Div. Leg. Book iv. § 4,

“ *pride of Judah, &c. Jeremiah xiii. 1—9.* And so it is  
 “ in *every* instance you have produced; which I need  
 “ not particularly prove, because you have confessed it\*.  
 “ And no doubt such explanations, attending the trans-  
 “ action, were always necessary for the information of  
 “ the prophet; because though *actions* are as expressive  
 “ of *ideas* as *words* are; yet it is on supposition that there  
 “ is either *common use*, or *special intimation*, to deter-  
 “ mine *what* ideas *such* or *such* actions import; other-  
 “ wise nothing can be understood. You will not pretend,  
 “ I suppose, that by any *common usage* of those times,  
 “ this transaction was *significative* of the sacrifice of  
 “ *Christ*; therefore there must have been some *special*  
 “ *intimation* attending the transaction, and determining  
 “ it to this meaning, if it was the intention of Providence,  
 “ hereby to give *Abraham* any such information; of  
 “ which special intimation since *nothing appears*, it can  
 “ *never appear* that any such information *was* intended.  
 “ The presumption lies the other way: because if any  
 “ such information *had* been intended; it is natural to  
 “ think that the *explanation* would have been *recorded*  
 “ with the *transaction*, as it is in all other such like  
 “ cases.” pp. 153, 154. This, indeed, stands unequalled,  
 even by himself. In *The Divine Legation*, I had shewn  
 the nature of this significative action here *commanded*;—  
 I had shewn how it *agreed*, and how it *differed*, from  
 others of the same kind—I had shewn how *Abraham*  
 must necessarily understand the import of it. Yet here,  
 the Examiner comes over me with an objection, that  
 implies a profound ignorance of every thing I had said.  
 I would fain instruct him; but if he chuses rather to be  
 shamed; why, every man to his taste. He says, I con-  
 sider the information by action *in the case of Abraham*  
*as parallel* to the information given to, or by the prophets  
*Zedekiah* and *Jeremiah*, for the instruction of the people:  
 “ Whereas it differs from them in a very material cir-  
 “ cumstance; namely, that nothing is here added by way  
 “ of explanation, to shew the import of it.” Hear, now,  
 whether I consider it as *parallel* or *different*—having  
 spoken of those significative actions done by the prophets,  
 at God’s command, for the people’s information, I go on

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. p. 25.

thus,

thus, *By these actions the prophets* instructed the people in the will of God—but where God TEACHES THE PROPHET, and, in compliance to the custom of that time, condescends to the same mode of instruction, then the *significative action* is generally changed into a vision, either natural or extraordinary—I say generally, but not always. Sometimes, though the information was only for the prophet, God would SET HIM UPON an expressive action, whose obvious meaning conveyed the intelligence proposed or sought\*. I therefore call upon him here again, the *Fifth Time*, to prove that I considered them as parallel; or else to make his retractation. He says, “he supposes, I will not pretend that, by any common usage of those times, this transaction was significative of the sacrifice of *Christ*.” All that I pretended to, I delivered in very plain terms, in the following manner. *From the view given of Abraham’s history, we see, how all God’s revelations to him, to this last [of the Command] ultimately relate to that mystic fundamental promise, made to him on his first vocation, that in him should all families of the earth be blessed. God opens the scheme of his dispensations, by exact and regular steps—We see, throughout, a gradual opening and fit preparation for some further Revelation, which—could be no other than that of the Redemption—the completion of the whole of God’s economy—But the only remaining one recorded—is the command to offer Isaac.—Now the happiness or redemption of mankind, promised to come through Abraham, could not but make him more and more inquisitive into the manner of its being brought about, in proportion as he found himself to be more and more personally concerned, as the instrument of so great a blessing.—We have shewn it to be the custom of antiquity to instruct by actions as well as words—that God himself, in compliance to a general custom, used this way of information.—Nothing could be conceived more apposite to convey the information than this very action; ABRAHAM DESIRED EARNESTLY to be let into the mystery of the Redemption, and God, to instruct him—said, Take now thy son, &c. The duration of the action*



*was the same as between Christ's death and resurrection, &c.\*.*—Could *Abraham* now, after this, be any more in doubt, that this command was to prefigure the sacrifice of *Christ*; than *Ezekiel*, that what he saw in the *chambers of imagery* was to represent the idolatries of his countrymen? But our Examiner artfully concealed, that I had, all along, supposed from the proofs given, that this Revelation was “made at *Abraham's* earnest request.” and then asks, Whether “by any common usage this transaction was significative of the sacrifice of *Christ*.” If not, he says, “there must have been some special intimation determining it to this meaning: of which, since nothing appears, it can never appear that any such information was intended. The presumption lies the other way, because if any such intimation had been intended, it is natural to think, the explanation would have been recorded with the transaction, as it is in ALL other such like cases.” Here again, he honestly conceals from his reader, that I had given *two reasons*, why the explanation was not recorded. The one arising from this species of information; the other, from the nature of the thing informed of. The first was, that *the narrative of such a converse by action was not, in its nature, so intelligible or obvious, as that where God is shewn conversing by action to the prophets, in the several instances before given. And the reason is this: those informations, as they are given to the prophets for the instruction of the people, have, necessarily, in the course of the history, their explanations annexed. But the information to Abraham being solely for his own use, there was no room for that formal explanation; which made the commanded actions, performed by the prophets, so clear and intelligible †.* And, to illustrate the truth of the observation, I gave an example, in the relation of *Jacob's wrestling with the angel*. Which (like this of the command) was an information by action, for *Jacob's* sole use: and therefore has the same obscurity, as not having its explanation annexed. I have shewn what that information was. And will he say, because the explanation was not recorded, that this was

\* See Div. Leg. vol. vi. pp. 17. & seq.

† Ibid pp. 25, 26.

the history of a *simple wrestling*, as that was of a *commanded human sacrifice*? Or will he rather chuse to retract what he *had said*, that where it is an information by action, the *explanation is always recorded in such like cases*?

The *second* reason I gave why the explanation was not recorded, arose from the *nature of the thing informed of*. The *knowledge of God's future dispensation, in the redemption of mankind, by the death of his Son, revealed as a singular favour to the Father of the Faithful, was* (say I) *what could, by no means, be communicated to the Hebrew people, when Moses wrote his history for their use; because they being then to continue long under a carnal economy, this knowledge of the end of the law would have greatly indisposed them to that dispensation with which God, in his infinite wisdom, thought fit to exercise them*.\*

XVII. But he has not learnt his trade for nothing. Catch an Answerer without his salvo, if you can. You may trust him to take care that it shall never be said, he had passed over, in absolute silence, the answer given above; he therefore subjoins—"To this you reply, *that the information to Abraham being solely for his own use, and which could, by no means, be communicated to the Hebrew people when Moses wrote his history; there was no room for the formal explanation which made the commanded actions performed by the prophets so clear and intelligible.*" p. 155.—"To this (*says he*) you reply." To what? To his objections against my interpretation; which are these—"That nothing is added by way of explanation—that this transaction was not, by any common usage of those times, significative of the sacrifice of *Christ*—that if any such information had been intended, it is natural to think that the explanation would have been recorded with the transaction."—Had he given but a common attention to what I wrote, he would have seen, that the answer, he here quotes from me, was a *reply* to quite a *different* thing; namely, *why the sacred writer did not, for the information of the Jewish church, give an explanation of the significative*

*action.* In the mean time, the reply I made to his three objections, he still reserves in profound silence. I have quoted it above, and it is in substance this, *That where the commanded action is for the information of the prophet only, there no explanation accompanies it.—That the command being given at Abraham's earnest request to be further acquainted with the mystery of the Redemption, he must needs see* (though the transaction was not, by any common usage of those times, significative of the sacrifice of *Christ*) *the true and real import of it.*—I had said, that our Examiner could not have been thus grossly mistaken, had he given a common attention to what he saw written. But the reader may have reason to suspect something worse, when he observes, that, in quoting this, which he calls my *reply*, he makes me say, that, “as the information was given solely for *Abraham's* use, there was no room for that formal explanation, WHICH MADE THE COMMANDED ACTIONS PERFORMED BY THE PROPHETS SO CLEAR AND INTELLIGIBLE.” Words so devoid of all purpose, to the argument he pretends I was there upon, that, had I used them, or any other like them, I should have been ashamed, after such impertinence, to have appeared again in print: yet we find they were to our Examiner's *purpose* to bestow upon me; in order to persuade the reader, that this was really a *reply* to his objections.

But be the *reply* what you please, if it will but give him an opportunity to *answer*, to *examine*, to force a trade, it is enough for him. He goes on, therefore, in this manner, “But this which you offer, as a solution of the difficulty, is, WITH ME, A NEW OBJECTION.” See here now, do I belie the man?—“For if the knowledge of *Christ's* sacrifice was not to be communicated; to what purpose was it clearly revealed to *Abraham*? You say, that the *Jews, being to continue long under a carnal economy; this knowledge—would have greatly indisposed them to this dispensation.* But why was it then communicated to *Abraham*? For his sole use, you say.” p. 155.—Here he asks me a question, then quotes my answer to it: and, not liking that, asks the question over again; and then makes an answer for it himself, which, he thought, he could manage better.

For let the reader take notice, that the last answer is not mine. I had talked very impertinently indeed, had I given it as a reason why the revelation was made to *Abraham*, and not given to the *Jews*, that it was *for Abraham's sole use*. I had proved, indeed, from *fact*, that it was *for his sole use*: but the *reason* I gave, for its not being communicated, was the unfit circumstances and disposition of the *Jewish* people to receive it. But what then? this which he calls the *answer* does its business; as that which he called the *reply* had done before it; and serves him for a handle to a NEW OBJECTION.

And thus he proceeds—"What use? will you be pleased to tell us? Was there any good use that *Abraham* could make of this knowledge, which the rest of the people of God might not have made of it as well as he? Or if it was unfit for every body else, was it not unfit for *Abraham* too?" p. 155. Amazing! Had not I given it as the reason why it could not be communicated to the *Jewish* people, that they were to continue long under a burthensome carnal economy; which, this knowledge would have tempted them to throw off before the appointed time? and did this reason extend to *Abraham*, who was never under that economy?

XVIII. But he goes on—"In short, Sir, I do not understand this doctrine (with which your whole Work much abounds) of revealing things clearly to patriarchs, and prophets, and leaders, as a special favour to themselves; but to be kept as a secret from the rest of mankind."—It is, but too plain (as he says) "he does not understand it:" for which I can give no better reason than its being *Scripture-doctrine*; and not that of *sums* and *systems*. Yet what he cannot *understand*, his client Bishop *Bull* could, however: who (as he himself informs us) asserts, "that there were Arcana in the *Jewish* theology, and consequently a twofold manner of teaching amongst them; one suited to vulgar apprehensions; the other to those who had made some proficiency in knowledge." *Exam. of Mr. W's second Proposition*, p. 125. So that I ascribe this rather to a want of *memory* than want of *understanding*.

"I have

“ I have been used (*says he*) to consider persons under “ this character, as appointed, not for themselves, but “ for others; and therefore to conclude that *WHATEVER* “ was clearly revealed to them, concerning God’s dis- “ pensations, was so revealed, in order to be communi- “ cated to others.” pp. 155, 6. This is the old hacknied sophism; that, because persons act and are employed for *others*; therefore they do nothing, or that nothing is done for *themselves*. When God said, *Shall I hide from Abraham that thing which I do?* was not this said to, and for himself? But he sinks and flounders under this false bottom, That *whatever was clearly revealed* to the prophets, *was so revealed, in order to be communicated to others*. Here then a little *Scripture-doctrine* will do him no harm. Did *Moses* (and this is a case in point) communicate all he knew to the *Jews*, concerning the *Christian dispensation*; which the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* tells us was *clearly revealed* to him in the Mount?—*Priests* (*says he*) *that offer gifts according to the law, who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle\**. Again, we find that *Ezekiel*, on his being called upon his mission, saw, what the author of *Eccles.* calls *the glorious vision*; and had (as appears from the allegory of the roll of a book) a full interpretation thereof. Yet, notwithstanding all his illumination, he was directed by God to speak so obscurely to the people, that he at length found cause to complain, *Ah, Lord, they say of me, Doth he not speak parables†?* And now let him *ask* the prophets with the same pertness he is accustomed to *examine me, What there any good use you could make of your knowledge, that the people of God might not have made of it as well as you?*—But the same dispensation is *alluded* to, and *continued*, under the kingdom of *Christ*—And his disciples asked him saying, *What might this parable be?* And he said, *Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others, in parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand‡.* And now, reader, shall I claim his promise? “ If you can shew (*says he*) that

• Heb. viii. 4, 5. † Ezek. xx. 49. ‡ Luke viii. 9, 10.

“ I am mistaken in this, pray do it, and I shall be obliged to you.” For, you see, I have taken him at his word. And ’twas well I did; for it was no sooner out of his mouth; than, as if he had repented (not of his candour, but his confidence) he immediately cries, Hold—and tells me “ I might have spared myself in asking another question, *Why, if Revelations cannot be clearly recorded, are they recorded at all.*” p. 156. But, great *Defender of the Faith—of the ancient Jewish church!* I asked that very question, because the answer to it shews how much you are mistaken; as the intelligent reader, by this time, easily perceives. But why does he say I might have spared that question? because, “ it a revelation is not clearly given, it cannot be clearly recorded.” Did I say it could? Or will he say, that there are no reasons why a revelation, that is clearly given, should be obscurely recorded? To what purpose then, was the observation made? Made! why to introduce another. For, with our equivocal Examiner, the corruption of argument is the generation of observation. “ And yet (*says he*) as you intimate, there may be reasons why an OBSCURE REVELATION should be recorded, to wit, for the instruction of future ages, when the obscurity being cleared up by the event, it shall appear, that it was foreseen and foreordained in the knowledge and appointment of God.” p. 156.

What I intimated, was not concerning an *obscure revelation*, but a *revelation obscurely recorded*. These are two very different things, as appears from hence, that the latter may be a *clear revelation*, the word being relative to him to whom the revelation was made; but this is a peccadillo only. However, he approves the reason of *recording*; for that, thereby, “ it shall appear, that it was foreseen and foreordained by God.” It—what? the *obscure revelation*, according to grammatical construction: but, in his *English*, I suppose, it stands for the fact revealed. Well then; from the recording of an obscure revelation, he says it will appear, when the foretold fact happens, that it was foreseen and preordained by God. This too he tells the reader I intimated; but, if the reader will take my word, I never intimated any thing so foolish. For every fact, whether prefigured

and foretold, or not prefigured and foretold, must needs have been foreseen and preordained by God. Now, whether we are to attribute this to *exactness*, or to *inaccuracy* of expression, is hard to say. If to the former, it is to be considered as one of his arts, to get to a consequence which he immediately afterwards endeavours to deduce from it; which is, "that, as well on his sense " of the command, as on mine, a dependency between " the two dispensations may be deduced." And it is certain, that if that dependency arises from God's foreknowledge of the fact, he is much in the right; but that will be seen by and by. On the other hand, if it be an *inaccuracy*, as I am rather inclined to think; then it is plain he must mean *something else*; and that *something* might, perhaps, be this; that, from such a *record*, a real connexion might be proved between the Old and New Testament, arising from the EVIDENCE that God, in this commanded action, did INTEND to prefigure the sacrifice of *Christ*.—Just before, he had said, "he desired not " to be mistaken." p. 156. But this, let me tell him, is an unreasonable request, unless he *desired* too to be *understood*. And that he desires not this, is evident from his perpetual equivocations. However, we presume, we have here insinuated ourselves into his meaning. But if the reader now should ask how this makes for the point to be proved, namely, that "I might have spared myself in " asking the question, *Why, if revelations cannot be " clearly recorded, are they recorded at all?*" I must tell him, and let him not be surprised, that it was not designed to have any thing to do with the point to be proved, at all; but only to *produce* or give birth to another OBSERVATION; begot, as he well expresses it, UPON the foregoing putrid argumentation.—"UPON this " principle (*says he*) you must give me leave to OBSERVE, " that the transaction in question will have the same " efficacy to shew *the dependency between the two " dispensations*. Whether *Abraham* had thereby any " information of the sacrifice of *Christ* or not." p. 156. This, indeed, is saying something. And, could he prove it, would be depriving my interpretation of one of its principal uses. Let us see then how he goes about it. " For this does not arise from *Abraham's* KNOWLEDGE,

" or

“ or any body’s KNOWLEDGE, at the time when the  
 “ transaction happened, but from the similitude and cor-  
 “ respondency between the event and the transaction, by  
 “ which it was prefigured; which is exactly the same  
 “ upon either supposition.” pp. 156, 7. To this I answer  
 and say, 1. That I myself never supposed that the de-  
 pendency between the two dispensations did “ arise from  
 “ *Abraham’s* knowledge, or any body’s knowledge,” at  
 that or any other *time*; but from GOD’S INTENTION  
 that this commanded action should import or represent  
 the sacrifice of *Christ*: and then comes in the question  
 whether that *intention* be best discovered from God’s  
 declaration of it to *Abraham*, or from a similitude and  
 correspondency between this commanded action and the  
 sacrifice of *Christ*. Therefore, 2. I answer and say,  
 that a SIMILITUDE AND CORRESPONDENCY *between the*  
*event and the transaction which prefigured it*, is not  
 enough to shew this DEPENDENCY to the satisfaction of  
 unbelievers: who say, that a likeness between two things  
 of the same nature; such as the offering up two men to  
 death, though in different ways, and transacted in two  
 very distant periods, is not sufficient alone to shew that  
 they had any relation to one another\*. With the same  
 reason they will say, you might pretend that *Jephtha’s*  
 daughter, or the king of *Moab’s* son, whom the father  
 sacrificed on the wall †, were the types of *Christ’s* sacri-  
 fice. Give us, say they, a Bible-proof that God declared  
 or revealed his intention of prefiguring the death of *Jesus*;  
 or some better authority at least than a modern typifier,  
 who deals only in *similitudes* and *correspondences*.  
 Now whether it be our Examiner, or I, who have given  
 them this satisfaction, or whether they have any reason  
 to require it of us, is left to the impartial reader to  
 consider.

XIX. We now come to the UTILITY of my interpre-  
 tation of the command, having got through all his objec-  
 tions to its TRUTH. And here, the same civility and  
 candour which so polished and enlivened the foregoing  
 part, shine out again, in the very first words of this.

\* See what the Letter-writer abovementioned says, pp. 53, 54.  
 much to the same purpose.

† 2 Kings iii. 27.



“ And now, Sir, (*says he*) give me leave to ask, what service have you done to religion by your interpretation? We were prepared for it, by an intimation that something was to arise from it *to the confusion of infidelity*: As how? why first, as by your manner of explaining this transaction of *Abraham*, you should *illustrate God's truth by the noblest instance that ever was given of the harmony between the Old and New Testament.*” And 2dly, “ as by its aid you should be enabled to give the true solution of those inexplicable difficulties which have been so long the stumbling-block of infidelity.” p. 157.

And now he addresses himself to shew, that my interpretation has neither of these advantages. “ First, as to the harmony (*he says*) he has just above shewn that the transaction will be equally prophetic of *Christ's* sacrifice, whether my interpretation be admitted or not.” He hath shewn it indeed! as the *Irishman* shewed his —. And it is fresh in the reader's memory. Come we, then, to the second. “ As to the second (*says he*) the difficulties which have been so long the stumbling-block of infidelity, which upon the foot of the common interpretation you call *insuperable*; I greatly marvel that you should call them so, when you acknowledge, in the very same page, that the arguments hitherto brought to support the history of this command are of great weight and validity.” pp. 157, 8. He *marvels*! Why let him marvel. I suppose he never heard that there are *insuperable difficulties* even to some demonstrable propositions. But he, of all men, should have accepted my concession upon fair terms, since it was made to humour Divines like himself; who think it enough for religion if the objections to it be, as he warily expresses it, GUARDED AGAINST: (p. 137.) which, God knows! they often are, by arguments of no great weight or validity.

XX. However (*says he*) “ whether you had owned this or not, I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN UPON MYSELF THE PROOF that these insuperable difficulties may be very effectually and substantially removed, without borrowing any aid from your interpretation. The substance of the objection to the historic truth of this  
“ relation,

“relation, as collected by yourself\*, is this, *That God could never give such a command to Abraham, because it would throw him into inextricable doubts concerning the author of it; as whether it proceeded from a good or evil being—[because] it would mislead him in his notions of the Divine attributes, and of the fundamental principles of morality. For though the revoking the command prevented the homicide; yet the action being commanded, and, at the revocation, not condemned; Abraham and his family must needs have thought human sacrifices grateful to the Almighty. For a simple revoking was no condemnation; but would be more naturally esteemed a peculiar indulgence for ready obedience. Thus the Pagan fable of Diana’s substituting a hind in the place of Iphigenia, did not make idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred human sacrifices, they having before been persuaded of the contrary.*” p. 158. The objection, the reader sees, consists of two parts: the *one*, that *Abraham* must doubt of the author of the command: the *other*, that he would be misled concerning his attributes; or in the gratefulness of human sacrifices to him.

To the *first*, our Examiner answers, partly from what I myself had observed might be urged by believers, as of *great weight and validity*, and partly from what he had pickell up elsewhere. But here I shall avoid imitating his example, in endeavouring to shew the invalidity of arguments professedly brought in support of religion: an employment by no means becoming a Christian Divine. If they have any weak parts, I shall leave them to unbelievers to find out. I have the more reason too to trust them to their own *weight*, both as they are none of his, with whom only I have here to do, and as I have acknowledged their *validity*. All I shall observe is, that, as I had made that acknowledgment, I see not to what end they are urged against me; unless it were to entertain us with his common-place: which I should have received in silence, had he not affected to introduce it with so much pomp—“Whether you had

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. p. 80.

“owned this or not (*says he*) I should have taken upon myself the proof.” Whereas, all that he has *taken* is the property of others : made his *own*, indeed, by a weak and an imperfect representation.

But now he comes to the *second* part of the objection. “As to the latter part of the objection (*says he*) that from this command, *Abraham* and his family must needs have thought human sacrifices acceptable to God ; the revoking the command at last, was a sufficient guard against any such construction. To this you make the unbeliever answer : No ; because the action having been *commanded* ought to have been *condemned* ; and a simple *revocation* was no *condemnation*. But why was not the revocation of the command, in this case, a condemnation of the action ? If I should tempt you to go and kill your next neighbour, and afterwards come and desire you *not* to do it ; would not this *after-declaration* be as good an evidence of my dislike to the action, as the first was of my approbation of it ? Yes, and a *much better*, as it may be presumed to have been the result of *maturer* deliberation. Now though *deliberation* and *after-thought* are not incident to God ; yet as God in this case condescended (as you say, and very truly) to act after the *manner* of men ; the same *construction* should be put upon his actions, as are usually put upon the actions of *men* in like cases.” pp. 160, 161. Now, though, as was said above, I would pay all decent regard and reference that becomes a friend of Revelation, to the common arguments of *others* in its defence, yet I must not betray my *own*. I confessed they had great *weight and validity* ; yet, at the same time, I asserted, they were attended with *insuperable difficulties*. And while I so think, I must beg leave to enforce my reasons for this opinion. And, I hope, without offence ; as the arguments, I am now about to examine, are purely this writer’s own. And the reader has, by this time, seen too much of him to be apprehensive, that the lessening his authority will be attended with any great disservice to religion.

I had observed, that the reasonings of unbelievers on this case, as it is commonly explained, were not devoid  
of

of all plausibility, when they proceeded thus—That as *Abraham* lived amongst heathens, whose highest act of divine worship was human sacrifice; if God had commanded that act, and, on the point of performance, only remitted it as a favour (and so it is represented); without declaring the iniquity of the practice, when addressed to idols; or his abhorrence of it, when directed to himself; the family must have been misled in their ideas concerning the moral rectitude of that species of religious worship: therefore, God, in these circumstances, had he commanded the action as a *trial only*, would have explicitly condemned that mode as immoral. But he is not represented as condemning but as remitting it in *favour*: consequently, say the unbelievers, God did not command the action at all.—Now what says our Examiner, in *answer* to all this? He says,—“ But why? “ Was not the revocation of the command a condemnation of the action? If I should tempt you to go and “ kill your next neighbour, and afterwards come and “ *DESIRE* you not to do it, would not this after-declaration be as good an evidence of my dislike to the “ action, as the first was of my approbation of it?” To this I reply; that the cases are, by no means, parallel; either in themselves, or in their circumstances: 1st. Not in *themselves*. The murder of our next neighbour was, amongst all the Gentiles of that time, esteemed a high immorality; but, on the contrary, human sacrifices a very holy and acceptable part of divine worship. 2dly, Not in *their circumstances*. The *desire* to forbear the murder tempted to is (in the case *he* puts) represented as *repentance*: whereas the stop put to the sacrifice of *Isaac* is (in the case *Moses* puts) represented as *favour*.

But what follows I could wish (for the honour of modern theology) that the method I have observed would have permitted me to pass over in silence. “ Now, “ though deliberation and after-thought (*says he*) are “ not incident to God, yet, as God, in this case, condemned (as you say, and very truly) to act after the “ manner of men; the same construction should be put “ upon his actions, as are usually put upon the actions “ of men in like cases:” (pp. 155, 156.) *i. e.* though *deliberation* and *after-thought* are not incident to God;

yet you are to understand his actions, as if they were incident. A horrid interpretation! And yet his representation of the command and his decent illustration of it, by a *murder in intention*, will not suffer us to interpret it in any other manner. For God, as if in haste, and before due deliberation, is represented as commanding an immoral action; yet again, as it were by an *after-thought*, ordering it to be foreborn, by reason of its immorality. And in what is all this impious jargon founded? If you will believe our Examiner; on the principle I laid down, *That God condescends to act after the manner of men*. I have all along had occasion to complain of his misrepresenting my *principles*. But they were principles he *disliked*. And this the modern management of controversy has sanctified. But here, though the principle be approved, he yet cannot forbear misrepresenting it. So bad a thing is an evil habit. Let me tell him therefore, that by the principle of *God's condescending to act after the manner of men*, is not meant, that he ever acts in compliance to those vices and superstitions, which arise from the depravity of human *will*: but in conformity only to men's indifferent manners and customs; and to those usages which result only from the finite imperfections of their nature. Thus though, as in the case before us, God was pleased, in conformity to their mode of information, to use their custom of revoking a command; yet he never condescended to imitate (as our Examiner supposes) the irresolution, the repentance, and horrors of conscience of a *murderer in intention*. Which (gracious heaven!) is the parallel this Divine brings to illustrate the command to *Abraham*. But he had read that God is sometimes said to *repent*; and he thought, I suppose, it answered to that repentance which the stings of conscience sometimes produce in bad men. Whereas it is said, in conformity to a good magistrate's or parent's correction of vice, first to threaten punishment; and then, on the offender's amendment, to remit it.

XXI. But he goes on without any signs of remorse. "Nor will the Pagan fable of *Diana's* substituting a hind in the place of *Iphigenia* at all help your unbeliever. This did not, say they, OR YOU FOR THEM,

“make idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred human sacrifices. But do not they themselves, or have not you assigned a very proper and sufficient reason why it did, viz. that they had been *before persuaded of the contrary*? Where human sacrifices make a part of the settled standing religion; the refusal to accept a human sacrifice in one instance may, indeed, be rather looked upon as a particular indulgence, than as a declaration against the thing in gross. But where the thing was commanded but in one single instance, and the command revoked in that very instance (which is our present case), such revocation in all reasonable construction is as effectual a condemnation of the thing, as if God had told *Abraham*, in so many words, that he delighted not in human sacrifices.” p. 161. To come to our Examiner’s half-buried sense, we are often obliged to remove, or at least to sift well, the rubbish of his words. He says, the *revocation* was an *effectual condemnation*. This may either signify, that *men now free from the prejudices of Pagan superstition* may see that human sacrifices were condemned by the revocation of the command: or, that *Abraham’s family* could see this. In the first sense, I have nothing to do with his proposition; and in the second, I shall take the liberty to deny it was an *effectual condemnation*. With how good reason let the reader judge.

*Abraham*, for the great ends of God’s providence, was called out of an idolatrous city, infected, as all such cities then were, with this horrid superstition. He was himself an idolater, as appears from the words of *Joshua*—*Your fathers dwelt on the other side of the flood in old time, even Terah the father of Abraham, and the father of Nachor: and THEY served other gods. And I took your father Abraham\**, &c. God, in the act of calling him, instructed him in the unity of his nature, and the error of Polytheism: as the great principle, for the sake of which (and to preserve it in one family amidst an universal overflow of idolatry) he was called out. That he must be prejudiced in favour of his country superstitions, is not to be doubted; because it is of

\* Josh. xxiv. 2, 3.

human nature itself to be so : and yet we find no particular instruction given him, concerning the superstition in question. Further, the noble Author of the *Characteristics* observes, that “ it appears that he was under no extreme “ surprise on this trying revelation ; nor did he think of “ expostulating in the least on this occasion ; when at “ another time he could be so importunate for the pardon “ of an inhospitable, murderous, impious, and incestuous “ city \*.” Insinuating hereby, that this kind of sacrifice was a thing he had been accustomed to : now the noble Author observes this, upon the *Examiner’s*, that is, the *common* interpretation. And I believe, on that footing, he, or a better writer, would find it difficult to enervate the observation. Whereas I have shewn (in the place from whence I have here quoted it) that it falls together with *that* interpretation.

Well ; *Abraham* is now in the land of *Canaan* ; and again surrounded with the same idolatrous and inhuman sacrificers. Here he receives the command : and, on the point of performance, has it countermanded as a *FAVOUR*. A circumstance, in the revocation, which I must beg the *Examiner’s* leave to insist upon ; especially when I find him so slippery as, at every turn, to forget it ; that is, to pass it over in silence, without either owning or denying. As indeed, the little support his general argument has, in any place, is only by keeping truth out of sight. But further, the *favour* was *unaccompanied* with any instruction concerning the moral nature of this kind of sacrifice ; a practice never positively forbidden but by the Law of *Moses*. Now, in this case, I would ask any candid reader, the least acquainted with human nature, whether *Abraham* and his family, prejudiced as they were in favour of human sacrifices (the one, by his education in his country religion ; the other, by their communication with their Pagan neighbours, and, as appears by Scripture, but too apt to fall into idolatry) would not be naturally tempted to think as favourably of human sacrifices as those Pagans were, who understood that *Diana* required *Iphigenia* ; though she accepted a hind in her stead. And with such readers, I, finally, leave it.

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. p. 37.

XXII. Our Examiner having now shewn, first, That my interpretation is not founded in *truth*—Secondly, That it is productive of no *utility*: he comes, in good time, to the third and last part of his *Herculean* labour, to shew, that it makes *matters worse than I found them*: which, in other words, we shall find, will amount to this—That the *common* interpretation agrees with *his system*; but that *mine* does not: which *system*, by the known courtesy of controversy, you are to permit him to call the *word of God*.

“ This, Sir, (*says he*) is the substance of what has  
 “ been or may be offered, in answer to the objections  
 “ propounded upon the common foot of interpretation.  
 “ Let us now see what *your* interpretation affords that is  
 “ better. You say then; That *the command could*  
 “ *occasion no mistakes concerning the divine attri-*  
 “ *butes, because it was only the conveyance of an*  
 “ *information by action instead of words; in confor-*  
 “ *mity to the common mode of conversing in early*  
 “ *times. This action therefore being more scenery,*  
 “ *and, like words, only of arbitrary signification; it*  
 “ *had no moral import; but the formality of that*  
 “ *action, which has no moral import, is seen no way*  
 “ *to affect the moral character of the author.*—All  
 “ this, Sir, is admitted.” Very well, proceed. “ In  
 “ your way of reckoning, the command had no moral  
 “ import; for nothing was intended to be done to  
 “ *Abraham’s* hurt or prejudice; who, as you tell us,  
 “ very well understood—*how the scenical representa-*  
 “ *tation was to end;—and must needs conclude—*  
 “ *either that God would stop his hand when he came*  
 “ *to give the sacrificing stroke; or that—his son,*  
 “ *sacrificed in the person of Christ, was IMMEDIATELY*  
 “ *to be restored to life.* This solution, no doubt,  
 “ clears up every thing as to *Abraham*; and conse-  
 “ quently removes *one* part of the objection, which says;  
 “ that God could not give such a command, because it  
 “ inferred a violation of the natural law.” pp. 161, 162.

Here certainly I can complain of nothing but my ill fortune. This is the first time the Examiner has pleased to own that I *have* removed an objection. And now, instead of rejoicing in the honour he does me, I have a  
 scruple



scruple of conscience about accepting it. And my case is this. He says I have *removed* it upon this principle of mine, *that the command had no moral import*. But, alas! in crossing the proverb, and *looking*, as it were, *into his mouth*, (for there his words have their birth, and not from his *heart*) I find he foully mistakes the meaning of the *principle*; and, what is worse, seems to give his own wrong meaning to me. "In your way of reckoning, the command had no moral import; for nothing was intended to be done to *Abraham's* hurt or prejudice." But as near as he thinks himself to me, he is a mile from the reason. The reason why I say it had no moral import, was, not because *nothing was done to Abraham's hurt or prejudice*; Alas! No: but because the act commanded was, both in the *intention* of God, and in the *knowledge* of *Abraham*, a mere *scenical representation*, and not a *religious sacrifice*: for that a *scenical* representation has nothing of that *moral import* which belongs to the *thing* represented. Let the gift, then, go current or not, just as the reader pleases. I find I have little reason to be anxious about its value, and less to be proud of the honour: for he immediately subjoins, "But as this solution removes one difficulty, it creates another." What, another in favour of infidelity! No. But concerning *Abraham's merit in obedience*. Yet his purpose is here to shew, that my *interpretation* can do nothing against an infidel *objection*; which, were it not for *his answers*, that, as he well expresses it, stand *guard* over them, might run nobody knows whither. So that still, by his own confession, my interpretation has removed one of the strongest infidel objections. However, as I would not before accept this honour at the expence of truth; so neither will I now at the expence of *Abraham's* character. Let us enquire, therefore, into this new-created difficulty. "It is (*says he*) that the command will not stand with the notion of a trial, in *one* point, in which the history itself intimates it was intended as such. You tell us; that *Abraham*, in expressing his extreme readiness to obey, declared a full confidence in the promises of God; which is very true. But you say nothing of his *virtue*, i. e. of his *patience* and self-

"denial;

“*denial*; of which, yet, this command was intended as a  
 “trial. The very words of the command shew this. *Take*  
 “*now thy son, thine ONLY son Isaac, whom thou*  
 “*lovest*. Here are two things pointed at, as standing  
 “in the way to hinder *Abraham* from obeying this com-  
 “mand. 1. The assurances which God had given him,  
 “that *Isaac* should be the heir of the promises; for  
 “*Isaac* was *Abraham*’s ONLY son, not by *birth* but by  
 “*promise*. 2. His *natural paternal* affection. The  
 “first difficulty his *faith* was to remove; the *second* was  
 “to be conquered by his *resolution* and *fortitude*.  
 “But where, I ask, was *Abraham*’s *resolution*; if he  
 “knew, either that God would not suffer the command  
 “to be put in execution; or if he did, that he should  
 “*instantly* be restored to him? *Resolution* is shewed  
 “by bearing *hard* things; but on neither of these sup-  
 “positions had *Abraham* any thing in expectation, by  
 “which he could be a sufferer.” p. 163. And now we  
 see how *willingly* he was misled, when he mistook my  
 reason, why the action had no moral import; and say-  
 ing, it was because nothing was intended to be *done to*  
*Abraham*’s *hurt or prejudice*. For it was preparatory  
 to what he here undertakes to shew, that, according to  
 my interpretation, *Abraham* had no room to exercise his  
 paternal affection; that being what he drives at by all his  
 round-about words. But to proceed. He says, “You  
 “tell us that *Abraham*, in expressing his extreme rea-  
 “diness to obey, declared a full confidence in the pro-  
 “mises of God. But you say nothing of his virtue;  
 “*i. e.* of his *PATIENCE* and *SELF-DENIAL*, of WHICH  
 “THIS COMMAND WAS INTENDED AS A TRIAL.” He  
 says very true I said nothing of it, and the reason was  
 (not that I thought he had them not, but) because holy  
 Scripture *says nothing of them*\*. But he tells me,  
 though Scripture *said nothing*, it *pointed* to them. And  
 so did I, if he goes to that. Indeed, I neither *said* nor  
*pointed at* any thing so absurd, as that *the command*  
*was intended as a trial of his patience and self-denial*,  
 because Scripture represents it as a trial of his faith  
 only. BY FAITH ABRAHAM WHEN HE WAS TRIED

\* See what the Letter-writer has very pertinently replied to this purpose, p. 72.

*offered up Isaac*, says the author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*. But I won't promise what I shall not do for the future. I think it deserves to be *pointed at*. But he says I speak of *Abraham's faith*, and say nothing of his *virtue*. It is commonly said, indeed, that *patience is a virtue*; but it is as true that *faith* is one also. Though he may be in the number of those subtle schoolmen the Poet speaks of, for aught I know,

“Who *faith* and *virtue*, sense and reason split,  
With all the rash dexterity of wit.”

Yet, for all this, I own, that the great *merit* of *Abraham's faith* implied in it *patience* and *self-denial*. Let us hear then how I have lessened these virtues. Why then “hear (*says our Examiner*) what the “Author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* says; who best “understood this matter. *By faith*, Abraham *when* “*he was tried, offered up Isaac*; and *he that had re-* “*ceived the promises, offered up his only begotten* “*son*; of *whom it was said, that in Isaac shall thy* “*seed be called*; *accounting, that God was able to* “*raise him up even from the dead*. Heb. xi. 17, 18, 19. “It is in the nature of the thing, necessary to be sup- “posed; that *Abraham* was firmly persuaded, *either*, “that God would revoke the command; *or*, that he “would raise up his son from the dead; for otherwise “the promise could never stand. The Apostle tells you “*precisely*, which of these he believed; *viz.* that it was, “that God would raise *Isaac* from the dead. And this “agrees with the character that the Scripture gives of “*Abraham's faith*; his believing AGAINST HOPE, *i. e.* “against all the appearances or probabilities of human “things. When *Isaac* was born, he received him *from* “*the dead*; *i. e.* from a *dead womb*. Supposing him “slain, he believed that he should again receive him “*from the dead*; and this again was believing AGAINST “HOPE; for one was as much against the natural course “of things, as the other. But pray observe this, Sir; “the Apostle does not say, that *Abraham* accounted “that God would raise his son INSTANTLY. He might “(for aught *Abraham* knew, or had any reason to hope “to the contrary) be FOR EVER lost TO HIM; though “he

“ he was assured he could not be so lost as that the  
 “ promise of God should fail ; upon which foot, there  
 “ will be room left for all that disturbance from passion  
 “ and natural affection, which every father feels upon  
 “ the loss of a beloved child ; and consequently, matter  
 “ left for the exercise of his virtue. It suits best indeed,  
 “ with your hypothesis, to say, that *Abraham* believed  
 “ that his son should be raised INSTANTLY. For if this  
 “ whole transaction was a scenical representation, to  
 “ inform *Abraham* of the sacrifice of *Christ* ; and if  
 “ this (as you say,\*) was the *principal design of the*  
 “ *command* ; the *information* once given, the *scenery*  
 “ ought to be at an end. And this is one reason, among  
 “ others, why I cannot believe your account to be the  
 “ true one ; because it destroys the force and virtue of  
 “ the command, considered as a trial of *Abraham’s*  
 “ *resolution* and *self-denial* ; which nevertheless, the  
 “ very history plainly intimates to us, it was intended to  
 “ be.” pp. 163—165.

But now when I thought he was going to prove that  
*Abraham* had these virtues of *patience* and *self-denial*,  
 he is got upon quite another scent ; and has started two  
 other virtues, his *resolution* and his *fortitude*.—“ The  
 “ first difficulty his faith was to remove ; the second was  
 “ to be conquered by his RESOLUTION and FORTITUDE.”  
 But what must be *my difficulty* all this while, who have  
 to do with such a writer ! Shall I examine what he says  
 to *Abraham’s patience and self-denial* ? Come on  
 then. But now they are of a sudden turned to *resolu-*  
*tion* and *fortitude* ! Shall I seize upon his *resolution*  
 and *fortitude* ? In vain. Before he gets to the end  
 of his argument, they are changed into *resolution* and  
*self-denial*. “ The command (*he says*) is to be con-  
 “ sidered as a trial of *Abraham’s* RESOLUTION and SELF-  
 “ DENIAL.” And so the two pair of virtues, *patience*  
 and *self-denial*, and *resolution* and *fortitude*, have  
 fairly compromised the matter. And at last it is agreed,  
 as in a Whig and Tory election, that *resolution* and  
*self-denial* shall stand each for the other’s representative.  
 Matters therefore being now well settled, here we shall  
 leave them. For there is the same reverence due to the

nonsense of great writers, as the honest translator of *Sallust* has taught us to be due to the *corruption* of great ministers. Therefore, what he says of this latter quality may not be unfitly applied to the former, that "what sounds like nonsense may not be nonsense: and "it is not so much the act, as the characters of men "that constitute it\*."—But as I can make nothing of his words, I will try to pick out his meaning; which, after all, seems to accuse me of leaving *Abraham* neither *patience* nor *self-denial*: and is founded in this, that, according to the common interpretation, as *Abraham* did not know when *Isaac* would be restored to him, "there was room left for all that disturbance "from passion and natural affection, which every father "feels upon the loss of a beloved child; and consequently exercise for his virtue." But on my interpretation (that *Abraham* knew his son must be soon restored to him) there was no room, it seems, for the exercise of these virtues. And now, what is here worth answering? In both cases *Abraham's faith* had the same trial. And this is allowed. And had not his *paternal affection*? In neither case did he know, but that his son was to receive the sacrificing stroke. And was not the paternal affection, as much interested in receiving him to life after three days, as after three years? Supposing, (as is granted) that his *faith* in God's promises was exactly the same in both cases. How then does the reader think our Examiner supports his chicane? How? but in that way all chicane is supported. By representing *both cases* falsely. Under the common interpretation, he represents it thus,—"*Isaac* might (for aught *Abraham* "knew, or had any reason to hope to the contrary) be "FOR EVER LOST TO HIM." And he tells me, "it suits "best with my hypothesis, to say that *Abraham* believed "that his son should be raised INSTANTLY." pp. 164, 165. I know of nothing that *suits* so well with my hypothesis as truth; nor nothing so ill with it, as our Examiner's understanding. What shall I say! Or rather what shall I not say. O *patience*! I feel thou art a *virtue*, as

\* "What sounds like corruption may not be corruption; and "it is not so much the act, as the characters of men that constitute it." Gord. Transl. of *Sall. Pol. Disc.* p. 97.

our Examiner truly calls thee.—What? do not those very words of Scripture, of which the Examiner serves himself in support of the common interpretation, *accounting that God was able to raise him up even from the dead*, imply, in all common construction, that *Abraham accounted*, or believed, or had *reason to hope*, that *Isaac was NOT FOR EVER LOST TO HIM?* But it could not be otherwise even upon our Examiner's own interpretation, who in p. 148, makes the *receiving from the dead* an allusion to the dead womb of *Sarah*; for, according to this sense, which, he tells us, he *prefers* to any other, the writer of the *epistle to the Hebrews* could never suppose (whatever our Examiner does) that *Abraham* might fear that *Isaac* would be *for ever lost to him*. For the argument, according to his conception of the Apostle's sense, runs thus,—*Abraham* received *Isaac* out of *Sarah's* dead womb; so he hoped to receive him again from the ashes of the sacrifice. Thus does this Examiner, at every turn, forget his own principles: or, rather, having no principles of his own, he perceives not that he takes the contradictory principles of others. Again, does not my interpretation, which supposes that *Abraham* well understood that this commanded action was a scenical representation of *Christ's* sacrifice on the cross, necessarily imply that *Abraham* knew no more than that, as the Redeemer of Mankind could not lie under the power of the grave; so, his representative, even though he received the sacrificing stroke, would not? Should he, therefore, have so prevaricated as to insinuate, that I used the word *instantly* in the sense of momentarily; when my argument shews I used it in opposition to a distant time? If the stroke had been given, we know, it could not have been till the third day at least. And in this time I hope there was “room enough left for all “that disturbance from passion and natural affection “which every father feels upon the loss of a beloved “child.” pp. 164, 165.

After all this, could the *candid* or *sensible* reader conceive it possible that our Examiner should end his argument in the following strain? “So that in taking “one handle away from unbelievers, you have given “them another. For if, upon the foot of the common

- “ interpretation, they think they see a violation of the  
 “ natural law ; they may, upon your interpretation,  
 “ alledge an inconsistency of the Scriptures with them-  
 “ selves: and I apprehend, Sir, that it is a much easier  
 “ thing to shew that the command carries no violation of  
 “ the natural law, the common interpretation admitted ;  
 “ than it will be to reconcile your hypothesis to the  
 • “ Scripture account of this matter. So much has Chris-  
 “ tianity *gained* by your interpretation !” p. 165.—But  
 I leave him to the reader’s mercy.

- XXIII. “ But this is not the greatest difficulty you  
 “ have to account for (*says he*). The objection relates  
 “ not to *Abraham* only, but also to his *family*; who (as  
 “ you have made your unbeliever say) *MUST NEEDS*  
 “ *have thought human sacrifices acceptable to God*;  
 “ because the action was not *formally condunned* at the  
 “ *revocation* of the command. I do think, Sir, that it  
 “ would be a very considerable objection to this history ;  
 “ if it did give any reasonable encouragement to the  
 “ belief, that human sacrifices were acceptable to God ;  
 “ and I have given my reason why I think it cannot give  
 “ any such encouragement ; which is that, in this case,  
 “ the revocation of the command, without any formal  
 “ condemnation of the action, is sufficient to guard  
 “ against any such abuse. Whether you agree with me  
 “ in this principle, or whether you are of the infidel side  
 “ of the question in this particular point, you have not  
 “ told us ; nor shall I take upon me to guess. But you  
 “ are fully persuaded, that, upon your hypothesis, the  
 • “ objection is entirely removed. Your words are these ;  
 “ *There was not the least occasion, when God remitted*  
 “ *the offering of Isaac, that he should formally condemn*  
 “ *human sacrifices, to prevent Abraham, OR HIS FAMI-*  
 “ *LY’S falling into an opinion, that such sacrifices were*  
 “ *not displeasing to him—For the command, having, as*  
 “ *we said, no moral import ; being only an information by*  
 “ *action, where one thing stood for the representative of*  
 “ *another ; all the consequence that could be deduced*  
 “ *from it was only this ; that the Son of God should be*  
 “ *offered up for the sins of mankind: therefore the con-*  
 “ *ceptions THEY [Abraham, viz. AND HIS FAMILY] had*  
 “ *of human sacrifices after the command, must needs be*  
 “ just

“just the same which they had before; and there-  
 fore, instruction concerning the execrable nature of  
 human sacrifices was not only needless, but quite  
 beside the question\*. I can easily understand, Sir,  
 how the matter stood with *Abraham*; and that he  
 was in no danger of being misled, as to the nature of  
 human sacrifices, who knew the secret of the whole  
 affair; and that it was nothing else but *scenery*. But  
 how this answer will serve for *his family*; who are to  
 be presumed to have known nothing of this *scenical*  
*representation*, is utterly past my comprehension. I  
 say that the *family of Abraham must be presumed to*  
*have known nothing* of this *scenical representation*;  
 because you have told us from the very first, that the  
 information to be conveyed by it was intended for  
*Abraham’s sole use*; and I do not see how *Abraham*  
 could open to his family the *scenery* of the transaction,  
 without explaining the *mystery*. Accordingly, your  
 answer, in this very passage, imports, that *Abraham’s*  
*family, as well as himself, were acquainted with this*  
*mystery*; for you say that *all the consequence that*  
*could be deduced from this transaction was, that the*  
*Son of God should be offered up for the sins of man-*  
*kind*. All the consequence that could be deduced!  
 By whom? Why, by the *family of Abraham*; for to  
 them, as well as to *Abraham*, does the inference, which  
 you immediately subjoin, belong—THEREFORE the  
 conceptions they had of human sacrifices must needs  
 be just the same, &c. But is not your putting the  
 family of *Abraham* in possession of this consequence  
 a very plain declaration, that they knew the mystery  
 of *Christ’s* sacrifice! Now therefore, Sir, take your  
 choice, and give up one part of your hypothesis, or the  
 other, as best pleases you; for to hold both is impos-  
 sible. If you say that the family of *Abraham* were  
 acquainted with the mystery of *Christ’s* sacrifice; it  
 will overturn all you have said concerning their igno-  
 rance of a future state: for to what purpose the Son  
 of God was to be offered up for the sins of mankind,  
 if no life is to be expected after this, it is impossible  
 to comprehend. It likewise overturns the single

\* Div. Leg. vol. vi. pp. 33, 34.



“reason you have given why the *explanation* (usual in all such cases) to shew the *import* of the transaction was not added, viz. that it was a point *not fit for common knowledge*. But if you shall chuse to say, that the revelation of this mystery, was for the *SOLE* information of *Abraham*, and that *his family* knew nothing of it (which I think you *must* say, to make your interpretation good), the objection will lie full against you, unanswered. For upon this supposition, *they* must have considered this transaction, not in your *artificial*, *hidden* light, but in its *apparent*, *natural* light; and the construction in favour of human sacrifices must have been the *very same*, as if no such representation as you speak of had been intended.” pp. 165—168.

“Whether (*says he*) you agree with me, or ARE OF THE INFIDEL SIDE OF THE QUESTION.” A dire dilemma! to which he reduces all his adversaries. *Agree* not with him, and you are at once on the *infidel side of the question*.

“Qui meprise Cotin, n'estime point son Roi,

“Et n'a, selon Cotin, ni Dieu, ni foi, ni loi.

But if this be my alternative, *sit anima mea cum philosophis*, as was said on the like occasion; they are much the better company.—I believed that an infidel objection to the command to *Abraham*, on the common interpretation of it, had weight; and I explain the force of it, in order to remove it; and to excite other defenders of Revelation to consider it: for which, it seems, I am of the *infidel side of the question*.

I had said, that the command was for *Abraham's sole use*; and “therefore (*he says*) that the family of *Abraham* must be presumed to know nothing of this scenical representation.” Notwithstanding this, *I presume* they *did know* it. Here he takes me in a flagrant contradiction. But did he indeed not see that where I spoke of its being given for *Abraham's sole use*, I was opposing it, (as the course of my argument required), not to the family which lived under his tents, but to the *Jewish* people, when the history of the transaction was recorded\*.—And now  
having

\* Here the Letter-writer, so often mentioned before, is quite scandalized; and cannot forbear breaking out at p. 77.—“I declare  
“ it,

having exposed his wrong conclusion from *my* words, let us consider next the wrong conclusion he draws from *his own*. "I do not see (*says he*) how *Abraham* could open 'to his family the scenery of the transaction without "explaining the mystery." What does he mean by, "open the scenery of the transaction?" There are two senses of this ambiguous expression; it may signify, either *explaining the moral of the scenery*; or simply, *telling his family that the transaction was a scenical representation*. He could not here use the phrase in the first sense, because he makes *explaining the mystery* a thing different from *opening the scenery*. He must mean it then in the latter. But could not *Abraham* tell his family, that this was a *scenical representation*, without *explaining the mystery*? I don't know what should hinder him, unless it were a charm. If he had the free use of speech, I think, he might, in the transports of his joy, on his return home, tell his wife, "that God had "ordered him to sacrifice his son, and that he had carried "him to Mount *Moriah*, in obedience to the Divine "command, where a ram was accepted in his stead. "But that the whole was a mere scenical representation, "or figure, of a mysterious transaction which God had "ordained to come to pass in the latter ages of the "world." And I suppose when he had once told his wife, the family would soon hear of it. Now could they not understand, what was meant by a *scenical representation*, as well when he told them it was to prefigure a *mystery*, as if he had told them it was to prefigure the *Crucifixion of Jesus*? The explanation, here given, had I no other way of blunting his dilemma (for if I escape his *contradiction*, he has set his *dilemma*, which, he says, 'tis impossible I should avoid) had I nothing else, I say, 'tis very likely I should have insisted upon this: but there  
are

"it, if you be Dr. S—, I am perfectly astonished at you." But so am not I. The good man knows nothing of the contagion of controversy. He seems to have studied his profession with an intent only of coming to the truth; and he speaks from the heart. His whole pamphlet is a learned and well-argued performance: and if he has been more attentive to the force of his reasoning than to the ornaments of his language, the lovers of truth have the more to thank him for, as he gives her to them undressed, and puts a gloss upon nothing.

are more ways than one of taking him by his horns. "Now therefore (*says he*) take your choice, and give "up one part of your hypothesis or the other, as best "pleases you; FOR TO HOLD BOTH IS IMPOSSIBLE. "If you say that the family of *Abraham* were acquainted "with the mystery, it will overturn all you said concern- "ing their ignorance of a future state.—But if you shall "chuse to say that the revelation of the mystery was for "the sole information of *Abraham*, and that his family "knew nothing of it, then—the construction in favour of "human sacrifices must have been the very same as if no "such representation, as you speak of, had been intended." I desire to know where it is that I spoke ANY THING concerning *Abraham's family's ignorance of a future state*; and therefore call upon him, for the *sixth and last time*, to name the place. But, I am afraid, something is wrong here again: and that, by *Abraham's family*, he means the *Israelites under Moses's policy*. For, with regard to them, I did indeed say that the gross body of the people were ignorant of a future state. But then I supposed them equally ignorant of the true import of the command to *Abraham*. But, if, by *Abraham's family*, he means, as every man does, who means honestly, *those who resided with him under his tents*, I suppose them indeed acquainted with the true import of the command; but then, at the same time, not ignorant of a future state. Thus what our Examiner had pronounced IMPOSSIBLE, was, it seems, all the while very possible. And, in spite of his dilemma, *both parts of the hypothesis* were at peace. I can hardly think him so grossly immoral as to have put this trick upon his reader with design; I rather think it was some confused notion concerning the Popish virtue of TRADITION (that trusty conveyancer of truth) which led him into all this absurdity; and made him conclude, that what *Abraham's family* once knew, their posterity could never forget. Though the *written word* tells us, that when *Moses* was sent to redeem this posterity from bondage, they remembered so little of God's *revelations* to their forefathers, that they knew nothing even of his *nature*.

XXIV. Our Examiner now concludes his Considerations (which we have quoted word for word in order as they

they lie, without curtailing or abridging) in this manner. "Thus, Sir, it appears, that what was *well* before, comes out *bad*, from under your hands. Which confirms to me what I have often thought; that *experiments* in religion are seldom good for any thing. The truth of this whole case, appears to me in this plain light. God called *Abraham* to this great trial; to make him an example of *faith* and *resignation*. *Abraham* obeys God's call; under a full persuasion that his son was *lost* to him; and yet as fully assured that the promises of God should not fail. In this view he *is* an example of *both*; and thus much the Scriptures *warrant*. We, who see the *resemblance* between this case, and God's requiring his only Son to be offered up as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world, rightly say, that the *one* was intended to be the *figure* of the *other*. But whether *Abraham* knew any thing at all of *Christ's sacrifice*; or whether he knew *nothing*; the Scripture is *wholly silent*; and you ought to have been silent too. It is fit for *us* to stop where the *Scripture* stops—and let *infidelity* do its worst." p. 169.

"What was well before, comes out bad," it seems, "under my hand;" which *confirms* him in a "Thought he often had, THAT EXPERIMENTS IN RELIGION ARE SELDOM GOOD FOR ANY THING." By the way, though, this seems but an odd compliment to the many fine *experiments*, which a great Prelate of his acquaintance has made in religion. However, that he *often had this thought*, I do not at all doubt. The thing I least expected was, that he should venture to *tell his thoughts*. But, in the paroxysm of *answering*, out it came; and from a man not the best formed by nature *aperto vivere voto*. Writers, indeed, have differed much how these EXPERIMENTS should be made. Some would have *Scripture alone* employed in making them: others were for taking in *fathers* and *councils*; and some again for applying *raillery* and *ridicule* to the work. But I know of no Protestant till our Examiner, who ever talked against the thing itself. That language had been now, for near two hundred years, confined to the walls of the Inquisition. For what is *making experiments in religion*, but illustrating it by new arguments, arising from new discoveries

coveries made of the harmony in God's various dispensations to mankind; just as philosophers unfold nature, by new enquiries into the contents of bodies? No EXPERIMENTS, is the language indeed of POLITICIANS (for in some things bigotry and politics agree; as extremes run easily into one another, by their very endeavour to keep at distance) because, according to the politician's creed, *religion* being useful to the state, and yet not founded in truth, all *inquiries* tend, not to confirm, but to unsettle, this necessary support of civil government. But can a man who believes religion to have come from God, use this language! If he pretends to believe, and will yet talk at so scandalous a rate, let me ask him, how it comes to pass, that *experiments*, which do such service in our advancement in the knowledge of *nature*, should succeed so ill in religion? Are not both equally the works of God? Were not both given to be the subject of human contemplation? Have not both, as proceeding from the Great Master of the Universe, their depths and darknesses? And does not the unveiling the secrets of his *Providence* tend equally with the unveiling the secrets of his *workmanship*, to the advancement of his glory? Have not the wisdom and goodness of God been wonderfully displayed, in these latter ages, to the confusion of *Atheism*, by some noble experiments made in nature? And why should not the same wisdom and goodness be equally displayed, to the confusion of *Deism*, by experiments made in religion? I believe I should not be accused of vanity, even by our Examiner himself in his better mood, should I venture to appeal to *The Divine Legation* itself, for the POSSIBILITY of the thing: for he has been graciously pleased to allow, that "what I " have said of converse being maintained by actions as " well as by words, is very just; and that the instances " I have produced from Scripture, where actions have " been used as foreshewing the determinations of Provi- " dence, are beyond all exception." p. 153. Now here, I presume, his modesty will confess, that I have taught him something *new*; both in the principle, and in the following application of it to the primary and secondary sense of prophecies. But if ever there was an *experiment* made in religion, this was one; it being deduced from a  
careful

careful *analysis* of the several various modes of human communication. In a word, had no *experiments* been made in *nature*, we had still slept in the ignorance and error of *school-philosophy*: and had *none* been made in *religion*, we had still been groping about, and stumbling in the darkness and superstition of *school-divinity*. For, what were they, but *experiments in religion*, made by a *Wickliff*, a *Cranmer*, a *Calvin*, an *Erasmus*, a *Hooker*, that rescued us from that darkness and superstition? Or is making experiments, like making gunpowder, a monopoly? that none are to be intrusted with it, in *religion*, but great names, and Fathers of the Church; and none, in *nature*, but *Fellows of the Society*. The worst mischief they ever do is, now and then, blowing up an indiscreet Divine, when he comes too near, and tramples upon them with security and contempt. To repay our Examiner, therefore, one secret for another; I will tell him what I have *often thought*, and what his own words *confirm*, "That he who can talk in this manner, "whatever face he may put on, must needs have his "doubts and fears about the truth of that religion which "he so peevishly defends."—"Abraham (*says he*) obeys "God's call under a FULL PERSUASION that his Son was "lost to him." So! the doubt is now determined. Before, it was only "That *Isaac* might, for aught "*Abraham* knew, be for ever lost to him." But this it is for a writer to have a *full persuasion* both of himself and his reader.

"WE who SEE (*says he*) the RESEMBLANCE between "this case [*the action commanded*] and God's requiring "his only Son to be offered up as a sacrifice, for the "sins of the whole world, RIGHTLY say, that the one was "intended to be the figure of the other." These *seers* by *resemblance* into facts, are like the *seers* by *second-sight* into futurity: that is to say, equally under the power of the imagination; which, whatever light it may afford to them, yet leaves their *readers* still in the dark. As to this *seeing by resemblance* in particular, the reader may, if he pleases, consult the *XVIIth Remark* for all that is necessary to be said on that subject.

"But whether *Abraham* (*says he*) knew any thing at "all of *Christ's* sacrifice, or whether he knew nothing,  
"the

“the Scripture is wholly silent: AND YOU OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN SILENT TOO.” To this I reply, in the *first* place, that the reason why I was *not silent*, was, because Scripture itself was *not silent*; but, in the words of *Jesus*, declared, that *Abraham* did know of *Christ*’s sacrifice. *Secondly*, I do not see why, even though Scripture had been *silent*, *I ought to have been silent too*. Scripture is silent concerning the *substance* of the *Son*. But so are not you; who, I make no doubt, declare at least, that he is of *one substance with the Father*. And why do you so? Because (you will say, and you will say true) that, although this proposition be not expressed in the Bible, in so many words; yet it is to be deduced from *Scripture-doctrine*, by the most known principles of philosophy and logic. Why then will you not allow *me* the benefit of the same answer, in the present case.—But in another mood he can be angry with me for being silent where Scripture is silent. And for not speaking out when that only gives a sign. “You say nothing (*says he*) of *Abraham*’s virtue, his patience and self-denial, yet Scripture POINTS AT them.”

But “It is fit (*he says*) for us to stop where the Scripture stops.”—With how good a grace, and how pertinently too, this maxim may be, sometimes, applied; I shall beg leave to observe; that, with regard to the *fundamental* points of the *Christian* faith, it is, indeed, fit we should stop where the *NEW TESTAMENT* stops; because that is able to *make us wise unto salvation*; and because there is now no reasonable expectation of any further revelation of God’s will to us, that shall refer to this, and be explanatory of it. But with regard to an *historical* passage, told obscurely (for the wise ends of God’s dispensations, which opened gradually upon mankind) in the *OLD TESTAMENT*, to which the *New* refers and is explanatory; there, I hope, we may *go on*, without presumption, to shew how, from such a passage, may be demonstrated the real connexion and dependency between the two covenants. Yet, by the strangest perversity, there are men who will not stop in the first case; and, in the second, will not go forward. But whatever our Examiner’s *notions* be; it is plain, he took his *expressions* from somebody who applied the maxim to a *maker of new*

*new fundamentals.* For such a one, only, it is seen to fit. "In conclusion (*says he*) LET INFIDELITY DO ITS WORST." And so it may, for what our Examiner or his fellows seem inclined to oppose to its progress. They keep *guard*, as our Author says; they perform watch and ward as the law requires: and let such as like it go to blows for them. One of my most abusive adversaries, in a book he wrote against me, intitled, *A Reply to Mr. W.'s Appendix in his second Volume of The Divine Legation*, has a long digression (for it has nothing to do in the dispute between him and me) of seventy pages, to prove that the *miracles* and *morality* of *Paganism* equal *those of Judaism and Christianity*: in which he has made a very elaborate collection of passages from classic writers, drawn up and set in battle-array against parallel places of Scripture. Eight or ten clergymen of the Church of *England* have found leisure and inclination to write against *The Divine Legation*, nobody knows for what; and yet not one of them has taken the least notice of this open barefaced insult and defiance of *Revelation*. But what then? Mr. *Tillard*, no doubt, was considered by them as a fellow-labourer in a good cause. Or was it, for that he is an active member of the Society for the *Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts*? of which, indeed, in these passages he has given a proof. For finding it was for staying at home, he, like a good member as he is, does his best to send it packing!—But still, says our Examiner, "let infidelity do its worst." And does he indeed think it could do worse than what himself has here attempted? I had wrote a *dissertation*; which, if it has any *reality* or *foundation*, in *reason* or *Scripture*, is of the highest service to *religion*: and, principally, on these two accounts, first, as rescuing a passage out of the hands of libertines, which was more obnoxious to the objections of infidelity than any in the whole Bible: and secondly, as discovering a real and substantial circumstance of *connexion* and *dependency* between the *Old* and *New Testament*; not subject to any of those objections which arise from typical or allegorical interpretations. Now, against such a discourse, so directed, was it natural to conceive, that a Divine of name should address himself, with much haughtiness and malice, to  
write




write an elaborate confutation? Would not a good man, who had a real regard for the interests of religion, and was persuaded of the weakness of my discourse, have left it to some unthinking, unbelieving Scribbler, to expose? And here, let me call, seriously, upon this learned man, to lay his hand upon his heart, and to acquit himself of his intentions, before the *public*; who finding nothing in this *dissertation* (how erroneous soever it may be deemed) either of Heresy or Libertinism, will needs be at a loss to discover any good purpose, in an attempt so seemingly inconsistent with his character and profession. For the public sees he has taken the unbelievers' task out of their hands, and executed it with such a spirit, as cannot chuse but give them the highest satisfaction.

“Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.”


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








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